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ABSTRACT 
Young Central and Eastern Europeans are growing up in newly solidifying 
democratic political systems with a parent generation raised under an entirely 
different regime. In order to comprehend future sociopolitical dynamics within these 
countries it is crucial to question how the youth are developing their political 
knowledge and how they are engaging in political activism. As such, political 
socialization theory provides a lens for analyzing what forms youth activism is taking 
as well as tracking the roots of current political trends.  
Political socialization, as a theory, is relatively straightforward. Experiences and 
influences of various agents that affect an individual in their earlier years have a 
significant impact on political outlooks, activism and values in later years. However, 
implied within this theory, ‘political socialization’ is also a process and a field of 
research with a variety of methods and research structures. Through primarily 
qualitative analysis, the research in this case study investigates the influences behind 
post-communist political trends among the youth, targeting the primary agents of 
socialization: the family unit, educational institutions and the media. These agents are 
analyzed in the context of developing partisanships and activism within political 
parties and grassroots social movements.  
Although socialization theory targets these agents as key actors affecting political 
development, there is limited previous research into multi-agent analysis, with the 
majority of research focusing on single agent analysis. This report also analyzes social 
movements as an increasingly salient agent of socialization, not traditionally targeted 
by previous political socialization theory. Thus, this report hopes to add to wider 
political socialization research as well as present a unique case study into youth 
political developments in a post-communist setting. 
Hungary is an important and timely case study, used in this report to analyze the 
country’s growing political shift away from liberal European values, giving 
preference to localized, nationalist and increasingly exclusionary politics. Larger 
trends of right wing and radical right voter support are also heightened among the 
youth population. Tracking how these shifts are developing and mainstreaming in a 
nation-specific context serves to better define what is a national anomaly in Hungary 
and what might be a predictor of larger regional or European trends. 
	   4	  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to first and foremost give thanks to my doctoral supervisor, Dr. Seán 
Hanley, for his consistent and thorough guidance throughout the PhD process. His 
attention to detail as well as his ability to put my thesis into context within a wider 
framework has been of great assistance in keeping me on track with each step of my 
thesis, from my initial proposal through my fieldwork and throughout my writing up 
process. 
I would also like to thank my colleagues and contacts that gave their assistance during 
my fieldwork and data collection, particularly Dr. István Benczes for helping arrange 
my affiliation at Corvinus University during my fieldwork, along with Erzsébet 
Trautmann, Mariann Pitroff, Georgia Efremova, László Galántai, Júlia Lakatos and 
the Pycrofts. I am eternally grateful to all the Hungarian activists, professors and 
specialists who gave their time for in-depth interviews and focus groups.  
Special thanks as well to Eszter Tarsoly and Dóra Reichenberger for teaching me 
Hungarian. Eszter, without your patience, linguistic innovation and passion for the 
language, learning Hungarian would have been a far more difficult task. Your three 
years of teaching were invaluable to me not only in learning Hungarian but also in 
gaining a cultural understanding of the country I immersed myself in. Dóra, thank you 
for your lessons during my field research, tailoring each session to my research needs.  
Thank you also to my fellow doctoral students Soraia Tabatabai, Kristen Perrin, Lise 
Herman, Camille Muris-Prime, Phillip Köker and Julia Halej for creating an outlet to 
discuss our research in its trials and tribulations, and to Dr. Peter Duncan and 
Professor Martyn Rady for always having an open door. 
Lastly, I want to thank my family for supporting me through the PhD process. Thank 
you to my parents David Saltman and Kay Greenwood and to my grandparents 
Barbara and Paul Saltman and Marie Violet Walters for never doubting my academic 
path, despite it taking me so far from home. You gave me the tools to make my goals 
and the opportunities to enjoy the journeys that lead me towards them. Thank you 
Alex Dunnett for being there for me and always having a cup of tea ready. 
 
	   5	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PART ONE: Introduction to Hungary and Thesis Research 
1. Introduction: ......................................................…………..….………..……….. 10 
1.1. The Political System in Hungary ………………………………………. 12 
 1.1.1. Hungary in Transition: A Tri-Polar Beginning     
 1.1.2. Solidifying a Bipolar Spectrum in Hungary      
 1.1.3. Defining Right, Left and Other        
1.2. Radicalism in Hungary: A Relevant Case Study ……………………… 33 
 1.2.1. Radical Right Politics in Hungary       
 1.2.2. Youth Support for Fidesz and Jobbik       
1.2.3. Breaking Bipolarity: The Shock of 2009/2010      
1.2.4. Defining a Cohort: The Politically Active Hungarian Youth     
 1.3. Chapter Outline ………………………………………………………... 48 
2. Research Design, Methods & Theories ……………….…………….....……… 51 
 2.1. Research and Methods…………………………………………………. 51 
  2.1.1. Interviews, Focus Groups and Participant Observation 
 2.2. Political Socialization Theory and Research .......................................... 62 
  2.2.1. Early to Modern Political Socialization Theory and Research 
  2.2.2. Political Socialization Research in Hungary and CEE 
 2.3. Grassroots Social Movement Theory and Research ............................... 82 
  2.3.1. Mobilization as Part of Socialization 
  2.3.2. Civil Participation and Social Movements in CEE 
PART TWO: Youth Engagement in Sociopolitical Organizations and Activism 
3. Political Parties and Youth Participation  ……………………………………. 95 
 3.1. Fidesz: Founder of Youth Parties in Hungary …………............……… 98 
  3.1.1. The Early Years of Transition 
  3.1.2. Mass Mobilization and Civic Circles 
  3.1.3. Fidesz’s Open Door Policy: Radical Rhetoric 
 3.2. A New Wave of Youth-Based Parties ……………………………….. 113 
  3.2.1. Movement Strategies: Horizontal and Vertical Processes  
  3.2.2. A Polarized Youth: Politically and Regionally 
 3.3. Political Youth Camps in Hungary ....................................................... 126 
4. Grassroots Social Movements & Subcultures ………...…………………….. 137 
 4.1. Civic Participation and Political Activism in Hungary ……………… 139 
  4.1.1. The Youth Appeal of Grassroots Social Movements 
4.1.2. Radical Right Grassroots Social Movements 
  4.1.3. Liberal-Left and Green Grassroots Social Movements 
 4.2. The Malleability of Social Movements ……………………………… 159 
  4.2.1. Blurring Movements with Political Parties 
  4.2.2. The Radical Right Subculture 
	   6	  
PART THREE: Socialization Influences 
5. Hungarian Families as Agents of Political Socialization …………………... 177 
 5.1. Familial Legacies: Parental Socialization ……………..…………….. 179 
  5.1.1. Parental Political Socialization 
  5.1.2. Passing on the Partisanship 
 5.2. Historical Narratives ………………………………………………… 187 
  5.2.1 Contentious Hungarian History 
  5.2.2 Relating Familial Experiences to Youth Political Opinions 
 5.3. Direct Familial Political Socialization ………………………………. 198 
  5.3.1. Family Influences on Partisanship, Voting and Membership 
  5.3.2. Familial Predispositions to the Right 
6. Education and Political Socialization …………..………………………….... 209 
 6.1. Education Decentralized and Recentralized ......................................... 210 
  6.1.1. Post-Communist Educational Restructuring 
  6.1.2. Difficulties and Complexities 
 6.2. Political Efficacy and Activism in Universities ................................... 224 
  6.2.1. Prohibiting Political Socialization in Universities  
  6.2.2. Subjective and Selective Teaching 
 6.3. Special Colleges: Elite Socialization .................................................... 232 
  6.3.1. Origins of the Szakkollégium in Hungary 
  6.3.2. Membership Process and Structure of Special Colleges 
  6.3.3. Developing Political Parties and Socializing Activism 
7. Media as an Agent of Political Socialization ................................................... 243 
 7.1. Post-Communist Media Transformation .............................................. 245 
  7.1.1. Privatization of Traditional Media 
7.1.2. Shifting the Media as a Tool for Right Wing Politics 
7.1.3. Outlets for Marginalized Political Views in the Media 
 7.2. Youth Media Usage ............................................................................. 255 
  7.2.1. Youth Internet Usage 
  7.2.2. Politicizing the Internet: Online News as a Political Tool 
  7.2.3. The Media’s Role as a Socializer 
8. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 277 
Appendix 1. Hungarian Election Results 1990-2010 ............................................. 293 
Appendix 2. Participant Observation: Demonstrations, Events & Youth Camps .. 294 
Appendix 3. Interviewee Breakdown ..................................................................... 296 
Appendix 4. Semi-Structured Interview Format & Example Questions ................ 298 
Appendix 5. Family Political Discussion and Party Alliance ................................. 299 
Appendix 6. Mapping Political Media Outlets Used by Young Hungarians .......... 300 
Appendix 7. Information Retrieval for Sociopolitical Information ........................ 306 
Appendix 8. Conceptual Model of the Decentralization Process ........................... 307 
Appendix 9. Political Discourse and Socializing Influences in Schools ................ 308 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 310 
	   7	  
FIGURES AND TABLES 
Reference Table of Political Parties in Hungary 1990 – 2010……………………… 8 
Chapter 1 
Figure 1.1: Comparing Youth & Older Cohorts Voting Trends: 2006 & 2010 ........ 14 
Table 1.1: Political Parties in Hungary 1990 – 2010 ................................................ 19 
Figure 1.2: The Three Primary Political Cleavages in 1990 ..................................... 25 
Table 1.2: Hungarian National Election Results 1990 .............................................. 26 
Figure 1.3: Party Map of Ideological and Economic Right and Left in Hungary ..... 28 
Table 1.3: Hungarian National Election Results 1994 .............................................. 30 
Figure 1.4: Stacked Column Chart of Party Representation in Parliament ............... 41 
 
Chapter 2 
Figure 2.1: Political Map of Hungary ........................................................................ 53 
Figure 2.2: Citizen Involvement in Volunteering ...................................................... 79 
Figure 2.3: Levels of Youth Participation in Hungary .............................................. 90 
 
Chapter 3 
Figure 3.1: Hungarian Party Membership 2011 .......................................................106 
Table 3.1 List of Fidesz Government Measures Inspired by Jobbik 2010-2012 ..... 111 
Figure 3.2 Comparing 2012 Polls of Youth and Nationwide Party Preferences ..... 117 
Figure 3.3 Mapping The Top 20 Constituencies of Jobbik and LMP ..................... 124 
Table 3.2 Political Youth Organizations ................................................................. 129 
Table 3.3 Political Youth Camps at a Glance ......................................................... 130 
Table 3.4 Camper Profile ........................................................................................ 133 
 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 Significant Grassroots Social Movements in Hungary ………………… 147 
Figure 4.1: Facebook Support of Grassroots Social Movements …………………. 148 
Figure 4.2: Political Parties, Leaders and Youth Organizations on Facebook ……. 162 
 
Chapter 5 
Table 5.1: Youth Information Retrieval Preference ………………………………. 183 
Figure 5.1: Frequency of Political Discussions With Associates …………………. 185 
Table 5.2: Linking Familial Historical Narratives to Political Alignment ………... 196 
Chapter 6 
Figure 6.1: Structure of Administrative Decentralization in Education 1990 …….. 212 
Figure 6.2: Students enrolled in Secondary School and Higher Education…...…... 215 
Figure 6.3: Total GDP Spent on Education: A Comparative Glance …………..…. 219 
Table 6.1: MSZP Decentralization Versus Fidesz Recentralization ........................ 222 
 
Chapter 7 
Figure 7.1: Media Usage in Europe Comparing Age Cohorts ................................. 256 
Figure 7.2: Daily Internet Usage in Hungary 2004 to 2012 ..................................... 260 
Table 7.1: Daily Page Views to Main Hungarian News Sites ................................. 263 
Table 7.2: Media Used by Young Activists ............................................................. 271 
Table 7.3 Major Changes Imposed by the 2010 Media Law ................................... 273 
 
	   8	  
REFERENCE TABLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN HUNGARY 1990 – 2010 
 
Abbreviation	   Party	   Alignment	  
Fidesz	  
	  
Fidesz	  -­‐	  Civic	  Union	  
	  
(Originally	  the	  Alliance	  of	  Young	  
Democrats)	  
Liberal	  	  
1990-­‐1993	  
Nationalist/Conservative	  
1993-­‐Present	  
MSZP	  
	  
Hungarian	  Socialist	  Party	  
Left	  	  
1990-­‐1994	  
Liberal-­‐Left	  	  
1994-­‐Present	  	  
MDF	  
	  
Hungarian	  Democratic	  Forum	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Christian	  Conservative	  
	  
SZDSZ	  
	  
Alliance	  of	  Free	  Democrats	  
Liberal	  
1990-­‐1994	  
Liberal-­‐Left	  	  
1994-­‐2006	  
KDNP	  
	  
Christian	  Democratic	  People’s	  Party	  
	  
Christian	  Conservative	  	  
FKgP	  
	  
Independent	  Smallholders	  
	  
Conservative	  Nationalist	  
MIÉP	  
	  
Hungarian	  Justice	  and	  Life	  Party	  
	  
Populist	  Radical	  Right	  
Jobbik	  
	  
Movement	  for	  a	  Better	  Hungary	  
	  
Populist	  Radical	  Right	  
LMP	  
	  
Politics	  Can	  Be	  Different	  
	  
Green	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   9	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART ONE 
Introduction to Hungary and Thesis Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   10	  
1. INTRODUCTION  
 Central and Eastern European nations have spent the last twenty-five years 
developing democratic systems, solidifying political partisanships and trying to come 
to terms with the communist past. Within this environment, the younger generation is 
growing up in a political system entirely different from that of their parents. Not only 
are familial backgrounds different for young post-communist youths compared with 
older western democracies, but many other sociopolitical influences also differ 
considerably. In order to comprehend future sociopolitical dynamics within the post-
communist region it is crucial to question how the youth are developing political 
knowledge and how they are engaging in political activism. Analyzing the political 
engagement of the youth is key in understanding both present and future political 
trends.  
 Political socialization theory provides a lens and framework for understanding 
how and why the youth engages within the political environments they are raised in. 
As a theory, political socialization states that experiences and the influences of certain 
agents earlier in life have a significant and solidifying effect on political efficacy and 
practices later in life.  Political socialization, as a field of research, varies widely with 
regards to method, structure and purpose. Through primarily qualitative analysis, the 
research in this case study investigates the influences behind post-communist political 
trends among the youth, targeting the primary agents of socialization: the family unit, 
educational institutions and the media. These agents are analyzed in the context of 
developing partisanships and activism within political parties and grassroots social 
movements. 
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This thesis adds to the growing body of research on youth politics, as well as 
the limited practical application of political socialization theory, by building a 
multifaceted approach to analyzing political value building processes.1 The post-
communist youth is of increasing interest as they become the primary electorate as the 
first voters socialized under a democratic system. This study analyzes how the main 
agents of socialization (political parties, family, education, media and grassroots 
social movements) are affecting political alignment and activism. It is through these 
agents the research in this thesis tracks political divisions and sociopolitical trends 
among the youth.   
The core focus of this thesis is a case study of the political socialization 
process of the youth in Hungary, analyzing the primary agents of socialization and 
their roles in developing political orientation. Hungary serves as a valuable and timely 
example of a post-communist country, struggling to define itself geopolitically, 
socially and culturally within its solidifying democratic system. In recent years 
Hungary has witnessed a political shift away from liberal European values, giving 
preference to localized, nationalist and increasingly exclusionary politics. Political 
socialization provides an important lens for tracing where young Hungarians are 
developing strong socio-political partisanships and how these agents are increasingly 
influencing tendencies towards supporting alternative, right and radical right wing 
parties and organizations.  
This introduction serves as a scene-setting chapter, placing Hungary in context 
as a case study for political socialization research. The first part of this chapter 
discusses the political structures and socializing structures that the parent generation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  An	  extensive	  review	  of	  political	  socialization	  theory	  and	  overview	  of	  literature	  is	  given	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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would have experienced, focusing primarily on the post-1956 Kádár era up through 
Hungary’s democratic transition. The second section of this chapter gives background 
on the more modern political developments which have given a majority of political 
support to both right wing and radical right political entities, disproportionately 
supported by young voters. This chapter concludes by putting Hungary in context, 
comparing some of its more recent sociopolitical trends with other Central and 
Eastern European countries and Europe at large. I argue that the post-communist 
arena has, in some respects, developed an a-typical network of socializing agents, 
which has amplified youth appeal towards the mobilizing and structure of populist 
and alternative forms of political participation. I also argue that current alternative and 
populist tactics being used by youth-based parties and social movements were 
founded by Fidesz and are now being used as a prototype for successful mass 
mobilization. 
1.1 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN HUNGARY 
Hungary has made headlines in recent years with an array of concerns from 
international watchdogs and media. The country’s democratic legitimacy, economic 
stability and membership within the European Union have all been questioned. The 
majority of international concern began after the 2010 national elections, which gave 
a two-third parliamentary majority to right wing party, Fidesz (Fidesz Magyar 
Polgári Szövetség – Fidesz Hungarian Civic Union), and made radical right party, 
Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom – Movement for a Better Hungary), the 
third largest party in government. Researchers have been questioning the fragility of 
liberalism in Central and Eastern Europe (Fowler et. al. 2007, Krastev 2007, Mudde 
2007) and Hungary in particular since 2010 (Müller 2011, Vásárhelyi 2011, Jenne and 
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Mudde 2012, Korkut 2012, Lendvai 2012). However, the roots of this rightward shift 
are traceable in Hungary prior to 2010 looking at certain sociopolitical trends. One of 
these significant visible shifts has been the development of youth partisanships and 
activism, harbingers of the visible electoral shift towards right and radical right 
political parties. Hungary’s youth are taking a more dominant position in the current 
political landscape, not only participating in increased activism but also developing 
new political parties.  
In 2009, youth-based green party LMP (Lehet Más A Politika – Politics Can 
Be Different) declared itself an official party and radical right party Jobbik broke into 
the political landscape by obtaining 14.77% in the European Parliamentary Elections.2 
The strong support for Fidesz’s nationalist rhetoric and radical right political 
alternatives is widespread among the youth in Hungary. This trend was magnified by 
strong youth support for Jobbik and Fidesz in the 2010 National Elections, albeit 
visible even in the 2006 National Elections with 58% of young voters preferring the 
right wing politics of Fidesz to the liberal-left politics of MSZP (Magyar Szocialista 
Párt – Hungarian Socialist Party), with a mere 22.6% youth support despite MSZP’s 
victory that year (see Figure 1.1). While in 2010 longstanding political parties fell to 
the wayside in the shadow of right wing party, Fidesz, the two newer youth-based 
parties, Jobbik and LMP, entered parliament for the first time. LMP managed to pass 
the parliamentary threshold with 7.48%, making it the first successful green party in 
Hungary’s democratic history. Meanwhile Jobbik became the third largest party in 
Hungary winning 16.67%, drawing out a new subculture of youth activists with one in 
four first time voters casting a radical right vote in support of Jobbik (Jordon 2010).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  ‘2009	  Európai	  Parlamenti	  Választások’	  (2009	  European	  Parliamentary	  Elections),	  Official	  Hungarian	  
Election	  site:	  Válaszás,	  <http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ep2009/index.html>.	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Figure 1.1 displays voting alignment of the youth (aged eighteen to thirty) in 
comparison with older cohorts looking at the 2006 and 2010 elections. This figure 
clearly shows the higher tendencies for the youth to vote for right and radical right 
political parties as exemplified for the high levels of support for Fidesz in the 2006 
and 2010 elections and the inflated increase in support for Jobbik in the 2010 
elections. 
Figure 1.1:  
Comparing Youth & Older Cohorts Voting Trends: 2006 & 2010 Elections  
 
2006	   election	   results	   come	   from	   raw	   data	   self-­stratified	   from	   exit	   polls	   from	   Szonda	  
Ipsos.3	  2010	  election	  raw	  data	  comes	  from	  the	  European	  Social	  Survey.4	  Although	  ESS	  data	  
was	  collected	  just	  after	  the	  2010	  elections	  it	  is	  the	  most	  accurate	  nationwide	  exit-­poll	  raw	  
data	  available	  to	  the	  public. 
Looking at Figure 1.1, there is an obvious high level of support given to Fidesz. In 
2010 youth support for Fidesz did not only increase nearly 8% but also radical right 
support was exponentially increased from 1.7% to 18.75%. While the reasons behind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  2006	  Election	  Results,	  Szonda	  Ipsos	  (Hungarian	  economic	  and	  political	  statistical	  information	  
website),	  <www.szondaipsos.hu/>	  [Accessed	  November	  2008].	  
4	  ‘ESS	  Round	  5’,	  European	  Social	  Survey,	  (2010),	  <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round5/>.	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the sudden popularity of Jobbik are discussed in Chapter 3 the sustained Fidesz 
support along with Jobbik’s success meant that 83.93% of youth votes supported right 
and radical right parties in 2010.  
Literature around the subject of voting trends and political shifts since 
transition ignores the role of the youth almost entirely, focusing instead on broader 
trends and concerns. A large portion of literature dealing with modern Hungarian 
politics originally focused on Hungary’s structural transformation from Soviet to 
democratic rule (Bozóki et. al. 1992, Csepeli and Örkény 1992, Kis 1989, Kovács 
1996, Todosijević and Enyedi 2000, Szabó 2003) seen mainly as a successful 
transition to a westernized free market economy. While the potential for populist and 
nationalist tendencies was hinted at from early transition (Hockenos 1993, Arato 
1994, Bozóki and Sükösd 1994) ultra-nationalist and radical right trends were largely 
marginalized.  
The 2010 national elections transformed the political spectrum with the 
success of two new political parties gaining parliamentary seats in Hungary and 
witnessed the failure of older, seemingly stable, parties like liberal SZDSZ and 
conservative MDF (see Table 1.1 listing parties and dates in parliament). 2010 was 
only the second time in Hungary’s democratic history that a radical right party passed 
the electoral 5% threshold, not to mention achieved a significant portion of 
parliamentary representation.5 More recent literature has begun to recognize the 
strengthening of right and radical right wing forces in Hungary, looking mainly at the 
maneuvering of political elites and Fidesz’s concentration of power (Szabó 2003, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In	  1998	  the	  radical	  right	  party	  MIÉP	  barely	  passed	  the	  5%	  electoral	  threshold	  into	  parliament	  but	  
continued	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  largely	  marginalized	  periphery	  party.	  MIÉP	  no	  longer	  exists	  as	  a	  political	  
party	  in	  Hungary.	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Fowler 2004, Enyedi 2005, Bozóki 2008, Solheim and Ekelove-Slydal 2013). Within 
this rightward trend researcher have also recognized the potent use of symbolic 
rhetoric among right wing politicians (Körösény 1999, Todosijević and Enyedi 2000, 
Lendvai 2012) and the failure of mainstream political structures to counteract ‘liberal 
backsliding’ (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006, Krastev 2007, Palonen 2009, Müller 2011, 
Korkut 2012).  
Youth-specific political literature, particularly concerning political 
socialization processes in contemporary Hungary, is severely lacking. Youth research 
in Hungary during transition mainly tracked trends of Europeanization and post-
materialist tendencies (Szabó 1988). Current youth research in Hungary, and the CEE 
region, focuses mainly on trends towards authoritarianism and low levels of 
democratic efficacy and participation (Iacovou and Berthoud 2001, Machácek 2001, 
Brannen 2002, Kuhar 2005, Kovacheva 2000 and 2005, Savicka 2008, Keil 2011) but 
rarely links these trends to larger political shifts. Youth specific literature in Hungary 
analyzing the rise of the radical right is limited to research profiling who Jobbik 
supporters are (Bíro Nagy and Róna 2011, Bartlett et. al. 2012) rather than why these 
young supporters have chosen Jobbik. Although limited, some Hungarian researchers 
have begun showing concern for the popularization of the radical right subculture 
(Kürti 2012) and the increasing levels of radical and alternative political support 
among university students (Vásárhelyi 2011, Bíro Nagy and Róna 2011, Róna and 
Szabó 20136). This thesis fills a gap in current research by tracking how young 
Hungarians are developing their political partisanships by targeting which socializing 
agents are influencing youth political alignments.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Research	  conducted	  on	  profiling	  university	  students	  values	  and	  political	  alignments:	  Róna,	  Dániel	  
and	  Andrea	  Szabó,	  Racionálisan	  Lázadó	  Hallgatók	  2012,	  (February	  2013),	  <http://aktivfiatalok.hu>	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Hungary is an important case study in analyzing its growing trend away from 
liberal European values, giving preference to localized, nationalist and increasingly 
exclusionary political remedies. Tracking how these trends develop and become 
mainstream in nation-specific contexts can better define what is a national anomaly 
and what is a predictor of larger regional or European trends. In a 2009 report on 
youth culture in Hungary, the Council of Europe noted the enlargement of ‘post-
traditional’ youth action outside of political parties, formal organizations and trade 
unions.7 Distrust and dissatisfaction with the government has led to party de-
alignment and political apathy alongside a desire to see a new forms of political 
participation and activism. While a large number of young Hungarians remain 
politically apathetic my research hones in on the active youth in the full spectrum of 
activism in Hungary.  
Across Europe youth cohorts are favoring non-traditional forms of political 
participation replacing, or coinciding with traditional involvement (Topf 1995, Fuchs 
and Klingemann 1995, Goerres 2009). Unusually, in Hungary this trend has 
manifested strongly in favor of the right and radical right politics, alongside a parallel 
trend of grassroots opposition movements. Radical right support is most often linked 
to the undereducated, the blue-collar worker and the impoverished (Kürti 2002, 
Lánczi 2009, Mareš 2010, Harrison and Bruter 2011) yet in Hungary the strongest 
Jobbik supporters are often young, employed and generally well educated (Bíro Nagy 
and Róna 2011, Bartlett et. al. 2012).  
This is one of the main reasons why there is much needed research analyzing 
how political alignments are developing among young Hungarian activists and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Youth	  Policy	  in	  Hungary:	  Conclusions	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  International	  Review	  Team,	  Jaaberg	  
(Chair	  of	  Committee),	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  (Strasbourg:	  Printed	  at	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  2008).	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exploring the puzzle of why the Hungarian youth have moved increasingly to the right 
and radical right. In relation to this trend my research also questions how liberal 
counter mobilization is developing. While this was not an original focus, the rapidly 
changing political landscape since 2010 is developing new grassroots social 
movements affecting youth participation and partisanship. The aim of this thesis is to 
contribute to the growing body of literature around post-communist democratization 
and the concerns of ‘liberal backsliding’ by analyzing the socialization and 
mobilization processes occurring in this shift to the right and radical right. This thesis 
also adds to modern youth research. Analyzing youth activism through political 
socialization allows for a multi-causal analysis, tracking how socializing agents 
influence partisanship development. Although Hungary is currently viewed as an 
exceptional case of contemporary radicalism, the Hungarian model can exploit 
whether the Hungarian scenario is truly unique or if similar developments can be, or 
are already starting to be, repeated elsewhere in Europe.  
Analysis and trends of newer alternative youth-based parties are intrinsically 
linked to the party developments of their predecessors. Contemporary politics in 
Hungary is strongly marked by the legacies of the its past, the process of a peaceful 
negotiated transition and the distinct party politics that has molded the contemporary 
political system. It is difficult to comprehend the shifts of today without fully 
understanding the patterns of the past in Hungary. Although my research focuses 
primarily on events and changes between 2002 to present, this provides context for 
the political transition between 1989 through 2010, outlining necessary actors, parties 
and events. For the purposes of this thesis Hungarian political parties are defined 
along a criteria of a party’s self-definition. While these definitions might vary slightly 
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from more general Western European standards they are dependent on national and 
historic contexts: 
Table 1.1: Political Parties in Hungary 1990 – 2010 
Party	   Abbreviation	   Alignment	   In	  Parliament	  
Fidesz	  -­‐	  Civic	  Union	  
	  
(Originally	  the	  Alliance	  of	  
Young	  Democrats)	  
Fidesz	   Liberal	  	  
1990-­‐1993	  
Nationalist/Conservative	  
1993-­‐Present	  
1990,	  1994,	  1998,	  
2002,	  2006,	  2010	  
Hungarian	  Socialist	  Party	   MSZP	   Left	  	  
1990-­‐1994	  
Liberal-­‐Left	  	  
1994-­‐Present	  	  
1990,	  1994,	  1998,	  
2002,	  2006,	  2010	  
Hungarian	  Democratic	  
Forum	  
MDF	   Christian	  Conservative	  
	  
1990,	  1994,	  (1998	  
and	  2002	  with	  
Fidesz),	  2006	  
Alliance	  of	  Free	  Democrats	   SZDSZ	   Liberal	  
1990-­‐1994	  
Liberal-­‐Left	  	  
1994-­‐2006	  
1990,	  1994,	  1998,	  
2002,	  2006	  
Christian	  Democratic	  
People’s	  Party	  
KDNP	   Christian	  Conservative	  	   1990,	  1994,	  
thereafter	  with	  
Fidesz	  
Independent	  Smallholders	   FKgP	   Conservative	  Nationalist	   1990,	  1994,	  1998	  
Hungarian	  Justice	  and	  Life	  
Party	  
MIÉP	   Populist	  Radical	  Right	   1998	  
Movement	  for	  a	  Better	  
Hungary	  
Jobbik	   Populist	  Radical	  Right	   2010	  
Politics	  Can	  Be	  Different	   LMP	   Green	   2010	  
The	  above	  table	   is	  a	   reference	  guide	  of	  party	  names	  and	  alignments.	   It	  also	   tracks	  when	  political	  
parties	  were	  elected	  into	  parliament.	  Parties	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  primarily	  by	  their	  abbreviations.	  	  
	  
MSZP is an established left-wing party, as defined during transformation with 
the primary definition linking back to its relation to the Soviet style Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZP). The left in Hungary is defined by its neo-liberal 
economic policies with a pro market economy based on privatization and 
decentralization as well as a liberal value of human rights (Pittaway 2003, Palonen 
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2009). SZDSZ is a self-defined liberal party, supporting similar neo-liberal policies in 
its previous coalition with MSZP, discussed within this chapter. The term liberal-left 
is often used to discuss the left side of the bipolar political spectrum. This is in 
reference to SZDSZ’ ‘liberal’ platforms that were originally a separate political camp 
from the left. Other political entities discussed and analyzed in later chapters are 
newer movements such as the MSZP fraction party, DK (Democratic Coalition- 
Demokratikus Koalíció) and the Together 2014 movement (Együtt 2014).8 
While Fidesz originally defined itself through the liberal camp, the party is 
unquestionably a right wing party. For its more conservative, nationalist and 
economic policies as well as its self-definition the party remains the commanding 
concentrator of the right in Hungary. There is a continuing debate over whether 
Fidesz can be defined as a radical right party from its tactics to its rhetoric (Bozóki 
and Körösényi 1992, Bohlen 2002, Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). While Fidesz has 
left an open door to more radical elements with strong anti-communist, anti-
globalization and nationalist appeals (Jenne and Mudde 2012, Bartlett et. al. 2012), 
for the purposes of this thesis Fidesz is considered right wing rather than radical right. 
However, Fidesz is referred to within this thesis as populist, as defined by their 
mobilization tactics and political rhetoric (Bozóki 2008, Palonen 2009), as well as a 
national conservative party (Enyedi 2005, Mudde 2007). The Fidesz Hungarian Civic 
Union consists of Fidesz and its coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s 
Party (KDNP) who make up the current ‘right’ as electorally significant in Hungary.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  DK	  and	  Together	  2014	  are	  brought	  up	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4.	  Both	  are	  more	  recent	  political	  party	  
movements,	  founded	  respectively	  in	  2011	  and	  2012	  in	  response	  to	  the	  controversial	  actions	  of	  the	  
Fidesz	  majority	  government.	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Jobbik and LMP are two new parties that entered parliament in 2010. Jobbik 
is the only radical right party in Hungary currently in parliament.  Jobbik openly 
defines itself as a radical party, apparent in their manifesto and rhetoric (Waterbury 
2010, Mareš 2010, Jobbik.hu).9 Jobbik is defined in its radicalism by its narrative of 
protectionist, anti-globalization messages with a commitment to ethnic Hungarian 
issues (Magyari 2009, Halasz 2009, Jobbik European Parliamentary Program 2009).10 
This line of thinking often dictates themes of anti-elitism, Zionist conspiracies and 
anti-Roma rhetoric and action. The radical right predecessor party MIÉP (Hungarian 
Justice and Life Party – Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja) will be discussed briefly in 
analyzing the rise of the radical right in Hungary. LMP is the only ‘green party’ to 
enter parliament in Hungary’s history. LMP is discussed throughout this thesis less 
for its widespread support, but for its integration of alternative political methods, 
attracting youth support, and its tactics for structure and mobilization. The party has 
refused from its beginnings to give allegiance to right or left political parties, taking a 
non-partisan stance on most issues. This has also been the party’s downfall in its 
inability to join opposition movements against Fidesz, ultimately fractioning the party 
in January 2012.11 
Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 explain transition politics in Hungary, mainly the 
political shift to a bipolar party system and the developments leading to Hungary’s 
current political spectrum, largely influenced by Fidesz’s transformation from a 
radical liberal youth party into a conservative nationalist party. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Jobbik	  Parliamentary	  Manifesto:	  2010,	  <http://jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-­‐RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>.	  
10	  Ibid.	  
11	  The	  party	  came	  to	  a	  stand	  still	  over	  internal	  debates	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  join	  the	  current	  popular	  
opposition	  group	  Together	  2014	  in	  January	  2013.	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1.1.1 Hungary in Transition: A Tri Polar Beginning12  
In the late 1980s Hungary’s political elites were already on a set path towards 
democratization with a majority of transition planning done far before the first 
democratic elections in 1990. Like the Velvet Revolutions of Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria and East Germany, Hungary transitioned peacefully, by way of bureaucratic 
structural reform over the course of numerous negotiations. After the 1956 revolution, 
under the leadership of János Kádár, Hungary shifted its socio-political and economic 
policies leading to partial economic liberalization. This allowed for the installation of 
certain free market mechanisms, improved living standards and easing on free speech 
and travel (Schöpflin 1991, Szalai 1994, Pittaway 2003, Korkut 2012, Solheim and 
Ekelove-Slydal 2013). Political stability was kept by building decentralized elements 
into Hungarian political culture so that the people were distanced from the political 
sphere. Administration aimed at a ‘collective amnesia’ of altercations with the 
political bodies such as forgetting the 1956 uprising in exchange for being left alone 
and receiving benefits from the government (Kis 1989). Under Kádár the goulash 
communism idea of ‘those who are not against us are with us’ was able to develop 
(Palonen 2009) allowing pockets of intellectual opposition to form, some taking shape 
as political parties during the lead up to the transition.  
Hundreds of elite negotiations between the ruling Hungarian Socialist 
Worker’s Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt - MSZMP) and political opposition 
groups were conducted in the lead up to transition tackling the complex process of 
decentralization and voting structures (Arato 1994, Ash 1994, Szabó 2003, Pittaway 
2003). Rather than the violence and uncertainty of a people’s revolution, Hungary’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  For	  clarifications	  of	  party	  names,	  parliamentary	  representation	  and	  acronyms	  for	  political	  parties	  
please	  refer	  to	  Table	  1.1	  listed	  previously.	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transition became known as a ‘negotiated revolution’ of the elites, with a lesser focus 
on communist prosecution and lustration, resulting in the morphing of the Soviet style 
Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party into the democratic Hungarian Socialist Party 
(Magyar Szocialista Párt – MSZP) (Tőkés 1996, Szabó 2003, Wolek 2008). The last 
congress of the ruling party was dissolved October 7th, 1989, six months prior to the 
first democratic elections with a diminished support network returning to MSZP 
(Enyedi and Tóka 2007).13 By the time electoral competitions commenced citizens 
already had politicized partisanships developing and were mobilizing for elections 
(Enyedi and Tóka 2007). In the lead up to the first elections, 24 March 1990, the 
divides between political camps and ideologies solidified. With an elite driven 
transformation looking towards the west all parties shared similar economic goals of 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation, differing only in the speed at which they 
thought liberalization changes should be implemented.14 New democratic parties 
campaigned on the desire to discard the communist past and embrace a free market 
democracy (Schöpflin 1992, Körösény 1999). Early divides differentiated less on 
socioeconomic policies, resulting in campaigns based on symbolic and ideological 
platforms (Baytchinska 2008).15 
As seen in Figure 1.2, in the forming of party identities three distinct political 
camps emerged in Hungary’s first democratic elections. The ‘left’ had been 
intrinsically linked with the previous regime. Regardless of the party’s platforms this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Exact	  membership	  numbers	  are	  not	  given	  however,	  MSZP	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  party	  of	  the	  past,	  at	  least	  
in	  the	  first	  elections,	  and	  few	  previous	  MSZMP	  members	  wanted	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  failed	  
Socialist	  Party.	  In	  the	  first	  1990	  elections	  MSZP	  only	  gained	  10.9%	  of	  the	  vote	  (See	  Appendix	  1).	  
14	  The	  liberal	  camp	  made	  up	  of	  SZDSZ	  and	  Fidesz	  were	  radical	  in	  their	  call	  for	  rapid	  economic	  
transformation	  while	  the	  conservative	  camp	  campaigned	  for	  a	  more	  gradual	  approach	  to	  economic	  
transition.	  
15	  Concrete	  economic	  divisions	  between	  parties	  began	  only	  after	  1995	  with	  the	  installation	  of	  the	  
‘Bokros’	  package,	  named	  after	  the	  Minister	  of	  Finance,	  cutting	  back	  on	  social	  redistribution.	  The	  
liberal	  camp	  went	  against	  the	  package,	  campaigning	  for	  increased	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  redistribution	  
(Körösény	  1999).	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rhetorical association meant the reformed Hungarian Socialist Party became defined 
as a left-wing party to stand as its own political camp (Körösény 1999). The other two 
camps solidified defined by their levels of communist opposition and desired speed of 
transition.16 In this way the Christian-conservative parties were labeled as the ‘right’, 
defined by their desire for a more gradual approach to economic restructuring and less 
aggressive anti-communist campaign. Christian and traditional nationalist values were 
at the root of the right’s ideological stance from the beginning, using historical 
symbolic references to gain voter sympathy (Schöpflin 1991, Arato 1994, Szalai 
1994, E. Kovacs 1998, Bozóki 1999, Wittenberg 2006, Palonen 2009 and 2011). This 
camp consisted of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum – 
MDF), the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt – 
KDNP) and the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party 
(Független Kisgazda, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt – FKgP).17 The followers of this 
camp could be roughly considered a network of the Christian middle class and 
moderate anti-communists.  
The third group of parties made up the ‘liberal’ camp, defined by their 
campaign for rapid economic reforms to a market economy and vocal anti-communist 
rhetoric. The main party defining this camp was the Alliance of Free Democrats 
(Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – SZDSZ). At their side was the radical liberal youth 
group Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Fidesz), who 
maintained an age limit of thirty-five and under on membership until party 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  There	  were	  also	  some	  differences	  in	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  west.	  The	  Christian-­‐conservative	  parties,	  
like	  MDF,	  used	  slightly	  more	  nationalistic	  references	  in	  their	  platforms.	  However,	  the	  main	  
differentiation	  for	  voters	  was	  how	  economic	  liberalization	  would	  be	  instated.	  	  	  
17	  Both	  KDNP	  and	  FKgP	  were	  parties	  that	  had	  been	  formed	  previously	  during	  the	  interwar	  period	  that	  
reformed	  in	  1989.	  The	  Christian	  Democrats	  (KDNP)	  were	  originally	  formed	  in	  1943.	  The	  Independent	  
Smallholders	  (FKgP)	  were	  technically	  formed	  in	  1908	  but	  ran	  in	  the	  1945	  Hungarian	  election,	  winning	  
an	  overwhelming	  majority	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  They	  reformed	  the	  party	  in	  1988	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  
communist	  fall.	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restructuring in 1993 (Bozóki et. al. 1992, Fowler 2004, Hanley et. al. 2008). Liberal 
followers were mainly intelligentsia and more adamant anti-communists attracting 
larger following from the youth and Budapest-based voters.  
Figure 1.2: The Three Primary Political Cleavages in 199018 
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Right wing parties in the first election utilized nostalgia for the pre-communist 
past, incorporating symbols and historic events of pre-war Hungary into speeches and 
campaigning. All parties maintained a desire to democratize along a western standard 
or free market economy and privatization. The first elections showed a generational 
clash between old and new parties. New parties excelled in attracting activism and 
hype while historic parties reminded Hungarians of short lived democratic legacies. 
Much of this hype came from the radical youth party Fidesz, known for creating 
political rallies in ex-Soviet bunkers and vocally condemning socialism and 
Hungary’s oppressive past. Meanwhile, along with the reformed Socialist Party, 
KDNP and FKgP both had distinctive ties linking with Hungary’s previous regimes.19  
Both parties had been active in the brief period of democracy between the end of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Diagram	  of	  tri-­‐polar	  divide	  originally	  from	  Körösény	  (1999).	  
19	  Other	  historical	  parties	  took	  part	  in	  the	  first	  democratic	  elections	  but	  failed	  to	  pass	  the	  5%	  
threshold	  to	  achieve	  parliamentary	  representation.	  Both	  parties	  were	  apart	  of	  Hungary’s	  short-­‐lived	  
democracy	  during	  the	  interwar	  period.	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German occupation and the start of Soviet control (Laar 2009). With a clear victory to 
MDF and its leader József Antall the 1990 elections displayed the majority’s rejection 
of their socialist past and a desire for a moderate conservative pace to lead Hungary 
into its new democracy (Vachudova 2011). The conservative camp formed a coalition 
with MDF, KDNP and FKgP and the reformed Socialist Party (MSZP) faced a 
crushing defeat.20 Like many other newly democratizing countries, Hungary’s first 
elections were followed by internal party fractioning, electoral volatility and political 
realignment creating a vastly different political system by the second elections in 
1994. 
Table 1.2: Hungarian National Election Results 1990 
Party	   SMC	  Seat	   SMC	  %	   MMC	  Seat	   MMC	  %	   Ntnl	  Seats	   Ttl	  Seats	  
MDF	   114	   23.9	   40	   24.7	   10	   164	  
SZDSZ	   35	   21.8	   34	   21.4	   23	   92	  
FKgP	   11	   10.7	   16	   11.7	   17	   44	  
MSZP	   1	   10.2	   14	   10.9	   18	   33	  
KDNP	   3	   5.8	   8	   6.5	   10	   21	  
Fidesz	   1	   4.8	   8	   9.0	   12	   21	  
SMC	  represents	  Single	  Member	  Constituencies,	  which	  equate	  to	  176	  seats	  in	  the	  national	  assembly.	  
MMC	  represents	  Multi-­‐Member	  Constituencies	  adding	  to	  120	  seats	  in	  parliament.	  An	  additional	  90	  
seats	  are	  given	  from	  compensatory	  national	  seats	  adding	  to	  a	  total	  of	  386	  seats	   in	  the	  Hungarian	  
National	  Assembly	  (data	  from	  Nohlen	  &	  Stöver	  2010,	  p.	  935).	  
	  
The 1990 elections resulted in a large victory for conservative party MDF. As seen in 
Table 1.2, the results were magnified by the complicated mixed voting system, which 
combines first past the post and proportional representation.21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  MDF	  won	  the	  national	  elections	  forming	  a	  government	  coalition	  in	  1990	  with	  KDNP	  and	  FKgP.	  MSZP	  
managed	  only	  10.9%.	  Tables	  of	  election	  results	  from	  1990-­‐2010	  are	  given	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  	  
21	  As	  of	  the	  2014	  national	  elections	  the	  electoral	  voting	  system	  in	  Hungary	  simplifies	  to	  one	  round	  of	  
voting,	  decreasing	  the	  number	  of	  MPs	  to	  199	  according	  to	  the	  Act	  CVIII	  of	  2011.	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1.1.2 Solidifying a Bipolar Spectrum in Hungary 
The events between 1990 and 1994 broke previous party alignments, opening 
the door for MSZP and Fidesz to reposition their platforms and stabilize a bipolar 
political system in Hungary. Similar to neighboring transition countries, the first few 
elections saw high levels of party volatility and shifting voting alignments (Rose et. 
al. 1998, Kostelecký 2002, Enyedi 2005 and 2006). Despite a more gradual approach 
to economic reforms the reality of free market transition still had a large impact on 
Hungary, bringing a wave of unemployment and decentralized social reforms that 
made MDF increasingly unpopular between 1990 and 1994. Weak internal party 
structures within MDF and electoral volatility led to the breaking and remaking of 
party coalitions and alignments. By 1992 the Smallholder’s Party (FKgP) had left the 
right wing, Christian conservative coalition and division over policy issues and 
strategy hurt relations between MDF and the Christian Democrats (KDNP).  
At the same time, the Socialist Party (MSZP) offered coalition status to liberal 
SZDSZ as part of their effort to consolidate a liberal-left camp. This move gave 
MSZP an opportunity to distance the party from its negative communist typecast 
while giving SZDSZ the opportunity to have greater parliamentary influence. This 
coalition also gave MSZP and SZDSZ the opportunity to create a strong opposition to 
the conservative camp (Enyedi and Tóka 2007). SZDSZ had been regarded as a party 
of political and professional minded liberals with extreme anti-communist sentiments 
(Szalai 1994). The decision to align with the Socialist Party came as a blow to liberal 
support networks, including SZDSZ’s alliance with the young radical Fidesz. The 
liberal camp had built itself on strong anti-communist platforms only to lose its 
leading party to a coalition with the Hungarian Socialist Party. Fidesz was thus left 
alone in the liberal camp, seeing very little chance of electoral success without a 
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coalition of its own. Fidesz used this opportunity to shed itself of its radical youthful 
roots and take advantage of a weak and fragmented conservative camp. Losing a large 
portion of its original liberal supporters Fidesz maintained an anti-communist stance 
but began transformed into a Christian conservative right-wing party (Fowler 2004).22 
As seen in Figure 1.3, Fidesz transformed its ideological platform while mostly 
maintaining its economic stance. 
Figure 1.3: Party Map of Ideological and Economic Right and Left in Hungary  
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Figure	   1.3	   shows	   where	   Hungarian	   political	   parties	   place	   defined	   on	   economic	   and	   ideological	  
terms.	  The	   left	   to	   right	  placement	  of	  parties	   in	   the	  diagram	  define	  parties’	  economic	  values.	  The	  
vertical	  placement	  of	  parties	  defines	  parties’	  ideological	  values.	  The	  original	  concept	  of	  this	  diagram	  
comes	  from	  Bozóki	  et.	  al.	  (1992).	  
 
Electoral volatility in Hungary compares with the first few democratic 
elections neighboring countries, with large shifts in party alignments and voter 
support. However, the massive structural and ideological transformation of Fidesz and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  An	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  Fidesz’	  transition	  to	  a	  right-­‐wing	  conservatism	  is	  continued	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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its ability to concentrate the right in Hungary is unparalleled in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Fowler 2004). As defined by Fowler, electoral concentration is the ‘process 
in which one continuously existing party gains a larger share of the vote over time, 
while the vote shares of other parties shrink, sometimes to effective non-existence’, 
(2004, p. 80). Fidesz’s original liberal platforms with SZDSZ had focused on strong 
anti-communist messages and a goal of rapid economic liberalization and 
Europeanization. To make the shift away from its liberal roots Fidesz began adopting 
a more interventionist economic platform, campaigning for smaller enterprises, taking 
a more nationalist stance by going against capitol relations with foreign investors and 
building a campaign on national pride and domestic priorities (Körösény 1999). 
Although Fidesz’s platforms changed its populist-activist mobilization tactics did not. 
The party maintained its anti-communist stance, building clear distinctions between 
the old socialists and the new Hungary (Palonen 2011). Like SZDSZ, the initial shift 
away from the liberal camp hurt a large portion of Fidesz’ original electoral network. 
Fidesz’s stronghold of young radical liberal supporters had originally criticized the 
Christian conservatives camp that Fidesz was now joining (Korkut 2009). However, 
despite large ideological changes the party maintained most of its core internal 
members in the process of realignment (Fowler 2004).  
The dismemberment of the liberal camp, splitting in opposite directions, 
meant that by the 1994 National Elections a very different divide had taken shape 
with a liberal-left coalition between MSZP and SZDSZ and a right-wing bloc of 
parties including Fidesz. By 1994 people were disappointed with the economic 
challenges felt on a local level by unemployment, regional disparities and the lack of 
socialist support structures. The death of Prime Minister József Antall, in 1993 also 
left the right wing camp in disrepair. Like Poland, Hungarian voters placed electoral 
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faith in a party with experience from the previous regime, voting in Socialist Party, 
MSZP (Grzymala-Busse 2002). 
Table 1.3: Hungarian National Election Results 199423 
Party	   SMC	  Seat	   SMC	  %	   MMC	  Seats	   MMC	  %	   Ntnl	  Seats	   Total	  Seats	  
MSZP	   149	   31.3	   53	   33	   7	   209	  
SZDSZ	   16	   18.6	   28	   19.7	   25	   69	  
MDF	   5	   12.0	   18	   11.7	   15	   38	  
FKgP	   1	   7.9	   14	   8.8	   11	   26	  
KDNP	   3	   7.4	   5	   7.0	   14	   22	  
Fidesz	   0	   7.7	   7	   7.0	   13	   20	  
Table	   1.3	   shows	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   1994	   elections	   resulting	   in	   a	   large	   wing	   towards	   left	   wing	  
(MSZP)	  and	  liberal	  (SZDSZ)	  parties,	  away	  from	  right	  wing	  parties	  such	  as	  MDF,	  FKgP	  and	  KDNP.	  
Between 1994 and 1998 Fidesz concentrated the right in two phases, making 
coalitions with other right wing parties. The Christian Democrats (KDNP) and 
Smallholders (FKgP) had a strong socioeconomic voting base among elderly, rural-
based churchgoers and less educated agriculture bases while the Democratic Forum 
(MDF) and Fidesz had catchall potential. Fidesz campaigned as a ‘new’ force within 
the right while at the same time appealing to the older, rural voter base (Fowler 2004). 
In January 1995 Fidesz announced the MDF-Fidesz Civic Alliance (Polgári 
Szövetség). Although FKgP attempted to counter Fidesz with its own alliances by 
autumn 1997 KDNP joined the Fidesz alliance creating the largest parliamentary 
opposition. By the 1998 national elections the survival of former leading right wing 
party, MDF, depended on cooperation with Fidesz. As Fidesz’s concentration grew 
other right wing parties could no longer maintain as the Democratic People’s Party 
disintegrated in 1997 and the Smallholders followed between 2001 and 2002. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Electoral	  results	  found	  at:	  ‘Elections	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  National	  Assembly:	  Results	  Lookup’,	  Election	  
Resources	  on	  the	  Internet,	  <	  http://electionresources.org/hu/>.	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Hungarian youth have been socialized primarily under the bipolar hegemony 
developed between the right wing camp (Fidesz-MPP) and the left wing coalition 
between MSZP and SZDSZ (discussed in Chapter 3). 
1.1.3 Defining Right, Left and Other 
 By 1994 a bipolar shift was apparent for the electorate, spurred by the split of 
the liberal camp into the conservative-right and liberal-left wing camps. The process 
of solidifying the two camps developed a strong ideological division between the 
national populist facets supporting the right and the liberal-left, supporting pluralism 
and a free market model (Kitschelt 1995 and 2002, Kitschelt et. al. 1999, Hanley et. 
al. 2008). By 1998 the victory of a fully transformed and concentrated right, led by 
Fidesz, began solidifying the bipolar nature of politics (Pittaway 2003, Solheim and 
Ekelove-Slydal 2013).24 The clear right-left divide pinned MSZP and Fidesz 
diabolically opposed to each other, reinforced by populist mobilization tactics and 
symbolic divisions (Szabó 2003). Both parties, but particularly Fidesz, used 
demonstrations and rallies against specific issues to draw out followings and polarize 
public opinion.25  
Hungary has always maintained a strong correlation between politics and 
ideology, basing the political spectrum on platforms along cultural cleavages (Fowler 
et. al. 2007, Baytchinska 2008). Many times even economic policy is used for 
ideological and symbolic means, such as Fidesz’s nationalist policies to support local, 
rather than foreign, investors, creating favor among the more rural, agriculturally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  In	  1998	  Fidesz	  took	  office	  with	  a	  coalition	  between	  MDF,	  FKgP	  and	  KDNP	  to	  create	  a	  united	  right	  
wing	  bloc	  with	  platforms	  based	  on	  Christian	  nationalist	  values	  (Solheim	  and	  Ekelove-­‐Slydal	  2013).	  
25	  Political	  parties	  in	  Hungary	  have	  incited	  public	  demonstrations	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s.	  
The	  most	  notable	  of	  these	  earlier	  demonstrations	  was	  the	  1990	  taxi	  drivers	  blockade	  against	  the	  
government’s	  increase	  of	  petrol	  prices.	  Opposition	  backed	  the	  public	  blockade,	  which	  lasted	  three	  
days	  and	  was	  supported	  by	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  public	  (Schöpflin	  1991,	  Szalai	  1994).	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based communities and small business owners. As mentioned above the initial right-
left divide solidified around the idea that the reformed Socialist Party (MSZP) was 
considered ‘left’, thus any party in opposition to MSZP was liberal or left. The 
disintegration of the liberal camp solidified the bipolar divide between left and right.  
Many of the post-communist transition states lacked the class-based or ethno-
religious bases for party cleavages that the Soviet system tried to eradicate, meaning 
that political divisions are highly varying from Western definitions and spectrums 
(Körösényi 1991, Kitschelt 1995, Enyedi 2005). Simplifying the party spectrum, 
Fidesz found a basis for concentration of the right through deep-rooted anti-
communist sentiments (Körösényi 1999, Krastev 2007, Palonen 2011).  
Economic divisions began to solidify in Hungary around the controversial 
installation of the 1995 ‘Bokros Package’, bringing in a series of austerity measures 
under the Socialist Prime Minister Gyula Horn.26 Aimed at avoiding national 
bankruptcy the economic package gradually devalued the forint to counterbalance the 
deficit while limiting social benefits, introducing tuition fees with an inevitable 
reduction of real wages. In other words, short-term stabilization measures were 
combined with economic and social restructuring, bringing on strong criticism from 
right wing and labor union forces arguing for more gradual stabilizing policies (Köves 
1995, Boros-Kazai 2005). Fidesz was at the forefront of opposition, deeming the 
package catastrophic. While the package proved to develop stabilizing economic 
growth by 1997 a visible economic divide now defined the right and left.27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  The	  Bokros	  Package	  was	  named	  after	  he	  Minister	  of	  Finance,	  Lajos	  Bokros.	  
27	  ‘Bokros-­‐csomag:	  a	  tények	  a	  mítosz	  mögött’,	  Origo	  Gazdaság,	  (18	  July	  2002),	  <	  
http://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/hirek/hazaihirek/20020418bokroscsomag.html#1>.	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The left has since been defined economically by its more pro-market, 
conservative austerity measures, often taking advice from international institutions 
like the European Union for structural assistance. The right has subsequently 
embraced more paternalistic socialist policies, focusing on internal growth of small-
scale private ownership, social mechanisms of redistribution and welfare (Fowler 
2004). The populist side of such initiatives has developed more recently with Fidesz’ 
vocal critique of the IMF and EU policies as encroaching on the freedoms of the 
Hungarian people.28   
1.2 RADICALISM IN HUNGARY: A RELEVANT CASE STUDY 
Analyzing modern youth political socialization and the impact of political 
structures on the youth in Hungary will have a large focus on the right and 
particularly the radical right. Hungary is not alone in having an electorally successful 
radical right. Greece’s Golden Dawn is the most recently successful radical right 
party, winning 6.9% at national elections as recent as June 2012. France’s National 
Front and the Netherlands’ Freedom Party have been successful in exploiting 
resentment towards immigrant populations. The Dutch PVV party, founded in 2005, 
has also been successful becoming the third largest Dutch party on an anti-Islam 
platform in 2010. But the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe varies from 
Western radicalism. While the Western radical right tends to focus on immigration 
and Islamophobia the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) maintains 
older roots of irredentist disputes, animosity towards globalization and internal ethnic 
minorities: mainly the Roma and Jewish populations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  ‘Let	  us	  deal	  with	  Orbán’,	  PressEurop,	  (3	  January	  2012),	  <	  
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1351841-­‐let-­‐us-­‐deal-­‐orban>.	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In general, the momentum behind the radical right in Europe and CEE seems to 
be declining compared with the recent surge of support in Hungary. In Poland the 
League of Polish Families failed to maintain parliamentary status in 2007. The 
Greater Romania Party, who was the second largest party in the 2000 national 
elections, lost all its parliamentary representation by 2008. In the Baltics, Czech 
Republic and Slovenia larger radical right parties no longer exist.29 Even in Slovakia 
and Bulgaria, where stronger radical traditions maintain, there seems to be a 
decreasing or stasis in electoral support.30 The Slovak National Party has maintained 
parliamentary representation in most elections since 1990 when they won 13.95% but 
have since lost support, no longer represented in parliament since 2012 elections. The 
Bulgarian Ataka is perhaps the closest example paralleling Jobbik’s recent rise in 
parliament. Founded in 2005 Ataka took 8.1% in their first elections and 9.4% in 
2009, maintaining as the fourth largest party in Bulgaria and bringing a new type of 
populist party to the country (Ganev 2006). But even compared with Ataka Jobbik is 
in its own league, receiving 16.67% in the 2010 national elections. Not only does 
Jobbik possess a keen ability to formulate economic policies around state-control and 
protectionist regulations benefitting local farmers and small business31 but also yields 
a strong multifaceted subculture, socializing a new wave of young radicals. 
1.2.1 Radical Right Politics in Hungary 
 Hungary has developed a very strong organizational network and value set 
behind the traditional conservatism and the more radical right, often sharing similar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Latvia	  is	  perhaps	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  list,	  developing	  its	  own	  radical	  right	  trends.	  	  
30	  ‘The	  far	  right	  in	  Eastern	  Europe:	  Right	  on	  down’,	  The	  Economist,	  (12	  November	  2009),	  <	  
http://www.economist.com/node/14859369>.	  	  
31	  Jobbik	  Parliamentary	  Electoral	  Manifesto:	  For	  National	  Self-­‐Determination	  and	  Social	  Justice,	  
<http://jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-­‐RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>.	  And	  ‘Europe’s	  Far	  Right:	  Culture	  
matters	  more’,	  The	  Economist,	  (11	  August	  2012),	  <http://www.economist.com/node/21560294>.	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symbols and historical outlooks, creating a distinctive nationalist political culture in 
Hungary. Traditional conservatism in Central and Eastern Europe, as defined by Chan 
(1999) draws from heritage and culture looking at the past and pre-communist era to 
draw meaning and symbolism.32 From the stance of original anti-communist parties in 
Hungary, 1989 was a national liberation from an alien ideology and a time to bring 
back the nation’s authentic heritage and traditions. The years following the 1956 
revolution had become known as the Kádár era, run by János Kádár and his goulash 
communism. Kádárism alienated the people from the politics, suppressing nationalist 
sentiments towards previous national historic events like the 1956 revolution and the 
1920 Treaty of Trianon that had stripped Hungary of a large portion of land and 
populace (Schöpflin 1991). In the fall of Soviet rule Christian Conservative parties 
embraced the return of family, national, cultural and religious values.33 Parties like 
MDF brought back national historical topics such as the Treaty of Trianon and the 
significance of previous revolutions, embracing Hungary’s tormented past while 
looking to rebuild the country’s nationalist traditions.34  
 While the conservative party MDF touched upon populist nationalist themes 
gaining support in the wake of transition, the first sizable party to establish an openly 
radical right agenda was the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), led by István 
Csurka, as a splinter party from within MDF.35 Csurka had originally been an MP for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  From	  this	  ideology	  there	  are	  also	  strong	  strands	  of	  Euroscepticism	  seeing	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  
other	  international	  forces	  like	  NATO	  akin	  to	  Soviet	  alien	  powers	  taking	  away	  Hungarian	  sovereignty.	  	  
33	   The	   political	   family	   of	   conservatism	   in	   Hungary	   includes	   Christian	   nationalists,	   national	   peasant	  
parties	  and	  religious-­‐fundamentalists.	  MDF,	  KDNP	  and	  FKgP	  were	  the	  first	  parties	  in	  this	  camp.	  Later	  
Fidesz	  joined	  this	  camp.	  MIÉP,	  and	  now	  Jobbik,	  lead	  the	  more	  radical-­‐right	  of	  nationalist	  politics.	  	  
34	  As	  Fidesz	  assimilated	  itself	  into	  the	  conservative	  camp	  it	  also	  began	  incorporating	  allusions	  to	  
Hungary’s	  controversial	  past,	  utilizing	  nationalist	  symbols	  like	  the	  tri-­‐colour	  (kókarda)	  for	  elections.	  	  
35	  Beginning	  his	  career	  as	  a	  literary	  figure	  and	  well-­‐known	  Hungarian	  playwright,	  István	  Csurka	  turned	  
to	   politics	   during	   post-­‐Communist	   transition.	   Csurka	   had	   originally	   been	   a	   MP	   for	   Christian	  
conservative	  party	  MDF	  but	  was	  expelled	  for	  his	  anti-­‐Semitic	  rhetoric	  and	  extremism.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  
form	  the	  radical-­‐right	  party	  MIÉP,	  father	  figure	  to	  the	  later	  created	  youth	  party	  Jobbik.	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MDF but was expelled from the party in 1993 for his radical nationalist views, 
creating MIÉP later that year (Oltay 1993, van Biezen 2003, Pittaway 2003, Szabó 
2003). MIÉP’s platforms supported ethnically based politics that politically divided 
the ‘globalists’ and Hungarians,36 where Hungarians were depicted as the victims of 
foreign oppression, be that by Nazi, communist or European forces (Bozóki and Kriza 
2008). MIÉP platforms propagated anti-EU policies and openly brought the Treaty of 
Trianon and Hungary’s lost borders back into discourse (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006). 
Much of MIÉP’s rhetoric was based on nationalist literary movements from the past, 
mainly the interwar Népi movement (népi translated most often as ‘folk’ but also 
meaning ‘populist’).37 The Népi movement was an a-political movement started in the 
1930’s, supported by intellectuals, writers, and poets supporting traditional living, the 
beauty of the untainted countryside and the ‘true Hungarian consciousness’. The 
movement also called for strong leadership to rid Hungary of its ailments, often 
linked with racist and anti-Semitic dialogues, finding scapegoats as a cause of 
Hungary’s weak state and international position (Hockenos 1993).38  
 In a stark contrast from the core of today’s radical right, earlier radical 
movements, during the 1990s and early 2000s, were primarily fragmented. Those 
supporting MIÉP tended to be an older base of radical nationalists formed mainly 
around the fears brought on by prospects of globalization in a more anti-modern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Globalists	   refer	   to	   those	   favouring	   the	   influence	   or	   assistance	   of	  Western	   powers	   in	   Hungarian	  
matters.	  This	   includes	  membership	   in	   the	  European	  Union	  and	  other	   international	  organization	   like	  
NATO.	   It	  also	   includes	   those	  who	  want	   the	   influence	  of	   foreign	  capital	   such	  as	   foreign	  corporations	  
buying	  and	  utilizing	  Hungarian	  lands	  and	  resources.	  	  
37	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  populism	  in	  Hungary	  differs	  slightly	  to	  more	  general	  ideas	  of	  populism	  in	  
that	  its	  main	  discontent	  is	  with	  internal	  ‘others’	  such	  as	  Jewish	  and	  Roma	  populations.	  Hungary	  is	  less	  
concerned	  with	  external	  ‘others’	  such	  as	  immigrants.	  In	  fact	  Jobbik	  and	  other	  radical	  right	  
organizations	  have	  taken	  a	  pro-­‐Palestine	  stance	  in	  international	  politics,	  unlike	  most	  populist	  entities	  
in	  Europe,	  due	  to	  their	  anti-­‐Semitic	  views.	  
38	   The	  Népi	  movement	  was	   neither	   left	   nor	   right	   politically	   but	   called	   for	   a	   ‘third	  way’	   in	   between	  
socialism	   and	   capitalism.	   This	   movement	   expounded	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   Hungary’s	   true	   soul	   was	  
founded	  out	  of	  traditional	  peasantry	  and	  small	  farming	  communities	  (Hockenos	  1993).	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fashion (Kober 2009, E. Kovács 1998). Meanwhile, a younger marginalized skinhead 
movement developed in the early to mid 1990s around the resurfacing of previously 
suppressed ideologies, youth revolt and questions of identity, though they remained 
largely separate from any formal political movements (Mareš 2010, Bozóki and Kriza 
2008, E. Kovács 1998, A. Kovács 2000). Although MIÉP was unsuccessful in uniting 
a strong radical right political front in Hungary the party developed a prototype for 
future radical right political movements in two crucial ways. Firstly, MIÉP was 
spawned out of the conservative right, having splintered off from MDF, a trend that is 
arguably similar to Jobbik’s foundations in relation to Fidesz, and secondly, MIÉP 
assisted in developing platforms for symbolic politics that remain salient today, 
mainly in its usage of Trianon and Hungary’s tormented past.39 The origins of radical 
rhetoric begin with Hungary’s transition, which was a negotiated or ‘self-limiting’ 
revolution (Arato 1994, Bozóki 1999). The radical right and MIÉP personified the 
transition as an elite-run operation, denying the people a true political revolution 
while keeping the old elite in power.  
 The fine line between populist, nationalist, right and radical right has always 
been an issue in Hungary. Early threads of nationalist political rhetoric hinted at 
radical undercurrents, showing the potential salience of nationalist and xenophobic 
platforms, visible in allusions made by MDF (Szalai 1994, E.Kovács 1998, Gerő 
2006, Bozóki 1999, Mudde 2007, Bozóki and Kriza 2008). Like many post-
communist transition states, anti-communist intellectuals and politicians realized the 
potential of nationalist culture as a means to amass support, bringing controversial 
history back into the political arena, including the ‘Jewish question’ and other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  MIÉP	  remained	  largely	  marginalized	  as	  a	  political	  party,	  peaking	  electorally	  in	  1998	  when	  they	  
broke	  the	  5%	  threshold	  into	  parliament.	  They	  have	  since	  failed	  to	  maintain	  parliamentary	  
representation,	  even	  running	  with	  Jobbik	  in	  2006,	  and	  received	  a	  disappointing	  0.03%	  by	  2010.	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mechanisms of self-other rhetoric. This technique worked to create scapegoats out of 
those seen as ‘modernizers’ or ‘bearers of alien values’ (Schöpflin 1992).  
 Right and radical right political forces in Hungary have subsequently 
monopolized patriotic and nationalist symbols and sentiment in Hungary over the last 
two decades. Hungarian political scientists stereotype the late 1980s through the early 
1990s as Hungary’s epoch of symbolic politics, using pre-communist images to evoke 
political meaning (Arato 1994, Bozóki 1999, Kovács 1998, Ost 2005). The main 
goals of the radical camp formed around the restitution of land, the purging of 
communist elites in politics, political justice and increasing an authoritative state. 
These radicalized goals were articulated through images of the Turul bird (alluding to 
Hungary’s ethnogenesis), the red and white Árpád flag (representing Hungary’s first 
kingships) and pre-Trianon Hungarian borders.40 These narratives and relating 
symbols are utilized to echo the perceived modern struggle (E. Kovács 1998, 
Dieckhoff 2003, Palonen 2011). Personifying these narratives are icons such as 
images of Hungary’s original borders (Nagy Magyarország térkép – Greater Hungary 
map), figures from the 1848 and 1956 revolutions and symbols alluding to ancient 
Hungary (E.Kovács 1998, Lendvai 2003).41  
 This first wave of radical right politics, embodied by MIÉP remained largely a 
movement of an older nationalist generation, though potential for youth mobilization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  The	  perpetuation	  and	  relevance	  of	  specific	  symbols	  and	  historic	  narratives	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  
41	  Icons	  of	  the	  Greater	  Hungary	  map	  are	  widespread	  in	  Hungary,	  easily	  visible	  on	  bumper	  stickers,	  t-­‐
shirts	  and	  other	  forms	  throughout	  Hungary.	  The	  two	  great	  revolutions	  of	  Hungary	  are	  used	  not	  only	  
for	  their	  symbolic	  weight	  of	  Hungary’s	  constant	  struggle	  against	  oppressive	  forces	  but	  also	  these	  
remembrance	  days	  have	  become	  politically	  charged	  days	  for	  speeches,	  demonstrations	  and	  marches	  
(to	  be	  discussed	  in	  depth	  in	  the	  chapters	  on	  political	  parties	  and	  grassroots	  and	  social	  movements).	  
The	  Árpád	  red	  and	  white	  striped	  flag	  as	  well	  as	  St.	  István	  and	  Turul	  iconography	  will	  also	  be	  discussed	  
further	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  but	  are	  primarily	  used	  to	  indicate	  one’s	  more	  nationalist	  and	  
traditionalist	  political	  alignment.	  The	  Árpád	  flag	  is	  particularly	  visible	  as	  a	  radical	  right	  symbols	  since	  it	  
was	  not	  only	  an	  ancient	  Hungarian	  flag	  but	  also	  used	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Nazi	  Arrow	  Cross	  Party	  flag.	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existed. On 23 October 1992, Hungary’s Memorial Day for the 1956 Revolution, 
MIÉP’s leader, István Csurka, amassed a popular protest against the ‘communist’ 
mass media with the aim of nationalizing Hungarian television and radio (Szalai 
1994). This was the first radical civil movement uniting MIÉP with younger radical 
subcultures of the ‘National-Democratic Youth’. Old and young united using the 
controversial Árpád flag as their symbol (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, Szabó 2003). 
Although radical right parties and social movements were mainly marginalized until 
2006, MIÉP created an archetype for ethnically based symbolic politics in Hungary 
(Bozóki and Kriza 2008) used by today’s radical right youth. 
1.2.2 Youth Support for Fidesz and Jobbik 
 Hungary as a case study on the youth is not only relevant for its current 
heightened activism but also useful in the wider discourse on democratization, 
political socialization and the future of civil participation. The literature around the 
topic of current youth activism has touched upon issues of Central and Eastern 
European ‘backsliding’ (Ost 2005, Schmitter 2006, Krastev 2007, Szczerbiak and 
Taggart 2008), and Jobbik’s rising appeal (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006, Bartlett et. al. 
2012, Halasz 2009, Jordon 2010, Keil 2011). However, this study treats the current 
trends as organic developments that can be tracked through political party tactics 
combined with influences from various agents of socialization starting at a young age.  
 Fidesz has been the most successful party in cultivating a strong official 
youth-base within its party. Fidesz has always maintained a significant youth 
following, apparent in its electoral youth turnout as well as its official membership in 
the party’s two youth organizations, Fidesz IT and Fidelitas. This aspect of Fidesz is 
unique in that no other political party has more than one official youth organization in 
Hungary. There are around 20,000 official youth members combining both 
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organizations’ figures. Other ‘larger’ political youth organizations in Hungary boast 
membership of around 2,000 (discussed further in Chapter 3, see Table 3.1). 	  
 The previous generation of radical right support came from fragmented 
periphery groups. Today’s radical right has taken successful elements from their 
predecessors and rejuvenated them with a modern, more tangible scapegoat as well as 
an immersive subculture (discussed in Chapter 4), highly attractive and interactive 
with Hungary’s youth. It is significant that while Jobbik has an official youth 
organization of only 2,000 members, Jobbik IT was only established in 2011. Their 
membership is also comparable with other longstanding youth organizations like 
IKSZ. Hungary as a whole voted Jobbik into parliament with 16.67% in 2010. This 
percentage was as high as 25% among young first-time voters (Jordon 2010, Medián 
and Tárki polls42). The right and radical right have proven highly successful in 
attracting youth support. Although the 2010 electoral results sparked wider debates 
about a rightward and radical right turn among the youth certain youth trends were 
evident in the previous elections despite Socialist victories. Referring back to Figure 
1.1, looking at the first round of the 2006 National Elections, 58% of youth voters 
(aged eighteen to thirty) supported Fidesz compared to 46.5% of older cohorts. 
Meanwhile combined support for the liberal-left coalition by youth voters was only 
26.4% in 2006 down to 9.03% by 2010.43  
1.2.3 Breaking Bipolarity: The Shock of 2009/2010 
Looking purely at electoral trends, the 2010 national elections completely 
changed the political landscape in Hungary. The stable bipolar divide cultivated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  ‘Political	  Opinion	  in	  Hungary	  –	  Medián	  and	  Tárki’,	  The	  Hungarian	  Spectrum,	  (24	  June	  2009).	  	  
43	  Liberal-­‐left	  support	  is	  the	  combined	  result	  of	  MSZP	  and	  SZDSZ.	  See:	  2008	  National	  statistics:	  See	  
Bibliography,	  ʻMagyar	  Választáskutatási	  Programʼ.	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between the left wing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the right wing 
Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) seemed to be a fixed hegemonic bipolarity from 
1994 until 2010. MSZP had a stable coalition with the liberal Alliance of Free 
Democrats (SZDSZ). Meanwhile, between 1994 and 1998 Fidesz had concentrated 
the right and developed a strong coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s 
Party (KDNP).  
Figure 1.4:  
Stacked Column Chart of Party Representation in Parliament: 1990 – 201044 
♦Fidesz	  	  	  	  ♦MDF	  	  	  	  ♦MIÉP	  	  	  	  ♦Jobbik	  	  	  	  ♦KDNP	  	  	  	  ♦FKgP	  	  	  	  ♦MSZP	  	  	  	  ♦SZDSZ	  	  	  	  ♦LMP	  
The	  stacked	  column	  shows	  the	  shifts	  in	  parliamentary	  representation	  from	  a	  mixed	  conservative	  
government	  in	  1990	  into	  a	  bipolar	  political	  system	  between	  Fidesz	  and	  MSZP	  in	  1998,	  2002	  and	  
2006.	  By	  2010	  this	  model	  shifts	  drastically	  favoring	  the	  right	  and	  radical	  right. 
**	  In	  the	  1998	  elections	  Fidesz	  ran	  with	  MDF	  and	  KDNP	  shown	  as	  one	  block	  in	  the	  diagram.	  
***	  By	  2002	  the	  Fidesz	  bloc	  won	  48.7%.	  KDNP	  and	  FKgP	  aligned	  with	  Fidesz	  creating	  Fidesz-­‐MPP.	  
	  
The polarization between right and liberal-left was heightened in 2002 when 
Fidesz launched an offensive attack after the first round of elections, bringing mass 
mobilization of the right wing supporters onto the streets, insinuating electoral foul 
play for the Socialist victory (discussed further in Chapter 3). What could not have 
been predicted was that large governmental scandals against MSZP, publicized by 
Fidesz and right wing media outlets, changed the dynamics of the political landscape. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Parliamentary	  representation	  data	  from	  the	  Hungarian	  National	  Election	  Office	  (www.valasztas.hu).	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Figure 1.4 shows the progression of Hungary’s election from a volatile first two 
elections in 1990 and 1994, into a solidified, and seemingly stable, bipolar system 
between 1998 and 2006. The stacked column helps visually display how drastic the 
shift to the right was in 2010 with significant gains for the right and radical right as 
well as significant losses for the liberal-left. Events after the 2006 national elections 
changed the political opportunity structure in Hungary allowing two new youth-based 
parties to enter parliament in 2010: radical right party, Jobbik, and green party, LMP 
(discussed further in Chapter 3). Significantly for this study, both parties were 
founded originally as youth-based organizations, campaigning through alternative 
media and grassroots organizations.  
 One of the reasons recent political shifts have been so shocking to the 
international community is due to Hungary’s longstanding image as one of the 
leading liberal and westernizing post-communist countries. In the early 1990’s 
Hungary began its process of democratization with fellow post-Communist countries. 
Eager to make changes based on a Western model, Hungary entered NATO in 1999 
and became one of the first post-communist member states of the European Union by 
2004 (Jordon 2010). Even in 2006 the now popular radical-right party Jobbik barely 
managed 2% in elections and the Socialist party (MSZP) enjoyed re-election to head 
parliament for a second term.  Much has changed since 2006.45 Between 2006 and 
2010 the right and radical right strengthened considerably. By the 2010 national 
elections Fidesz won 52.73% electorally giving the party a two-thirds majority in 
parliament and leaving its previous rival, MSZP, far behind with only 19.3%. 
Meanwhile Jobbik trailed only narrowly behind with 16.67%. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	   Some	   speculate	   that	   2006	  was	   a	   catalyst	   for	   right	  wing	   and	   radical-­‐right	   support	  when	   protests	  
broke	  out	  after	  tapes	  of	  the	  Socialist	  Prime	  Minister	  Gyurcsány	  saying	  his	  government	  had	  lied	  to	  get	  
into	  the	  European	  Union	  leaked	  to	  the	  public	  (Jordon	  2010).	  Discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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 While the electoral success of the radical right was drastically higher than had 
been previously achieved in Hungary it is questionable whether or not the 
undercurrent of radical right ideological preferences is a new trend or just one that has 
been allowed to surface politically. Predictions about the potential influence and 
mainstreaming of the radical right began in the mid 1990’s:  
The prospects for the stabilization of democratic institutions and the formation of a 
market economy in Hungary are menaced for the foreseeable future by dangers 
coming from the extreme right- the ideologies of a radical right are formulated within 
the governing party [MDF] itself. (Szalai 1994, p.137).  
 
Hungarian researchers were quick to pick up on the salient, radical nationalist 
undercurrent in Hungary (Szalai 1994, A. Kovács 1996, E. Kovács 1998). There was 
already concern over the easy politicization of nationalism and hints of xenophobia 
used by parties to gain support, avoiding platforms concerned with complicated 
economic redistribution and unemployment problems left over from transition (Szalai 
1994, Gerő 2006, Bozóki 1999, Bozóki and Kriza 2008).   
 Earlier research feared the potential political backlash from the disillusioned 
‘losers of transition’ bearing the brunt of shock from the transition. The strong 
presence of the radical right today comes less from the older nationalist MIÉP 
supporters, pointing to Zionist conspiracies coming from Budapest. It is rather the 
Hungarian youth that has taken the radical right to new heights, and while the youth 
can be seen as a disadvantaged cohort from the economic recession, the radical right 
is often supported by well-educated university students, and the previously 
disillusioned non-voter (Varró 2009, Bartlett et al 2012, Nagy and Róna 2012). It is 
peculiarities such as this, and other new political youth trends, that are the focus of 
my research. Trends within the youth-based right and radical right are possible 
indicators of future nationalist and Eurosceptic levels within the region (Mareš 2010). 
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If current youth trends continue Hungary is at risk of an increasing population 
supporting extremist ideologies. Political transition has left young cohorts caught 
between values of a socialist past and a democratic present. Earlier predictions of 
potential radicalization are coming to pass: 
The greatest threat to democracy today is no longer communism, either as a political 
movement or as an ideology. The threat grows instead from a combination of 
chauvinism, xenophobia, populism, and authoritarianism, all of them connected with 
the sense of frustration typical of great social upheavals. (Michnik 1991)  
 
Mannheim (1960) postulated that quick and rapid social changes, such as the 
one surrounding the fall of the USSR, were more likely to produce a youth that has a 
clearly common culture, distinct from older generations. The rapidity of change 
requires the youth of the era to adapt to new systems and institutions while models of 
older generations become dissolved and obsolete (Mannheim 1960). This thesis 
analyzes the distinctness of this transitional youth and questions what mechanisms are 
behind the current upsurge of support for alternative and radical politics in Hungary. I 
also argue against the idea of a common youth culture as theorized by Mannheim, 
analyzing to what extent Hungary’s youth can be considered a united generation. 
1.2.4 Defining a Cohort: The Politically Active Hungarian Youth 
 ‘Youth’ is a contested concept, often context and culture specific (Philips 
1999, Skelton and Valentine 1998, Kürti 2002). While social and psychological 
studies define ‘youth’ by life stages (Bynner and Roberts 1991, Wallace and 
Kovacheva 1998, Kovacheva 2005),46 there is debate on whether to separate 
individuals in generational terms or define them as a specific cohort (Goerres 2009, 
Szalai 2011, Vásárhelyi 2011). Defining a ‘cohort’ refers to a group of people born 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	   In	   this	   context	   the	   youth	   is	   considered	   a	   transitory	   social	   group,	   moving	   through	   phases	   until	  
independent	  living	  is	  achieved.	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around the same time while a political ‘generation’ is defined by the shared 
experience of a group born during a specific period (Goerres 2009). I choose to refer 
to the group I am observing as a cohort since I am looking at a specific age group and 
certain requirements to qualify a ‘generation’, such as a shared and unifying 
experience, are arguably lacking from this group (Vásárhelyi 2011).47  
Within Hungary the definition of youth varies on the context and sector 
defining it (Walther et. al. 2007).  Age definitions and life stages were made clearer 
under the socialist system by distinct youth groups and political divisions48 however, 
the decentralization process and democratic transition has left institutions to define 
their own terms and conditions on what constitutes the ‘youth’, often with very 
different criteria.49 Membership into a political party’s youth organization also has 
different age conditions for joining. A good example of this is Fidesz. The party 
uniquely has two separate youth organizations with different age cut-offs: for youth 
party Fidelitas, the age cut-off for membership is 35 whereas the youth organization, 
Fidesz Ifjúsági Tagozat, (Fidesz IT) restricts age to under 30.  
For the purposes of my research I examine politically active youths between 
the ages of eighteen and thirty.50 I begin at eighteen since that is the legal age to vote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  There	  are	  specific	  requirements	  of	  a	  ‘generation’	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  more	  in	  depth	  later	  within	  
this	   thesis,	   however	   it	   is	   contestable	   to	   say	   that	   the	   current	   youth	   cohort	   in	  Hungary	   represents	   a	  
definable	  generation	  at	  this	  point	  (Szalai	  2011).	  Discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  
48	   Youth	   leagues	   were	   set	   up	   clearly	   dividing	   children,	   youth,	   and	   adults.	   Those	   under	   the	   age	   of	  
fourteen	  were	   instated	   in	   the	  Young	  Pioneers	   (Uttoros),	  while	   those	  aged	   fourteen	   to	   twenty-­‐eight	  
became	   members	   of	   the	   Communist	   Youth	   League	   (Kisz).	   These	   youth	   programs	   were	   created	   to	  
‘educate	  young	  people	  in	  the	  Communist	  spirit’	  but	  also	  in	  order	  to	  divide	  up	  developmental	  stages	  
(Volgyes	  1975,	  p.110).	  
49	  National	  reports	  place	   ‘young	  adults’	  within	  the	  fifteen	  to	  twenty-­‐nine	  ranges	  while	   labor	  market	  
directs	  policies	  at	  eighteen	   to	   twenty-­‐five	  year	  olds.	   	  At	  other	   times	   ‘youth’	   refers	  only	   to	   students	  
enrolled	  in	  academic	  institutions.	  Within	  the	  Hungarian	  court	  system	  criminal	  responsibility	  starts	  at	  
the	  age	  of	  fourteen.	  For	  specific	  health,	  child	  protection,	  and	  poverty	  policies	  youth	  ends	  at	  eighteen,	  
and	  for	  some	  Hungarian	  NGO’s	  standards	  range	  from	  six	  through	  thirty-­‐four	  (Walther	  et.	  al.	  2007).	  	  
50	  My	  field	  research	  was	  conducted	  in	  2011	  meaning	  these	  were	  youths	  that	  were	  between	  eighteen	  
and	  thirty	  at	  this	  time.	  More	  specifically	  my	  cohort	  was	  born	  between	  1981	  and	  1993.	  
	   46	  
in Hungary. It is around this age that individuals begin voting, determine jobs, finalize 
academics and create professional goals with longer-term trajectories (Cannon 1995, 
Gokalp 1981, Bruter and Harrison 2009). While political exposure can begin in earlier 
stages of life this age period tends to be when political identifications solidify more 
concretely and individuals define partisan alignments and memberships (Bruter and 
Harrison 2009). This cohort has reached the voting age while Hungary has been a 
democracy and has been primarily socialized after Fidesz’s political shift to the right 
between 1993 and 1994. The cohort includes those that were first-time voters in the 
2010 National Elections. This is also the standard age categorization for ‘youth’ in 
most Hungarian electoral statistic-based studies ensuring a more seamless comparison 
between my primarily qualitative data and the quantitative resources available 
Narrowing my research I focus only on the ‘politically active’ youth providing 
a clearer analysis on youth involved in current political changes and subcultures. 
Political activity is defined here as ‘legal activities by private citizens that are more or 
less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the 
actions they take’ (Verba et. al. 1978, p.46).51 Included within this categorization I 
add actions that include diverse actors in the public, non-profit and private sectors 
aimed at supporting or changing aspects local or national policies and practices 
(Norris 2007).52 The youth have been at the forefront of political changes in the post-
communist arena (Bunce and Wolchik 2006, Furlong and Cartmel 2007, Ó Beacháin 
et. al. 2012, Tereshcenko 2012). Mass protests and demonstrations are now arranged 
at least biannually since 2006, both opposing and supporting the government.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Sidney	  Verba,	  Norman	  Nie	  and	  Jae-­‐on	  Kim,	  Participation	  and	  Political	  Equality:	  A	  Seven	  Nation	  
Comparison,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  P.	  46.	  
52	  Norris,	  Pippa,	  ‘Political	  Activism:	  New	  Challenges,	  New	  Opportunities’,	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  
Comparative	  Politics,	  Carles	  Boix	  and	  Susan	  Stokes	  (eds.),	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007).	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The current activist culture in Hungary has changed form in light of a shifting 
political climate bringing forth a new range of subcultures and political engagement 
not seen before in Hungary. Hungary’s activist youth culture is not a unique 
contemporary phenomenon. Young protesters are involving themselves in political 
changes across the Arab Spring territories while the Occupy movement went global 
throughout much of America and Europe.53 However, while most of today’s strongest 
youth movements hint at a spreading global consciousness and liberal value 
orientation the increasing support of radicalized networks by the youth in Hungary 
has caused concern by local and international onlookers (Halasz 2009, Palonen 2009, 
Jordon 2010, Mareš 2010, Szalai 2011, Vásárhelyi 2011, Kürti 2012, Bartlett et. al 
2012). While originally this thesis focused solely on larger right and radical right 
activist trends newer grassroots social movements across the political spectrum are on 
the rise with numbers, unseen since earlier historic revolutions (discussed in Chapter 
5).54 Focusing on young activists aged eighteen to thirty, this thesis is one of the few 
studies analyzing the causes behind new youth mobilization and shifts towards radical 
and alternative political options.  
Debates remain over the youth and their relation to post-communist value shifts 
(Chan 1999, Svyrnarenko 2001, Enyedi 2005), citizenship (Helve and Wallace 2002, 
Jamieson and Grunfy 2005) and democratic participation (Siurala 2000, Forbig 2005, 
Kovacheva 2005, Pleyers 2005). This cohort is the first group of young adults 
socialized primarily in a new democracy. Political socialization allows for an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Mason,	  Paul,	  ‘Twenty	  Reasons	  Why	  It’s	  Kicking	  Off	  Everywhere’,	  BBC	  Blogs,	  (5	  February	  2011),	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/paulmason/2011/02/twenty_reasons_why_its_kicking_off.
html>	  	  
54	  Zilhaly,	  Péter,	  ‘Young	  Hungarians	  are	  Intent	  on	  Writing	  Their	  Own	  Future’,	  The	  Guardian,	  (17	  
December	  2011),	  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/17/young-­‐hungarians-­‐
viktor-­‐orban>	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outlining of influences still apparent from the Socialist and pre-Soviet era, as well as 
new mechanisms of political socialization restructured after 1989. The youth of today 
are rapidly becoming the primary citizen and voter of tomorrow. Analyzing salient 
influences and political trends within this cohort develops an understanding of 
political preferences and directions Hungary may develop in the future. 
1.3 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is broken down into three main parts. The first part, consisting of this 
chapter and Chapter 2, serves to introduce the socio-political situation in Hungary and 
outline my research. This chapter gives a broad overview of political development in 
Hungary since transition and makes a case for analyzing youth political activism and 
strong trends towards the right and radical right. Going more specifically into my 
approach Chapter 2 serves as a research, methods and theory chapter giving an 
overview of political socialization theory and the practical side of its usage for a 
theoretical framework within a Central and Eastern European context. This chapter 
goes into the foundations of political socialization theory as well as a review of more 
current research incorporating political socialization as a method.  Within the context 
of Central and Eastern Europe this chapter also reviews the heavy monitoring and 
implementation of political socialization under Socialism compared with the much 
sparser socialization research continuing today within the region. 
Part II covers political organizations and grassroots social movements in how 
they organize and engage with young people in Hungary. Chapter 3 dives deeper into 
an analysis of how political parties are directing themselves at the youth through party 
structures, campaigns, youth organizations and events. This chapter emphasizes the 
stronger formal relations Fidesz has within its party structure compared with the more 
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informal, alternative networks attracting the youth to parties like Jobbik and LMP. An 
understanding of these relations gives a foundation for analyzing political 
socialization at large within Hungary. Chapter 4 analyzes politically focused 
grassroots social movements seeing how the youth has become activated within these 
networks and mapping the primary movements influencing alternative political 
participation in Hungary. The malleability and political counterparts of certain 
movements is also discussed with reference to the current blurring between 
subcultures and movements as well as political parties and movements creating new 
movement parties in Hungary. Both chapters also serve to set the scene for how other 
agents of political socialization relate and interact with political parties and activist 
movements in Part III.  
Part III deals more directly with my own research and findings corresponding 
with agents of socialization focused on in this research, the order of which correlates 
with the spheres of influence an individual first comes into contact with. Chapter 5, 
therefore, focuses on the role and influence of the family on the political socialization 
process. Once considered the primary mechanism of political socialization, this lens 
looks at how young Hungarians interact with their family on the topic of politics and 
historically relevant events in shaping their own political ideologies. Very little 
literature deals with familial political socialization in a post-communist setting. This 
chapter explores the relationship between family members’ political ideologies and 
the ideologies of young respondents, how politics is discusses, suppressed or active in 
the home. References to the past and passing on historic memories are of key interest 
in analyzing the remnants or discarding of politically significant events and symbols.   
Chapter 6 progresses into the current political socialization process taking place 
within the education system, mainly focusing on secondary and higher education 
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correlating with the main age of respondents and the timing of solidifying political 
partisanships. The transition from a highly centralized socialist education system to a 
fully decentralized structure has effected how politics addressed at schools. This 
chapter also looks at the influence of teachers as well as the school setting as a 
socializing space. With regards to teachers and professors I rely mainly on interviews 
with professors themselves as well as youth accounts of politically engaging or 
passive academic experiences.  Somewhat unique to the Hungarian higher education 
system, this chapter also addresses Special Colleges existing as a quasi-dorm external 
learning space apart of certain universities, and their active role in political 
socialization and platform creation. 
Chapter 7 looks directly at post-communist media transformations and the role 
media plays in politics. This chapter views media as an agent of political socialization 
as well as a structural political tool. Chapter 7 analyzes how the media has politically 
polarized in the wake of mass privatization efforts as a top-down process. Media in 
Hungary has also developed new trends in counter culture in the form of online 
media. This chapter addresses both mainstream media (print, television and radio) as 
well as alternative youth media, mapping the most used networks of information 
retrieval, discussing youth views on media ‘legitimacy’ and ‘objectivity’. 
Chapter 8 serves as a conclusion chapter, bringing together these themes, 
analyzing the overall view of structural changes that have affected youth partisanship 
and activism and how various agents of political socialization have developed in a 
post-communist setting.  
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 2. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODS & THEORIES  
 This chapter serves as a framework to explain how research was structured 
around political socialization in Hungary while justifying the methods I utilized and 
the theoretical framework underpinning the basis for my approach. As mentioned in 
my introduction, my aim is to analyze how political parties, grassroots social 
movements, family, education and the media have an effect on and/or cultivate youth 
political alignment and participation practices in a post-communist setting. Section 
2.1 of this chapter gives an overview of my research design and methodology in 
conducting field research in Hungary. This section explains the scope and reasons 
behind my mixed-methods approach as well as the technical aspects of how 
participants were recruited and how interviews and focus groups were conducted.  
 Section 2.2 looks more closely at political socialization theories, how this 
approach was founded and how it has developed since, as a theory, it has been put 
into research practice in a number of ways. Section 2.3 looks at the literature and 
research around grassroots social movements. Social movements have their own body 
of literature but also work as a potential agent for socialization through their ability to 
manipulate and change societal norms and political culture. Social movements are 
analyzed not only as a socializing agent but also call for a structural and stylistic 
analysis similar to political parties in their tactics and ability to activate youth 
participation.  
2.1 RESEARCH AND METHODS  
 The complexity of current political trends in Hungary alongside an under-
researched youth activist cohort led me to choose a qualitative approach for my 
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research. National electoral data and voter preference polls can show who is voting 
for what party but is unable to explain why an individual has chosen to vote for a 
particular party and more importantly how that partisanship was cultivated. 
Quantitative data is unable to explain if current youth voting trends are indicative of a 
temporary protest vote for new alternative and radical party options or if deeper 
political subcultures are forming, particularly concerning the drastic electoral 
increases in radical right support. While available quantitative electoral data and 
larger youth-based reports were used to compare and solidify findings, my research is 
based on a mixed-methods qualitative approach. In this way I was not only able to 
analyze trends beyond the statistical data but it also allowed for topics, narratives and 
trends previously unidentified to develop.  
Among various qualitative methods I found political socialization most fit for 
a multi-variable approach despite the fact that it is rarely used for analysing more than 
one or two agents. Political socialization is also most often used to analyze youth 
development relating to civil participation and various influencing agents behind 
partisanship development. Political socialization is, by nature, very interdisciplinary, 
combining a wide arena for methodological approaches including psychological, 
sociological, anthropological and political theories. My own research approach is 
based in political science and sociology, analyzing the nature of political culture and 
activism among the youth in Hungary. This qualitative approach combines the 
structural analysis of political parties and social movements with political 
socialization theory analyzing the potential political influences of family, education 
and media. Analyses and conclusions are based on findings from my research in 
combination with existing data, relevant media sources, political polls and statistics.  
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Field research consisted of a six-month period in Hungary between March and 
September 2011, as well as various trips to Hungary before and after my fieldwork for 
major political events and protests.55 Research in Hungary was divided between three 
locations: Budapest, Debrecen and Miskolc (seen in Figure 2.1). These cities were 
chosen due to their size, significance and differing political cores. Larger Hungarian 
cities were of greater value for my research for more prevalent political activism and 
larger youth populations residing in these areas.  
Figure 2.1: Political Map of Hungary 
 
In	  this	  political	  map	  of	  Hungary	  the	  three	  cities	  I	  conducted	  research	  in	  are	  shown.	  Budapest	  is	   in	  
the	  centre	  of	  the	  orange	  region.	  Miskolc	  is	  in	  the	  Northeastern	  region	  colored	  purple	  and	  Debrecen	  
is	  located	  in	  the	  Eastern	  region	  colored	  pink. 56	  	  
The majority of the research time was spent in Budapest due to its central 
position as the capitol as well as the political epicenter of Hungary. Budapest is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  A	  list	  of	  relevant	  events	  attended	  are	  given	  in	  Appendix	  3.	  
56	  ‘Hungary	  Map	  –	  Political	  Map	  of	  Hungary’,	  Ezilon	  Regional	  Maps	  2009,	  
<http://www.ezilon.com/maps/europe/hungary-­‐maps.html>.	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largest city in Hungary with a population around 1.7 million.57 It has the highest 
number of universities and colleges of higher education creating a broad population of 
young, educated individuals within my cohort range.58 While Budapest is considered, 
and electorally defined, as more liberal than the rest of the country I chose my other 
two locations to contrast the possible liberal biases found in Budapest. Debrecen is 
the second largest city in Hungary with a population of around 200 thousand located 
in Eastern Hungary.59 Debrecen contrasts Budapest in that it has been a longstanding 
Fidesz bastion. The mayor of Debrecen, Lajos Kósa, has been a strong Fidesz figure 
and has remained undefeated as mayor since 1998.60 The annual Fidelitas Congress 
2011 was held in Debrecen, symbolic of the strong Fidesz youth-base in the region, 
which I was also able to attend. Debrecen also has a large central university, 
providing a flourishing youth population. For these reasons Debrecen was chosen as 
the second base for research.  
In order to target the radical right subculture more directly my third research 
location was Miskolc, conducting interviews and attending Jobbik’s youth summer 
camp. Networking with Jobbik youth followers in Budapest proved relatively difficult 
compared with the openness of Miskolc and Debrecen-based Jobbik followers who 
felt less marginalized in these cities. This was particularly true of Miskolc. Miskolc is 
the fourth largest city in Hungary with a population of around 170 thousand located in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  ‘Hungary:	  Major	  Cities’,	  City	  Populations,	  Populations	  Statistics	  for	  Countries,	  Administrative	  Areas,	  
Cities	  and	  Agglomerations	  –	  Interactive	  Maps,	  <http://www.citypopulation.de/Hungary-­‐Cities.html>.	  	  
58	  There	  are	  eighteen	  universities	  (state	  run	  and	  private)	  and	  twenty	  one	  colleges	  of	  higher	  education	  
in	  Budapest	  compared	  with	  just	  ten	  universities	  and	  twenty	  four	  colleges	  of	  higher	  education	  in	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  country	  (Hungarian	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  and	  Culture:	  
<http://www.okm.gov.hu/felsooktatas/felsooktatasi-­‐intezmenyek>.	  
59	  ‘Hungary:	  Major	  Cities’,	  City	  Populations,	  Populations	  Statistics	  for	  Countris,	  Administrative	  Areas,	  
Cities	  and	  Agglomerations	  –	  Interactive	  Maps	  –	  Charts,	  <http://www.citypopulation.de/Hungary-­‐
Cities.html>.	  
60	  ‘Kósa	  Lajos	  Polgármester’,	  Official	  Debrecen	  City	  Site,	  
<http://portal.debrecen.hu/varoshaza/onkormanyzat/polgarmester>.	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the northeastern region of Hungary.61 Previously an industrial city, Miskolc has 
suffered from economic depression and is now a stronghold for the radical right with 
some of the highest Jobbik-supporting exit polls. Fieldwork within these three 
locations consisted of in-depth, semi-structured interviews as well as focus groups 
and participant observation of relevant events and meetings.  
2.1.1 Interviews, Focus Groups and Participant Observation 
Interviews are important in acquiring deeper information and nuances that the 
format of surveys and focus groups are less able to achieve (Gubrium and Hosteign 
2001). They are also useful in grasping points of view and personal accounts that can 
be expanded on through dialogue (Burgess 1982, Legard et. al. 2003). Previous youth 
political socialization research has used in-depth interviews to gauge levels of trust in 
civil and political institutions (Csepeli and Örkény 1997), interpret why young people 
join political parties (Bruter and Harrison 2009), and understand the process of how 
people reason when making political decisions (Herbert 1985). Within the context of 
my research, seventy in-depth, semi-structured interviews were held with politically 
active young Hungarians as well as relevant experts and researchers within Hungary.   
The ‘politically active’ criteria for interviewees was that they were active in 
some form of political participation either by traditional means, such as voting and/or 
party membership, or by alternative forms of political participation, such as attending 
social movements or taking part in politically relevant demonstrations, protests or 
events. Interviews and focus groups were conducted primarily in public settings, such 
as cafés or within university grounds. In certain situations interviews were held at an 
individual’s home, based on their preference and my own comfort levels. Interviews 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  ‘Hungary:	  Major	  Cities’,	  City	  Populations,	  <http://www.citypopulation.de/Hungary-­‐Cities.html>.	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and focus groups were produced in a manner to best allow participants the 
opportunity to express personal opinions and feelings on relevant topics developing 
their political knowledge and reflections throughout the conversation while avoiding 
leading questions on a given topic.62 Interviews and focus groups were often tape-
recorded, unless objected to by the interviewee, and notes were taken to supplement 
each interview. A list of research participants is given in Appendix 4, showing the 
age, political alignment and region of interviewees. Specialist interviewees with 
political analysts, professors, journalists and political representatives are also listed.  
Focus groups were used to get a broad sense of political thought processes 
among various political alignments. While they were less useful in retrieving detailed 
information, they did map general trends and sentiments of particular subcultures. 
Focus groups between two to six people were arranged with politically like-minded 
individuals who knew each other either socially or through political outlets such as 
protest groups or political youth organizations. Focus groups held during my field 
research included members of the Socialist Youth Academy, liberal journalists, 
members of the Jobbik Youth organization (Jobbik IT), alternative lifestyle activists 
and Fidelitas members. Participants in focus groups were subsequently asked if they 
would be willing to also participate in an in-depth interview at a later date. A majority 
of focus group participants agreed to further research contribution and were 
subsequently interviewed.  
Despite ensuring focus-group participants held similar political partisanships it 
became quickly apparent that participants did not feel fully comfortable expressing 
their own political thought processes or experiences in front of their peers. This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  The	  loose	  semi-­‐structured	  format	  of	  interviews	  and	  example	  questions	  are	  given	  in	  Appendix	  4.	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potentially a cultural layover from the parent generation, raised under communism, 
where political opinions were kept private, only discussed within the family or among 
very close friends.63 Often focus groups would result in one person would dominate 
the conversation if particularly strong opinions were held and subsequently other 
participants would revert to nodding in agreement. For this reason I found interviews 
more useful for getting responses on specific questions, however, focus groups 
remained important not only for assessing general trends in the initial stages of my 
research as well as sources for networking for later interviews.  
Interviewees and focus group participants were recruited primarily through 
three pathways: 1) by using contacts I had previously made in Hungary and using 
these contacts to spider-web (or snowball) connections within their social circles, 2) 
by targeting politically inclined youth groups and social movement coordinators 
through their websites and Facebook profiles and 3) by recruiting activists met at 
political and protest events. Participants in interviews and focus groups were found 
initially through certain contacts that had been maintained from my first stay in 
Hungary during my Masters in 2009-2010. For my Masters thesis I had already begun 
interviews on ‘youth culture’ in Hungary and, as such, had networked with young 
university-based Hungarians at Corvinus University in Budapest. These initial 
contacts varied in political support, although support for Green party LMP was 
somewhat over represented in the initial cohorts. This is partly due to the liberal bias 
in Budapest as well as the fact that LMP had, in part, been formed within a Special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  The	  limited	  trust	  in	  non-­‐family	  based	  networks	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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College at Corvinus.64 However, some previous contacts had also been Fidesz and 
Jobbik supporters.  
The majority of these previous contacts were willing to help me recruit 
participants from within their friends groups and in some cases offered to introduce 
me to the more politically active individuals they knew from either party membership 
or political events they had attended. This ‘spider-webbing’ was used with each 
individual that participated in interviews and/or focus groups. After interviews and 
focus groups were conducted I verbally asked if anyone could email me individuals 
that they knew of that would be willing to participate. I followed this up with personal 
emails one or two days after interviews to again request any further contacts. In many 
cases individuals would provide a name and contact details of a friend, relative or 
colleague.  
Recruiting participants also took place by using the internet to contact political 
youth groups and social movements via official websites and Facebook groups. In this 
capacity I was able to directly message specific activist youth groups which included: 
local factions of political parties’ youth organizations, pro and anti-government 
protest movement organizers and student protest groups. Local factions of Fidelitas 
and Fidesz Ifjúsági Tagozat (both Fidesz youth organizations), LMP, MSZP and 
Jobbik youth groups were contacted. Online networking was particularly useful in 
Debrecen and Miskolc, where I had little or no previous contacts. Lastly, some 
interviewees were recruited while attending political demonstrations and events. On a 
few occasions I approached organizers or active participants and was able to 
exchange details, asking to meet on a later date for interviewing.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Special	  Colleges	  are	  discussed	  in-­‐depth	  in	  Chapter	  6.	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Due to the ‘politically active’ cohort my research focuses on there is a slightly 
in-built bias towards a sample that is much more active compared with, perhaps, the 
general youth population in Hungary. However, my aim was target youth that were 
engaging with the political system in different ways. Although previous estimates of 
youth participation in elections are estimated at around 67%, this percentage is likely 
higher when including young Hungarians participating in other forms of activism.65 
Grassroots social movements have become more common place in Hungary in recent 
years, highly attended by the youth, and with the recent increase in youth votes 
supporting radical right party Jobbik some estimate up to 80% of young Hungarians 
engage in some form political activism.66 My definition of political activism, as 
explained previously, is also quite broad. Many interviewees had very little advanced 
activist experience but had perhaps voted or attended an event at some points. 
Interviews were conducted in English or Hungarian, depending on whose 
second language skills proved better. On two occasions a politically neutral 
acquaintance was used as a translator who had been briefed on the nature of my 
research and the necessary conduct during an interview. This was to ensure an in-
depth understanding of certain key specialist interviews. Notes were taken during all 
focus groups and in-depth interviews. In most cases interactions were also recorded to 
ensure translating and quotation accuracy, except on the few circumstances when 
interviewees were uncomfortable with electronic recording devices. 
Within the in-depth interview process politically active young people were 
asked a progression of questions concerning their views and thoughts on personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  ‘European	  Youth:	  Participation	  in	  Democratic	  Life’,	  Flash	  Eurobarometer	  375,	  (May	  2013),	  <	  
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_375_en.pdf>.	  	  	  
66	  Discussed	  in	  a	  panel	  session	  at	  the	  ‘Summer	  University’	  put	  on	  by	  LMP	  (August	  2011).	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experiences, memories and relations to the various agents of political socialization 
targeted in this thesis. The process of questioning was semi-structured in order to 
allow interviewees to bring in related topics, give personal anecdotes and develop 
their ideas.67 Most often youth interviews began with questioning their relations with 
the least controversial agent of socialization, mainly their upbringing and familial 
memories of political events and dialogues. Interviewees were asked to what extent 
they felt they knew family members’ political orientations, the nature of political 
dialogue in the home and their first memories of politics. On the topic of education 
interviewees were asked to discuss their secondary and university experience in terms 
of political efficacy, awareness of teachers’ political alignment and the openness of 
political dialogue and opinions within a campus setting. Media questions were more 
directly about media usage and opinions about various media outlets within Hungary, 
tracking perceived biases within the media. Grassroots social movements were 
discussed in terms of personal experience, willingness to participate in various 
movements and thoughts on current events. Political party preferences and opinions 
were generally asked last after the interviewee felt more comfortable with conversing. 
Direct topics on political parties are often a controversial subject matter in Hungary. 
Voting, participation and party preferences were usually divulged in the final stage of 
questioning.68  
 Fifteen interviews were conducted with Hungarian specialists, mainly 
sociopolitical experts and university professors in the field of politics, civics and 
history, four of which were also youth cohorts. In specialist interviews I was able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Appendix	  5	  gives	  the	  semi-­‐structured	  interview	  format	  used	  in	  my	  research.	  
68	  The	  interview	  sample	  spans	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum	  with	  slightly	  more	  respondents	  supporting	  
Fidesz,	  LMP	  and	  Jobbik	  and	  fewer	  in	  support	  of	  other	  political	  parties.	  This	  was	  expected	  since	  these	  
three	  parties	  have	  the	  largest	  bodies	  of	  youth	  support.	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get a sense of larger political changes affecting the youth sector as well as how 
professors handle sensitive topics of history and politics within the classroom. There 
are increasingly high levels of radical right sentiments and anti-Semitism among 
university students, particularly taking courses in political science and history 
(Kovács 1996, Vásárhelyi 2002, Nagy and Róna 2011). My hypothesis was that either 
these trends are disseminated through the education system by professors in particular 
fields or that there are certain contentious topics that are avoided, causing a gap in 
knowledge of political history to be filled by other agents of socialization.69  
 Participant observation was used for researching the activities of grassroots 
social movements as well as the inner workings of political youth parties.70 This was 
most relevant for my structural analysis of movements and parties. I attended youth-
based political events across the political spectrum. As seen in Chapter 2, with regards 
to observing political youth camps, participant observation was beneficial in mapping 
the structure and style of parties and movements and how they mobilized. It was also 
useful in profiling attendees to get a sense of age, gender and socioeconomic trends. 
Participant observation was also used to track symbols, slogans and subculture traits 
within movements and parties. This was especially useful looking at the distinct 
development of a radical right subculture in Hungary in recent years. On certain 
occasions an insider accompanied me to an event or camp, usually in order to gain 
initial access. Insiders tended to be an individual that had previously been interviewed 
and had offered admission of attendance. Appendix 3 gives a list of relevant events, 
speeches and youth camps attended for participant observation research. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Discussed	  in-­‐depth	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  Education	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  political	  socialization.	  
70	  See	  Appendix	  3	  for	  a	  list	  and	  description	  of	  demonstrations,	  events	  and	  youth	  camps	  attended	  for	  
participant	  observation	  in	  Hungary.	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 Data collected during my field research was analyzed extensively, tracking 
trends on different socializing agents and stratifying results, often along partisan lines. 
These trends and results are discussed in the following chapters. The next section 
discusses political socialization as well as social movement theories and research in 
relation to my framework.  
2.2 POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 
 Political socialization is an interdisciplinary field researching how values, 
beliefs, attitudes, behaviors and opinions are transmitted to the mass public. 
Seminally developed by Herbert Hyman (1959), political socialization draws from a 
variety of disciplines and subjects to analyze the process by which political values are 
developed in the youth by institutions. Specifically defined, it is the ‘process by which 
individuals acquire knowledge, skills and dispositions that enable them to participate 
as more or less effective members of groups and the society’ (Brim 1966; p 2). This 
includes how citizens learn their social role within their given environment from a 
young age onwards (Gross, Mason and McEachern 1958).71 Political socialization 
theory assumes that socialization experienced earlier in life will have a more lasting 
effect on attitudes and choices latter in life (Jennings and Niemi 1981, Fendrich and 
Turner 1989, Hooghe and Stolle 2003, Sears and Levy 2003, Galston 2001, Jennings 
and Stoker 2002). This process is two-fold. On the one hand it is assumed that 
experiences earlier in life will affect beliefs and attitudes more strongly than 
experiences later in life, and on the other hand it is assumed that networks established 
earlier in life are made more easily and will be stronger and more accessible than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Socialization	  is	  a	  complex	  and	  multifaceted	  field	  of	  research	  incorporating	  macro-­‐system	  values,	  
socialization	  or	  the	  resistance	  to	  it,	  political	  identity,	  community	  environment,	  discourse	  analysis	  and	  
political	  identity	  (Torney-­‐Purta	  2002).	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networks created later in life (Hooghe and Stolle 2003). This is not to say that 
attitudinal changes do not occur later in life due to employment (Kohn and Schooler 
1982) or family transitions (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2001), but the primary networks 
of political attitude are developed during early phases of the life cycle (Sigel 1989, 
Hooghe and Stolle 2003). 
Political socialization is relatively straight forward as a theory; however, as 
the basis for a research structure there is a large amount of variation. Often 
researchers have used qualitative methods to analyze the impact and inner-workings 
of one socializing agent in country or region-specific analyses: looking at family 
patterns (Chaffee et. al. 1973), the socializing effects of media (Chaffee 1997), the 
socialization of youth civic participation and civic education (Dudley and Gitelson 
2002, Gimpel et. al. 2003, Hooghe and Stolle 2003, Letki 2004) and the 
developmental process of youth political participation (Hooghe et. al. 2004, Pacheco 
2008). A limited scope of research has compared the impact of multiple agents 
(Jennings and Stoker 2002). Some research has previously analyzed the familial and 
media influences on political socialization as the television and internet become 
increasingly prevalent in daily lives (Grossbart et. al. 2002, Horowitz 2005). In fact, 
the only full multi-agent analysis of political socialization which has encompassed all 
the agents I am currently researching took place during the communist era under the 
strict centralized and totalitarian monitoring systems put in place primarily between 
1950 through the 1970s (Clawson 1973, Macintyre 1993). 
The above-mentioned research has all used a combination of qualitative 
methods, from large-scale surveys to in-depth interviews and focus groups. Without 
the scope to be able to fund a nation-wide survey, I felt that focus groups, interviews 
and participant observation provided the most robust framework for analyzing 
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political socialization trends in Hungary. In fact, after having completed my field 
work I realized that the answers I was seeking, about personal experiences and the 
influences of various institutions, were better answered through in-depth interviews 
and participant observation.72 While my research focused on youth activists as my 
primary cohort there an implied secondary focus on the generational divide between 
the current youth cohort and the parent generation. Section 2.2.2 discusses the 
political socialization experience of the parent generation in Hungary as a background 
comparison to contemporary processes.  
Thus, this research adds a valuable multi-agent analysis to the larger body of 
political socialization research, looking at the five primary agents of socialization and 
their effects on youth partisanships and political ideology development. This is of 
particular use in the Hungarian post-communist context with a rapidly changing 
political landscape, largely shaped by youth voters and activists supporting alternative 
political parties and movements. Political socialization offers a useful lens for 
studying trends in youth politics particularly the rise in radical right sentiments among 
the youth population in Hungary.  
2.2.1 Early to Modern Political Socialization Theory and Research 
 Early theories of political socialization in the 1950’s and 1960’s stated that 
youth participation on a civil and political level was the result of internalizing 
dominant social norms, which led to societal integration (Eisenstadt 1956, Coleman 
1961, Goslin 1969, Parsons 1952). Along these lines, learning and internalizing social 
roles created comprehension of the role expected of an individual and the status they 
expected to be recognized from others (Goslin 1969, Gross et al 1958) creating the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  The	  format	  for	  how	  questions	  were	  developed	  in	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  and	  in-­‐depth	  manner	  for	  
interviews,	  and	  a	  list	  of	  events	  attended	  for	  participant	  observation	  are	  given	  in	  Appendices	  2	  and	  3.	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political and cultural structure of a society.73 Politically speaking, socialization on 
these terms is the transmission of political beliefs and attitudes from generation to 
generation. These are maintained or changed by shifts in the political, social and 
economic environment at community, national, and international levels (Almond and 
Verba 1963, Gimpel et al 2003, Owen 2008). A large body of early research focused 
on youth interactions with authoritarian and democratic personality structures 
(Laswell 1930 and 1948, Lane 1959 and 1962, Greenstein 1975) as well as children’s 
perceptions of authority figures (Easton and Dennis 1965, Jaros 1967). Although early 
theories have remained strong in political socialization research, these foundational 
concepts have a tendency to emphasize political influence from the political system, 
placing the youth as a passive subject, accepting values dictated by the status quo 
(Hartman and Trnka 1985).  
 More recent theories have developed active models with new dimensions of 
socialization taken into account such as media, technology, peer groups and 
education, giving a greater scope to the study of political culture.74 In modern political 
socialization research more interactive agents of socialization are given credence, 
such as family relations (Greenstein 1965, Niemi and Jennings 1991, Horowitz 2005, 
Bruter and Harrison 2009), educational institutions (Torney-Purta 2002, Kovács 
1999), peer networks (Bruter and Harrison 2009), political organizations (Hockenos 
1993, Hooghe and Stolle 2005, Johnson and Reynolds 2007), and the media (Chaffee 
1997, Horowitz 2005). These agents of socialization often have varying levels of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  early	  political	  socialization	  theories	  were	  based	  almost	  entirely	  in	  Western	  
Democratic	  case	  studies,	  primarily	  in	  America	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  
74	  To	  define	  political	  culture	  I	  use	  the	  definition	  laid	  out	  by	  Lucian	  Pye	  and	  Sidney	  Verba	  (1965)	  
considering	  it	  as	  a	  ‘system	  of	  beliefs	  about	  patterns	  of	  political	  interaction	  and	  political	  institutions’	  
and	  not	  ‘what	  is	  happening	  in	  the	  world	  of	  politics,	  but	  what	  people	  believe	  about	  those	  happenings’	  
(Pye	  and	  Verba	  1965,	  p.516).	  These	  beliefs	  can	  be	  empirically	  or	  emotionally	  based.	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influence depending on national and cultural contexts. 
 Early political socialization research done in the 1950s and 1960s portrays the 
family as the primary source of socialization. In this model children base their values 
and political ideas on parental interaction and discussions at home (Greenstein 1965, 
Hyman 1959, Jennings and Niemi 1968). This remains a large part of youth 
socialization tracking the relation between parent-child interaction and potential 
political participation (Brady et. al. 1995, Gimpel et. al. 2003, Plutzer 2002, Verba et. 
al. 2005). Some still hold that the home environment is the most important factor in 
youth socialization as the first political resource an individual is exposed to. These 
resources include parental discussions, media materials and information technologies 
present in the home (Brady et. al. 1995, Verba et. al. 2005). Research has also shown 
that family-based socialization is intrinsically tied to party membership (Cross and 
Young 2008, Bruter and Harrison 2009).75  
 Although parental influence might be strong in earlier years, some predict that 
parental influence is eroded as the individual matures (Niemi and Jennings 1991, 
Sapiro 2004). As a young person comes in contact with other, sometimes more 
alluring, agents of socialization like peer groups or academic environments, previous 
political ideologies may be undermined and replaced (Niemi and Jennings 1991). 
Generally it is accepted that parents who create a more open environment, either by 
valuing independent thinking or providing media resources, have a greater influence 
on their child’s political attitude and knowledge (Chaffee McLeod and Wackman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Studies	  by	  Cross	  and	  Young	  (2008)	  showed	  that	  in	  research	  on	  Europe	  youth	  members	  were	  twice	  
as	  likely	  to	  to	  join	  a	  political	  party	  if	  a	  parent	  was	  already	  a	  member	  and	  with	  party	  members	  age	  25	  
and	  younger	  50%	  said	  that	  they	  were	  recruited	  into	  the	  party	  by	  a	  family	  member.	  Looking	  at	  six	  
European	  countries	  and	  fifteen	  political	  parties	  (including	  Hungary	  and	  political	  party	  Fidesz)	  Bruter	  
and	  Harrison	  (2009)	  found	  that	  on	  average	  53.4%	  of	  members	  said	  a	  family	  had	  inspired	  them	  to	  join.	  
Only	  9%	  said	  that	  the	  organization	  alone	  had	  influenced	  them.	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1973, McLeod and Chaffee 1972). Research into the link between family environment 
and political socialization has been done primarily by qualitative interviews and 
opinion-based surveys (Bruter and Harrison 2009, Cross and Young 2008, Torney-
Purta 2002, Niemi and Jennings 1991). Broad research shows that intergenerational 
value transmission is weakening with increased self-direction and individualism 
among the youth, leaving room for influences from other socializing agents 
(Slomczynski and Shabad 1997). 
 Education is a key tool in political socialization, analyzed in Chapter 6. Its 
utility as a mechanism to train the population according to national standards, 
including political and civic values, makes it a potentially powerful socializing tool 
(Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Sears 1975). Civic education is highly correlated with 
political knowledge and has the ability to develop increased civic participation 
(Hyman et. al. 1975, Delli et. al. 1996, Nie et. al. 1996, Dudley and Gitelson 2002).  
The ability to teach democratic norms and values is of particular interest in the post-
communist region where Western institutions are influencing national curriculums 
and structures within new democracies, eager to produce core democratic values 
(Barany and Vogyes 1995, Linz and Stepan 1996, Slomczynski and Shabad 1998, 
Sapiro 2004).  
 Adolescence and early adulthood, focused on in this thesis, is considered an 
especially important developmental period for learning civic orientation and 
developing norms for political participation (Galston 2001). In research done in 
twenty-eight countries, the Civic Education Study (CES) showed that the classroom 
environment has a large impact on personal expression and political perspectives 
(Torney-Purta 2004). Civic courses introduced into classrooms make up between a 
4% and 11% impact on raising political efficacy (Niemi and Junn 1998). The 
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classroom environment is also effective in giving students information and awareness 
about social and political organizations available to them, preparing them with skills 
needed to interpret politics (Torney-Purta 2002, Niemi and Junn 1998).  
 Of the politically socializing agents discussed in this thesis the media is the 
most fluctuating and ambiguous of the agents for its dual nature as an agent within its 
own accord as well as a political tool, used by party politics. ‘Media’ here includes 
print media, news television, information radio programs and online news portals, 
analyzed further in Chapter 7. Earlier studies on the connection between media and 
political socialization remain focused on political efficacy rather than partisanship. 
Research shows that young people who pay closer attention to news media are more 
likely to discuss it at home, developing a higher political consciousness and active 
network (Pingree et al 1975). Television and Internet-based media are becoming the 
principal source of media socialization for many young people in developed 
democracies causing a new line of political socialization research (Chaffee and Yang 
1990, Chaffee et al 1997).76 Computers, televisions and cell phones have 
revolutionized access to information on local and international levels creating a ‘total 
disclosure medium’ (Postman 1983 – p. 81, Buckingham 2000).  
 Newer online interactive media outlets also blur the distinction between media 
and social network. Increased media outlets and the Internet have allowed for newer, 
less conventional political participation; utilizing lobbying, forums, recruitment sites, 
networking and fundraising online (Norris 2002, Horowitz 2005). Linked to 
technological advances, social media has also changed how quickly young members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Television	  news	  and	  papers	  are	  considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  the	  largest	  distributor	  of	  political	  
knowledge	  and	  education	  (Chaffee	  1997).	  Television,	  and	  arguably	  now	  the	  Internet,	  is	  a	  bridge	  to	  
politics	  depicting	  real	  life	  politics	  and	  conveying	  concepts	  learned	  in	  school	  (Chaffee	  and	  Yang	  1990).	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can align and interact to create political identities through devices such as YouTube, 
Facebook, MySpace, and blogging (Owen 2008, Bennet 2008), relevant to Hungary’s 
blossoming mass mobilization culture. Since the abolition of media censorship laws in 
post-communist countries new television channels, newspapers, online news and 
forum outlets have become increasingly prevalent for youth information retrieval 
(Richardson 1998, Horowitz 2005).77 
 While my thesis targets five primary agents of socialization there are a myriad 
of other socializing forces, which have been targets in other research. Other agents of 
political socialization not dealt with directly in this thesis include religious belief 
systems (Searing et. al. 1973, Jelen and Wilcox 1998, Davidson-Schmich et. al. 
2002), the military (Beck 1977, Marshall 1998, Sapiro 2004, Gheciu 2005), non-
governmental organizations (Risse and Sikkink 1999, Warleigh 2002, Sapiro 2004, 
Gheciu 2005, Forbig 2005), local communities (Gimpel et al 2003, Campbell 2006) 
and labor unions (Volgyes 1975, Klandermans 2011). These agents are, however, of 
less relevance for the Hungarian youth case study. With regards to religiosity in 
Hungary only 45% of Hungarians report to believe in god (Eurobarometer 72, 2010) 
with around 12% of the population reporting that they attend church (Manchin 2004). 
Among the youth religious participation and attendance is even lower. Up to two-
thirds of young adults declare themselves as atheists or non-believers (Keil 2011). 
Labor unions are also perhaps less relevant to the youth cohort with very low youth 
subscription (Serrano and Waddington 2000, Pleyers 2005). With no large military 
presence, mandatory enrolment or international threat to Hungary the military also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Television	  access	  has	  changed	  media	  culture	  in	  post-­‐Communist	  areas.	  When	  censorship	  laws	  were	  
taken	  down	  in	  Poland	  in	  the	  early	  1990’s,	  24	  new	  commercial	  television	  stations	  were	  created.	  Poland	  
is	  now	  Europe’s	  5th	  largest	  television	  market	  (Horowitz	  2005)	  with	  Poles	  watching	  an	  average	  of	  67	  
more	  hours	  of	  television	  a	  year	  compared	  to	  other	  European	  countries	  (Richardson	  1998).	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plays a less insignificant role for youth socialization, although paramilitary 
organizations belonging to the radical right are discussed further in Chapter Seven 
with regards to grassroots social movements. NGOs are also present in Hungary but 
have little direct effect on the cohort in question. There is very little institutional trust 
in NGOs with a typically low turn out for membership and involvement in Hungary 
(Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011).  
 In the original planning of my thesis peer networks, or social circles, were 
meant to be a primary agent of socialization I was analyzing. As my research 
progressed I quickly realized that dedicating a chapter to peer networks was highly 
problematic for a number of reasons. During interviews an overwhelming majority of 
young Hungarians said that they did not ever discuss politics with friends at school or 
casually. The only time young politically active Hungarians felt that they could talk 
about politics, if they wanted to, was during activist events, either for a political party 
or within a social movement.  
 The lack of social circle socialization was best exemplified during initial focus 
groups during my field research, discussed further in the second part of this chapter. 
Despite focus groups being constructed around like-minded partisanships, often 
created from within a friend groups, participants were hesitant and often unwilling to 
discuss personal political sentiments and opinions, other than general complaints or 
broad opinions, in front of their peers. For this reason, instead of developing peer 
networks as its own agent of socialization, social political interactions are discussed in 
relation to political youth organizations (discussed in Chapter 3), grassroots social 
movement (Chapter 4) and educational environments (Chapter 6).  
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2.2.2 Political Socialization Research in Hungary and CEE: Socialism to Present 
 This section serves as a review of pre and post-communist research analyzing 
various agents of socialization as well as trends in civil society since this is the main 
focus of much youth-based literature incorporating CEE countries. Political 
socialization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) before 1989 was highly monitored 
compared to Western democracies. Similar to other communist satellite states, 
political socialization of the youth was centrally organized and studied by the state. 
With an intricate centralized system, the government monitored and institutionalized 
political socialization within the education system and social sectors to enforce and 
maintain Soviet ideologies and culture (Csepeli and Örkény 1992). Among the Soviet 
satellite states governments controlled the media, educational institutions and public 
spaces leading to a population that developed a strong distrust for those outside 
immediate family and close social circles and a general withdrawal from the public 
sphere (Koralewicz and Wnuk-Lipinski 1989, Tarkowska and Tarkowski 1991, 
Slomczynski and Shabad 1999). 
 The goal was to ensure that the primary socializing agent was the Communist 
State, working through the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP). Although 
informal agents of socialization played a role in child development such as peer 
groups and family, the Soviet powers did what they could to inculcate the Communist 
agenda into all formal forms agents of socialization including media, literature, youth 
groups and culture (Clawson 1973, Volgyes 1975).78 Despite large-scale efforts, 
Communist socialization was unsuccessful in that the youth failed full political and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  The	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Hungary	  created	  mandatory	  youth	  groups	  called	  the	  Young	  Pioneers’	  and	  
the	  ‘Communist	  Youth	  League’	  to	  insert	  political	  ideology	  from	  social	  networks	  from	  childhood	  to	  
adulthood.	  Political	  command	  of	  TV,	  radio	  and	  newspaper	  publications	  ensured	  media	  control.	  
Publications	  of	  books,	  what	  films	  and	  theatre	  pieces	  were	  shown,	  and	  art	  was	  also	  censored	  to	  ensure	  
control	  of	  formal	  agents	  of	  socialization	  (Volgyes	  1975).	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ideological indoctrination by the Soviet ideology (White 1977) counteracted by the 
impenetrable private sphere of family and primary support groups (Macintyre 1993, 
Siemienska 2002).79 This is not to say that communist rule did not leave its mark. 
Lasting imprints have been left on many facets of life in Hungary, however 
ideological indoctrination was far from successful. The changing grassroots landscape 
during Soviet rule also altered how the state viewed and treated the youth. In post-
WWII through the 1960’s, young people were seen as active participants in the plan 
to rebuild the state (Kuhar 2005). The youth were well integrated into societal 
programs and agendas. In the 1960’s through mid 1970’s this changed as political 
suspicion of youth intellectuals increased with student movements leading to an 
increase in independence in the 1980’s. The youth became a symbol of societal 
rejuvenators as active integrators of change (Mitev 1982, Mahler 1983).  
 The Kádár administration (ruled by János Kádár from 1956 until 1989) was 
reliant on continued economic expansion in Hungary, which sustained through the 
1970‘s but began to stagnate through the 1980s (Tőkés 1996, Kornai 1996). Political 
stability was maintained by the Kádár administration through developing an a-
political culture, separating people from the political sphere. In terms of socialization 
this meant that the Hungarian Socialist Party explicitly socialized citizens away from 
political engagement. This was managed through state-controlled media and 
education (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). While the education system still taught 
communist ideologies, the censored media and public discourse aimed to keep the 
public disengaged. Politics were for politicians and maintaining a passive stance 
towards politics was paralleled by a lenient second economy and increased national-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  There	  is	  also	  significant	  evidence	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  about	  non-­‐communist	  topics	  had	  a	  
greater	  influence	  in	  causing	  counter-­‐questioning	  against	  the	  state	  compared	  with	  political	  
socialization	  directly	  from	  the	  state	  (Macintyre	  1993).	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cultural freedoms, developing Hungary’s unique ‘goulash communism’ (Kornai 1996, 
Nyyssönen 2006). Young Hungarians in the period of political transition were the first 
cohorts to develop their own, albeit limited, political culture and profile, engaging in 
public and political life in formal and personal ways without the same level of 
political interference experienced by previous generations (Kuhar 2005). 
 From the 1960s till the end of socialism in 1990 the demobilization strategy of 
the Kádár government socialized citizens towards a general disinterest of politics 
through low civic competence combined with centralized media outlets. The family 
unit was the only counter agent to bureaucratic institutions (Szabó 1991). Supporting 
individual autonomy even internal family communications around political topics 
diminished during the Kádár Era (Kéri 1987, Szabó 1987). Alienating citizens from 
political processes and information outlets decreased general political dialogue in the 
private sphere. However, the family was still the most important agent for alternative 
political discourse.  
The Soviet system even attempted to control youth social networks by 
developing mandatory after school programs. Civil activities were mandatory for the 
youth under the communist system (Zasavsky and Brym 1978). Society building was 
communicated most heavily in mandatory ‘scouting’ youth organizations developed 
outside of school to promote the political system. Scouts under the age of fourteen 
were enrolled in the Young Pioneers (Uttoros) and those aged fourteen to twenty-
eight were enlisted in the Communist Youth League (KISZ) with the task to ‘educate 
young people in the communist spirit’ (Volgyes 1975, p.10). Good participation was 
rewarded with incentives such as trips around Hungary. Youth programs such as these 
blurred the line between politics, education and social life for the youth living under 
communism, something that Hungary’s radical right is reinventing today. Memories 
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of communist youth programs are still vivid for young adults that were in primary 
school through the transition.80 
 Educating a generation of Socialist youths was a top priority in the political 
agenda (Kürti 2002, Volgyes 1975). The education system was transformed through 
class-based de-stratification to bring education to the masses in a process of positive 
discrimination against the previously elite academic system (Szelényi 1998). To 
create a classless working population with homogenized support of the communist 
ideology the government installed free schooling and made education available to 
children from peasant and working-class families (Benda 1983, Ferge 1979, Bencédy 
1982, Simkus and Andorka 1982, Szelényi 1998).81 A strong socialist political 
ideology was added to most facets of the curriculum in an attempt to decrease the 
intergenerational transference values and limit the socializing influence of the family 
(Aschaffenburg 1998, Simkus and Andorka 1982, Volgyes 1975). Universities had 
tight curricula with very few extracurricular options, making higher education more 
like an advanced extension of secondary school. Each university was introduced with 
a new center of communist control monitoring the social origin and any political 
activism of every student (Murray 1960).82 Administration aimed at a ‘collective 
amnesia’ editing history books and public discourse to omit controversial political 
pasts such as the 1956 Hungarian uprising against the Soviets. Remaining politically 
passive was exchanged for being left alone and receiving benefits from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Although	  post-­‐1956	  education	  focused	  less	  on	  Sovietization	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  stronger	  Hungarian	  
orientation	  there	  were	  still	  Soviet	  influences	  in	  academic	  and	  scouting	  exercises.	  Communist	  scouting	  
programs	  were	  still	  active	  in	  Hungary	  up	  until	  transition,	  teaching	  communist	  songs	  and	  taking	  the	  
youth	  on	  politically	  driven	  camping	  trips	  (see:	  Hungary	  Country	  Studies).	  
81	  In	  1949	  school	  fees	  were	  abolished,	  dorms	  and	  cafeterias	  were	  created	  and	  admissions	  processes	  
started	  favoring	  peasant	  and	  working-­‐class	  children.	  By	  the	  1950’s	  it	  was	  required	  that	  half	  of	  the	  
students	  in	  schools	  had	  to	  be	  of	  peasant	  or	  working	  class	  families	  (Szelényi	  and	  Aschaffenburg	  1993).	  
82	  In	  1956	  university	  students	  took	  up	  arms	  against	  the	  Soviets	  in	  what	  is	  now	  known	  as	  the	  1956	  
Revolution,	  changing	  the	  government’s	  tactic	  and	  view	  of	  the	  youth	  and	  the	  role	  of	  education.	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government (Kis 1989, E.Kovacs 1998, Bozóki 1999, György 2000, Lendvai 2008).  
The media was used to promoting cynicism, cultivate support for social 
individualism and atomize people as separate form politics (Hankiss 1989, Bruszt and 
Simon 1994, Körösény 1999). As part of liberal reforms within the Kádár Era, 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, more autonomy was given to media editors and there 
was partial decentralizing of the press. Hungary had less rigid media regulation 
compared to elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, allowing for a slightly broader, 
albeit limited, scope for sociopolitical content and debate (Lánczi and O’Neil 1996). 
Changes during this time period also increased the circulation of certain national 
newspapers, almost doubling news availability within more provincial areas (Arpad 
2004). Although outwardly the government showed willingness to decentralize, 
nationwide the press was still a state-run apparatus with restricted access to 
alternative or oppositional views. The monopoly of free press by the Hungarian state 
suppressed information about oppositional movements and smaller uprisings of the 
time, helping the government distance the people from national politics creating 
political apathy (Szabó 1996).83 The media was used as a political tool for culture 
control, however, only a small percentage of those exposed became committed 
Marxist-Leninists (Volgyes 1975, Wittenberg 2006).84 
 The highly centralized and monitored system of control over socializing agents 
was stringent until 1980s when the government’s stimulus plans proved to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  It	  remains	  difficult	  to	  have	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  the	  level	  of	  outward	  contention	  states	  under	  
Communism	  due	  to	  the	  filtered	  media.	  Countries	  like	  Hungary,	  Slovakia	  and	  Slovenia	  have	  very	  few	  
records	  from	  press	  at	  the	  time	  showing	  any	  controversial	  events	  or	  movements	  that	  might	  have	  been	  
against	  the	  greater	  powers	  at	  the	  time	  (Szabó	  1996).	  
84	  Hungary	  was	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  least	  affected	  by	  Soviet	  political	  socialization	  through	  media.	  
While	  some	  countries	  like	  East	  Germany,	  Romania	  and	  Czechoslovakia	  had	  highly	  restrictive	  media	  
outlets;	  these	  regulations	  were	  comparably	  more	  lax	  in	  places	  like	  Hungary	  and	  Poland.	  Media	  
messages	  through	  television	  and	  papers	  supported	  passive	  more	  than	  active	  support	  of	  the	  political	  
system	  (Volgyes	  1975).	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economically unsustainable. Consistent figures of economic gain could no longer be 
maintained. The government-citizen relation of economic well being exchanged for 
civil passivity was no longer stable and it was at this point the government began 
negotiating the country’s transition towards democracy. Since transition policy-
making has shifted the youth into a passive if not forgotten position with few 
directives aimed at youth development or political engagement (Chuprov et. al. 2001, 
Kovacheva 2005). This is partially explained by the large-scale decentralization 
projects of democratic transition between 1990 and 1998, directing very little 
centralized funding towards ‘youth projects’ relying on increasingly monetary 
distribution which has led to significant urban-rural divides (Roker and Eden 2002, 
Kovacheva 2000a).85 The focus away from youth-directed initiatives has also affected 
the youth socialization research more generally across Central and Eastern Europe, 
moving away from state-monitored research.  
 Contemporary youth-based political socialization studies in Central and Eastern 
Europe are primarily incorporated within larger research projects comparing the post-
communist democracies with Western Europe. These studies most often track levels 
of democratic efficacy (Schwartz, Bardi and Bienchi 1996, Torney-Purta 2004, 
Baytchinska 2008, Bruter and Harrison 2009). Trying to measure levels of democratic 
consolidations and success in socializing democratic practices has been a priority for 
research on the youth population in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the largest 
concerns behind such studies is that traditional agents of socialization, such as family, 
school and mass media, may not be adequate resources to instill the post-communist 
youth population with democratic values (Niemi and Hepburn 1995, Chaffee 1997, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  The	  newer	  youth-­‐based	  parties	  and	  grassroots	  social	  movements	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  are	  
changing	  political	  space	  for	  the	  youth,	  providing	  tangible	  political	  outlets	  for	  young	  people	  as	  well	  as	  
forcing	  political	  attention	  back	  onto	  the	  youth	  cohort.	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Horowitz 2005, Forbig 2005).  
 The new youth generation is growing up without having lived through the 
Communist era while at the same time growing up without a stable tradition of 
democracy to set an example (Horowitz 2005). Many young people across Europe, 
but particularly in CEE countries, feel they have little or no power in influencing their 
economic and political situations and have become disillusioned by the political 
process (Touraine 1999, Pleyers 2005, Kovecheva 2005). Concern remains that the 
older generation, socialized under a socialist system, is not equipped to teach about 
democratic institutions or value sets (Chaffee and Jackson-Beeck 1977, Niemi and 
Hepburn 1995, Horowitz 2005). This is an increasing concern as right wing and 
radical right political outlets in Hungary offer historical revisionism and non-
traditional forms of political participation that are often more appealing to young 
citizens (Mareš 2010).86 
 Modern socialization and citizenship theory depicts citizenship as an active, 
rather than passive socializing process. Political socialization has the ability to 
encompass a broad spectrum of influencing agents. How citizenship is defined is no 
longer limited to interaction with political institutions (Delanty 2000, Kovacheva 
2005), encompassing participation within a variety of public and private networks. 
Volunteering, community involvement and a wide range of activities aimed at 
influencing policies, practices and environment are all relevant forms of citizen 
participation (Roker and Eden 2002).87 Political participation studies have shown that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Jobbik,	  as	  the	  strongest	  radical	  right	  wing	  political	  party,	  currently	  draws	  in	  significant	  youth	  
supporter	  electorally.	  Taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  Bulgarian	  Ataka,	  the	  Serbian	  Radical	  Party,	  the	  
Greater	  Romanian	  Party,	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democratic	  Party	  in	  Russia,	  Jobbik	  is	  unique	  in	  its	  youth	  
appeal	  and	  organizational	  management	  as	  a	  radical-­‐right	  party	  (Mareš	  2010).	  
87	  Chisolm	  and	  Kovacheva	  (2002)	  outline	  three	  forms	  of	  political	  participation	  by	  contemporary	  
youths;	  1)	  activity	  in	  institutional	  politics	  such	  as	  elections,	  campaigns,	  and	  party	  membership,	  2)	  new	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involvement and knowledge of civic and political practices earlier in life leads to a 
greater likelihood of participation and involvement within these practices later in 
life.88  In modern political socialization research the primary agents of socialization 
are depicted as family relations (Greenstein 1965, Niemi and Jennings 1991, 
Horowitz 2005, Bruter and Harrison 2009), the education system (Torney-Purta 2002, 
Kovács 1999), social groups and grassroots networks (Bruter and Harrison 2009), 
political organizations (Hockenos 1993, Hooghe and Stolle 2005, Johnson and 
Reynolds 2007), and the media (Chaffee 1997, Horowitz 2005) all targeted in this 
study. Political parties have been addressed mainly with reference to their structure 
and style in socializing strong youth support networks. Grassroots social movements 
are similarly dissected with regards to their organizational and horizontal structuring, 
taking on a unique format compared with more traditional agents of socialization like 
family, education and media. 
While political socialization remains an under-researched process within CEE 
most post-communist political research analyzes successful democratic transition 
through levels of civic engagement. Measuring civil society by way of voting, 
volunteering and membership in civic organizations is considered a critical factor in 
ensuring that new democratic institutions remain intact (Dahl 1989, Barnes and 
Simon 1998, Putnam 2000, Krishna 2002, Paxton 2002, Juknevicius and Savicka 
2003, Letki 2004, Savicka 2008). Socializing effects of community and civic 
organizations remain much lower in Central and Eastern Europe compared with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
social	  movements	  and	  participation	  like	  protests	  and	  demonstrations	  and	  lastly	  and	  3)	  civic	  
engagement	  expressed	  by	  community	  participation,	  volunteering	  and	  association	  memberships.	  The	  
third	  form	  of	  participation,	  defined	  by	  Siurala	  (2000)	  as	  post-­‐modern	  participation,	  is	  any	  
participation	  that	  encompasses	  expression,	  emotions,	  aestheticism,	  or	  virtual	  participation.	  
88	  Numerous	  studies	  have	  concluded	  that	  participation	  in	  voting	  at	  the	  earliest	  eligible	  age	  (usually	  
18)	  leads	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  likelihood	  of	  participation	  throughout	  one’s	  life	  (Plutzer	  2002,	  Hooghe	  
and	  Stolle	  2003).	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Western democracies (see Figure 2.2). In the early 2000s Hungary had estimates of 
above average levels of citizen volunteering compared with Western Europe but these 
levels have decreased drastically between 2004 and 2010.89 Currently Hungary 
maintains the lowest levels of volunteering within Central and Eastern Europe, as 
seen in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2: Citizen Involvement in Volunteering 
 
Figure	   2.2	   shows	   the	   percentage	   of	   citizens	   who	   claimed	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   some	   form	   of	  
volunteering	   either	   on	   a	   local,	   national	   or	   international	   level.	   This	   figure	   shows	   the	   Western	  
European	  Average	  compared	  with	  various	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  Union	  members.90 
Without developing democratic socializing agents to encourage civic 
participation young people are less willing to give up time to participate in their 
community or politics (Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2003, Kuhar 2005). In Hungary 
there have been politically-driven increases in civic participation during election 
times, particularly driven by right wing party, Fidesz, and the creation of localized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Hungary	  had	  an	  estimated	  40%	  citizen	  volunteering	  in	  2004	  yet	  more	  recent	  studies	  show	  
Hungary’s	  volunteering	  efforts	  have	  dropped	  to	  5.5%.	  See	  Figure	  2.2	  (Information	  from	  same	  report).	  	  
90	  Data	  comes	  from:	  Volunteering	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  Final	  Report,	  Educational,	  Audiovisual	  &	  
Culture	  Executive	  Agency	  (EAC-­‐EA),	  Directorate	  General	  of	  Education	  and	  Culture	  (DG	  EAC),	  
Submitted	  by	  GHK,	  (Brussels:	  2010),	  <	  http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1018_en.pdf>.	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‘civic circles’ (discussed in Chapter 3). Hungary has witnessed increased political 
activism in the election years of 2002, 2006 and 2010 as seen by civic protests, 
demonstrations and event riots.91 Despite general optimism towards civil participation 
in new democracies, alternative forms of political participation, popular among the 
youth, are not always a ‘democratic phoenix’ (Sloam 2013), as seen by the 
mainstreaming of radical right values through grassroots social movements in 
Hungary (discussed in Chapter 4). Research to date remains too narrowly focused on 
civic participation, defined by volunteering and/or statistics on membership in local or 
national organizations (eg. sports teams, environmental groups or local volunteer 
groups). Political socialization offers a more intricate analysis of what is driving 
political activism and partisanships.  
Education is also a key institutional agent in teaching democratic values and 
civic participation, under scrutiny by researchers looking at post-communist countries 
(Slomczynski and Shabad 1998, Torney-Purta 2002 and 2004). Research in Central 
and Eastern Europe shows mixed results concerning the effects of schooling and 
socialization towards democratic practices (Csepeli et. al. 1994, Fratczak-Rudnicka 
1991). How knowledge imparted within the education system solidifies or contradicts 
knowledge imparted from other socializing agents often determines success levels, as 
seen by the failures of Soviet ideological socialization. Family and education-based 
socialization processes are most often seen as primary foundation-builders (Niemi and 
Sobieszek 1977, Sears 1975, Slomczynski and Shabad 1998).  
In new democracies one of the main questions is how new democratic systems 
are able to preserve the past while institutionalizing new norms and political practices 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  As	  discussed,	  the	  political	  scandal	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Ferenc	  Gyurcsány	  in	  2006	  led	  to	  violent	  riots,	  
not	  typically	  common	  in	  Hungary.	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(Sapiro 2004). While some research shows positive correlations between civic 
education and political efficacy (Slomczynski and Shabad 1998) others argue that 
young citizens are not responsive to political programs or ideological messages 
distributed through civic education programs and political parties (Heyns and 
Jasinska-Kania 1992, Jowitt 1992). However, there is currently no literature 
comparing multi-agent socializing effects within Central and Eastern European 
countries making it difficult to know broader correlations between socializing agents. 
The theoretical model of political socialization underlying my research 
allowed for a flexible research structure so that my focus could shift slightly after 
initial focus groups, conducted to get a sense of general trends at the start of my 
research. In part my research design was pragmatic, allowing for a mixed methods 
approach that evolved slightly as my research continued. I used available quantitative 
data sets concerning elections and sociopolitical trends from Eurobarometers for data 
triangulations in combination with methodological triangulations between my focus 
groups, interviews and participant observations. Interviews proved the most useful, 
however, focus groups were essential in initial research and participant observation 
was key in analyzing the results espoused in interviews.  
 Having targeted five primary agents of socialization from background 
research into contemporary Hungarian political trends and youth activism I expected 
certain tendencies from each agent. My expectations for each agent are elaborated on 
in the chapters focusing on individual agents, however, generally I expected a 
continued strong familial influence, politically divided media outlets and polarizing 
political influences. I was initially less certain about the role played by secondary and 
higher education and the socializing impact of social groups. As mentioned, my initial 
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focus on social groups as a primary agent shifted into an analysis of grassroots social 
movements, which are having an increasing impact on political activism and partisan 
development in Hungary. As such, grassroots social movements took on its own body 
of research with distinct background theory and research. 
2.3 GRASSROOTS SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY RESEARCH 
 This report adds social movements into political socialization research. 
Although social movements are not traditionally analyzed as agents of political 
socialization this report recognizes the increasing importance of movements as an 
influencial factor in youth activism and partisanship building. Social movements in a 
Hungarian context are particularly relevant since post-communist Hungary has 
witnessed three movements turn into legitimate political parties. Fidesz, Jobbik, LMP 
and Together 2014 all began as grassroots social movements and transformed into 
political parties. Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP are especially relevant since they were 
founded as youth organizations and became youth-based parties. As such this section 
analyzes social movement theory and research and places it within the context of 
socialization theory as well as contextualizing social movements within Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
Social movements have their own body of research across the United States 
and Western Europe as well as within Central and Eastern Europe. Before a 
Hungarian specific analysis of grassroots social movements this section serves as an 
introductory review of foundational and region-specific social movement research. As 
defined by David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, social movements are ‘collective 
challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with 
common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and 
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authorities’ (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, p. 4). The foundation for engagement of social 
movements most often entails a political or cultural conflict (Wright 2004). Social 
movements typically lack formal membership or chairpersons and have the capability 
to overlap with other movements, cross borders and utilize decentralized forms of 
democracy, unlike the confines of formal political institutions (Gundelack 1984, van 
de Donk et. al. 2004). The grassroots element maintains that the movement is 
organized and run by common or ordinary individuals, in contrast to the leaders or 
elites of political parties or government bodies. In the context of researching social 
movements this thesis focuses less on early theories of collective behavior as random 
occurrences (Kornhauser 1959, Smelser 1962), relative deprivation causes (Gurr 
1970) or rational choice theory weighing costs and benefits of participation (Olsen 
1965, Chong 1991, Lichbach 1995).  
Grassroots social movements are essential in researching modern political 
socialization in Hungary due to their increased usage in recent years. Social 
movements, similar to political parties, have become a center for emotive responses to 
politicized topics and are creating activists out of previously passive citizens. 
Analyzing social movements in Hungary, my research mainly looks at structural and 
resource mobilization (Edwards and McCarthy 2004) paralleled with the political 
context creating an environment for social movements to arise (Meyer and Minkoff 
2004, Meyers 2004). Grassroots social movements taken into consideration in the 
Hungarian context include civil protest movements and grassroots organizations 
affiliating themselves with specific political parties. Social relations developed early 
on often effect political socialization carried into adulthood (Settle et. al. 2010) 
regardless of social status or economic background (Campbell et. al. 1954, Mutz and 
Mondak 1998, Beck et. al. 2002). Often times social network affiliations find 
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common values between familiar parallel socializing trends such as family or friend 
networks (Bruter and Harrison 2009).92  
In the Hungarian case, politicized social networks are often created and 
solidified within grassroots social movements while avoided, or even prohibited, in 
many other traditionally socializing outlets.93 While grassroots social movements are 
not a typical agent in political socialization research current social movements are 
playing an active socializing role in Hungary. My research originally focused on 
social/friend networks (mentioned in Chapter 1) but as my research continued my 
findings showed strong activist networks, partisan development and politically-based 
friendship socialization within Hungarian social movements. Grassroots social 
movements are an interesting and necessary agent in that they can create political 
space and content while also developing activist social networks beyond the original 
issue-specific causes (discussed in Chapter 4). 
2.3.1 Mobilization as Part of Socialization 
The boundaries between politics, cultural values, identity processes and collective 
self-reliance become fluid; politics becomes not only an instrumental activity for 
achieving concrete goals, but even at times an expressive and performance activity, 
entwined with the development of the self. (Dahlgren 2004, p. xii) 
What mobilizes people and how people mobilize as citizens are key questions 
with relation to socializing political participation and solidifying partisanships. 
Participation in social movements is an increasingly important aspect of citizenship as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  The	  influence	  of	  social	  networks	  and	  related	  movements	  often	  influences	  party	  membership	  and	  
many	  times	  parallels	  with	  family	  influences.	  In	  Surveys	  and	  interview	  across	  Europe	  16.4%	  of	  party	  
members	  mentioned	  friends	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  membership,	  9.1%	  mentioned	  friends	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  
family	  member	  and	  7.3%	  as	  the	  sole	  reason	  for	  joining	  (Bruter	  and	  Harrison	  2009).	  
93	  Discussed	  with	  relevance	  to	  Chapter	  6	  and	  the	  limiting	  education	  environment	  with	  regards	  to	  
political	  social	  discourse.	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participation in ‘official politics’ declines (Dahlgren 2004).94 Voluntary grassroots 
activism for political parties is in decline, paralleling trends of party de-alignment 
(Katz et. al. 1992, Mair 1994 Mair and van Biezen 2001, Dalton 2005). Civil society 
is defined as the process by which individuals interact and negotiate with each other, 
political actors and economic authorities by formally using parties and unions, or 
informally using voluntary associations and movements (Kaldor 2003). Social 
participation encompasses any means for an individual or group to participate within 
their community to influence policies, practices and the world around them (Roker 
and Eden 2002).  
As more formal practices of voluntary political activism decline new forms of 
civil participation through social movements are becoming increasingly appealing 
(Whiteley 2011). Social movements are a specific type of ‘alternative politics’, that 
are more ad hoc, mainly independent of traditional institutions and elites, 
incorporating interest groups, activists, single-issue coalitions and civic networks 
(Dahlgren 2004).95 A large portion of modern social movement research came about 
after the Second World War, particularly in the 1960s, when many people were trying 
to discover new forms of collective action in the creation of what is now known as 
our information society (Touraine 2002). Social movements in this period in the 
United States and Western Europe, and to a certain extent through Central and 
Eastern Europe, experienced cultural movements such as women’s movements, 
environmental movements and global citizen movements that combined institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  As	  mentioned	  previously	  ‘official	  politics’	  refers	  mainly	  to	  institutionalized	  forms	  of	  political	  
participation	  such	  as	  voting,	  party	  membership	  and	  volunteering	  for	  a	  political	  party.	  
95	  Alternative	  politics	  is	  also	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘new	  politics’,	  ‘life	  politics’	  and	  ‘sub-­‐politics’.	  
The	  term	  embodies	  non-­‐traditional	  forms	  of	  political	  participation.	  Traditional	  participation	  is	  defined	  
by	  party	  membership,	  voting,	  and	  membership	  in	  official	  issue	  oriented	  institutions	  like	  unions	  and	  
youth	  parties.	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advocacy with extra-institutional activities (Walker 1991, Minkoff 1994, Kriesi et. al. 
1995, Dalton 1996). 
An increasing body of social movement research analyses how the diversity 
within social movements affects cultural norms. Many researchers believe that 
networks between people of different backgrounds, cultures, and opinions are 
important for democratic politics (Putnam 2000, Marshall and Stolle 2004, Cigler and 
Joslyn 2002) but it remains unclear whether multicultural social networks have 
normative effects on political values and mobilization (Sears et al 1999). Some 
research finds a positive effect of multicultural peer networks fostering tolerance 
(Mutz 2002, Ciglar and Joslyn 2002) and stimulating community involvement  
(Harell et. al. 2007). Others have found that heterogeneous networks create weak 
political values, inhibiting rather than mobilizing democratic political participation 
(Sears et al 1999, Alesina and Ferrara 2000, Mutz 2006, Costa and Kahn 2003).96 The 
increasing frequency of political grassroots social movements in Hungary serves as an 
ideal platform for analyzing how movements are changing cultural norms and thus 
socialization trends.    
Numerous studies have concluded that today’s young citizens in America and 
across Europe are more individualistic and less collectively minded than previous 
generations regarding organizational and political participation (Eisner 2004, Dalton 
2008, Sander and Putnam 2010). However, exploring the evolving relationship 
between electoral politics and social movements allows for individualism and 
collective action to coexist (Burstein and Linton 2002, Meyer 2007, Heaney and 
Rojas 2007, Fisher 2012). Most young people in Hungary, and across Europe, feel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Most	  research	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  has	  been	  conducted	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Western	  Europe	  making	  it	  
difficult	  to	  say	  that	  the	  same	  results	  and	  mechanisms	  would	  be	  true	  within	  a	  post-­‐communist	  context.	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that parties fail to interact or make efforts towards the inclusion of their age cohort 
(Bang 2005, Bruter and Harrison 2009). Generally, flexible, non-committal social 
movements have been most successful in attracting young people across Europe 
(Tarrow 1998, Sloam 2013) including Hungary (Szabó 1996). 
Grassroots social movements are of special interest with regards to political 
youth-based studies. Young people remain more likely to participate in social 
movements and protest activities compared with older cohorts (Dalton 1996), largely 
due to their increasing marginalization from electoral politics (Sloam 2013). Most 
research underestimates the scope of youth political activity by a narrow definition of 
political engagement (Owen 2008, Farthing 2010). While traditional political 
activism, such as party membership and volunteering, is rapidly decreasing (Mair and 
Van Biezen 2001, Pedersen et. al. 2004, Scarrow 2000, Webb et. al. 2002) the youth 
sector is developing new and preferred ways of expressing their disenchantment with 
politics and politicians within alternative political groups and organizations (Bruter 
and Harrison 2009, Whiteley 2007, Kürti 2002). Modern alternative political 
organizations tend to build on larger volunteer bases and rarely require formal 
membership or subscription (Whiteley 2007) compared with older movements 
requiring a small core of permanent organizers with a wider sporadic activist base 
(Gerhards and Rucht 1992).   
To a large extent the growing use of social protest movements are diffused 
through electronic and internet communication, redefining the structure and capacity 
of movement organizations and allowing for a more rapid and widespread network 
(Meyer and Tarrow 1998, Gibson and Ward 2000, Dahlgren 2004). New media such 
as blogs, organization sites, e-zines and online groups allow inexpensive dispersal of 
information and communication between activists and interested individuals (Klein 
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2000, Bennett 2003 and 2004, Oates et. al. 2006). These online information and 
organizational formats are also more preferred and utilized by a younger network.97 
Social movements remain largely based on direct interaction between people but have 
become increasingly complimented by internet networking as well as alternative 
media outlets such as leaflets, zines and newsletters (van de Donk et. al. 2004). The 
ability of social movements to penetrate accessible media formats to disperse their 
message remains one of the largest obstacles for most founding movements (Zaller 
1992, Rucht 2004). Modern social movements can create temporary political 
mobilization directed at authorities as well as mature into parties and interest groups, 
creating long-lasting civil services (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, Kriesi 1995).  
Social movements can shape public discourse and debate as well as create an 
infrastructure for collective action and facilitate mediating collective identities linking 
marginalized groups in society (Minkoff 1997). Grassroots social movements work to 
engage in communal civic networks and local communities, helping build civil 
society (Foley and Edwards 2006) similar to the strategies being employed by current 
alternative youth-based parties in Hungary like Jobbik. 
2.3.2. Civil Participation and Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe 
Social movements and political activism define the ‘political citizen’, 
establishing norms, creating socializing experiences and developing skills that define 
future political participation (Schier 2000, Owen 2008). Grassroots social movements 
are a participatory option available to the youth in Central and Eastern Europe that 
was previously denied. In Soviet-run society highly restricted public political 
discourse made open civil society and alternative political movements practically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Particularly	  in	  Hungary	  the	  youth	  uses	  the	  Internet	  with	  significantly	  higher	  frequency	  than	  older	  
cohort,	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  See	  also	  Figure	  7.1	  comparing	  media	  usage	  by	  age	  cohort.	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impossible (Csepeli and Örkény 1992, Siemienska 2002). Participatory democracy 
and an active civil society have been difficult to fully develop after years of social and 
political distrust in Central and Eastern Europe (Putnam 1993, Letki 2004, Kovács 
1996, Mareš 2010). Till the early 2000s in CEE there was only a limited social 
movement culture and few identifiable new activist actors (Touraine 2002).  
Low levels of interpersonal trust leftover from the Soviet era are thought to be 
a main cause of low participatory involvement. While social movements were 
prevalent during transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Giugni 1998), activism declined as the initial goal of regime change 
normalized and citizens became more passive (Pickvance 1999). This effect can be 
seen as particularly high in Hungary where, as seen in Figure 2.1, only 5.5% of 
Hungarians participate in volunteering compared with a Western European average of 
35%. Hungary also ranks low in activism in single-issue movements where only 2% 
of the population participates in political forms of activism.98 While Western 
democracies have a thriving culture of think tanks and NGOs, post-communist 
Europe has been less successful in developing NGOs, lacking resources, treated with 
apathy and seen skeptically by most of the public (Kurkchiyan 2003, Smilov and 
Tisné 2004, Grødeland 2006, Grødeland and Aasland 2011). 
Analyzing the impact of social movements is useful in questioning whether 
the trend of youth un-involvement in traditional political participation, such as voting 
and party membership, is really a sign of youth disengagement or if new forms of 
activism are replacing traditional forms of participation (Kovacheva 2005). A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Poland	  has	  the	  fewest	  political	  activists	  and	  members	  while	  Hungary	  ranked	  close	  behind	  along	  
with	  Latvia	  and	  Russia.	  This	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  Soviet	  legacy	  of	  weak	  civil	  society	  and	  
discredited	  political	  affiliations	  (Whitely	  2011).	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majority of the youth in Hungary and across Europe feels that parties fail to make 
efforts to include their age cohort (Bruter and Harrison 2009). The youth are less 
politically active, especially in traditional political activities, than older cohorts 
(Siemienska 2002). Also, the ‘voluntary’ civil service that was mandatory for the 
youth under the Soviet system (Zasavsky and Brym 1978) no longer exists to enforce 
and socialize civil participation. Politically led civil youth programs attached to 
schools like the Hungarian Pioneers (Úttörő) and Communist Youth Organization 
(Magyar Kommunista Ifjúsági Szövetség – KISZ) promoted local volunteering and 
community activities with a strong focus on political socialization (Volgyes 1975, 
Szabó 1991). Forced political messages embodied in these mandatory youth programs 
have created a legacy of distrust in political parties and cynicism towards political as 
well as civil institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997).  
Figure 2.3: Levels of Youth Participation in Hungary Compared with EU27 
 
Figure	   2.3	   shows	   levels	   of	   youth	   participation	   in	  Hungary	   (in	   Blue)	   compared	  with	   the	   European	  
Union	  average	  (in	  Red).	  The	  definition	  of	  ‘Youth’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  EU	  looks	  at	  responses	  from	  
those	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  fifteen	  and	  thirty.	  Data	  for	  Figure	  2.3	  comes	  from:	  ‘Youth	  of	  the	  Move’,	  
Flash	  Eurobarometer,	  (319a),	  (European	  Commission,	  May	  2011).	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This distrust and lack of interest in civil institution is apparent by the low 
participatory levels of young people in Hungary, shown in Figure 2.3. Hungary is 
about average compared with other CEE countries however they rank particularly low 
in youth participation in outward volunteering efforts. Sports Clubs, Youth 
Organizations and Cultural Organization usually have very little to do with civil 
participation aiding the community at large. Local activities rank higher with regards 
to civil participation however participation in political activities, environmentally 
focused work and international/human rights focused participation is particularly low 
in Hungary among young Hungarians. There are, however, some youth-directed 
NGOs at work in contemporary Hungary such as Mobility (Mobilitás - mobilitas.hu), 
the Foundation for Democratic Youth (Demokratikus Ifjúságért Alapítvány), and the 
Association of Community Developers (Közösségfjlesztők Egyesülete - www.kka.hu). 
These groups aim at increasing youth volunteering and civic education with varying 
levels of membership and participation.99 
Popular demands for democratic institutions and freedoms by grassroots 
organizations in Central and Eastern Europe show an alternative view of democratic 
participation and political interest (Rose et. al. 1998). The use of grassroots social 
movements to convey political ideas is proliferating across Europe, becoming less of 
a subculture and more part of normalized participatory practices (Scarrow and Gezgor 
2010, Sloam 2013). Thus legitimizing grassroots social movements as an increasingly 
influential socializing force, paralleling political parties. Grassroots social movements 
are being developed and utilized with more frequency in Hungary starting in 2002 
with the politically charged creation of civic circles developed by Fidesz. Movements 
have increased further with the controversial political events sparked in 2006 as well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Only	  one	  interviewee	  mentioned	  participation	  within	  any	  of	  these	  NGO	  youth-­‐directives.	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as more recently in 2010 (discussed in Chapter 3). For the purposes of my research 
the final body chapter of this thesis targets grassroots social movements as an agent of 
socialization by mapping the most influential and prevalent movements, most drawing 
in substantial youth activism. Research on social movements is complex in that it 
stands alone as its own agent of political socialization as well as utilizing and 
attaching to other socializing agents such as media, educational institutions and 
political parties.  
*** 
Political socialization remains a relatively new approach for research in post-
communist countries. The highly state-centralized enforcement and monitoring of 
socialization processes within education, media and political messages during 
socialism has left distaste for the continuation of state-run socialization research. This 
is a large reason for the discontinuation of much socialization research within Central 
and Eastern Europe since 1989. While political socialization theory targets multiple 
agents, in practice, even within Western Europe and the Unites States, most research 
limits its focus to one socializing agent. However, in tracking the current processes 
behind political party alignments and value shifts towards right and radical right 
preferences among the Hungarian youth, a broader spectrum is necessary. While early 
socialization theory focused primarily on family upbringing and authority relations, 
modern theories have developed a framework for a more active and complex account 
of political socialization. Youth specific socialization research tends to focus mainly 
on family and education. CEE country research is usually only included in wider 
comparative, single-agent studies. This thesis goes beyond single-agent approaches in 
order to analyze, not only how initial civic and political practice is taught, but also 
compare various influences developing partisanship and activism. 
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In the last decade Hungary has also seen an increasing use of grassroots social 
movements in the form of large-scale protests and demonstrations as well as the 
institutionalization of politically aligned civil organizations. Hungary’s current 
political climate is far from stable, with large sociopolitical changes in flux. Although 
grassroots social movements are not often used as an agent in analyzing political 
socialization they are arguably a very influential and key force in these current shifts, 
particularly with regards to youth activism. The following chapters use Hungary as a 
case study for utilizing political socialization theory to track the influences behind 
Hungary’s shift to the right and radical right, largely represented by the youth.  
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3. POLITICAL PARTIES & YOUTH PARTICIPATION  
Taking a youth-oriented perspective on political developments this chapter 
analyzes major shifts in party politics, covering the rise of the right and radical right 
as well as the decline of liberal-left parties between 2002 and 2010. The solidified 
bipolar nature of Hungarian politics, embodied by right wing party, Fidesz, and left 
wing party, MSZP, dominated the political landscape from 1998 until the 2010 
national elections, which produced an entirely new political paradigm. The right 
(Fidesz) and radical right (Jobbik) have been highly successful in turning popular 
grassroots nationalism into official policy-driven nationalism.100 This chapter 
investigates the successes and weaknesses of Hungarian political parties in their 
ability to cultivate youth support within both traditional and alternative forms of 
political activism.101 Hungary’s significant electoral shift towards the right and radical 
right was greater among youth voters compared with other cohorts (see Figure 3.2), 
exemplifying a youth tendency towards conservative authoritarian political 
preferences, suggested by certain Hungarian researchers previous to the 2010 
elections (Kitschelt 1992, Todosijević and Enyedi 2000, Nagy et. al. 2012).102 
For the purposes of my research Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP are the primary 
parties focused on due to their high levels of youth electoral support compared with 
other parties as well as their youth foundations. All three parties were originally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  The	  idea	  of	  party	  politics	  turning	  ‘popular	  nationalism’	  into	  ‘official	  nationalism’	  was	  first	  
introduced	  by	  Anderson	  (1991)	  however	  this	  concept	  has	  been	  discussed	  with	  regards	  to	  post-­‐
communist	  networks	  by	  Hockenos	  (1993)	  looking	  at	  radical	  right	  movements	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
101	  Traditional	  activism	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  official	  youth	  party	  membership	  and	  voting	  trends.	  
Alternative	  activism	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  civil	  protests	  and	  demonstrations.	  	  
102	  This	  thesis	  does	  not	  go	  into	  much	  depth	  over	  the	  materialist/post-­‐materialist	  debate,	  which	  has	  an	  
extensive	  literature.	  While	  some	  researchers	  within	  this	  field	  have	  pointed	  towards	  a	  youth	  in	  
Hungary	  that	  is	  following	  Inglehart’s	  lines	  of	  post-­‐material	  development	  (Mónika	  2005),	  others	  have	  
provided	  evidence	  tending	  towards	  more	  authoritarian	  values	  (Todosijević	  and	  Enyedi	  2000).	  This	  
thesis	  looks	  at	  the	  mechanisms	  behind	  political	  alignment	  and	  identity	  more	  than	  of	  post-­‐materialism.	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founded as youth organizations and gained high levels of youth support in the 2010 
national elections. Fidesz has played a dynamic role not only in developing youth 
political activism in Hungary but also as the harbinger of other youth-based parties, 
Fidesz has developed a party structure and format for gaining grassroots support that 
both Jobbik and LMP have taken from in building their own parties. Throughout this 
thesis I refer to youth parties and youth-based parties with reference to Fidesz, Jobbik 
and LMP. Youth parties refer to parties that were founded by a group of young 
people, usually evolving out of a youth organization. Youth parties have an age limit 
to membership. In the case of Fidesz this cut off was originally thirty-five. I also refer 
to youth-based parties defined as parties aiming a large focus of their political efforts 
at younger voters and whose primary or most significant voter base is among those 
under the age of thirty. Most literature refers to youth organizations attached to 
political parties (Hooghe et. al. 2004, Hooghe and Stolle 2005, Bruter and Harrison 
2009) but there is little written on political parties formed by youth organizations or 
made up of primarily youth supporters.  
Fidesz was established as a youth party with an age limit of thirty five until 
1993 when the party began to shift its alliances towards the right and rid of its age 
restriction.103 Jobbik originated and remains largely a youth-based party as defined by 
their foundations as a youth organization within one of Fidesz’s civic circle 
initiatives. Jobbik’s chairman, Gábor Vona, is also a hallmark of Jobbik’s youthful 
radicalism, still in his early thirties. LMP is considered a youth-based party as well by 
their core founders, formed largely within the Special College, TEK, attached to 
Corvinus University in Budapest (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). Their 
support network is primarily younger Hungarians and activists, drawing in large 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Fidesz	  originally	  had	  an	  age	  limit	  of	  thirty-­‐five	  labeled	  as	  a	  liberal	  youth	  party.	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support from the Budapest-based youth. Fidesz was the only party that maintained an 
age limit as a political party, however Jobbik, previous to becoming an official party, 
also unsurprisingly had an age limit for membership in its youth organization. LMP’s 
foundations were mainly grassroots based, maintaining a relatively low profile until 
announcing their political status in 2009. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part focuses more on the 
founding structures and initiatives of Fidesz that have given a format to newer youth-
based parties. The first part of this chapter dissects Fidesz as a party with reference to 
youth activism and support, starting with its foundations as a youth party through its 
tactics in gaining wider support across Hungary with its more grassroots techniques. 
Fidesz’s development of civic circles (polgári körök) to concentrate the right and 
create a network for mass mobilization has developed a model for sociopolitical 
maneuvering in Hungary. This section also addresses Fidesz’ relationship with the 
radical right in more recent years. The second section of this chapter looks more 
directly at the two newer parliamentary parties, Jobbik and LMP. Despite the current 
questionable stability of LMP as a political party in the long run the party is a useful 
case study. LMP not only shares similar strategies to LMP and Fidesz but also 
maintains high levels of youth support, mainly in Budapest, regardless of internal 
splits within the party.104 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  Media	  around	  the	  2010	  elections	  speculated	  that	  LMP’s	  ability	  to	  achieve	  parliamentary	  status	  and	  
pass	  the	  electoral	  threshold	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  viable	  liberal-­‐left	  political	  options	  more	  
than	  LMP’s	  credentials.	  The	  party	  has	  also	  faced	  recent	  internal	  splits	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  
to	  join	  other	  viable	  political	  opposition	  movements	  against	  Fidesz	  or	  to	  remain	  free	  of	  larger	  
coalitions.	  The	  party’s	  ability	  to	  form	  from	  a	  youth-­‐based	  grassroots	  format	  and	  their	  tactics	  to	  gain	  
public	  awareness	  and	  political	  support	  is	  what	  will	  be	  of	  interest	  for	  this	  thesis.	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3.1 FIDESZ: FOUNDER OF YOUTH PARTIES IN HUNGARY 
 Fidesz has maintained an influential role in youth politics in Hungary, from its 
foundation in March 1988 as the liberal Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal 
Demokraták Szövetsége – FIDESZ) through its transformation into the conservative 
nationalist Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz Magyar Polgári Szövetség - Fidesz-MPP). 
The party is, not least, important in this case study in its maintenance of the largest 
political youth organization in Hungary, and one of the largest in Europe, with around 
12,000 members.105 Fidesz is a distinct case among CEE centre-right parties not only 
in its shift from a radical liberal party to a conservative nationalist party, but also in its 
ability to concentrate other right wing parties under its umbrella ideology and to 
organize mass mobilization in the form of civic circles (Fowler 2004, Enyedi and 
Linek 2008, Korkut 2012). Fidesz has also provided a crucial model for ‘youth 
parties’ and social movements that have aspirations of transforming into mainstream 
political parties. The early years of democratic transition molded Fidesz, in part, into 
the party it is today. 
3.1.1    The Early Years of Transition 
 Fidesz was founded in 1988 as an autonomous student movement, organizing 
outlawed protests against the communist system, often in symbolic locations such as 
ex-Soviet bunkers (Szabó 2011). This dissident and avant-garde youth movement was 
a radical liberal alternative supporting the end of Soviet control as well as a strong 
separation of church and state (Enyedi 2005). Early Fidesz had the ability to collect 
tens of thousands of signatures asking communist MPs to resign in the last two years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  12,000	  is	  the	  membership	  number	  given	  through	  Fidelitas’	  official	  website.	  Fidelitas	  
representatives	  confirmed	  this	  number	  to	  be	  ranging	  between	  10-­‐12,000.	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of socialism, taking a hard line against Soviet power (Körösény 1990). Most of 
Fidesz’s leading representatives in the 1990s had a record of anti-establishment 
activism in the Kádár period before 1989 (Szabó 2011).106 The Hungarian protest 
tradition in the late socialist period consisted of urban youths, young professionals 
and white-collar workers. Dissident opposition groups brought together artists, 
students, scientists and educators, conducting protests, mainly in the city center of 
Budapest and other larger university towns (Schöpflin 1979).  
The 1989 Fidesz-led youth mobilizations modeled demonstrations on the 
Hungarian Revolutions of 1848 and 1956 (Tőkés 1998), a tradition that continues 
today. Hungary had some of the most highly attended youth protests in Central and 
Eastern European during the late Kádár era, rejecting models for planned economy 
and communist structures (Knabe 1989, Ramet 1991, Szabó 1991). It was from this 
atmosphere that Fidesz, as a political party, came into being. Tracking the frequency 
of political activism in the early transition years, between 1990 and 1994, Fidesz 
organized more protests and political demonstrations than any other political party in 
Hungary, mainly condensed between 1989 and 1992 (Ekiert-Kubik 1998). This was 
largely due to the strong youth network Fidesz had developed as an organization, 
supported by activist students and intellectuals. 
While the party’s platforms have shifted over the years, Fidesz’ legacy as an 
‘outlawed and clandestine’ political youth movement has been preserved in the 
party’s continued strong anti-communist stance and popular mobilization strategies 
(Szabó 2011, p.47, see also Bozóki 1992). Transitioning from a political youth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Other	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  also	  began	  anti-­‐Soviet	  political	  organizations	  in	  the	  
lead	  up	  to	  transition.	  A	  large	  alternative	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  Polish	  Solidarity	  Movement.	  However,	  
Fidesz	  was	  somewhat	  unique	  for	  being	  a	  well-­‐organized	  youth	  movement	  with	  political	  intentions.	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organization into a liberal youth party Fidesz maintained an age limit of thirty-five I 
its first three years as an official party. Even as an official party, Fidesz was known 
for its radicalism in demanding a constitutional state and liberal economy, as well as 
its readiness for action.107 The young Fidesz politician Viktor Orbán first came into 
national awareness on 16 June 1989 at the reburial of the former Prime Minister Imre 
Nagy, where Orbán demanded in his speech that all Soviet troops immediately 
withdraw from Hungary and that free elections commence (Palonen 2011, Lendvai 
2012).108 In the first democratic national elections in 1990 Fidesz ran in a joint 
candidacy with fellow liberal party Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ).  
SZDSZ was the original leading liberal party with strong anti-communist 
platforms and a core membership of liberal, Budapest and more urban-based 
intelligentsia (Körösény 1999). In the first national elections SZDSZ gained the 
majority of its support from their campaign for rapid, rather than gradual, changes to 
the transition economy as well as their distinct and clear stance against MSZP, seen as 
the continuation of socialism (Pittaway 2003). Although the two parties joined a 
coalition, SZDSZ was clearly a stronger party option in the first elections. SZDSZ 
gained 21.4% of the votes, becoming the second largest political party in Hungary, 
while Fidesz only gained 9% on its own (see Table 1.1 for Hungarian national 
election results 1990). By the second national elections in 1994 Fidesz had already 
begun to shift its image abandoning its original age limit and redefining its voter base. 
Fidesz maintained membership in the political federation ‘Liberal 
International’ until 1992, with Viktor Orbán on the group’s bureau (Pridham 2008). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  ‘A	  FIDESZ	  Politikai	  Program	  Nyilatkozata’,	  FIDESZ	  Hirek,	  (4),	  (1988),	  pp.	  4-­‐6.	  
108	  This	  seminal	  speech	  is	  also	  listed	  in	  Viktor	  Orbán’s	  official	  CV:	  ‘CV	  of	  Viktor	  Orbán’,	  Magyarorszag	  
Jobban	  Teljesít,	  Miniszterelnök	  Hatósági	  Weboldal	  (Prime	  Minister	  Official	  Website),	  
<http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_cv_of_viktor_orban/>.	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Between 1993 and 1998 Fidesz transformed itself from a radical liberal youth party 
into a conservative nationalist party while maintaining most of its core representatives 
keeping Viktor Orbán as the party’s unquestioned leader (Fowler 2004, Enyedi and 
Linek 2008, Szabó 2011, Korkut 2012). Fidesz began to modify its identity in 1993 
when Viktor Orbán announced that the party was a national-liberal party at the Party 
Congress, keying on the nationalist aspects of Fidesz’s earlier stances (Enyedi 2005). 
However, it was only after a poor electoral result for the party in 1994 combined with 
the surprising shift of Fidesz’s liberal partner Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) 
that Fidesz openly began its conservative transformation.109  
Similar to the political swing in Poland, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 
won the second democratic elections in 1994 and SZDSZ shocked many of its liberal 
supporters, who campaigned strongly on anti-communist platforms, when the party 
agreed to a coalition with MSZP coalition. The alliance allowed MSZP to gain 
credibility away from its communist past while giving SZDSZ greater influence in 
parliament. Fidesz was thus left alone in the liberal camp and found political 
opportunity in the conservative right camp, which was at this point in disarray. The 
leading conservative right wing party, Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), which 
had won elections in 1990, found transitional political decisions pressured resulting in 
socioeconomic strains, unwelcome by Hungarian citizens. MDF was further 
weakened by the death of the party’s leader and Prime Minister, József Antall, in 
1993.  
Fidesz recognized that a shift to the right would benefit the party and thus 
began their party reform to concentrate right wing political entities that had been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  In	  1994	  the	  liberal	  camp	  dissolved	  in	  part	  from	  its	  inability	  to	  win	  the	  1994	  elections.	  SZDSZ	  
received	  19.74%	  while	  Fidesz	  received	  only	  7.02%.	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weakening from internal fractioning and external pressures of transformation (Fowler 
2004, Korkut 2009). Between 1994 and 1998 the political rhetoric of Fidesz branded 
the party as a guardian of Hungarian values and an embodiment of the national 
consciousness (Korkut 2009). 1994 data shows that Fidesz was considered the least 
authoritarian party within the Hungarian political spectrum. By 2002 the party was on 
the other end of the spectrum as one of the most authoritarian parties in Hungary 
(Enyedi 2005). By 1998 Fidesz had developed a new right wing political format in 
Hungary by adopting mixed ideological elements and utilizing the lowest common 
denominator of anti-communist sentiments to consolidate a diverse range of right 
wing forces. In Hungary ideology and strategy are often blurred combining national 
myths with state aspirations to mobilize political support from citizens (Kovacs 1998, 
Bayer 2005). The first Fidesz government (1998 to 2002) combined conservative 
consolidation with populist mass mobilization branding itself the ‘second revolution’ 
by defeating MSZP, personified in propaganda as a continuation of the previous 
Communist regime (Bozóki 2008). In shedding the party’s ‘youth brand’, Fidesz 
strayed away from its grassroots organizational style after 1994, centralizing the party 
and strengthening its structure (van Biezen 2003), however the party soon re-
recognized the salience of grassroots mobilization combined with centralized party 
structures. While the first Fidesz government focused on changing the media 
landscape (discussed in Chapter 7) and national re-branding of the party, it was not 
until the next elections in 2002 that Fidesz truly branded itself as a mass mobilization 
party. 
3.1.2 Mass Mobilization and Civic Circles 
Fidesz’s transformation into the most successful and powerful right wing party 
in Hungary was three-fold. Fidesz firstly asserted the party as a competent right wing 
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political option while keeping its core leaders and party structure between starting in 
1994. Secondly, Fidesz developed links with traditional right wing parties and 
institutions, forming a coalition with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and 
the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) in 1998. The final step solidifying 
Fidesz as a right wing stronghold in Hungarian politics was the creation of right wing 
social movements and extra-parliamentary structures (Enyedi 2005). Fidesz came into 
power in 1998 as the leader of a large right wing coalition stressing increased national 
and popular issues (Glenn 2001, Mény-Surel 2002). However, it was not until 2002 
during the national elections that Fidesz transformed the format and content of 
Hungarian politics.  
After a close first round of voting between Fidesz and MSZP in the 2002 
national elections Fidesz became wary that despite a high popular electoral victory the 
party might not win in Hungary’s system of proportional representation and first-pass-
the-post.110 Fidesz began a more aggressive campaign tactic, mobilizing up to 
100,000 citizens in demonstrations and rallies against MSZP (Enyedi and Linek 
2008). Fidesz rhetoric questioned the legitimacy of electoral results before the second 
round of elections, preemptively calling for a re-vote in the case that MSZP might 
win. Fidesz lost the 2002 elections to MSZP by a narrow margin, however, the tactics 
and grassroots support networks developed by Fidesz during the course of the 
elections are the lynch pin behind Fidesz’s continued political strength. Prior to the 
start of the 2002 elections campaigns Fidesz maintained four hundred local branches 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Hungary	  has	  a	  mixed	  electoral	  voting	  system	  taking	  place	  every	  four	  years	  in	  two	  rounds	  of	  voting.	  
There	  are	  386	  members	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly:	  176	  representatives	  are	  elected	  via	  single-­‐seat	  
local	  constituencies	  while	  152	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  representatives	  are	  elected	  via	  proportional	  
representation	  in	  multi-­‐seat,	  or	  regional	  seat,	  constituencies.	  There	  are	  also	  58	  compensation	  seats	  
from	  national	  list	  votes.	  	  As	  of	  the	  2014	  national	  elections	  voting	  will	  change	  slightly	  so	  that	  there	  are	  
199	  Members	  of	  Parliament:	  106	  representatives	  elected	  via	  single-­‐seat	  local	  constituencies	  and	  93	  
via	  national	  party	  list	  votes	  (Official	  website	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Government,	  <	  
http://www.kormany.hu/en/hungary/the-­‐electoral-­‐system-­‐parliamentary-­‐changes>).	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across Hungary. By 2005 after large-scale mass mobilization efforts and the 
development of civic circles Fidesz had 1,050 local branches, during a time when left-
wing local organizations and branches were decreasing (Enyedi and Linek 2008).  
2002-2006 was a peak point for protest from the Right which leveled the accusation 
that parliamentarism and constitutionalism were being manipulated by the Left and 
winning the elections was being accomplished through a clandestine conspiracy of 
Communism and Capitalism. (Szabó 2011, p.56) 
The events of 2002 marked a distinct change in Fidesz’s campaign style by 
using openly antagonistic propaganda against MSZP combined with popular 
mobilization through citizen’s initiatives known as civic circles (polgári körök) 
(Szabó 2011). The salience and usage of the communist versus anti-communist 
propaganda, targeting MSZP as the reformed Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
(MSZMP), solidified through the creation of civic circles, as a means of spreading 
Fidesz support networks within localized civic groups. While many post-communist 
parties struggle with the lack of stable party membership and voter support (Kopecký 
1995, van Biezen 2003 and 2005), Fidesz was the first party to introduce alternatives 
to official membership with the use of civic circles.  
Civic circles are mainly compartmentalized subgroups based on interest in 
Fidesz created around location and/or interest-based such as Christian democratic 
associations, women’s groups, Roma forums, ethnic Hungarian groups (from 
neighboring countries), cultural movements and youth factions (Szabó 2003, Enyedi 
2005, Enyedi and Linek 2008). Civic circles allow citizens to identify with a party 
through overlapping localized networks without binding affiliation to the party 
through official membership (Enyedi and Linek 2008). Due to Fidesz’s foundations as 
a memberless liberal social movement in 1988, these alternative, less formal forms of 
party support structure came as second nature to Fidesz (van Biezen 2003). Within 
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months of the creation of Fidesz’s localized initiative in 2002 there were over 10,000 
civic circles with over 100,000 participants at a time when official party membership 
of Fidesz was only around 10,000 (Enyedi 2005). By the second round of the 2002 
national elections right wing civic circles were questioning the Socialist 
Government’s legitimacy, mobilizing civic circle participants while at the same time 
unifying new right wing and radical right citizen groups (Szilágyi 2009).  
Civic circles have also been linked as a catalyst for opening new political 
doors to populist tactics by legitimizing alternative grassroots political alliances 
(discussed in Chapter 4), as seen by the usage of similar mobilizing tactics by Jobbik 
(Szilágy 2009, Müller 2011). Civic circles based on more radical nationalist focuses 
have been allowed to flourish. Although participation in civic circles is informal the 
gray area between participation and partisanship allows for a myriad of voter support 
for Fidesz as a catchall party, ranging from moderate conservatives to more radical 
nationalists. Such is the case with the foundations of Jobbik through one of Fidesz’s 
youth initiatives, discussed in the following sections. Fidesz was the forerunner of 
blending formal and informal political participation within their party structure, as 
seen by the rapid growth of civic circles and the informal partisanship outlet they 
created. Civic circles attracted a variety of previously inactive citizens into political 
activism. Having a legitimate political party using dissident tactics of mass protest 
and grassroots organizing within a relatively stable democracy has drawn in 
significant youth interest through grassroots participation as well as official 
membership.  
Seen in Figure 3.1, Fidesz’s informal participation options through civic 
circles have also turned into increased official party membership over the years. From 
only ten thousand official members in 2000, Fidesz now has the highest number of 
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official party members in Hungary (around 40,000 members) followed by MSZP 
(around 33,000). The data collected by the Hungarian national news media, MTI, 
shows that just over one percent of eligible voters in Hungary are members of a 
political party.111 Of those that are party members, membership numbers show the 
bipolar Fidesz-MSZP divide still remaining strong with a significant rise in 
membership for the newer radical right political party Jobbik.	   
Figure 3.1: Hungarian Party Membership 2011112 
 
	  
Note:	  Continued	  support	  for	  KDNP	  can	  be	  attributed	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Fidesz	  allows	  dual	  
party	  membership	  to	  multiple	  parties	  within	  its	  alliance.	  
 Fidesz’s tactics still reflect protest party strategies, employing mass mobilizing 
events in opposition as well as in power. Fidesz successfully formed a mainstream 
nationalist divide between itself and MSZP with its anti-communist propaganda to 
concentrate the right through the party’s ability to ‘identify the common ideological 
denominator and establish an organizational structure that allows for the aggregation 
of interests’ (Enyedi 2005, p. 701). The anti-communist propaganda against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  ‘Tiny	  fraction	  of	  Hungarians	  members	  of	  political	  party’,	  Politics.hu,	  (16	  May	  2011),	  
<http://www.politics.hu/20110516/tiny-­‐fraction-­‐of-­‐hungarians-­‐members-­‐of-­‐political-­‐party/>.	  
112	  Ibid.	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Hungarian Socialist Party continues to personify MSZP as a continuation of 
communism.113 
 Fidesz has also been highly successful in attracting official youth members 
through the party’s two youth organizations, mentioned briefly in Chapter 1. These 
youth organizations have attracted significant membership compared with other 
Hungarian youth organizations attached to political parties (see Table 1.4). Fidelitas, 
the primary youth party attached to Fidesz, is the largest youth party in Hungary and 
among the largest youth factions in Europe with between 10,000 and 12,000 official 
members. Fidelitas is the oldest official democratic youth organization attached to a 
political party in Hungary, founded in 1996. Fidesz Ifjúsági Tagozat (Fidesz Youth 
Division – Fidesz IT), a separate parallel youth faction, boasts another 8,000 
members.114 Both youth organizations help the party during election time with 
campaigning and recruiting new members. Youth organizations also develop fun 
events and programs to create incentives for participation.115  
3.1.2 Fidesz’s Open Door Policy: Radical Rhetoric 
Fidesz has successfully moved across the political spectrum from a radical 
liberal youth organization to the nationalist conservative party we see today (Kiss 
2002, Korkut 2012). The array of Fidesz facades leaves researchers with an equal 
amount of difficulty defining Fidesz on the political spectrum. Although originally a 
pro-European liberal party in the European Parliament, Fidesz’s shift since the mid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  This	  was	  apparent	  even	  in	  Fidesz’s	  2010	  electoral	  campaign,	  which	  depicted	  a	  number	  of	  MSZP	  
candidates	  as	  liable	  for	  large	  monetary	  based	  political	  scandals,	  harking	  back	  on	  a	  corrupt	  communist	  
elite.	  Fidesz’s	  rhetoric	  calling	  itself	  a	  ‘fourth	  republic’	  also	  alludes	  to	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  previous	  
regime	  through	  MSZP	  that	  needs	  eradication	  for	  a	  true	  political	  transition.	  	  
114	  Information	  from	  www.fidelitas.hu	  and	  www.ifjusagitagozat.hu.	  Data	  also	  comes	  from	  interviews	  
with	  Fidelitas	  and	  Fidesz	  IT	  coordinators	  and	  elected	  officials.	  Jobbik’s	  IT	  is	  harder	  to	  measure	  
although	  estimations	  will	  be	  given	  later.	  Jobbik’s	  youth	  division	  was	  founded	  only	  in	  2011.	  
115	  See	  Section	  3.3	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  political	  summer	  camps	  in	  Hungary.	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1990s the party has taken a more Eurosceptic party stance (Taggart and Szerbiak 
2001, Chytilek and Kaniok 2006, Bíro Nagy et. al. 2012). Fidesz self defines, and is 
most notable, for its stance as a national conservative party (Enyedi 2005, Mudde 
2007).  
Although some have categorized Fidesz as a populist radical right party (Bohlen 
2002), Fidesz remains a national conservative party. Fidesz utilizes populist tactics 
and nationalist rhetoric but as of yet remains a democratic party that is neither fully 
definable as anti-democratic nor anti-system (Učeň 2007). As defined by Bustikova 
and Kitschelt (2009), Fidesz is a ‘moderately conservative party with at times radical 
right wing grid/group rhetoric’ (p. 470). The populist aspect of Fidesz’s structure 
developed early on in the original youth organization’s grassroots orientation, non-
hierarchical membership and anti-elite campaigns. The development of civic circles 
from 2002 onwards brought widespread electoral success to the party by focusing on 
local networks, establishing a presence across Hungary. Within the diverse range of 
civic circles and nationalist rhetoric Fidesz has always left a door open to extremism 
in party officials’ rhetoric as well as certain policy actions (see Table 3.1). Yet Fidesz 
remains tactically careful not to be labeled as extreme (Korkut 2009, Jordon 2010, 
Müller 2011, Lendvai 2012).  
Fidesz success in the 2010 elections can be attributed to internal as well as 
external political party factors. Autumn 2006 was a crucial breaking point for Fidesz’s 
strong stance against MSZP. Fidesz had again narrowly lost the national elections to 
the Hungarian Socialist Party in the Spring yet on September 18th a leaked broadcast 
onto the national radio exposed MSZP Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, saying that 
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he and his party had ‘lied morning, noon and night’ to win elections.116 A 
spontaneous mass gathering of ten thousand people congregated outside of parliament 
beginning a month of protests and riots demanding the resignation of the Prime 
Minister. Fidesz supporters were a permanent installation at demonstrations, sending 
official speakers to the site almost daily (Szabó 2011).  
The events of 2006 crippled Fidesz’s main adversary, MSZP and the liberal-left 
coalition, with a legacy of corruption while exposing a radical and united subculture 
that gave momentum to the radical right party Jobbik (Jordan 2010, Bartlett et. al. 
2012, Korkut 2012). The large media attention focusing on the corruption of MSZP 
and the citizen mobilization against the government delegitimized the governing party 
to a point that they lost a large portion of their voter base. This is seen most clearly by 
the 2010 national election results where MSZP managed only 19.3% compared with 
43.2% in 2006. Meanwhile liberal party SZDSZ did not manage to pass the 5% 
electoral threshold, having previously isolated a large portion of their original anti-
communist voter base by forming an alliance in 1994 with MSZP in the first place 
(Pittaway 2003). These events also exemplified the continuation of Fidesz’s 
mobilization capabilities. 
 Fidesz and supporting right wing media networks were keen to point out 
corruption and financial scandals apparent among certain left wing politicians 
increasingly since the party’s 1998 media revival (Lendvai 2012 – discussed further 
in Chapter 7). Continued accusations climaxed with the 2006 leaked tape of the Prime 
Minister, Gyurcsány. MSZP and subsequently SZDSZ could not fully return to their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Listened	  in	  full	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  expressed	  his	  criticism	  of	  politics	  in	  general	  in	  Hungary	  yet	  the	  
sound	  bite	  was	  enough	  to	  spark	  public	  outrage.	  A	  Hungarian	  transcription	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  first	  
half	  of	  the	  leak	  tape	  can	  be	  found	  here:	  ‘Az	  őszödi	  beszéd	  első	  fele’,	  Index,	  (27	  September	  2006),	  <	  
http://index.hu/belfold/partI7339/>.	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former strength, still only managing polling support of between 25% and 30%.117 The 
void in political competition against Fidesz was evident in the 2010 elections. Also 
evident was the opportunity for new political parties to put themselves forth as 
electoral alternatives. 
In Hungary the aftermath of 2006 witnessed a shift not only in electoral trends 
but also in Fidesz rhetoric and, since 2010, political overhauls making many rethink 
Fidesz’s positions. Until recently Fidesz was not considered particularly Eurosceptic 
or radical. While Fidesz continues to articulate its commitment to suppressing the 
radical right and commitment to the EU, the party’s nationalist policies since the 2010 
national elections also legitimize many of Jobbik’s political stances (Müller 2011). 
Many of Jobbik’s voters come from previous Fidesz voting bases (Bartlett et. al. 
2012). Both parties share radicalized rhetoric and policy strategies around ‘gypsy 
criminality’ (cigánybűnözés) and symbolic platforms such as the Treaty of Trianon118 
and increased Euroscepticism (Kántor 2008, Lendvai 2012).119 While Jobbik openly 
calls for the exiting of the European Union,120 Fidesz words its Euroscepticism more 
carefully while still expressing outward critiques of the EU.  
Popular policies and decrees by Fidesz since 2010 have included a number of 
Jobbik’s primary nationalist targets such as creating a national holiday on June 4th as a 
memorial day for Trianon as well as the dual citizenship law concerning ethnic 
Hungarians (see Table 3.2). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Polls	  tracked	  between	  2007	  and	  2012	  (TÁRKI	  and	  Szonda	  Ipsos).	  
118	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Trianon	  is	  a	  point	  of	  nationalist	  contention	  in	  Hungary.	  In	  1920	  after	  WWI	  the	  Allied	  
Powers	  redistributed	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Hungary’s	  territory	  to	  neighboring	  countries	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  
119	  See	  also:	  ‘A	  cigány	  kérdes	  kriminalizálása’,	  Heti	  Világgazdaság,	  (21	  February	  2009).	  The	  title	  of	  the	  
article	  translates	  as	  ‘The	  question	  of	  gypsy	  criminality’.	  	  
120	  Jobbik	  has	  openly	  said	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  protect	  Hungarian	  land	  and	  keep	  it	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  
Hungarians	  is	  to	  exit	  the	  European	  Union.	  Party	  Chairman,	  Gábor	  Vona	  has	  said	  openly	  that	  this	  is	  the	  
only	  way	  to	  protect	  Hungary	  from	  ultraliberal	  international	  forces.	  (‘Protect	  Hungarian	  Land	  by	  Exiting	  
EU,	  Jobbik	  Head	  Says’,	  Politics.hu,	  (20	  July	  2013).	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Table 3.1 List of Fidesz Government Measures Inspired by Jobbik 2010-2012121 
Segments	   from	   Jobbik’s	   2010	   Election	  
Program	  
Measures	  Instated	  by	  Fidesz	  Government	  	  
Since	  2010	  
»The	  multinationals’	  contribution	  to	  tax	  revenues	  
is	   negligible,	   they	   use	   accounting	   tricks	   to	  make	  
profits	   disappear	   and	   take	   them	   out	   of	   the	  
country.«	  
Fidesz	   imposed	   a	   special	   tax	   on	   the	  
telecommunications	   branch,	   energy	   providers	  
and	  retail	  chains,	  sectors	  are	  mainly	  in	  the	  hands	  
of	  foreign/multinational	  companies.	  
»We	   will	   abolish	   compulsory	   private	   pensions	  
and	   lead	   the	   pension’	   system	   back	   towards	   a	  
state	   arrangement,	   in	   which	   individual	   account-­‐
holding	  would	  nevertheless	  remain.«	  
Fidesz	   has	   nationalized	   savings	   paid	   into	   private	  
pension	   funds.	   Unlike	   Jobbik’s	   proposal,	  
however,	   moving	   to	   the	   state	   system	   is	   not	  
optional	  
»The	   principle	   should	   be	   made	   clear	   that	   the	  
Holy	   Crown	   and	   the	   Hungarian	   State	   as	   well	   as	  
the	   Holy	   Crown	   and	   the	   Nation	   (consisting	   of	  
members	   of	   various	   nationalities	   and	   religions)	  
are	  identical.«	  
The	   reference	   to	   the	   Holy	   Crown	   is	   part	   of	   the	  
new	  Constitution:	  »We	  honour	  the	  achievements	  
of	  our	  historical	  constitution	  and	  the	  Holy	  Crown,	  
which	  embody	  the	  constitutional	  state	  continuity	  
of	  Hungary	  and	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  Nation.«	  
»Jobbik	  will	  pass	  a	  media	  law	  creating	  new	  value-­‐
oriented	  media	  with	  public	  status.	  The	  criteria	  for	  
such	  media	  will	  be	   [the	  contribution	   they	  make]	  
to	   building	   a	   national	   identity	   and	   to	  
communicating	   knowledge	   and	   balanced	  
information	   of	   all	   kinds…we	   will	   facilitate	   the	  
rapid	  imposition	  of	  penalties	  on	  individual	  media	  
organizations.«	  
Fidesz	   has	   passed	   a	   new	   media	   law	   even	  
changing	  the	  constitution	  to	  ensure	  approval.	  All	  
Hungarian	   media	   organs	   are	   thus	   under	   the	  
surveillance	   of	   government-­‐appointed	  monitors.	  
The	   preamble	   to	   this	   bill	   contains	   the	   same	  
»value-­‐oriented«	   arguments	   as	   those	   advanced	  
by	   Jobbik.	   The	   draft	   law	   grants	   the	   media	  
watchdog	  options	  for	  imposing	  sanctions.	  
»We	  would	  make	   it	  obligatory	   in	  at	   least	  one	  of	  
the	   upper	   years	   of	   primary	   schools	   for	   the	  
children	   to	  go	  on	  a	   school	   trip	   to	   the	  Hungarian	  
territories	  seized	  from	  us.«	  
A	   government	   initiative	   has	   been	   launched	   that	  
allows	   all	   pupils	   in	   public	   education	   to	   receive	  
state	   funding	   for	  a	   trip	   to	  a	  neighboring	  country	  
inhabited	  by	  Hungarians.	  Approved	  October	  2012	  
»We	  will	  remove	  the	  Károlyi-­‐Statue	  from	  Kossuth	  
square	   immediately...	   Roosevelt	   Square	   will	   be	  
given	   the	  only	   name	  worthy	  of	   it,	   that	   of	   Count	  
István	  Széchenyi!«	  
»The	   names	   of	   public	   places	   associated	   with	  
negative	   historical	   figures	   or	   epochs	   will	   be	  
abolished	   and	   their	   statues	   brought	   to	  
appropriate	  places.«	  
»In	   memory	   of	   Miklós	   Horthy,	   Albert	  Wass,	   Pál	  
Teleki,	   Ottokár	   Prohászka,	   Cecile	   Tormay,	   Béla	  
Hamvas	   and	   our	   other	   great	   figures	   who	   have	  
been	   unworthily	   forgotten.	   Together	   with	   civil	  
society	  we	  will	   launch	   a	   nationwide	   program	   to	  
erect	  statues	  in	  public	  places.«	  
In	   March	   2012	   the	   Károlyi	   statue	   was	   removed	  
from	   Kossuth	   Square.	   The	   Fidesz	   majority	   in	  
Budapest	  changed	  the	  name	  of	  Roosevelt	  Square	  
to	   Széchenyi	   Square.	   The	   application	   for	   the	  
change	  submitted	  by	  	  Fidesz	  and	  the	  KDNP	  to	  the	  
city	  administration	  states:	  »No	  public	  square,	  no	  
public	  institution	  may	  bear	  the	  name	  of	  a	  person	  
involved	   in	   the	   foundation,	   setting	   up	   or	  
maintenance	   of	   a	   political	   system	   of	   arbitrary	  
rule	   in	   the	   20th	   century,	   nor	   a	   name	   that	   is	   an	  
expression	  of	  or	  the	  name	  of	  an	  organization	  that	  
directly	   refers	   to	   or	   recalls	   a	   political	   system	   of	  
arbitrary	  rule	  in	  the	  20th	  century.«	  
One	  square	  has	  been	  named	  after	  Albert	  Wass.	  
On	   the	   day	   of	   the	   constituent	   meeting	   of	  
parliament	  Jobbik	  proposed	  a	  motion	  that	  would	  
declare	   the	   anniversary	   of	   the	   Trianon	   Treaty	   a	  
day	  of	  national	  remembrance.	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  May	  2010	  the	  parliament	  declared	  
the	  day	  of	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Trianon	  Peace	  Treaty	  
a	  day	  of	  national	  unity	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Table	  and	  translation	  come	  from	  Nagy	  et.	  al.	  (2012).	  	  See	  bibliography	  for	  Jobbik’s	  Election	  
Programme.	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Fidesz also shares an increasing Euroskeptic stance with Jobbik, often 
challenging EU authority. Early antagonism of ‘us versus them’ rhetoric targeted the 
remaining ‘communists’ embodied by MSZP in 2002 (Szabó 2003, Palonen 2009), 
however, the new ‘them’ has shifted since 2010 towards a new ‘other’, embodied by 
the EU. Prime Minister Orbán’s speeches have always titillated the masses, from his 
infamous first speech telling the Soviets to leave Hungary in 1989 at the age of 
twenty-six to his recent speeches challenging the EU. Euroskepticism has paralleled 
EU critiques of major Fidesz reforms since 2010.122 Viktor Orbán has likened the EU 
to Soviet and Habsburg oppressive forces personifying Brussels as a tyrannical center 
point:  
Freedom means that we decide about the laws governing our own life, we decide what 
is important and what isn’t. From the Hungarian perspective, with a Hungarian 
mindset, following the rhythm of our Hungarian hearts. We will not be a colony.123  
	  
Fidesz’s political rhetoric has brought radicalized discourse to the mainstream. 
This sociopolitical process of radicalization is particularly prevalent in younger voters 
as seen by voting trends (see Figure 1.1) as well as activist trends (discussed in 
Chapter 4). Fidesz has shifted to the right, increasingly towards radical politics while 
maintaining a strong youth network, taking young Hungarians with it from a liberal to 
nationalist conservative political ideology (Enyedi 2005). Table 3.2 shows the direct 
link between radical right objectives put forth by Jobbik compared with the Fidesz’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Fidesz	  government	  overhauls	  include	  a	  New	  Media	  Law,	  a	  new	  Hungarian	  Constitution	  and	  
changes	  to	  the	  constitutional	  court.	  The	  Fidesz	  government	  maintains	  that	  all	  these	  changes	  are	  in	  
line	  with	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  outlines	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Europe	  to	  the	  
European	  Union,	  however,	  many	  international	  bodies	  and	  European	  institutions	  have	  questioned	  the	  
democratic	  principles	  of	  these	  changes.	  Due	  to	  concerns	  and	  possible	  sanctions	  from	  the	  European	  
Union	  institutions	  directed	  at	  Hungary	  the	  Fidesz	  government	  has	  already	  put	  fourth	  five	  
amendments	  to	  the	  new	  Constitution,	  the	  fifth	  being	  instated	  October	  2013.	  	  
123	  Orbán	  made	  similar	  statements	  15	  March	  2011	  and	  2012.	  Translation	  from:	  Traynor,	  Ian,	  ‘Hungary	  
prime	  minister	  hits	  out	  at	  EU	  interference	  in	  national	  day	  speech’,	  The	  Guardian:	  World	  News,	  (15	  
March	  2012),	  <	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/15/hungary-­‐prime-­‐minister-­‐orban-­‐eu>.	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measures appealing to the same platforms (Nagy et. al. 2012). It also shows the 
increasing political potential of new youth-based parties in Hungary, like Jobbik. 
3.2   A NEW WAVE OF YOUTH-BASED PARTIES 
As discussed at the start of this chapter, youth-based parties are political parties 
that maintain a significant part, if not majority, of their electoral support from youth 
voters (aged 18 to 30) and who focus considerable political efforts directly at the 
youth. The flourishing networks being developed by new youth-based parties, from 
informal media outlets to grassroots collaboration, would have been impossible before 
democratic transition. In the process of decentralization and democratizing all state-
run mechanisms involving the youth within politics, culture and community 
disappeared with very few youth-based institutions replacing them. The state shied 
away from centralized mandatory youth programs, such as the Communist Youth 
Leagues (discussed in Chapter 7), putting very little emphasis on youth-based 
structures and policies. As a result many young people feel little control over their 
personal economic and political situation and view the bureaucracy as complex, 
corrupt and ignorant of youth needs (Touraine 1999, Pleyers 2005, Kovacheva 2005). 
In Hungary, youth-future studies show a young population with en masse pessimism 
towards the democratic transition and a larger focus on individualism over community 
and national participation (Hideg and Nováky 2002). Fidesz has maintained a strong 
youth following, however, as newer youth-based parties appear in Hungary Fidesz’s 
image and voting base are beginning to shift.124 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Despite	  large	  official	  membership	  numbers	  in	  Fidesz’s	  youth	  organizations,	  Fidelitas	  and	  Fidesz	  IT	  
members	  mentioned	  in	  interviewees	  that	  it	  is	  increasingly	  hard	  to	  intrigue	  younger	  18	  to	  23	  year	  old	  
voters	  who	  seem	  to	  prefer	  LMP	  or	  Jobbik.	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Among today’s pensioners, who were socialized during the era of the Kádár regime, 
the MSZP is traditionally popular, whereas Fidesz always found the most favor with 
the age group that grew up with the opposition movement in the early 1980s. By 
contrast, the generation socialized after 1989 has no memory of socialism and they 
are too young to remember Viktor Orbán as the politician who on 16 June 1989 
publically demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. (Nagy et. al. 2012) 
	  
For new movements or political parties to be given legitimate space within 
civil society sociopolitical opportunity structures have to shift, changing the access to 
decision making (Kitschelt 1986, Dalton 1994, Kriesi et. al. 1995, Donk et. al. 2004, 
Harrison and Bruter 2011). The downfall of the liberal-left political bloc and the anti-
government demonstrations that ensued (discussed above) provided an outlet for 
Fidesz to create an electoral revolution, winning a two-third majority in the 2010 
national elections (Palonen 2011). But the other critical shift from these events was 
that the bipolar hegemonic political spectrum was broken, changing the opportunity 
structure for new parties to enter the political arena. Thus, LMP and Jobbik were able 
to campaign in the 2010 national elections gaining newfound support in their 
platforms against elitism and corruption within politics. 
Green parties and, more significantly, the populist radical right are the only 
two new party families to develop in Western democracies since WWII (Mudde 
2007). Hungary has followed this trend with the recent inclusion of LMP and Jobbik 
into the Hungarian parliament. In 2010 radical right party Jobbik (Jobbik 
Magyarországért Mozgalom – Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary) and green 
party LMP (Lehet Más a Politika – Politics Can be Different) entered the Hungarian 
Parliament for the first time. This was the first time that a green party in Hungary 
entered parliament and only the second time a radical right party entered 
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parliament.125 LMP won 7.47% while Jobbik became the third largest party in 
Hungary with 16.67%. Both are youth-based parties, originating from groups of 
university students wanting to change not only who is running politics but also how 
politics is run in Hungary. Both LMP and Jobbik gained momentum and electoral 
significance around similar times, breaking into European Parliament in 2009 and 
passing the 5% threshold, entering the national parliament in 2010. The following 
sections focus on these newer youth-based parties in Hungary, analyzing Jobbik’s 
success in developing and maintaining a youth-based party into wider networks in 
contrast to LMPs failure to maintain itself beyond limited youth support since its 2010 
electoral breakthrough.  
Jobbik began in 2002 as the Right-Wing Youth Association (Jobboldali 
Ifjúsági Közösség - JOBBIK). Catholic and Protestant university students at Eötvós 
Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest founded the youth group. Jobbik was 
originally developed within one of Fidesz’s younger civic circles, offering services to 
right wing parties such as Fidesz, MDF and MIÉP with the original aim of assisting 
Fidesz in re-election (Czene 2009, Varró 2009, Nagy and Róna 2011, Nagy et. al. 
2012, Korkut 2012). The 2002 national elections proved to be disappointing for right 
wing parties. The Jobbik youth group felt that Fidesz catered too much to European 
and international agendas and was therefore not the nationalist party of strength that 
Hungary needed to take the country forward (Nagy and Róna 2011). Jobbik registered 
as an official political party in October 2003, now known as Jobbik Magyarországért 
Mozgalom (Jobbik, Movement for a Better Hungary). Jobbik ran as a coalition partner 
to its radical right predecessor MIÉP for the 2006 national elections with a poor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  The	  Hungarian	  Life	  and	  Justice	  Party	  	  (MIÉP)	  managed	  to	  pass	  the	  5%	  electoral	  threshold	  in	  1998	  
but	  feel	  short	  of	  electoral	  support	  afterwards.	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electoral turnout126 leading Jobbik to run alone in the 2010 elections.127 One of the 
original founders and chairman of Jobbik is Gábor Vona. Still only in his early 
thirties, Vona embodies the youthful side of the radical right, often giving speeches in 
blue jeans and polo shirts, also fitting of Jobbik’s anti-elitist platforms. 
LMP (Lehet Más a Politika – Politics Can Be Different) emerged as a social 
initiative from a youth-based network of Hungarian environmental NGOs and 
university student networks in September 2008 (Lapos 2010). LMP officially 
registered as a political party in February 2009. The party was developed mainly at 
the Corvinus University in the specialist college TEK, which is known for its more 
liberal and eco-conscious stance (discussed in Chapter 6). Although LMP originally 
rejected ideological party labels of any kind, the core members, led by András 
Schiffer (also in his early thirties), eventually defined LMP as a ‘green party’, 
reflected in their 2010 Party Manifesto.128 The foundations of LMP are similar to 
Jobbik and Fidesz in that the party was originally an informal youth group, without 
official membership or internal hierarchy. LMP maintained its non-hierarchical core 
until the 2010 national elections when András Schiffer was put forth as party 
chairman. Like Jobbik, LMP targeted political corruption and the need for 
transparency among the elite, rallying for voter involvement in overturning the trends 
of blatant corruption seen in leading parties (Keil 2011).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  The	  MIÉP	  –	  Jobbik	  coalition	  received	  only	  1.7%	  and	  2.2%	  in	  the	  two	  rounds	  of	  elections.	  	  
127	  Miért	  alakult	  meg	  a	  Jobbik	  Magyarországért	  Mozgalom-­‐párt	  (Why	  was	  the	  Movement	  for	  a	  Better	  
Hungary	  founded?),	  zuglo.jobbik.hu	  (Hungarian),	  <Accessed	  6	  January	  2008>.	  
128	  Lehet	  Más	  a	  politika	  2010	  országgyűlési	  választás,	  LMP	  2010	  Manifesto,	  (Budapest:	  2010).	  Note:	  
Although	  the	  future	  of	  LMP	  is	  currently	  uncertain	  they	  represent	  a	  political	  party	  format	  and	  structure	  
relevant	  for	  gaining	  youth	  support	  and	  increasing	  participation	  through	  alternative	  activism.	  There	  is	  
currently	  fractioning	  within	  LMP	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  join	  larger	  opposition	  
movements	  against	  Fidesz.	  The	  main	  issue	  concerns	  the	  electoral	  ‘Alliance	  for	  Change’	  between	  the	  
Gyurcsány-­‐led	  Democratic	  Coalition,	  the	  Bajnai-­‐led	  ‘Together	  2014’	  movement	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  
Social	  Democratic	  Party.	  LMP’s	  future	  state	  is	  therefore	  currently	  uncertain.	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Figure 3.2 Comparing 2012 Polls of Youth and Nationwide Party Preferences 
 
Youth	  party	  preferences	   come	   from	   the	  Active	  Hungarian	  Youth	   (AFM)	   study	   survey.	  Nationwide	  
party	   preferences	   come	   from	   Szonda	   Ipsos	   polling	   data	   of	   decided	   voters.	   Both	   surveys	   were	  
published	  within	  three	  months	  of	  each	  other	  reflecting	  the	  same	  time	  frame.129	  	  
	  
Both parties are significant for their ability to cultivate youth support and 
activism in the form of mass mobilization and voting allegiances. In a nationwide 
survey of Hungarian party preference, conducted in the fall 2012, results showed high 
levels of continued support for LMP and Jobbik among university students and young 
working people. As shown in Figure 3.2, 33% of the youth first and foremost 
supported Jobbik while 29% supported LMP. Contrary to Fidesz’s strong electoral 
success the conservative party ranked with substantial support but placing third with 
24% support from this cohort while the Socialist Party (MSZP) received only 7%.130 
62% of young voters support the two new parties compared with only 22% of the 
average electorate Meanwhile the average electorate gave 72% to the established 
parties, MSZP and Fidesz.131  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  undecided	  voters	  since	  2010.	  Currently	  
disaffected	  voters	  make	  up	  as	  much	  as	  55%	  of	  the	  voting	  population.	  Youth	  data	  comes	  from:	  
‘Racionálisan	  lázadó	  hallgatók	  2012’,	  Aktív	  Fiatalok	  Magyarorszag	  (AFM),	  <http://aktivfiatalok.hu/>	  
Nationwide	  party	  preference	  data	  comes	  from	  Szonda	  Ipsos	  polling	  (published	  18	  February	  2013).	  
130	  Data	  comes	  from:	  ‘Racionálisan	  lázadó	  hallgatók	  2012’,	  Aktív	  Fiatalok	  Magyarorszag	  (AFM),	  
<http://aktivfiatalok.hu/>.	  	  
131	  ‘Latest	  Ipsos	  poll	  shows	  Fidesz	  retaining	  solid	  lead	  against	  Socialists’,	  Politics.hu,	  (18	  February	  
2013),	  <	  http://www.politics.hu>.	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24%	  
7%	   7%	  
Youth	  Party	  Preference	  
Jobbik	  LMP	  Fidesz	  MSZP	  Other	  
16%	   6%	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Jobbik serves most essentially as an example of a highly successful youth-
based party that has managed to develop and maintain support in a seemingly short 
amount of time while LMP is a less successful example of a new youth-based party. 
Analyzing why this is, section 3.2.1 looks at the movement mentality of the two 
parties and their ability to blend grassroots structures and subcultures within their 
parties’ foundations and networks. Section 3.2.2 goes forward in analyzing the 
successes and limitations of these two parties are analyzed with reference to their 
ability in creating a stable following of activist youth supporters.  
3.2.1 Movement Strategies: Horizontal and Vertical Processes 
Although Jobbik and LMP represent opposite sides of the political spectrum 
they share strong foundational, tactical and even ideological approaches with regards 
to eco-conscious policies and varying degrees of Euroskepticism, drawing in large 
support from young Hungarians. The significant difference in success between the 
two parties lies in their structural development and grassroots alliances cultivating 
distinct subcultures.132 Similar to the non-hierarchical and movement-like strategy of 
early Fidesz both LMP and Jobbik have reproduced tactics blending grassroots efforts 
with political alignment (Korkut 2012). Jobbik and LMP became successful 
participatory and electoral alternatives to traditional parties for young people in 2010 
by combining informal grassroots participation with formal political options. 	  
This section examines Jobbik and LMP analyzing 1) how they organize 
through non-traditional media, 2) their abilities to create coalitions with grassroots 
movements and 3) their distinct party aims that appeal to activist youth culture and 
previously disillusioned young Hungarians. Similar to Fidesz’s foundations at ELTE 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Subcultures	  referenced	  here	  as	  behavioral	  patterns	  and	  cultural	  values	  that	  are	  distinct	  to	  a	  
particular	  group	  in	  society	  with	  distinguishable	  traits.	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University, both Jobbik and LMP parties were formed informally within Budapest 
universities. Young radical intelligentsia founded Jobbik’s core as early as 1999 
within ELTE University as one of Fidesz’s youth-based civic circles (Havas 2009, 
Korkut 2012). Meanwhile a more mixed-liberal network of intelligentsia and 
environmental activists began formulating LMP as early as 2007, networking within 
the Corvinus University special college, TEK, before their 2009 transformation into a 
political party.133 Both parties made their electoral debuts, gaining nationwide 
attention at the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. Although LMP only managed 
2.61%, unable to enter the European Parliament, Jobbik made headlines by winning 
14.77%.134 By the 2010 national elections both parties increased their support. Jobbik 
won 16.67% of the vote while LMP passed the electoral threshold with 7.47%.  
Jobbik and LMP have used similar techniques in cultivating national 
recognition and electoral support, first and foremost in their creation of alternative 
methods of gaining media coverage. Both parties have been highly innovative in their 
usage of alternative news media creating their own interactive online portals, 
incorporating news, blogs and social networking aspects, most used by younger 
Hungarians (Solheim et. al. 2013). While older cohorts increasingly use online media 
across Europe, in Hungary daily usage remains much higher among younger cohorts 
(discussed in Chapter 7). Jobbik is supported by a variety of radical right online 
portals, most notoriously Kuruc.info (said to be maintained by the party) and 
Baríkad.hu, which also distributes a weekly magazine (Havas 2009, Bartlett et. al. 
2012, Nagy et. al. 2012). Kuruc.info, run from an American website domain to avoid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  As	  explained	  by	  LMP	  core	  member	  and	  party	  translator	  Balint	  Pinczes.	  Interviewees	  of	  LMP	  within	  
TEK	  also	  recall	  LMP	  founders	  coming	  and	  holding	  discussions	  within	  the	  special	  college.	  
134	  ‘Results	  by	  country	  (2009):	  Hungary’,	  European	  Parliament	  Official	  Website,	  <	  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00082fcd21/Results-­‐by-­‐country-­‐
(2009).html?tab=16#result_party>.	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government interference, has been attacked openly by the government for its overt 
racist and xenophobic content (see Chapter 7). While less innovative than Jobbik, 
LMP was also highly active online distributing news emails to followers and posting 
articles and updates on their webpage during elections.  
Ignoring the difficult access to mainstream media coverage, both parties used 
YouTube to create farcical as well as more serious political campaign adds attracting 
young voters. Outside of their own online networks both parties have also used 
activist shock methods to spark more mainstream media attention. During campaign 
time LMP created flash mobs and human chains to visually force people to pay 
attention to their issues, such as Fidesz’s media laws, environmental concerns and 
political corruption.135 Meanwhile Jobbik’s party chairman Gábor Vona and MEP 
Krisztina Morvai have made mainstream headlines in their visible displays of radical 
right support. Vona fulfilled one of his party promises by wearing the controversial 
uniform of the illegal paramilitary Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) at the opening 
session of parliament136 while Morvai has led groups of irredentist Hungarians to 
Versailles mourning the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. 
The second organizational strategy that both parties have attracted youth 
networks from is in their blending and coordination with grassroots organizations. 
These organizations and informal networks (discussed in Chapter 4) do not 
necessitate official party membership but do assume party support and potential 
electoral partisanship, similar to civic circles. While Fidesz cultivated civic circles to 
develop its own grassroots network, newer youth-based parties have spread their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  ‘Flashmob	  köszönti	  este	  SchmittetL	  Csak	  úgy	  doktor	  úr	  ő...’,	  Népszabadság	  Online,	  (27	  March	  
2012),	  <	  http://nol.hu/belfold/csak_ugy_doktor_ur_o__ahogyan_es_orvos_-­‐_flashmob>.	  
136	  ‘Gábor	  Vona	  speaks	  at	  the	  opening	  session	  of	  the	  parliament	  wearing	  the	  uniform	  of	  the	  
Hungarian	  Guard’,	  Hungarian	  Ambiance,	  (14	  February	  2011),	  <	  
http://www.hungarianambiance.com/2011/02/gabor-­‐vona-­‐speaks-­‐at-­‐opening-­‐session-­‐of.html>.	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support through horizontal grassroots movements. LMP has mainly networked 
through various green NGOs such as Védegylet Egyesület (Protect the Future).137 
Funding for the party has come in part from green organizations and parties across 
Europe. LMP has worked closely with the German Greens, taking from their structure 
and planning, as well as developing their youth camp mainly as an eco-learning space 
they call a Summer University (Nyári Egyetem) rather than a camp. Their 
‘universities’ are run by mainly by the green Hungarian organization Ökopolitikai 
Műhely Alapítvány (Ecopolitics Workshop Foundation) that set up projects, events 
and political lectures by green parties across Europe.138 LMP also originally attached 
itself to the opposition movement Milla that spoke out against the Fidesz 
government’s controversial Media Law in 2010 (discussed in Chapter 4). Internal 
conflict over the direction LMP should take regarding its potential cooperation with 
other political parties and movements has led to a split within the party.139  
While LMP’s inability to maintain its internal and external networks led to the 
party’s split, Jobbik has developed a strong and loyal network system within the 
radical right. Often these organizations are unofficially attached or created by Jobbik 
but maintain a separate leadership and constitution. Despite being an official political 
party Jobbik describes itself as a movement, as implied by its full party title ‘Jobbik, 
Movement for a Better Hungary’. Jobbik works closely with other radical right civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  Védegylet	  is	  a	  green	  NGO	  that	  was	  founded	  in	  2000	  to	  encourage	  people	  in	  participating	  in	  local	  
and	  national	  public	  affairs	  concerning	  environmental	  protection	  and	  sustainable	  energy	  issues:	  
Official	  Védegylet	  Website,	  <http://www.vedegylet.hu/>.	  
138	  Information	  from:	  Official	  Website	  of	  Ökopolitikai	  Műhely	  Alapítvány	  (Ecopolitics	  Workshop	  
Foundation),	  <http://okopolmuhely.hu/>.	  
139	  In	  October	  2012	  the	  arrival	  of	  a	  new	  political	  alliance	  Együtt	  2014	  (Together	  2014)	  put	  LMP	  in	  a	  
difficult	  position.	  Together	  2014	  is	  made	  up	  of	  a	  ex-­‐Prime	  Minister	  Gordon	  Bajnai	  and	  two	  of	  the	  
strongest	  grassroots	  opposition	  movements,	  Milla	  and	  unionist	  group	  Szolidaritás	  (discussed	  in	  
Chapter	  4).	  LMP	  has	  fractioned	  as	  a	  party,	  dividing	  over	  whether	  to	  join	  a	  political	  union	  that	  might	  
include	  Together	  2014	  and	  MSZP	  or	  not.	  LMP	  has	  previously	  held	  anti-­‐communist	  sentiments	  which	  
hold	  back	  some	  of	  their	  core	  representatives	  from	  joining	  a	  coalition	  that	  would	  include	  MSZP.	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organizations (Solheim et. al. 2013). Radical-right civil organizations are numerous 
and growing in Hungary. The two most active and powerful groups working with 
Jobbik are the well-known paramilitary group, the Hungarian Guard (Magyar 
Gárda) and the active Sixty-Four County Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye 
Ifjúsági Mozgalom- HVIM) (grassroots social movements analyzed in Chapter 4). 
Lastly, both parties have supported similar populist platforms targeting elite 
and political corruption, political transparency including lustration of the previous 
regime and the need for sustainable environmental policies. These newer Hungarian 
parties are bringing ‘subterranean politics’ to the mainstream (Káldor and Selchow 
2013).140 Beyond their online presence and accessibility through grassroots methods, 
Jobbik and LMP are attractive to the youth largely because they are addressing 
sociopolitical concerns that had previously been avoided in mainstream political 
discourses. Both parties vocalized the need to rise up against political corruption and 
flagged transparency issues during campaigns while rallying around the voter as a key 
component in changing Hungary (Keil 2011). Jobbik often differentiates itself from 
typical politicians and elites within its Manifesto as well is within speeches of 
representatives. As declared by Jobbik presidential nominee, Krisztina Morvai (now a 
Jobbik MEP) at the General Assembly introducing the 2010 Jobbik Manifesto: 
Hungary, our communal home, is in crisis. And though it may be possible to list the 
symptoms of this crisis, it is now also necessary to finally endeavor to apply those 
remedies, which politicians would like to have us believe simply do not exist... This lie 
can now be maintained no longer.  
(Krisztina Morvai at the Jobbik General Assembly, 16 January 2010)141 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  ‘Subterranean	  Politics’,	  as	  coined	  by	  Kaldor	  and	  Selchow	  (2013),	  are	  previously	  marginalized	  
heterogeneous	  social	  movements	  and	  collective	  action	  that	  utilize	  political	  opportunity	  and	  breach	  
mainstream	  public	  opinion.	  
141	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  speeches	  from	  the	  General	  Assembly	  announcing	  the	  2010	  Jobbik	  
Manifesto	  provided	  by	  the	  Jobbik	  official	  website:	  <http://jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-­‐
RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>.	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 The anti-elite and anti-establishment topics brought up by both LMP and 
Jobbik are some of the main draws for youth support (Nagy and Róna 2011). Other 
common platforms include progressive leftist economic policies tied with ecologically 
aware economic and social policies.142 While the majority of attention paid to Jobbik 
focuses on the party’s more radical nationalist social policies their economic policies 
are similar to LMP in their national focus on a strong interventionist state to 
counteract the damaging effects of globalization (Nagy et. al. 2012).  
3.2.2 ‘Two Hungaries’: A Polarized Youth 
 Behind the concept of ‘two Hungaries’ lies a history of sociopolitical and 
ideological division in Hungary, going back to longstanding polarities starting in the 
16th century during the peasant revolts which, drew a line between the urban city-
dwellers (emberek meaning men or people) and the ‘civilians’ or populists (polgári). 
Current streams of populist political rhetoric used by Fidesz and Jobbik also denote a 
distinct division in Hungary between the people and the real Hungarian citizens. 
Fidesz used this differentiation explicitly in the changing of the party’s full title to 
Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség) differentiating 
Fidesz from the more urban-based MSZP. This differentiation is also apparent among 
LMP and Jobbik voters showing a distinct regionalism of a more cosmopolitan liberal 
LMP based in Budapest and the more polgári countryside support of Jobbik in the 
Northeast. Budapest is often stereotyped as a liberal center of corruption by the 
radical right while the countryside is exemplified as being pious and untainted, not 
dissimilar to the rhetoric produced by many populist parties across Europe.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  Data	  from	  comparing	  Jobbik’s	  2010	  Manifesto	  and	  LMP’s	  2010	  Manifesto.	  Jobbik	  even	  has	  a	  
specific	  section	  of	  the	  manifest	  dedicated	  to	  ‘Agricultural	  and	  Rurul	  Renewal’	  as	  well	  as	  
environmental	  and	  energy	  sections	  that	  are	  very	  similar	  to	  LMP’s	  ‘Sustainable	  Rural	  Areas	  
Programme’.	  See	  also	  Nagy	  and	  Róna	  (2011)	  and	  Nagy	  et.	  al.	  (2012).	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Figure 3.3: Mapping The Top 20 Constituencies of Jobbik and LMP143
  
 
The	  two	  maps	  show	  the	  urban-­‐rural	  divide	  between	  LMP	  and	  Jobbik.	  Jobbik	  support	  is	  dominant	  in	  
the	  northeastern	   region	  of	  Hungary,	  mainly	   ex-­‐industrial	   areas	  hit	   hard	  by	   transition	  with	  higher	  
Roma	   populations.	   LMP	   support	   is	   based	   almost	   entirely	   in	   Budapest,	   with	   a	   small	   pocket	   of	  
support	  throughout	  Pécs,	  considered	  a	  liberal	  culture	  center	  of	  Hungary.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  Jobbik’s	  Top	  Scores:	  33.1%	  in	  Tiszavasvári,	  32.1%	  in	  Ózd,	  30.6%	  in	  Tiszaújváros,	  30.1%	  
in	  Mátészalka,	  	  29.8%	  in	  Sajószentpéter,	  29.7%	  in	  Kunhegyes,	  29.5%	  in	  Heves,	  28.9%	  in	  Mezőkövesd,	  
28.8%	  in	  Kazincbarcika,	  28.7%	  in	  Füzesabony,	  27.9%	  in	  Hatvan,	  27.7%	  in	  Miskolc	  1,	  27.6%	  
in	  Kisvárda,	  27.6%	  in	  Szerencs,	  26.7%	  in	  Szarvas,	  26.5%	  in	  Miskolc	  4,	  26.1%	  in	  Gyöngyös,	  25.5%	  
in	  Mezőtúr,	  25.4%	  in	  Hódmezővásárhely,	  24.7%	  in	  Miskolc	  3	  /	  Note:	  A	  majority	  of	  these	  provinces	  
are	  within	  the	  Borsod-­‐Abaúj-­‐Zemplén	  and	  Szabolcs-­‐Szatmár-­‐Bereg	  province.	  
LMP	  Top	  Scores:	  17.5%	  in	  Budapest	  9,	  16.7%	  in	  Budapest	  8,	  16.4%	  in	  Budapest	  1,	  16.0%	  in	  Budapest	  
21,	  15.6%	  in	  Budapest	  10,	  15.5%	  in	  Budapest	  22,	  14.8%	  in	  Budapest	  12,	  14.3%	  in	  Budapest	  31,	  13.8%	  
in	  Budapest	  15,	  13.7%	  in	  Pilisvörösvár	  /	  Pest	  province,	  13.6%	  in	  Budapest	  17,	  13.3%	  in	  Budapest	  19,	  
13.2%	  in	  Budapest	  6,	  13.1%	  in	  Budapest	  5,	  12.9%	  in	  Pécs	  3	  /	  Baranya	  province,	  12.9%	  in	  Budapest	  3,	  
12.8%	  in	  Budaörs/Pest,	  12.8%	  in	  Pécs	  2/Baranya,	  12.7%	  in	  Szentendre/Pest,	  12.6%	  in	  Budapest	  18.	  
Statistics	  calculated	  from	  ‘Election	  Resources’	  from	  the	  Hungarian	  Government:	  
http://www.electionresources.org/hu/maps.php?election=2010.	  Images	  developed	  by	  
http://www.flickr.com/photos/almodozo/4516511580/.	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This stereotype was played out in the 2010 elections looking at the political 
support for Jobbik compared with LMP seen in Figure 3.3. The concept of a right-left 
divide along regional lines has marginalized among youth supporters into an LMP-
Jobbik divide. The urban population of Budapest gave the large majority of support to 
LMP while Jobbik managed up to 32% electoral success in more rural northeastern 
parts of the country (see Figure 3.3). Despite the disintegration of the bipolar MSZP-
Fidesz divide, polarization remains a political tool to create unity and support 
networks (Palonen 2009). The more radical this polarization becomes the more 
Hungary is developing a youth population embodying the division of ‘two 
Hungaries’. 
Jobbik and LMP represent a youth-based polarization in Hungarian political 
culture. This polarization was first solidified by the ‘bipolar hegemony’ between right 
and left, embodied by Fidesz and MSZP between 1994 and 2010 (Palonen 2009 – 
previously discussed in Chapter 1). Hungarian researchers looking at the apparent 
political and value-based division among the youth, between radical right and liberal 
support, have coined the term ‘two Hungaries’ (két Magyarország) (Gombár et. al. 
2005, Gombár et. al. 2005, Osiris 2005, Palonen 2009, Szalai 2011, Rupnik 2012, 
Bruck 2012). In Hungary the youth generation is split due to the lack of generational 
continuity in the post-communist era and the socializing influence of the strong 
bipolar divide in Hungarian politics. Erzsébet Szalai (2011) explains that the youth 
cohort does not fit the criteria of having a coherent ‘generation’. Szalai outlines the 
three criteria for defining a generation as 1) a common developmental youth/teen 
experience, 2) rebellion against the parent generation turning into a common ideology 
or philosophy and 3) a common enemy perception (Szalai 2011).  
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The current parent generation in Hungary united over the transitional 
experience going from a socialist system to a democracy and the grandparent 
generation was defined by the post-1956 experience of communism. However, there 
has not been any significant uniting event or historical parameter to fuse the current 
youth cohort under a common experience. The youth was socialized at the height of 
political polarization between MSZP and Fidesz, normalizing a divided, rather than 
united, political youth culture. High levels of popular support for right wing and 
radical right politics in Hungary are undeniable. However, the less obvious but 
significant parallel trend of continued bipolar political divisions is continued among 
the youth. This division is politically exemplified in the form of Jobbik and LMP and 
the grassroots organizations attached to these opposing sociopolitical sides. While this 
division is most visible in the demonstrations of grassroots and social movements 
(discussed in Chapter 4) it is also visible in the polarized youth support divided 
between Jobbik and LMP, as seen in Figure 2.1 youth support of Jobbik (33%) and 
LMP (29%) are above all other political parties (Nagy et. al. 2012). These two distinct 
political camps have emerged in Hungary creating a split political culture among the 
youth. The existence of a strong political divide between right and left has re-emerged 
since the mid 1990s in Hungary (Kitschelt et. al. 1999, Kitschelt 1995 and 2002). This 
sociopolitical split is currently exacerbated into extremes within the youth context, 
with regionally divided urban-rural implications (as seen in Figures 3.2 and 3.3). 
Socioeconomic divisions related to partisanship, as well as differences in developing 
youth subcultures are exemplified in an analysis of political youth camps in Hungary. 
3.3. POLITICAL YOUTH CAMPS IN HUNGARY 
 
The following section gives a detailed overview of political youth camps in 
Hungary. Participant observation during my fieldwork included attending three out of 
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four of the parliamentary parties’ youth camps taking place in Summer 2011. I was 
unfortunately not able to attend the youth camp of MSZP for organizational reasons, 
however, as discussed previously in this chapter, MSZP has a much smaller and 
marginal youth base. Most liberal and left wing youths in Hungary tend to prefer 
LMP and other newer movement-parties such as Together 2014. 
Fidesz was the first democratic party in Hungary to establish an official youth 
organization associated with its party, allowing the party to continue its youth legacy 
through a highly structured and organized youth faction. Fidelitas was created in 
1996. It has subsequently grown larger than any other political youth organization in 
Hungary.144 Members of Fidelitas are between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five 
while official party membership of Fidesz is not required. To create a more strictly 
politically aligned youth group Fidesz created Fidesz Ifjúsági Tagozat (Fidesz Youth 
Organization – Fidesz IT). Fidesz IT focuses largely on international relations, 
networking with other conservative youth organizations abroad and assisting Fidesz 
in media management and youth recruitment.145 Differing from Fidelitas, Fidesz IT 
members have an age limit of thirty and must be official party members of Fidesz. All 
Fidesz members under the age of thirty are automatically enlisted in Fidesz IT.146  
Jobbik created its own official youth section in January 2011. Jobbik IT 
(Jobbik Ifjúsagi Tagozat). Jobbik IT has a national organizing committee of eight 
members that manage the various county youth divisions. Jobbik claims over one 
hundred Jobbik IT organizations across the country with nearly two thousand official 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  Data	  official	  from	  the	  Deputy	  International	  Secretary	  of	  Fidesz	  IT	  in	  2011	  as	  well	  as	  Fidelitas’	  
official	  website:	  www.fidelitas.hu	  [accessed	  April	  2010]	  
145	  Fidesz	  IT,	  Bemutatkozás,	  <http://www.ifjusagitagozat.hu/Bemutatkozas.aspx?menuid=3>.	  
Information	  was	  also	  given	  from	  interviewing	  Fidesz	  IT	  international	  representative.	  	  
146	  Fidesz	  ʻYouth	  Departmentʼ,	  Ifjúsági	  Tagozat	  (IT),	  www.ifjusagitagozat.hu	  [accessed	  November	  
2009]	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members. On their official website Jobbik IT sets out its aims to attract young 
Hungarians away from apathy and pessimism, participation in local and national 
youth initiatives and have fun meeting like-minded people participating in a number 
of events.147 LMP created a youth division attached to the party informally between 
late 2011 and early 2012. While the group is not currently recognized by parliament 
as an official youth organization members congregate and organize within the LMP 
party. A few hundred active members are estimated to network, primarily throughout 
Budapest. Although the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) once had a significant 
youth organization youth support of MSZP was damaged directly when the young 
Socialist MP János Zuschlag, head of the MSZP youth organization ‘Young Leftists’ 
(Fiatal	  Baloldal- FIB), was arrested in 2007 for embezzling up to 75 million forints 
(about 300,000 Euros). While MSZP still maintains a youth division it has never fully 
recovered from what is now known as the ‘Zuschlag scandal’.148  
Youth members have varying levels of participation. A large majority of 
members are involved only around election times or for social gatherings; however, 
dedicated members meet weekly and play integrative roles in administering Fidesz 
directives, building political connections.149 While membership expectations tend to 
vary, depending on region and local headquarters, assisting in campaign efforts by 
distributing posters, rallying and retrieving list votes during election times are 
considered a minimum requirement of membership. 150	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  ‘Kik	  vagyunk?’,	  Jobbik	  Ifjúsági	  Tagozat,	  <	  http://www.jobbikit.hu/kik-­‐vagyunk>.	  
148	  Finances	  were	  reportedly	  attached	  to	  the	  ʻThird	  Millennium	  Foundationʼ	  and	  other	  FIB	  youth	  
organization	  planning.	  The	  liberal-­‐left	  has	  since	  been	  linked	  to	  numerous	  financial	  scandals,	  some	  
speculative	  and	  some	  convicted,	  and	  the	  right	  and	  radical-­‐right	  have	  been	  quick	  to	  utilize	  them	  in	  
their	  political	  oppositions.	  Reports	  from	  fn.hu	  and	  politics.hu	  2007	  	  
149Information	  from	  interviews	  with	  Youth	  Organization	  representatives	  from	  Fidesz,	  Jobbik	  and	  LMP.	  	  
150	  In	  the	  Hungarian	  electoral	  process,	  previous	  to	  2011	  Fidesz	  changes	  made	  to	  the	  voting	  system,	  
parties	  running	  for	  office	  have	  to	  collect	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  ‘list	  signatures’	  to	  show	  that	  they	  have	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Table 3.2: Political Youth Organizations 
Youth	  Group	   Party	  Affiliation	   Date	  Created	   ~Membership	  	   Age	  Limits	  
Fidelitas	   Fidesz	   1996	   12,000	   35	  and	  Under	  
Fidesz	  IT	   Fidesz	   2005	   8,000	   30	  and	  Under	  
IKSZ151	   KDNP	   2001	   2,000	   35	  and	  Under	  
Societas	   MSZP	   1999	  &	  2008*	   N/A	   35	  and	  Under	  
Jobbik	  IT	   Jobbik	   2011	   ~2,000	   14-­‐30	  
LMP	  IT	   LMP	   2011/2012**	   A	  few	  hundred	   30	  and	  Under	  
Table	  data	  comes	  from	  Youth	  Organizations	  official	  websites.	  Fidelitas,	  Fidesz	  IT,	  Jobbik	  IT	  and	  LMP	  
IT	  representatives	  have	  confirmed	  figures	  and	  data.	  	  
*	  MSZP’s	   original	   Youth	  Organizations	  was	  Fiatal	   Baloldal	   (Young	   Left),	   created	   in	   1999	  
but	  dissolved	  in	  2008	  due	  to	  financial	  scandals.	  Reformed	  as	  Societas–Új	  Mozgalom	  (New	  
Movement).	  
**	  LMP	  IT	  has	  been	  informally	  created	  between	  2011	  and	  2012	  but	  it	  is	  uncertain	  whether	  
or	  not	  the	  Hungarian	  Parliament	  officially	  recognizes	  the	  group	  as	  of	  yet.	  	  
An overview of political youth camps shows the difference in the types of 
support Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP are attracting. Camp access, agenda and camper 
profile displays the type of youth activism cultivated within these political parties. 
Research on young party members in Europe distinguish between three types of youth 
party members based on their incentives for participation: 1) the moral minded 
members pursuing ideological and policy preferences, 2) the professional minded 
member using membership to benefit a material and/or career path and 3) social 
minded members with altruistic group oriented goals (Bruter and Harrison 2009, see 
also Clark and Wilson 1961, Pedersen et. al. 2004). Based on the young party 
members criteria laid out by Bruter and Harrison (2009) each of the three parties in 
question fits a different genre of membership. Fidesz members fit a professional-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
valid	  support	  to	  run	  for	  office.	  A	  certain	  number	  of	  list	  papers	  are	  needed	  depending	  on	  the	  district	  
and	  region	  for	  a	  party	  to	  appear	  on	  the	  ballots.	  	  
151	  IKSZ	  (Ifjúsági	  Kereszténydemokrata	  Szövetségis	  –	  Christian	  Youth	  Association)	  is	  the	  official	  Youth	  
Organization	  for	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  People’s	  Party	  (Kereszténydemokrata	  Néppárt-­‐	  KDNP).	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minded profile, Jobbik contains more socially minded members and LMP draws in 
moral-minded memberships.152 This is apparent in analyzing the youth organization 
summer camps (ifjúsági tagozat nyári tabor) looking at the camp outline, event 
activities and participant profile. 
 
Table 3.3: Political Party Youth Camps at a Glance 
Party	   Price	   Days	   Location	   Campers	   Access	  Fidesz	   21,700	  Ft	  	   7	   Lake	  Balaton	  in	  Hotel	   370	   Fidelitas	  Members	  LMP	   6,000	  Ft	  per	  day	  15,000	  Ft	  	   5	   Árnyas	   Sziget	   Camp	  Budapest	   180-­‐200	   Anyone	  Jobbik	   2,500	  Ft	  	  (Miskolc)	  5,000	  Ft	  (Balaton)	   5	   In	  a	  field	  in	  Sostofalva.	  Lake	   Balaton	  Tengerpart	  
80-­‐100	  200	   Jobbik	  supporters	  
 
Access to political party youth camps varied between the three parties in 
openness, location, number of participants and cost. Concerning camp access Fidesz 
is the most closed of the camps. Attendants had to be youth party members. Many 
attending had also been to the camp previously. The cost of the ‘camp’ was also 
higher than the other camps costing 21,700 Forint (about 77 Euro). The four-day 
event was more like a conference than a camp taking place within a three star hotel 
(Hotel Ezüspart) on the water’s edge at Lake Balaton.153 Of the camps, Fidelitas had 
the most participants (370 campers).  
LMP conducted a very different set up. LMP was not the organizer of the 
camp, nor was LMP written on any of the signs or posters officially at the camp. The 
camp is organized by the Ecopolitical Workshop Foundation (Ökopolitikai Műhely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  In	  this	  criteria	  professional-­‐minded	  youth	  members	  join	  in	  order	  to	  better	  their	  position	  for	  gaining	  
job	  opportunities	  or	  financial	  incentives.	  Social	  members	  join	  parties	  to	  meet	  like-­‐minded	  people	  and	  
create	  friend	  networks	  while	  interacting	  with	  their	  locality.	  Moral-­‐minded	  members	  join	  parties	  to	  
participate	  in	  pushing	  what	  they	  feel	  to	  be	  important	  issues	  forward	  in	  the	  political	  world	  (Bruter	  and	  
Harrison	  2009).	  
153	  Lake	  Balaton	  is	  a	  well	  off	  middle	  and	  upper	  class	  area	  where	  many	  Hungarians	  have	  second	  homes.	  
Due	  to	  the	  higher	  price	  of	  a	  location	  with	  hotel	  rooms	  one	  participant	  mentioned	  that	  financial	  aid	  
from	  the	  party	  was	  available	  to	  some	  participants.	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Alapítvány), referred to as a ‘Summer University’ (Nyári Egyetem) and includes a 
number of other green foundations and organizations supporting the camp.154 Access 
was open to anyone who wanted to come for either the entire four-day camp or a day 
ticket could be purchased. The price for just one day was 6,000 forints (slightly over 
20 euros) or 15,000 forints (around 53 Euros) for the full five-day course of the camp. 
The camp was held at Árnyas Sziget Youth Camp, located within greater Budapest. 
Participants could come with a tent or for slightly more money there were a dozen log 
cabin type set ups that groups or families could stay in. 225 participants signed up for 
the camp with about 180-200 participants around on any given day.  
Jobbik’s camp was also open to non-official members. Uniquely, Jobbik held 
two separate youth camps, each for four days in order to target youths from both the 
countryside and the city. One camp took place at Balaton Tengerpart costing 5,000 
forints (about 18 euros for four days), considered the Nemzeti Tabor (National Camp). 
The second Jobbik youth camp took place in the Northeastern region of Hungary 
where the highest levels of Jobbik support can be found in Miskolc, in the field of a 
small town called Sóstofalva, called the Bórsod County camp and was half the price 
of the other camp (2,500 forints for the four days - less than 10 euros). The national 
camp had 200 participants while the Borsod County camp had around 80 to 100 
participants.155 
Activities in the three camps varied, perhaps not in outline but in execution. 
While all three camps had political and national figures speaking content and 
presentation differed greatly. Fidesz had a well-planned schedule laying out various 
options throughout each day that individuals could partake in. These ranged from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  http://okopolmuhely.hu/	  
155	  At	  both	  the	  LMP	  and	  Jobbik	  camps	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  of	  participants	  on	  the	  weekends	  that	  
came	  out	  for	  either	  the	  day	  or	  the	  weekend.	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formal speeches and presentations from politically relevant individuals to lakeside 
sporting events. Those attending speeches tended to be the more politically devoted 
Fidelitas members, many seeing participation and immersion as helping them in their 
future political careers. Party events were held at night with dancing and socializing. 
LMP camp also had a well-planned structure with lectures and workshops taking 
place throughout the day. Speeches did not always touch upon specifically Hungarian 
issues and many times topics were about sustainable living questioning routes towards 
political change. LMP had the most diverse range of speakers including party 
representatives from the German Greens. Lectures also had translators available to 
assist in translating English lectures into Hungarian and Hungarian lectures into 
English. Headsets were available in the back of each lecture cabin. Some had been to 
this camp in previous years while others had come alone or with a friend for the first 
time.  
Jobbik camp was organized on the outset. The original program included 
many events, but in reality it was a much looser schedule with many things on the 
hardcopy plan being ignored or falling into disarray. The camp was visited by party 
chairman, Gábor Vona for an hour to give a speech and sit with campers answering 
questions. Other than two political figures speaking the rest of the camp was created 
around leisure fun and traditional Hungarian sports and craft. Horseback riding, 
archery, shooting (with political figures from other parties as the targets), bullwhip 
and learning rovás irás, were all available. At night music was played and people 
gathered to sing, drink and bond. This was the first year Jobbik camp has existed so 
most participants were very new, few being official members.  
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Table 3.4: Camper Profile 
Party	   Core	  Age	   Economic	  Status	   Clothing	  Fidelitas	   25-­‐30	   Middle	  to	  Upper	   Generally	  more	  formal	  LMP	   All	  ages	  mixed	   Middle	  to	  Upper	   Business	  casual-­‐	  Hippy	  Jobbik	   17-­‐22	   Lower	  to	  Middle	   Casual-­‐	  Nationalist-­‐	  Traditional	  
 
The profile of campers varied greatly between the camps. At the Fidesz camp 
there was a much more professional feel to the organization as well as profile of camp 
participants. At lectures held by various political and national figures there was a 
mixture of formal suits, white button up shirts as well as more casual lakeside wear 
but nothing as informal as swimwear. Speakers, political figures or relevant 
individuals, all wore suits. Campers ranged mainly between the ages of 21 and 30 
though the core group of attendance was in the latter 25 to 30 year old age category. 
Lehet Más A Politika campers had the greatest range in diversity. It was not 
specifically a youth camp and organizers as well as participants ranged across the 
spectrum from younger voters in their early to mid-20s to families with children to 
older liberals from academic circles. Even dogs were welcome to participate. The 
dress code was very casual though speakers tended on a more business casual line of 
dress. There was a significant amount of participants in more ‘hippy-wear’ attire with 
hemp clothing and loose fitting attire. Jobbik campers were the youngest core group 
of participants of the three camps. Ages ranged from 12, being the youngest camper, 
up through early 30s but by far the main age cohort was in the 17 to 22 range. This 
was the age range of the majority of campers. Jobbik also had the most homogenous 
‘look’ of the three camps. There was an obvious abundance of Harcos t-shirts and 
outerwear as well as a very visible wearing of significant radical right symbols such 
as maps of greater Hungary, the Turul bird, rovás irás writing (usually saying 
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Hungary), Petofi figures and tribal Atilla the Hun icons.156 There was a visible 
skinhead group though they were not the majority. There was also a visible group 
with ‘traditional wear’ (hagyományos) as well as more Turulistic wear, referencing 
Attilla the Hun and ancient warriors. Even speakers that came to the camp such as 
Gabor Vona and the now controversial Csanad Szegedi wore casual attire or hints of 
tribal wear. Most participants came from the Northeastern region of Hungary, but 
groups also came from Budapest with a spattering of participants from other 
regions.157 
	  
As seen by the camps described above, as an example of youth party 
membership and relationship to the political party Fidesz maintains a youth 
organization with a more professionally aligned membership base. Jobbik draws in a 
wider range of stereotypically social-minded members, cultivating friends, defining 
themselves by group orientation and interacting with like-minded people. LMP, from 
its nature as a green party as well as its more university-formatted camp draws 
members that are mainly morally minded, pursuing policy change and ideological 
goals.  
*** 
Young people feel increasingly alienated from mainstream politics, feeling a 
lack of choice between professional politicians who seem corrupted or separated from 
the issues of common society (Robertson 2009). Youth-based parties offer an 
alternative to mainstream politics by blending alternative grassroots participation with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  These	  symbols	  and	  icons	  are	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  Social	  Networks	  as	  well	  as	  
throughout	  this	  paper.	  	  
157	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  this	  was	  the	  Borsod	  County	  Jobbik	  camp	  in	  the	  Northeast.	  
There	  was	  also	  a	  national	  camp	  held	  separately	  nearer	  to	  Lake	  Balaton.	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traditional electoral participation. In Hungary the youth-party tradition began in 1989 
with Fidesz and has recently been rejuvenated by newer youth-based parties, Jobbik 
and LMP. The creation of informal political participation in the form of civic circles 
not only became the precondition for Fidesz’s success (Enyedi 2005) but also laid the 
foundations of political strategies for both newer youth-based parties, who have used 
similar mobilization tactics and horizontal means of gaining support. These parties 
have been innovative in creating media-grabbing political stunts to reach wider 
audiences with their issues while also sustaining localized youth networks online and 
through events. Jobbik has maintained and increased its strong youth network by 
linking with other radical right networks, however, LMP has lost support by 
distancing itself from other liberal political and grassroots networks in its attempt to 
remain neutral. 
The youth cohort has been socialized under a divided political culture. 
Fidesz’s transformation and concentration of the Hungarian right along with the 
liberal-left coalition between MSZP and SZDSZ developed a strong bipolar political 
hegemony between right and left between. This divisive political landscape peaked 
between 1998 and 2006 before liberal-left political scandals in 2006 eroded the 
bipolar divide to electorally favor the right by the 2010 national elections. This 
erosion created a significantly different political opportunity structure, giving Jobbik 
and LMP the opening to penetrate the political spectrum. Both parties used new 
media, cooperation with grassroots organizations and anti-elite platforms to garnish 
high levels of youth support. However, the strong polarized political culture remains 
among the youth, creating a split cohort, or ‘two Hungaries’, personified by the 
divided youth support for the radical right and alternative left. Political youth camps 
assist in exemplifying the socioeconomic and regional division apparent among the 
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youth based on partisanship. They also served show the different activism, values and 
motivations behind contemporary party membership for young Hungarians. 
Political youth camps observed served to clarify the differences between how 
leading youth-based political parties coordinate their youth followers. There were vast 
differences between the profile, socioeconomic background and intent of campers. 
This also showed the strong unity of a developing subculture among the radical right. 
Other camps showed less visible unity.  
Political parties are creating the primary context for political socialization to 
evolve within. The youth, raised under strong political bipolarities, show well-defined 
partisanships, even if this is sometimes defined most by what someone is not more 
than what they think they are. The next chapter gives maps the current development 
of grassroots social movements and movement parties, forming as an alternative to 
traditional political participation.   
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4. GRASSROOTS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS & SUBCULTURES 
 Grassroots social movements, like political parties, are influential in political 
socialization in that they become the center of emotive responses to politicized topics 
and agendas, often activating previously passive or disillusioned citizens. They also 
have the ability to develop and disseminate new politically relevant topics and 
reframe the context or debate on preexisting topics, influencing sociopolitical culture 
and norms (Crossley 2002). Social movements represent a collective response 
challenging the existing power structures, uniting people with a common purpose, 
creating an interaction with elites, authorities and opposition (Meyer and Tarrow 
1998). In this way grassroots social movements provide a space for political activism 
that is not confined to the formal structure or regulations of political organizations 
(van de Donk et. al. 2004). They are ‘organized conflicts’ or ‘conflicts between 
organized actors over the social use of common cultural values’ (Touraine 2002, p. 
90). Social movements provide an answer to a threat or desire linked to a social 
group’s ability to make decisions and attempt to control changes, much like political 
parties.  
Both grassroots social movements and political parties also have the potential 
to utilize other socializing agents, such as media outlets, to further their agendas.158 
The purpose of this chapter is to map the most influential and visible grassroots social 
movements drawing out youth activism in Hungary in the last ten years and analyze 
how these movements are bridging the gap between the youth and politics. The 
movements targeted in this thesis are relevant in that they have been at the core of 
recent largest demonstrations and protests in Hungary. Most of them are also youth-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  Grassroots	  social	  movements	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  single-­‐issue	  target	  but	  can	  also	  diversify	  into	  a	  series	  
of	  contentious	  campaigns	  or	  performances	  where	  ordinary	  citizens	  make	  a	  collective	  claim	  (Tilly	  
2004).	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based movements, founded and run by younger Hungarian activists, although they 
have brought out a diverse age-range of support. 
Like Chapter 3 on political parties, this chapter gives an analysis of current 
politically motivated grassroots social movements and how they are engaging and 
activating young Hungarians. There are two main parts to this chapter. The first looks 
at why the youth in particular are attracted to grassroots and social movements in 
general and in Hungary. The second part analyzes the blurring distinction between 
political parties and grassroots movements in Hungary as well as the blurring between 
social movements and popular culture. This blurring process is analyzed with 
reference to grassroots social movements’ role in attracting young people into 
politically participatory roles while inadvertently linking them to political 
partisanships and new subcultures. 
Although Hungarian civil society is measured as declining in its strength by 
institutions such as Freedom House, there is a current resurgence of grassroots social 
movements in Hungary, which could improve civic participation in Hungary.159 
Social movements are operating at the level of civil society or in a space between civil 
society and the state, developing distinctive cultural attributes, often affecting 
symbolic changes, collective identity and cultural politics (Melucci 1985, Martin 
2002). Discussed later in this chapter, while civic participation is generally measured 
as a positive indicator of a healthy democracy (Dudley and Gitelson 2002, Wallace 
2002) the most active grassroots movements in Hungary are not always cultivators of 
liberal democratic values.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  Hungary	  was	  listed	  as	  the	  only	  Post-­‐Communist	  nation	  where	  civil	  society	  was	  decreasing.	  
‘Democracy	  Deficit	  Grows	  in	  Former	  Soviet	  Union’,	  Freedom	  House,	  (Press	  Release:	  27	  June	  2011),	  
<www.freedomhouse.org>,	  (viewed	  1	  July	  2011).	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4.1 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT & POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN 
HUNGARY 
There are a very few Hungarian specific studies looking at the social activism 
of the youth and youth perceptions of their role within society (Hideg and Nováky 
2002, Hideg and Nováky 2009, Vásárhelyi 2006 and 2011). To date there have been 
no larger studies on youth participation in grassroots social movements in Hungary. 
Most research underestimates the scope of youth political activity by a narrow 
definition of youth political engagement (Owen 2008, Farthing 2010). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, civil society under state socialism was practically non-existent, monitored 
and oppressed by highly centralized state-controlled forces (Csepeli and Örkény 
1992). Much of social and personal life was restricted to the family and close kin 
networks. While some believe that this socialist past has mainly indirect effects on the 
contemporary social and political experience in post-communist Europe (Mishler and 
Rose 1997) others believe that the cultural remnants from the previous era have 
impeded a healthy civil society from developing (Kovács 1996, Letki 2004, Mareš 
2010).  
During the 1980’s and into transition plurality increased and political civic 
engagement became more open and less prohibited. Political parties and social 
movements began to rapidly gain power by the rejection of state socialism (Csepeli 
and Örkény1992). However, since the 1990s there was a decrease civic engagement 
on the local and national level. The main goal of achieving transition and establishing 
a democracy had been accomplished. Social movements and the ability to mobilize 
support for civic and non-governmental organizations decreased in the 1990s from a 
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scarcity of financial and citizen support combined with a still weak civil society 
(Szabó 1996, Rose-Ackerman 2007).160  
Concern over the lagging development of a strong civic culture in Central and 
Eastern Europe includes a youth population that is uncompelled to give up free time 
for participation in NGOs, volunteering or community building (refer back to Figure 
2.3). Civil activities were mandatory for the youth under the communist system 
(Zasavsky and Brym 1978). This is one source of the current alienation and cynicism 
towards political as well as civic institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997).161 In Central 
and Eastern Europe there remains low social capital and low levels of interpersonal 
trust leading to a weak political society lacking civil involvement (Letki 2004). While 
Western democracies have a stable culture of think tanks and NGOs, often supported 
by larger business or private investment, post-communist Europe has been less 
successful in developing similar organizations, often lacking resources, treated with 
apathy and seen skeptically by most of the public (Kurkchiyan 2003, Smilov and 
Tisné 2004, Grødeland 2006, Grødeland and Aasland 2011).162  
Youth participation in civic organizations is particularly low in Hungary 
discussed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.3). While Hungary remains below the EU27 
average for youth participation in all organizations, from sports clubs to political 
parties, these figures are, for the most part, comparable with other post-communist 
countries. Levels of participation in human rights, international networking and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  Only	  around	  15%	  of	  Hungarians	  participate	  in	  some	  form	  of	  volunteering	  compared	  to	  an	  average	  
of	  35%	  in	  Western	  Europe.	  Hungary	  has	  also	  had	  the	  lowest	  increase	  in	  civil	  participation	  compared	  
with	  other	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  (Savicka	  2008).	  
161	  The	  Hungarian	  Pioneers	  (ages	  six	  to	  fourteen)	  and	  the	  Communist	  Youth	  Organization	  (ages	  
fourteen	  to	  thirty)	  are	  prime	  examples	  of	  politically	  led	  youth	  civil	  programs	  made	  mandatory	  in	  
Hungary	  (Volgyes	  1975,	  Szabó	  1991).	  
162	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  NGOs	  have	  not	  succeeded	  as	  widely	  in	  post-­‐communist	  Europe	  is	  to	  a	  large	  
extent	  due	  to	  the	  previous	  bureaucracy	  and	  red-­‐tape	  of	  the	  Soviet	  era	  that	  developed	  informal	  
networks	  to	  achieve	  goals	  rather	  than	  institutionalized	  processes	  (Grødeland	  and	  Aasland	  2011).	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political organizations are particularly low in Hungary. There are some organizations 
directed at youth involvement in democratic civil society but their membership 
remains largely marginalized.163 
4.1.1 The Youth Appeal of Grassroots Social Movements  
Grassroots social movements are the perfect vehicles for politically engaging 
the previously politically inactive youth. The youth across Europe and America are 
less interested in official politics, defined by elite political parties and nationally 
defined rules, and more interested in alternative forms of political participation (Donk 
et. al. 2004). Grassroots social movements are more appealing to the youth for three 
primary reasons dealing with form, focus and scope. Firstly, grassroots social 
movements allow for flexible forms of political involvement (Dahlgren 2004).164 For 
young citizens who have more flexible time schedules and the drive to be involved in 
sociopolitical change, the lack of formal restraints from membership or predesigned 
participatory rules is highly alluring. Secondly, unlike political parties, social 
movements have an undefined and changing scope, often joining with other 
organizations or movements, shifting goals or limiting aims to one-off events (Donk 
et. al. 2004). Lastly, building from the alternative social movements began in the 
1960s and 1970s in America and Western Europe, new social movements tend to 
embrace diversity, decentralized informality and have the ability to span across 
national borders (Gundelack 1984).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  There	  are	  some	  youth-­‐directed	  NGOs	  at	  work	  in	  contemporary	  Hungary	  such	  as	  Mobilitas	  
(mobilitas.hu),	  Amnesty	  International,	  The	  Foundation	  for	  Democratic	  Youth,	  and	  the	  Association	  of	  
Community	  Developers	  (Közösségfjlesztők	  Egyesülete-­‐	  www.kka.hu).	  These	  groups	  aim	  at	  increasing	  
youth	  volunteering	  and	  civic	  education,	  however	  their	  membership	  numbers	  remain	  relatively	  small.	  
164	  Social	  movements	  are	  collective	  with	  a	  common	  purpose	  and	  create	  a	  social	  solidarity	  around	  a	  
cause	  with	  sustained	  interaction	  aimed	  at	  elites	  or	  opposing	  authorities	  (Tarrow	  1998).	  New	  forms	  of	  
political	  participation	  are	  more	  ad	  hoc	  and	  less	  dependent	  on	  elites	  or	  hierarchical	  structures.	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Online media, grassroots groups and decentralized local actors have made 
democratic politics more complex and have allowed social movements to develop 
across Europe (Norris 2002, Forbig 2005). Grassroots social movements allow young 
protestors to question the legitimacy of power and refuse commitment to traditional 
social norms and parties while at the same time refusing apathy and isolation (Pleyers 
2005, Muxel 2001). While elements of western-style social movements are embodied 
within the Hungarian case there remain some distinct differences. In Hungary 
politically directed social movements provide an uncensored social space to address 
topics that mainstream politics avoid, mainly corruption and politically sensitive 
historical topics.  
The rebellion of the youth is aimed always first at topics that are taboo for societies. 
In the 50s and 60s it was a sexual revolution and nowadays we rebel against grounds 
of policy and history. Especially the Treaty of Versailles and things that have not been 
taught. We are still in a transition era. It is still considered an insult to speak about it. 
So people seek out these topics that they are not supposed to talk about and start 
talking about it. Because grown up politicians still find it difficult to address. (Lászlo, 
Age 24: Budapest) 
Observed in the United States and Western Europe, many social movements 
are based on conflicts organized against people or power structures at a global level 
and often targeting effects of globalization (Touraine 2002).165 However, in Hungary 
the largest grassroots social movements are influenced by, and aimed towards, 
discontent with national political elites and policies being made. Right wing, radical 
right and alternative liberal-left social movements in Hungary have all been formed 
on the basis of perceived political corruption. Hungary has a distinct branding of its 
grassroots social movements using similar strategies to right wing and radical right 
political parties. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  most	  recently	  with	  the	  Occupy	  movement	  as	  well	  as	  environmental	  movements	  
that	  span	  across	  national	  borders.	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In Hungary the largest grassroots social movements combine disillusionment 
and discontent towards the political elite with nationally relevant symbols and historic 
narratives, similar to Fidesz and Jobbik’s effective political tactics discussed in 
Chapter 3. The largest and most successful social movements in Hungary since 2002 
have utilized distinct historical symbols and concepts, mainly: 1) that 1989 was not a 
legitimate ‘people’s revolution’ (Arato 1994), 2) that Hungary has a longstanding 
revolutionary tradition from 1848 and 1956 that is reflected today and 3) that Hungary 
is continuously suppressed as a nation by outside forces, tying in with points one and 
two. The last point is primarily reiterated by right wing and radical right movements 
while the first two points are used more generally across the political spectrum of 
grassroots social movements.166 It is important to note that political culture is ‘not 
what is happening in the world of politics, but what people believe about those 
happenings’ which can be empirical, value oriented or emotive (Pye and Verba 1965, 
p. 516).  
The first point about feeling the need for a new ‘people’s revolution’ in 
Hungary is perpetuated within activist youth circles. The concept of 1989 as a ‘self-
limiting revolution’ is rejected by more nationalist and radical right activists and was 
discussed openly in focus groups as well as individual interviews by activists. Most 
social movements drawing out youth activists revolve around the symbolic idea of 
developing a Fourth Republic to confront Hungary’s controversial aspects of history, 
holding politicians accountable for their scandalous and potentially undemocratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  Liberal	  activist/party	  group	  4K!	  (Fourth	  Republic)	  and	  the	  radical	  right	  64-­‐County	  Youth	  Group	  both	  
openly	  call	  for	  a	  people’s	  revolution	  that	  they	  feel	  did	  not	  happen	  in	  1989.	  The	  concept	  of	  needing	  a	  
further	  people’s	  revolution	  is	  apparent	  in	  nationalist	  and	  radical	  right	  movements	  like	  the	  Hungarian	  
Guard	  and	  HVIM	  but	  also	  within	  liberal	  movements	  like	  4K!,	  similar	  to	  LMP.	  See	  Table	  4.1	  for	  
references	  on	  contemporary	  Hungarian	  Movements.	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actions.167 This symbolic revolution is also voiced openly through Fidesz, who 
referred poignantly to the 2010 national elections as a voter’s revolution, and through 
Jobbik’s call for complete political restructuring. These sentiments carry over into 
Hungarian activist traditions of demonstration and protest culture. Not only does the 
liberal movement-party 4K! literally stand for ‘fourth republic’ (negyedik köztársság), 
implying the revolutionary need for a new republic, but the concept of a fourth 
republic has also been repeated by other larger movement-parties like Together 2014 
(discussed in Section 4.2.1).  
Regarding the second historically significant point current grassroots social 
movements are utilizing, past revolutions and historic national tragedies live on 
through constant use of their symbols, slogans and remembrance days (discussed 
further in Chapter 5 analyzing familial historical narratives). Nationally salient 
narratives are widely used by grassroots social movements in Hungary. Symbol 
formation within grassroots social movements is key in mediating sociopolitical 
understanding of a movement’s aims and discontents to the wider public (Laitin 
1988).168 Hungary’s revolutionary tradition has taken on national memorial dates of 
historically significant revolutions. Since 2006 the memorial days around the 1848 
Revolution against the Hapsburgs and the 1956 Revolt against Soviet powers have 
become days of political activism, protests and demonstrations for political parties as 
well as oppositional activist groups (Palonen 2009).169 These national holidays have 
become institutionalized as days when political parties as well as grassroots social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167	  The	  misrepresentation	  of	  Hungary’s	  recent	  and	  distant	  past	  is	  discussed	  more	  in	  Chapter	  6	  on	  
Education.	  	  
168	  Symbols	  used	  by	  movements	  enter	  people’s	  consciousness	  to	  unite	  and	  mobilize	  citizens	  (Tarrow	  
1998).	  Groups	  feel	  embedded	  within	  the	  world	  when	  they	  can	  trace	  their	  origins	  into	  history,	  
tradition	  and	  ancient	  moments	  through	  relevant	  symbols.	  Mythical	  and	  historical	  symbols	  are	  thus	  
transformed	  into	  modern	  relevant	  devices	  (Csepeli	  1997).	  
169	  March	  15th	  is	  the	  national	  holiday	  in	  remembrance	  of	  the	  1848	  Revolution	  and	  October	  23rd	  is	  the	  
national	  holiday	  in	  remembrance	  of	  the	  1956	  Revolution.	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movements, for and against the government, organize events and demonstrations.170 
More recently the newly created national holiday day for remembrance of the Treaty 
of Trianon on June 4th has also drawn out more nationalist and radical right crowds.171 
Social movements and political parties are competing for public space on key 
symbolic days.  
The last point, targeting Hungary as an oppressed nation by outside forces, ties 
in with the narrative of Hungary’s lacking revolution in 1989 as well as both 
revolutions in that international elites are the scapegoat for these happenings. Taking 
this perspective, 1989 was an elite-driven transition that kept key communist players 
in power. Both the 1848 against the Hapsburg’s rule and 1956 against Soviet rule both 
targeted international oppressive forces. While Hungary’s contentious past has been 
used by political parties and social movements to gain emotive leverage, the success 
or failure of marginalized political movements is highly dependent on shifts in the 
political opportunity structure. 
The form and scope of grassroots social movements within a country are 
dependent on the sociopolitical opportunities available within a regime (Kitschelt 
1986, Tarrow 1998). As discussed in Chapter 3, a shift in the political opportunity 
structure allows new players to enter the political sphere, also creating a space for 
alternative agents such as social movements (Kriesi et. al. 1995, Donk et. al. 2004). 
The same time periods allowing for strong political shifts in Hungary in 2002, 2006 
and 2010, also cultivated new forms of politically motivated grassroots social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  See	  Appendix	  3	  for	  a	  list	  of	  relevant	  events	  and	  speeches	  that	  I	  attended	  for	  research	  purposes.	  
171	  In	  2010	  the	  Fidesz	  government	  instated	  June	  4th	  as	  the	  Remembrance	  Day,	  known	  as	  the	  ‘national	  
day	  of	  unity’	  for	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Trianon	  in	  1920.	  In	  parliament	  the	  new	  law	  about	  Trianon	  
Day	  was	  supported	  by	  radical	  right	  party	  Jobbik	  as	  well	  as	  green	  party	  LMP.	  The	  Socialist	  Party	  MSZP	  
was	  the	  only	  party	  not	  supporting	  the	  Fidesz	  initiative	  for	  the	  new	  national	  holiday.	  (’Trianon	  Day	  in	  
all	  but	  name’,	  The	  Budapest	  Times,	  (9	  June	  2010),	  
<http://www.budapesttimes.hu/2010/06/09/trianon-­‐day-­‐in-­‐all-­‐but-­‐name/>).	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movements. The first of these opportunities came in 2002 when Fidesz developed 
grassroots civic circles with non-membership oriented affiliations to the party, 
however, these circles were developed by Fidesz and mobilized by the party.  
Two significant events in recent years in Hungary have sparked the creation 
and development of newer grassroots social movements across the political spectrum, 
bringing citizens out onto the streets to convey their discontent and speak out against 
the political elites. The first were the large-scale protests in reaction to the Prime 
Minister’s leaked tape in the Fall of 2006, giving way to a rise in civil youth activism 
supporting nationalism and the radical right. Later, as a counter-reaction to the 2010 
Fidesz government, a new wave of visible liberal-left and green grassroots social 
movements appeared in Hungary. Parallel to the creation of alternative parties, Jobbik 
and LMP, youth-based networks have formed their own grassroots social movements 
that have developed outside of mainstream politics. Table 4.1 shows the larger, more 
significant grassroots social movements that have appeared since 2000 in Hungary. 
These movements are qualified by their common ideology bringing groups of people 
together in the attempt to achieve specific sociopolitical goals challenging existing 
power structures (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). The following sections focus on the 
primary grassroots activist groups in social politics, drawing youth supporters out 
onto the streets in alter-political movements. 
Table 4.1 shows the more significant grassroots social movements developing 
since 2000. These movements are all aimed at sociopolitical topics, either in support 
of, or in opposition to, a political movement or party. Most of these movements are 
primarily youth-based apart from the Hungarian Guard, which has a largely middle-
aged core, and Szolidaritás, which was created for the same purposes as Milla but 
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formatted itself on the Polish Solidarity unionist movement. Most Szolidaritás 
members are therefore also slightly older.  
Table 4.1 Significant Grassroots Social Movements in Hungary (2000 to Present) 
Movement	  Name	   Created	   Alignment	   Purpose	  
	  
64-­‐County	  Youth	  
Movement	  (HVIM)	  
2001	   Radical	  Right	   Supports	  regaining	  Hungary’s	  original	  
borders.	  
Supports	  other	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  
organizations.	  
Arranges	  annual	  radical	  right	  culture	  
festival	  ‘Magyar	  Sziget’.	  
	  
Hungarian	  Guard	  
2006	   Radical	  Right	   Grassroots	  paramilitary	  unit	  protecting	  the	  
countryside.	  
Protect	  Hungarian	  culture	  and	  tradition.	  
Support	  radical	  right	  political	  movement	  
Jobbik.	  
	  
Milla	  
2010	   Anti-­‐Fidesz	   Demonstrate	  and	  unite	  against	  
undemocratic	  Fidesz	  legislation	  such	  as	  the	  
New	  Media	  Law,	  new	  Constitution	  and	  
other	  perceived	  restrictions	  on	  human	  
rights.	  
	  
Szolidaritás	  
2011	   Anti-­‐Fidesz	   Similar	  to	  Milla	  but	  made	  mainly	  of	  trade	  
unionists	  and	  a	  slightly	  older	  traditional	  
crowd	  uniting	  for	  increased	  social	  security	  
and	  equality.	  
	  
4K!*	  
2007/2011	   ‘Patriotic	  Left’	   Originally	  to	  create	  public	  space	  for	  young	  
Hungarians	  to	  ‘take	  back	  the	  streets’.	  	  
To	  create	  community	  building.	  
Supporting	  participatory	  democracy.	  
	  
Together	  2014*	  
2012	   Anti-­‐Fidesz	  
Liberal-­‐Left	  
Calling	  for	  an	  activist	  movement	  to	  unite	  
all	  opposition	  parties	  and	  movements	  
against	  Fidesz	  to	  overthrow	  the	  two-­‐third	  
majority.	  
	  
Békemenet	  **	  
2012	   Pro-­‐Fidesz	  
Government	  
Created	  to	  counter	  Milla	  and	  Szolidaritás	  
movements,	  rallying	  pro-­‐government	  
support	  for	  Fidesz.	  
	  
*	  4K!	  and	  Together	  2014	  are	  significant	  in	  that	  they	  began	  as	  movements	  but	  became	  legitimately	  
recognized	   political	   parties	   and	   will	   both	   be	   running	   in	   the	   2014	   elections.	   These	   ‘movement-­‐
parties’	  are	  discussed	  in	  section	  4.2.1.	  
**	   Békement	   (Peace	   March	   for	   Hungary)	   formed	   January	   2012	   by	   pro-­‐Fidesz	   government	  
supporters,	   marching	   to	   counteract	   anti-­‐Fidesz	   movements.	   Participation	   ranges	   from	   10,000	   –	  
1,000,000.	  	  
While Facebook support is not a representative or accurate measurement of 
real participation it is a visual indicator of online support by mainly younger 
Hungarians. Figure 4.1 is given as an indicator of online support levels through 
Facebook usage supporting primary grassroots social movements and movement 
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parties As seen in Figure 4.1, Milla has one of the highest online support networks 
compared with other grassroots social movements in Hungary.172 The online support 
around Milla and the Together 2014 movements are particularly impressive due to 
their more recent formations in 2010 and 2011. 
Figure 4.1: Facebook Support of Grassroots Social Movements 
 
	  The	  support	  levels	  given	  in	  Figure	  4.1	  correspond	  with	  ‘likes’	  viewed	  19	  June	  2013.	  
The seemingly low support online for radical right movements, HVIM and the 
Hungarian Guard, is surprising at first glance compared with the high levels of online 
support for Jobbik (see Figure 4.2) and the strong radical right alternative media 
online (discussed in Chapter 7). Searching on Facebook there are at least fifty-seven 
variations of HVIM pages and sixty-six variations of Hungarian Guard pages, mainly 
defined by supporters within local villages or towns across Hungary. This diffuses the 
support for one main Facebook page, which is often difficult to decipher from other 
pages with the same label. This is also indicative of grassroots social movements with 
strong localized networks that can feed into larger national grassroots activism, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	  Szolidaritás’	  lower	  online	  support	  is	  most	  probably	  due	  to	  the	  group’s	  older	  cohort	  base,	  however,	  
still	  has	  a	  relatively	  large	  online	  following	  compared	  with	  most	  social	  movement	  Facebook	  pages.	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catering to youth individualism allowing multiple levels of involvement and 
affiliation.	  
4.1.2 Radical Right Grassroots Social Movements 
The 2006 MSZP political scandal, of the Prime Minister’s leaked tape, 
discussed in section 3.1.2, was utilized not only by right wing opposition, Fidesz, but 
by radical right movements, alongside Jobbik, to gain national attention (Waterbury 
2010, Jordon 2010, Korkut 2012). The political scandal occurred just weeks before 
the Memorial Day for the 1956 Revolution against the Soviets and this day was 
utilized to unite the radical right counterculture against the government. Violence 
broke out between protestors and state police, climaxing with protestors taking over 
Hungary’s national media center, MTV (Magyar Televízió – Hungarian Television), 
harking back on the bloody 1956 revolution when revolutionaries stormed the media 
headquarters in Budapest. Rioting and protests continued for days on end outside of 
parliament. Meanwhile Jobbik became a visible group among protestors. Large red 
and white striped flags of the ancient King Árpád emerged among Jobbik supporters, 
controversially linked to the red and white stripes appearing on the flag used by the 
Hungarian Nazi Arrow Cross faction (Halasz 2009, Jordon 2010, Korkut 2012).173 
This was also shocking since many Hungarians had not witnessed social movements 
that occupied public buildings, created blockades or incited police violence since 
1956 (Szabó 1996).174  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  ‘Report	  to	  the	  Special	  Committee	  on	  the	  Problem	  of	  Hungary’,	  United	  National	  General	  Assembly,	  
11th	  Session	  Supplement	  18	  (A/3592),	  (New	  York,	  1957),	  p.	  20,	  	  
<http://mek.oszk.hu/01200/01274/01274.pdf>.	  
174	  Among	  post-­‐communist	  countries	  Hungary	  was	  previously	  considered	  to	  have	  the	  lowest	  levels	  of	  
violent	  disruption	  or	  public	  disorder	  (Szabó	  1996).	  Hungary	  did	  have	  taxi	  blockades	  occurring	  in	  the	  
early	  1990s	  around	  petrol	  inflation	  but	  nothing	  that	  would	  incite	  violence.	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Jobbik and its radical counterparts appeared in the media as a strong and 
united young force addressing sociopolitical topics that had been previously ignored 
such as police crime (rendőrség bűnözés) and the much-evaded topic of gypsy crime 
(cigánybűnözés) (Halasz 2009, Magyari 2009). The 2006 protests were a crucial step 
for that radical right in gaining nationwide media coverage, giving Jobbik a platform 
to unite radical right subcultures and vocalize their discontent with current politics 
and corrupt politicians. While most grassroots social movements are defined by their 
inclusiveness and diversity, radical right movements tend to network in a more 
segregated fashion, often focusing on dense personal networks in smaller circles (van 
de Donk et. al. 2004).  
Groups linked with the radical-right mentioned here are also of significance 
since, they have visibly supported the party at their events and rallies as well as 
signed informal agreements with Jobbik in 2009, creating what is referred to as the 
‘Genuine National Side’ (Valódi Nemzeti Oldal).175 Both Fidesz’s civic circles and 
Jobbik’s affiliated movements support their respective political parties at events and 
demonstrations, also taking on civil roles during elections by handing out flyers and 
campaigning. However, Fidesz’s circles were developed as local informal support 
networks while radical right organizations have developed their own events and 
agendas outside of official Jobbik itineraries (discussed below). The two most well-
known and large-scale radical right grassroots organizations are the 64-County 
Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom abbreviated hereafter 
as HVIM) and the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  In	  June	  2009	  leading	  representatives	  László	  Toroczkai	  (from	  HVIM),	  Róbert	  Kiss	  (from	  the	  
Hungarian	  Guard),	  Zsolt	  Tyirityán	  (from	  the	  Army	  of	  Outlaws	  -­‐	  Betyársereg)	  and	  Jobbik	  president	  
Gábor	  Vona	  formed	  the	  ‘Genuine	  National	  Side’.	  [‘Összefognak	  a	  nemzeti	  radikálisok’,	  Index,	  (14	  June	  
2009),	  <http://index.hu/belfold/2009/06/14/osszefognak_a_nemzeti_radikalisok/>].	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The true participant numbers of these radical right groups and grassroots 
social movements are difficult to calculate. HVIM’s official Facebook page has just 
over 3,000 supporters while the main Hungarian Guard page has around 3,500 online 
supporters (see Figure 4.1).176 This is seemingly a low support number, however, both 
movements have numerous different Facebook pages and links corresponding to 
various regions and localities in Hungary, ranging in support from a few hundred to a 
few thousand. Regional support for HVIM and the Hungarian Guard tends to mirror 
Jobbik strongholds, showing larger networks in Northeastern Hungary (refer back to 
Figure 3.3).  
The Sixty-Four County Youth Movement (HVIM): 
As suggested by the movement’s name, HVIM is an irredentist nationalist 
group with an overarching goal of reinstating Hungary with its 64-county, pre-
Trianon borders.177 The movement works closely alongside Jobbik and Jobbik’s youth 
faction (Jobbik IT), though they do not have official political ties to the party. HVIM 
is openly anti-EU and anti-globalization. Supporters of HVIM work alongside 
Jobbik’s youth organization, sometimes arranging events together, though not 
officially linked. HVIM is considered more extreme than Jobbik, as one Jobbik youth 
member explained: 
‘The 64 County Youth Movement is sort of partnered with Jobbik IT. They are 
separate but work with us. We do not share common members but they are invited to 
our demonstrations… We are good friends with them and have the same goals but 
sometimes different ways of getting those goals. It is good this way because they are 
more radical’ (Péter, Age 24: Debrecen). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176	  Most	  recently	  checked	  on	  19	  June	  2013.	  
177	  The	  post-­‐WWI	  Treaty	  of	  Trianon	  distributed	  large	  portions	  of	  Hungary’s	  borders	  neighboring	  
countries.	  The	  movement	  is	  named	  after	  the	  sixty-­‐four	  Hungarian	  counties	  before	  the	  treaty.	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Although HVIM was originally established in 2001, leadership has since changed and 
the movement’s following has grown significantly since the 2006 riots, when Jobbik 
and the radical right gained nationwide recognition. 178 HVIM was an active force in 
the 2006 riots, leading the siege of the national radio headquarters, MTV, having 
drafted a petition against the government for the radio to read out, thought to incite 
the police violence that followed.179 While it is hard to calculate support levels this is 
most obviously marked by the increasing attendance at HVIM’s summer festival, 
Magyar Sziget (Hungarian Island), which had over 10 thousand participants in 2009 
(discussed further in section 4.2.2 analyzing the radical right as a subculture).180  
Besides the actual number of HVIM members the group is significant for its 
ability to develop a distinct radical right youth culture. With the ability to draw 
thousands of people out to attend anti-Trianon marches and music festivals, the youth 
group has become a strong youth-based grassroots social movement.181 The 
movement has been very successful in socializing young people around political 
partisanship directly for Jobbik, with their attendance and participation in riots, 
demonstrations and protests, as well as indirectly, with their immersion in popular 
culture creating concerts, festivals, charity events and establishing their own bars and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	  The	  original	  leader	  of	  HVIM	  is	  László	  Toroczkai	  who	  founded	  the	  group	  in	  2001.	  In	  2006	  Toroczkai	  
handed	  presidency	  over	  to	  Gyula	  György	  Zagyva	  possibly	  due	  to	  lawsuits	  brought	  forth	  against	  
Toroczkai	  accusing	  him	  as	  instigating	  large-­‐scale	  damage	  that	  was	  done	  to	  Hungary’s	  national	  media	  
center,	  MTV,	  in	  Budapest	  during	  the	  2006	  riots.	  [‘Court	  finds	  head	  of	  radical	  group	  responsible	  for	  
damage	  in	  2006	  riots’,	  Politics.hu,	  (12	  January	  2012),	  <	  http://www.politics.hu/20120112/court-­‐finds-­‐
head-­‐of-­‐radical-­‐group-­‐responsible-­‐for-­‐damage-­‐in-­‐2006-­‐riots/>.	  
179	  From	  the	  HVIM	  official	  website:	  ‘A	  Mozgalomról’,	  HVIM	  Official	  Site,	  <	  
http://www.hvim.hu/mozgalomrol>.	  	  
180	  See	  ‘Hatvannégyvármegyések	  tüntetnének	  a	  Szigeten’,	  Index.hu,	  (18	  July	  2011),	  
<http://index.hu/belfold/2011/07/18/hatvannegy_varmegyesel_tuntetnenek_a_szigeten/>.	  (Viewed	  
16	  August	  2011)	  AND	  Smith,	  Martin,	  ‘A	  Tale	  of	  Two	  Festivals’,	  Socialist	  Review,	  (September	  2009),	  <	  
http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10952>.	  
181	  ‘Over	  one	  thousand	  attend	  Budapest	  anti-­‐Trianon	  march’,	  Politics.hu,	  (6	  June	  2011),	  
<http://www.politics.hu/20110606/over-­‐one-­‐thousand-­‐attend-­‐budapest-­‐anti-­‐trianon-­‐march/>.	  	  
	   153	  
clubs (discussed in section 4.2.2). HVIM members are often seen beside Hungarian 
Guardsmen at local and national Jobbik rallies and political events. 
The Hungarian Guard: 
Jobbik’s party chairman, Gábor Vona, created the Hungarian Guard soon 
after the 2006 protests. The civil group was developed as a cultural organization with 
a paramilitary gendarmerie subdivision (csendőrség) to ‘prepare youth spiritually and 
physically for extraordinary situations when it might be necessary to mobilize the 
people’.182 The Hungarian Guard is a blend between a formal organization with 
official membership and a grassroots civil movement. The Hungarian Guard is also 
unique in that the movement draws from a broad age range with a majority of 
members between the ages of thirty-five and fifty, acting akin to an older counterpart 
of HVIM. The mission of the Hungarian Guard is to protect Hungarian culture and 
tradition, vowing to defend rural Hungarians that are victims of ‘gypsy crime’ 
(cigánybűnözés) (Jordon 2008). Like HVIM, the movement has undeniable links with 
Jobbik183 providing the party with a grassroots affiliation and well organized 
volunteer based militia created to work for the ‘Hungarian cause’ (Halasz 2009).   
The Hungarian Guard’s uniform and presence is distinct and unmistakable. 
Members wear black military boots, white shirts and black caps, and a vest with the 
red and white striped Árpád Flag emblem while marching through provincial villages, 
attending official meetings and participating in Jobbik’s political rallies (Jordon 
2008). Although it is difficult to estimate exact membership or support it is generally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  As	  defined	  by	  Jobbik	  in	  their	  registration	  of	  the	  Magyar	  Gárda	  in	  June	  2007:	  (‘Appeals	  court	  
reaffirms	  ban	  on	  Magyar	  Gárda’,	  Politics,	  <www.politics.hu>,	  3	  July	  2009,	  [Accessed	  31	  July	  2009].	  
183	  An	  example	  of	  Jobbik’s	  links	  with	  the	  Hungarian	  Guard	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Guard	  uniform	  
by	  head	  Jobbik	  MEPs.	  Controversially,	  just	  after	  the	  legal	  banning	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Guards	  MEP	  
Csanád	  Szegedi	  wore	  the	  Guard	  uniform	  attending	  the	  European	  Parliament	  July	  2009:	  ‘Jobbik	  MEP	  
wears	  banned	  Hungarian	  uniform	  in	  first	  EP	  session’,	  Politics.hu,	  (14	  July	  2009)	  first	  reported	  by	  MTI.	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accepted that the Hungarian Guard is the largest and most well known radical right 
paramilitary organization in Hungary. Demonstrations in Budapest have brought out 
guardsmen by the hundreds. However, demonstrations in smaller localities have 
witnessed larger demonstrations upwards of a thousand.184 There is also a growing 
younger membership, as reported by Tibor, a youth member of the Debrecen 
Hungarian Guardsmen. As explained by Tibor the Hungarian Guard has been typecast 
as ignorant villagers but in fact are intelligent civil servicemen: 
Everyone is thinking that the Hungarian Guard is chauvinist, uneducated and this is 
bull. If you look at the Hungarian guard, Jobbik and its youth [organization] the 
members are educated …The only fault is that the Hungarian guard are really willing 
to do something for the nation and the government. We helped so many times and 
were called bad. (Tibor, Age 24: Debrecen) 
 
 In May 2009 the Hungarian Courts ruled that the Hungarian Guard was illegal 
on grounds of engaging in racist and unconstitutional activities.185 The Hungarian 
Guard has since reformed ranks under various altered titles such as the New 
Hungarian Guard (Új Magyar Gárda) and the Better Future Civil Group (Szebb 
Jövőért Polgárőrség). While the Hungarian Guard continues under various titles they 
divide opinions among right wing and radical right youth activists. Some see the 
Hungarian Guard as violent radical fear mongers. Others see them as a symbol of 
national strength and civil unity that provide a service of protection that the 
government is not strong enough to take:186 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184	  ‘Neo-­‐Nazi	  groups	  in	  Hungary:	  Guards	  of	  the	  Carpathian	  Homeland,	  National	  Front	  and	  Others’,	  
Hungarian	  Spectrum,	  (26	  August	  2012).	  <http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2012/08/26/neo-­‐
nazi-­‐groups-­‐in-­‐hungary-­‐guards-­‐of-­‐the-­‐carpathian-­‐homeland-­‐national-­‐front-­‐and-­‐others/>.	  
185	  Although	  never	  proved,	  the	  group	  is	  linked	  to	  violence	  in	  Roma	  villages	  and	  over	  a	  dozen	  murders	  
since	  2006	  (Salzmann	  2009).	  In	  reaction	  to	  court	  rulings	  to	  ban	  the	  Hungarian	  Guard	  a	  group	  of	  up	  to	  
800	  members	  demonstrated	  in	  Budapest	  July	  2009,	  resulting	  in	  127	  arrests,	  including	  Gábor	  Vona.	  
186	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  although	  many	  Hungarian	  Guard	  members	  are	  older	  than	  the	  youth	  
cohort	  I	  look	  at,	  this	  is	  not	  true	  as	  a	  whole.	  Younger	  members	  of	  the	  Szebb	  Jövőért	  Polgárőrség	  
interviewed	  reported	  substantially	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  younger	  members.	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Violence is not good so I don’t really agree fully with the Magyar Gárda, but if I was 
a villager and they came to help me (with a gypsy problem) when nobody else would 
then, yes, I would be ok with them too. (István, Age 25: Budapest) 
 
Within interviews right wing supporting activists, like István, do not agree 
with the potentially violent outcomes of Hungarian Guard but they sympathize with 
the need for action in the countryside with what has been coined ‘gypsy crime’, 
something that many people do not believe mainstream political entities are dealing 
with, as discussed in Chapter 3. Radical right grassroots social movements are 
indicative of the divided ‘two Hungaries’, discussed previously, polarizing opinion by 
strengthening radical right political support for some while strongly dissuading others. 
Meanwhile, Budapest has become a bastion of liberal alternative grassroots social 
movements more recently since 2010. 
4.1.3 Liberal-Left and Green Grassroots Social Movements 
The next wave of social activism in Hungary after 2006 was brought forth in 
2010 and 2011. These new movements formed in reaction to the controversial Media 
Law and constitutional changes put forth by the Fidesz government, as noted in 
Chapter 3. Electoral support for liberal-left political parties has decreased since 2006 
and alternative green party support for LMP remains electorally marginal.187 
However, where liberal-left and green parties are lacking in electoral support and 
mass mobilizations (see Section 3.1.2), grassroots social movements based on Fidesz 
opposition are drawing out crowds of up to 100,000. There are two main grassroots 
social movements that I focus on that have drawn out large crowds since 2010 and 
have been working together in their anti-Fidesz legislation efforts. These two groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  Appendix	  1	  shows	  tables	  of	  election	  results	  between	  1990	  and	  2010.	  A	  significant	  decrease	  can	  be	  
seen	  in	  support	  for	  MSZP-­‐SZDSZ	  in	  the	  2010	  elections	  and	  LMP	  only	  barely	  managed	  to	  pass	  the	  5%	  
electoral	  threshold.	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are Milla (Egymillióan a Magyar sajtószabadságért – One million for the freedom of 
press in Hungary, nicknamed Milla) and Szolidaritás Mozgalom (The Hungarian 
Solidarity Movement). Both movements declare that they are unaligned with political 
parties though their anti-Fidesz stance tends to place them more on the liberal-left side 
of the political spectrum. Milla was founded as a youth-based movement against 
Fidesz’s 2010 Media Law while unionist groups against Fidesz laws affecting 
pensions founded Szolidaritás. Szolidaritás has subsequently become a slightly older 
demonstration partner to Milla, often coordinating rallies and protests together. 
One Million for the Freedom of Press in Hungary (Milla): 
Milla was founded in December 2010 in reaction to the new laws being 
instated by the Fidesz government, particularly in reaction to the first draft of the New 
Media Laws, seen as infringing on the freedom of speech and press in Hungary. Milla 
is the largest national grassroots opposition movement speaking out against Fidesz 
and are active in creating demonstrations and protests to bring awareness to the 
potential threat to democracy and anti-human rights from Fidesz’ new political 
overhauls. On their Facebook website Milla says that their two main goals are to: 1) 
show politicians that citizens and civil society hold an important and active role in 
politics with the ability to change faulty politics or politicians and 2) to create a 
platform for alternative civil, grassroots and political groups to be heard.188  
Milla’s core followers are similar to the core support network of LMP voters 
in that they are primarily young activists and Budapest-based intelligentsia, as seen by 
the main organizers and the audience of their first demonstrations. During my 
fieldwork in Budapest I attended two Milla demonstrations, the largest of which took 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188	  Information	  from	  Milla’s	  Official	  Facebook	  Site:	  <www.facebook.com/sajtoszabadsagert?sk=wall>.	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place March 15, 2011 and was the first large-scale demonstration they organized, 
drawing notice from national and international audiences and media. They have since 
put on numerous demonstrations mainly focusing on the potential threat to human 
rights from the Fidesz government’s initiatives. There is also a large presence and 
incorporation of Hungarian poets and writers presenting anti-Media Law texts to their 
audiences. In the last two years Milla has expanded, drawing in a broader age range 
out into the street to demonstrate against the Fidesz government.189 The movement 
has also been a highly incorporating movement, bringing in other organization and 
grassroots social movements that are against the current path the Fidesz government 
is taking.  
Actually I used to be very Fidesz… I demonstrated with Milla when the new 
government made the Media Law and this was all arranged on Facebook. Student 
organization movements helped arrange movements about the new Fidesz laws (with 
Milla and LMP) (Beata, Age 24: Budapest). 
 
Milla is a significant new development in Hungarian civil society in that it has 
brought out estimates of 50,000 to 100,000 demonstrators in their last four large-scale 
events (taking place March 15th and October 23rd of 2011 and 2012).190 Milla is 
providing a political outlet for discontented liberal-left supporters and right wing 
supporters upset with Fidesz’s current path, as seen by Beata’s quotation. Milla also 
has the strongest Facebook support of any other civil movement on either side of the 
political spectrum with numbers close to that of the most well-known political figures 
in Hungary (comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.2). They currently are the most successful 
grassroots social movement in Hungary providing information and creating activism 
among young people. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  The	  increasing	  number	  and	  age	  range	  of	  Milla	  demonstration	  participants	  was	  apparent	  from	  
observing	  Milla	  and	  Szolidaritás	  events	  between	  2010	  and	  2012.	  See	  Appendix	  3	  for	  a	  list	  of	  relevant	  
events,	  speeches	  and	  youth	  camps	  attended	  using	  participant	  observation.	  
190	  See	  Appendix	  3	  for	  a	  list	  of	  relevant	  events	  attended	  for	  this	  research	  including	  Milla	  events.	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The Hungarian Solidarity Movement (Szolidaritás): 
 The Hungarian Solidarity Movement (Szolidaritás) was founded in October 
2011 as a ‘community organization’ in opposition to the recent Fidesz policies and 
constitutional changes, taking from Milla’s grassroots social movement format and 
developing an older counterpart to Milla.191 The main founders of the Szolidaritás 
movement are union activist groups, started primarily by members of one Hungary’s 
largest unions, the Armed Forces and Police Workers Advocacy Alliance (Fegyveres 
és Rendvédelmi Dolgozók Érdekvédelmi Szövetsége – FRDÉSZ).192 While quickly 
drawing in supporters on Facebook and in rallies Szolidaritás differs from Milla in 
that they are typically less of a youth-based movement. Their demonstration dynamic 
is a mixture of ages with a stronger middle-aged crowd, largely due to their stronger 
ties networking with worker’s union organizations. The main goal of Szolidaritás is to 
publicize the creation of liberal-left-green roundtable discussion forums to develop 
plans for how opposition forces can better strengthen against Fidesz.193  
Szolidaritás is relevant as an example of how youth-based grassroots social 
movements, like Milla, can change sociopolitical norms making alternative political 
participation open to a wider civic base. Szolidaritás is a prime example of the reverse 
socialization process where youth movements, like Milla, have set a political example 
for older generations, changing political culture at large (reverse socialization 
discussed further in Chapter 5). Younger activist networks are inspiring other civic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191	  Official	  Facebook	  Page	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Solidarity	  Movements:	  
<www.facebook.com/SZOLIDARITASmozgalom?sk=wall	  and	  http://szolidaritas.org>.	  	  
192	  Naming	  the	  movement	  ‘Solidarity’	  is	  in	  partial	  relation	  and	  reference	  to	  the	  Polish	  Solidarity	  
Movement	  in	  Poland	  before	  transition.	  	  
193	  The	  symbolic	  significance	  of	  a	  ‘roundtable’	  discussion	  links	  to	  the	  roundtable	  discussions	  that	  
political	  elites	  held	  during	  transition.	  Hundreds	  of	  such	  roundtables	  were	  held	  to	  create	  Hungary’s	  
peaceful	  ‘velvet	  revolution’.	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groups to modernize their approach to politics and develop non-traditional means of 
political participation through social movements.  
4.2 THE MALLEABILITY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  
Grassroots and social movements have the ability to blur the distinction 
between political parties as well as popular culture through the cultivation of 
subcultures. While in some cases distinct subcultures create political parties (Johnston 
and Snow 1998, Art 2009) or develop movements based on a subculture’s preferences 
(Simonelli 2002), in Hungary grassroots social movements have become the initial 
source of new movement parties and subcultures. This section looks at how the main 
movements discussed in Section 4.1 are operating and why their tactics are directly 
and indirectly increasing youth activism and potential partisanship. Section 4.2.1 
analyzes how grassroots social movements in Hungary have created the opportunity 
to counter as well as become alternative political parties. Section 4.2.2 looks at the 
ability of grassroots social movements to develop distinct new youth-based 
subcultures, indoctrinating political identities within the popular culture of certain 
movements. Like political parties, these movements are defining their own 
sociopolitical symbols and meaning as well as developing their own media networks 
and defining citizenship in their own terms.   
4.2.1 Blurring Movements with Political Parties 
Electoral politics and social movements have an important and necessary 
relationship. Grassroots social movements create a political outlet for those, usually 
young citizens, that would normally be passive or disillusioned by mainstream 
participatory practices (Putnam 2000, Dalton 2008, Fisher 2012). Social movements 
and political parties are both primary ways in which political interests are 
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communicated and intermediated (Kitschelt 2006). Social movements relate directly 
to the state by framing protest issues (Gamson and Meyer 1996), addressing 
repression (Rasler 1996), vocalizing outcomes (Dalton 1995) and changing the 
political opportunity structure (Kriesi 1995, Tarrow 1996). For these reasons, 
sometimes the boundaries between social movements and political parties become 
blurred (Burstein 1998, Goldstone 2003). There are two cases when this blurring 
occurs: 1) when political parties utilize movements or movement tactics within their 
political strategies to gain popular support and 2) when certain movements take on 
political debates at the party level, subsequently becoming movement parties 
(Kitschelt 2006).  
The first movement-party relation is developing from political parties using 
social movement tactics of online activism and demonstrative mobilization to increase 
their activist and youth support networks as well as gain broader populist support. 
Fidesz’s civic circles, discussed in Section 3.1.2, are the most successful Hungarian 
example of a political party developing and employing movement tactics by creating 
localized networks of partisanship that can be brought together for larger political 
purposes. Fidesz’s civic circles developed a political format for cultivating successful 
populist tactics of mass mobilization more recently incorporated by radical right 
party, Jobbik, and green party, LMP. Fidesz has used grassroots organizations to 
spread and maintain support networks across Hungary, a tactic used effectively by 
Jobbik with relation to the Hungarian Guard and HVIM in reaching smaller towns and 
villages. Fidesz’s continued usage of mass mobilization through social movements is 
most recently embodied by the Békemenet (Peace March for Hungary).194 The ‘Peace 
Marches’, started January 2012, have corresponded mainly with large national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  Békemenet	  translates	  to	  ‘Peace	  March’.	  English	  translations	  prefer	  ‘Peace	  March	  for	  Hungary’.	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holidays where Fidesz, and more recently anti-Fidesz, rallies take place. The 
Békemenet movement was created specifically to counter anti-Fidesz demonstrators 
and give draw national media around the large pro-government followers.195 
Jobbik has also been successful in using social movements, like the Hungarian 
Guard and HVIM to maintain the grassroots element of the party. Localized Jobbik 
networks work with regional radical right movements to support Jobbik’s strong core 
leadership, allowing for local and national mobilization and perceived intimacy to the 
party. As explained by one interviewee: 
The The Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary is really strong. I can phone Gabor 
Vona and he will talk to me. We are like a big family… We are first a movement and 
second a party. (Péter, Age 24: Debrecen) 
 
At Jobbik events, such as Political Youth camps or Jobbik May Day Festival other 
radical right wing movements are present with official booths or roles.196 LMP has 
been less successful in maintaining its movement momentum. While LMP had 
original ties with the Milla movement it has split as a party over internal discrepancies 
specifically about how much to involve itself with other movements and parties.  
Successful utilization of movements and movement tactics by Fidesz and 
Jobbik also correlates with stronger youth support, displayed by online activism and 
support through online networks such as Facebook (see Figure 4.2). Fidesz and 
Jobbik have been highly successful in developing an online presence, utilizing 
Facebook groups, blogs and online newsletters more than other political parties to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  To	  increase	  Peace	  March	  attendance	  Fidesz	  has	  also	  offered	  financial	  assistance	  to	  ethnic	  
Hungarians	  in	  bordering	  countries	  to	  come	  to	  these	  rallies	  (‘A	  Fidesz	  is	  besegített	  a	  békemenetre	  
utaztatásban’,	  Origo,	  (24	  January	  2012),	  <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20120123-­‐civilek-­‐mellett-­‐a-­‐
fidesz-­‐is-­‐szervezett-­‐buszokat-­‐a-­‐bekemenetre.html>.	  
196	  At	  the	  Jobbik	  Youth	  Summer	  Camp	  the	  Hungarian	  Guard	  were	  the	  official	  security	  of	  the	  camp,	  
checking	  bags	  at	  entry	  and	  staying	  for	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  camp	  in	  uniform	  (see	  Section	  3.3	  and	  
Appendix	  3).	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stream consistent information and recruit support (see Pleyers 2005).197 For 
previously marginalized parties this ‘mélange of virtual and real-world political 
activity is the way millions of people – especially young people – relate to politics in 
the twenty-first century. The nascent, messy and more ephemeral form of politics is 
becoming the norm for a younger, digital generation’ (Bartlett et. al. 2012, p. 14). 
Figure 4.2: Political Parties, Leaders and Youth Organizations on Facebook 
	  
Figure	   4.2	   compares	   Facebook	   support	   for	   the	   current	   political	   parties,	   party	   chairmen	   (Prime	  
Minister	   Viktor	   Orbán	   Ferenc	   Gyurcsány,	   Gábor	   Vona	   and	   András	   Schiffer)	   and	   political	   youth	  
organizations	   (Fidelitas,	   Societas	   and	   Jobbik	   Ifjúsági	   Tagozat).	   Note:	   LMP	   has	   not	   officially	  
established	  a	  formal	  youth	  party.198	  
In Hungary daily Internet usage and especially online social networking sites 
remains largely youth-oriented.199 As seen by Figure 4.2, Jobbik and Jobbik’s leader, 
Gabor Vóna, have the most Facebook support, only surpassed by right wing Prime 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197	  LMP	  was	  also	  significant	  in	  its	  original	  usage	  of	  the	  Internet	  to	  campaign	  through	  YouTube	  and	  
Facebook,	  however,	  as	  mentioned,	  the	  party	  has	  since	  lost	  many	  grassroots	  support	  networks.	  	  
198	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Ference	  Gyurcsány	  left	  MSZP	  in	  2011	  to	  form	  the	  new	  party,	  Democratic	  
Coalition,	  he	  is	  still	  the	  primary	  political	  figure	  associated	  with	  MSZP.	  
199	  In	  Hungary	  79%	  of	  young	  people	  aged	  15	  to	  24	  use	  the	  Internet	  almost	  daily	  whereas	  64%	  of	  25	  to	  
39	  year	  olds,	  50%	  of	  40	  to	  54	  year	  olds	  and	  23%	  of	  those	  aged	  50	  and	  up	  use	  the	  Internet	  daily	  
(Eurobarometer	  76:	  Autumn	  2011).	  See	  Figure	  7.1	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  
35,346	  
156,743	  
4,710	  
50,442	   35,442	  
1,778	  
105,859	   96,891	  
15,494	  19,674	   7,429	  0	  20,000	  
40,000	  60,000	  
80,000	  100,000	  
120,000	  140,000	  
160,000	  180,000	  
Party	   Chairman	   Youth	  Org.	  
Fidesz	  MSZP	  Jobbik	  LMP	  
	   163	  
Minister Viktor Orbán. While right and radical right support online and electorally 
remain strong new movement parties have formed in opposition to Fidesz for the 
2014 national elections. 
The second form of movement-party blurring has developed in the form of 
new movement parties in opposition to Fidesz. As defined by Herbert Kitschelt, 
movement parties are ‘coalitions of political activists who emanate from social 
movements and try to apply the organizational and strategic practices of social 
movements in the arena of party competition’ (2006, p. 280). The emergence of 
movement parties occurs when 1) grassroots social movements realize their goals 
demand a larger reorganizing of society rather than a singular policy reform, 2) when 
a movement feels they can amass a large electoral base from the popularity of their 
cause and 3) when the legislative and structural threshold to become a party is low 
enough for a movement to transition (Kitschelt 2006).  
Following the first criteria of movement party development, both groups have 
recognized the need to become parties to counteract Fidesz’s current political 
hegemony. After having won a two-third majority in parliament in 2010, the Fidesz 
government has made large political overhauls affecting Hungary’s media laws, 
judiciary system and constitution. Anti-Fidesz movements are faced with a wider 
scope than a single-policy change solution. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 2, this 
scenario is paired with political weakness and fracturing on the liberal-left, creating 
an opportunity for opposition social movements to amass a large electoral base from 
previous MSZP-SZDSZ voters. In Hungary the 5% electoral threshold means that if 
current new movement parties are able to legitimize themselves and create alliances 
with other liberal-left facets there is a high likelihood that in 2014 there will be a new 
political party in parliament. Two distinct movement parties have emerged to provide 
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alternative political options in the 2014 national elections; 4K! movement and 
Together 2014 have formed in Hungary in an attempt to assemble the youth and 
disillusioned voters using social movement tactics to mobilize citizens against Fidesz.   
The Fourth Republic!: 
The Fourth Republic! movement (Negyedik Köztársaságot! – known as 4K!) 
was founded as a youth movement in 2007, promoting young people taking public 
areas and creating public space for young Hungarians to feel comfortable in their 
cities. 4K! as a grassroots social movement set up flash mobs of city-wide pillow 
fights, impromptu Simon Says games and other activist programs to allow young 
people to identify themselves within their cities, often incorporating political 
messages in their actions. Founding chairman András Istvanffy explained in an 
interview the need for creating youth-based movements: 
When 4K! started there was a big desire from the youth to do something by the youth, 
for the youth. One reason people joined was to come for fun and the other was ‘Now 
at least the youth do something and show themselves’. It is an autonomous youth 
action. It is important that this generation can join something with creativity and 
courage – not just Societas and Fidelitas.  
(András Istvanffy Interviewed 19 July 2011). 
 
Istvanffy’s reference to MSZP and Fidesz’s youth organizations framed what he 
discussed as the lack of youth options for sociopolitical participation and activism that 
is not directly attached to a political party.  
Since the 2010 national elections, however, 4K! began working closely with 
Milla in anti-Fidesz efforts. András Istvanffy, the 4K! chairman, and one of the 
party’s founders, was a headlining speaker at the March 15, 2011 Milla 
demonstrations. 4K! has subsequently made the transition to party politics and it is 
currently uncertain of how this might change the function and core participation of the 
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movement. In 2011 4K! registered as a political party with the slogan ‘There is no 
more right and left, just above and below’, signifying that elite politics were all the 
same in neglecting the average citizen. The movement party defines itself as the 
‘patriotic left’ combining nationalism with left-wing platforms, something 4K! 
leaders say is missing in Hungary.200  
Together 2014: 
While 4K! caters mainly to the disillusioned Budapest-based youth, the line 
between social movement and political party has gone more mainstream with 
Together 2014 (Együtt 2014). Together 2014 is a true blending of Hungarian 
grassroots social movements and political mainstream created by three entities: Milla, 
Szolidaritás and the Patriotism and Progress Association (Haza és Haladás 
Közpolitikai Alapítvány –HHKA). HHKA was founded by the former interim Prime 
Minister, Gordon Bajnai.201 The ‘alliance’ was announced 23 October 2012 at the 
large Milla opposition rally against the Fidesz government with the ultimate goal of 
allying opposition forces to beat Fidesz in the 2014 elections.  
Together 2014 has refrained from defining itself on the political party 
spectrum, preferring to unite all those in opposition to the current Fidesz monopoly in 
government. That being said, Bajnai’s role as the MSZP interim Prime Minister and 
Milla’s more liberal-left following tend to classify the movement party, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  Information	  about	  4K!	  comes	  from	  their	  official	  Facebook	  site:	  
<https://www.facebook.com/NegyedikKoztarsasag?fref=ts>,	  and	  their	  official	  website	  <	  
http://negyedikkoztarsasag.hu/>,	  as	  well	  as	  interviews	  with	  4K!	  members	  and	  movement	  party	  
founder,	  András	  Istvanffy.	  
201	  Gordon	  Bajnai	  was	  the	  interim	  Prime	  Minister	  after	  Ferenc	  Gyurcsány	  resigned	  in	  2009.	  The	  HHKA	  
is	  a	  public	  policy	  foundation	  formed	  in	  2010	  to	  suggest	  biannual	  policy	  packages.	  	  
See:	  Saltman,	  Erin,	  ‘Together	  2014	  movement	  emerges	  in	  Hungary’,	  Policy	  Network,	  (23	  November	  
2012),	  <	  http://www.policy-­‐network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4294&title=%E2%80%9CTogether-­‐
2014%E2%80%9D-­‐movement-­‐emerges-­‐in-­‐Hungary>.	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Together 2014 also attracts disappointed Fidesz voters. Bajnai remains one of the 
most popular politicians in Hungary, and the Together 2014 movement, uniting 
activist movements and political elite, has one of the largest online support networks 
compared with all other large political parties and movements in Hungary (see Figure 
4.1). The main question remains how successful these movement parties will be in the 
national elections in 2014, turning support on the streets and online into votes.202  
4.2.2 The Radical Right Subculture 
Subcultures are defined by an actively sought minority style, usually against 
what is considered normalcy or commercially provided styles and meanings (Riesman 
et. al. 1961, Hebdige 1979). Although subculture and social movement theorists 
originally held distinctly different fields of study, theorists since the 1970s have 
begun to recognize the complex interplay between subcultures and social movements 
(Willis 1978, Cohen 1987, Thornton 1995, Martin 2002). In Hungary, there has 
always been a strong link between subcultures and social movements, developing new 
identities, symbols and values for young Hungarians challenging the existing status 
quo (Kéri 1987, I. Szabó 1986, Szabó 1988).203 Nationalist revivalism in the years 
leading up to transition, for example, brought forth an array of youth movements with 
built in subcultures. These ranged from subcultures indirectly challenging 
communism, such as the Tánchaz204 – folk dance movement (Szabó 1991), to more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202	  Together	  2014	  is	  now	  facing	  the	  difficulties	  of	  running	  as	  official	  political	  parties	  in	  the	  next	  
national	  election.	  They	  are	  facing	  legal	  challenges	  by	  the	  national	  courts	  over	  party	  names.	  It	  is	  still	  
uncertain	  how	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  transition	  into	  party	  politics	  and	  how	  support	  networks	  will	  
change.	  For	  now	  this	  blending	  of	  political	  party	  and	  social	  movement	  is	  creating	  a	  hybrid	  outlet	  for	  
participation.	  
203	  Most	  noteworthy	  are	  perhaps	  the	  student	  and	  young	  intelligentsia	  uprisings	  that	  created	  the	  1848	  
and	  1956	  revolutions	  in	  Hungary.	  During	  transition	  the	  ecological,	  feminist	  and	  skinhead	  subcultures	  
also	  emerged	  (Szabó	  1988	  and	  2002).	  
204	  The	  Tánchaz	  movement,	  which	  still	  exists	  today,	  revitalized	  nationalism	  through	  creating	  space	  for	  
distinctly	  Hungarian	  folk	  dancing.	  To	  this	  day	  Tánchaz	  dancers	  can	  meet	  informally	  at	  certain	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aggressively political youth subcultures like the one founding the radical liberal 
Fidesz youth organization (discussed in Chapter 3). In Hungary subcultures serve as a 
basis for wider mobilization. 
Current youth political activism in Hungary has developed a new radical right 
subculture, blending political activism with a popular culture incorporating music, 
nightclubs and festivals to go along with ideologies being conveyed (Bartlett et. al. 
2012). Despite large Facebook support for opposition movements like Milla and 
Together 2014, it is in the smaller and localized support networks for radical right 
movements that the strongest new youth-based subculture is emerging. Young people 
are actively developing a popular subculture to rekindle nationalist awareness, by 
utilizing Hungarian symbols and traditions to counteract perceived Europeanization 
and Western influences.  
Like many other anti-globalist movements, ultra-nationalist and radical right 
Hungarians are against globalization and capitalism, embodied by the influx of 
multinational corporations, banks and chain eateries (Lánczi 2002).205 Often the social 
narratives within nationalist and radical right political parties and movements give 
Europe, ‘Westerness’ and modernity distinct properties as something different to 
Hungary. This ‘otherness’ is also often associated with liberal-left ideologies and 
practices. In Hungary, claims of Western modernity can often conflict with 
counterclaims of Eastern authenticity (Gal 1991, Hofer 1991, Brubaker and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nightclubs	  or	  more	  formally	  in	  traditional	  dance	  at	  Tánchaz	  festivals	  and	  events.	  Tánchaz	  embodies	  a	  
distinct	  subculture	  through	  its	  own	  sense	  of	  nationalism	  through	  dance	  and	  music	  (Szabó	  1986).	  
205	  There	  is	  an	  increasing	  social	  dialogue	  articulated	  among	  informal	  friend	  groups,	  online	  networks	  
and	  grassroots	  social	  movements	  questioning	  Western	  influences	  and	  attempting	  to	  revitalize	  a	  more	  
Hungarian	  popular	  culture.	  I	  define	  popular	  culture	  as	  anything	  denoting	  ‘enculturation	  that	  people	  
participate	  in	  or	  approve	  of.	  It	  may	  be	  differentiated	  into	  folk	  culture	  or	  enculturation	  by	  family	  and	  
kin	  that	  teaches	  such	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  living	  skills	  as	  one’s	  native	  language,	  foodways,	  and	  modes	  of	  
clothing,	  and	  that	  inculcates	  the	  group’s	  values,	  attitudes,	  and	  beliefs’	  (Arpad	  2004).	  
	   168	  
Feischmidt 2002).206 Examples of this can be seen in interviewee responses such as 
when a young Jobbik supporter asked me whether the stereotype in the movies was 
true in America, if we had parties at our parents’ houses while they were away. When 
I responded that this was in part true his response was: 
Oh this is bad you know. Not for the drinking so much but the doing of drugs you see. 
That is a big part of us [being a ‘real’ Hungarian]. The radical right is very against 
drugs and these Western parties. (Lászlo, Age 21: Miskolc) 
The radical right has subsequently developed its own subculture, linked to 
grassroots social movements like the Hungarian Guard and HVIM, and ultimately 
linking to radical right party Jobbik, depicted as the only authentically Hungarian 
party. The radical right subculture has transformed Hungary into an idealized form, or 
‘nation-religion’ where the nation is not only a community but also an ordained 
territory with historic, ethnic, aesthetic and morally justified existence (Hockenos 
1993, Gerő 2008, Szilágyi 2009). The radical right is developing what Thornton 
(1995) describes as the ‘aestheticization of politics’. An idealized vision of Hungary 
as a humble, traditional peasantry is displayed in fashion trends and narratives having 
roots in the literary interwar Népi movement (Hockenos 1993).207   
Symbols depicting the ‘real Hungarian’, or idealized Hungary, most often 
target pre-Trianon Hungary, symbols royal Hapsburg Hungary and ancient Hungary. 
The most common nationalist narrative and iconographies revolve around the Treaty 
of Trianon (Müller 2011) evoked through the pre-Trianon map of Greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206	  The	  narrative	  of	  five	  hundred	  years	  of	  Hungarians	  fighting	  for	  independence	  includes	  the	  
oppression	  of	  Turkish,	  Habsburg,	  Nazi	  and	  Soviet	  occupation.	  The	  European	  Union	  and	  all	  its	  
facsimiles,	  are	  potentially	  added	  to	  this	  list:	  ‘They	  do	  not	  see	  accession	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  draw	  
neighbouring	  countries	  together	  in	  terms	  of	  culture	  and	  politics,	  but	  rather,	  they	  consider	  European	  
Enlargement	  a	  modern	  form	  of	  colonisation’	  (Ligeti	  and	  Nyeste	  2006,	  p.97).	  
207	  The	  term	  Népi	  means	  the	  people	  or	  folk.	  The	  Népi	  movement	  was	  a	  romantic	  artistic	  movement	  in	  
the	  interwar	  period	  when	  poets,	  artists	  and	  writers	  glorified	  the	  Hungarian	  countryside	  and	  
traditional	  and	  cultural	  aspects	  of	  Hungarians.	  This	  current	  radical	  right	  subculture	  of	  romanticized	  
Hungarian	  peasant	  culture	  is	  similar	  to	  UK	  working	  class	  youth	  subcultures	  in	  the	  1970s	  (Cohen	  1987).	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Hungary. Greater Hungary represents a time when Hungary had geopolitical power, 
linked with the Hapsburg Empire. More ancient Hungarian symbols utilized by the 
radical right target the national Turul bird and Árpad flag. In the Hungarian 
ethnogenesis myth a large Turul appears and gives a vision to a young women that 
she will birth the founding father of Hungary. She is linked with the birth of King 
Árpad. The Árpad flag is represented by horizontal red and white stripes on a flag. 
The Árpad tribal kings are also linked in folklore to Attila the Hun as a strong pioneer 
of ancient Hungarian tribes. Nationalist and radical right historians also propagate the 
myth of rovás irás, a type of runic writing that some Hungarian historians say 
predates Latin and therefore links the founding of Hungary with ancient times.208 
These symbols and icons are used to show nationalist and radical right partisanships 
and affiliations. Revisionist marches and songs like the Transylvanian March 
accompany tales of Hungary’s divine right to territory (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006).  
Often times, images on T-shirts display menacing hands tearing pieces of 
Hungary off into its neighboring regions. Even in ‘liberal Budapest’ the Map of 
Greater Hungary is a common image displayed on bumper stickers, T-shirts, 
necklaces, flags, belt buckles, bags and any number of goods. These popular culture 
trends were widely visible at Jobbik events and Jobbik summer camp, attended for 
participant observation. A majority of radical right supporting youths are visible 
based solely on these trends. Verified in focus groups and interviews, non-radical 
right youths would not wear images of the Greater map of Hungary, the Árpád flag or 
rovás irás writing. Emerging from of the 2006 riots in Budapest was the brand 
Harcos, meaning fighter or warrior. Described and explained by numerous Jobbik 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208	  Rovás	  Irás	  writing	  is	  written	  from	  right	  to	  left	  and	  is	  now	  used	  phonetically	  since	  the	  original	  
language	  paralleling	  the	  language	  is	  not	  fully	  understood.	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youth supporters, Harcos clothing appeared in 2006 on the scene of the riots by the 
production of hooded sweatshirts that could be zipped up entirely so that the hood 
became a mask, showing only one’s eyes. The brand has since diversified making 
clothing displaying combinations of radicalized symbols, slogans and icons. Radical 
right subculture fashions are available at ‘Traditional Shops’ (Hagyományos Bolt) as 
well as through online outlets like MagyarHarcos.hu and TurulBolt.hu. Symbols are 
combined and manipulated to convey a distinctly radical right subculture. 
The most notable event embodying this subculture is an annual nationalist 
festival called Magyar Sziget (Hungarian Island) put on by 64-County Youth 
Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom – HVIM). Founded in 2001, 
the festival is a weeklong festival incorporating conferences, historical presentations, 
folk dance, handcrafts, cavalry, archery and national rock music (nemzeti rock).209 
Magyar Sziget was formed in opposition to the ‘liberal’, Sziget Fest (Island Festival). 
The summer Sziget Fest on Óbudai-sziget (Old-Buda Island) boasts of being ‘the 
island of friendship, the island of love, the island of self-abandon, the island of 
freedom, the island of cultural diversity’, also controversially having a Roma tent and 
gay-lesbian venue on site.210 Magyar Sziget provides a counter attack to this ‘non-
Hungarian’ entity.  
Decreed on its website as the most important patriotic event in Hungary, chief 
organizer György Zagyva explains that one of the festivals main roles is to ‘serve 
mental ammunition for those who require this, and supporting those who are still at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209	  National	  Rock	  is	  a	  genre	  of	  music	  in	  Hungary,	  considered	  its	  own	  category	  of	  hard	  rock	  and	  metal	  
music.	  Bands	  of	  this	  genre	  typically	  have	  lyrics	  containing	  nationalist	  themes.	  The	  outfitting	  of	  a	  band	  
in	  either	  Harcos	  attire	  or	  adding	  traditional	  Hungarian	  elements	  to	  their	  dress	  is	  common.	  	  
210	  Sziget	  Fest	  began	  in	  1993	  and	  now	  attracts	  nearly	  400,000	  attendees	  from	  more	  than	  seventy	  
countries	  into	  Budapest	  for	  the	  music	  festival.	  Sziget	  fest	  is	  mainly	  a	  music	  festival	  but	  also	  has	  
cultural	  programs	  of	  theatre,	  circus	  and	  exhibitions	  (‘About’,	  Sziget	  Island	  of	  Freedom,	  Official	  
Website,	  <www.sziget.hu>).	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the stage of finding their own life path’.211 One interviewee spoke about the need for 
events like Magyar Sziget counteracting foreign forces in Hungary: 
Magyar Sziget is a quality cultural event. I don’t agree with the multiculturalism of 
Sziget Fest. We need something that is purely Hungarian. I don’t want a liberalism, 
which consents with drug use. Liberalism consents to abusing alcohol and trashing 
Hungary. All this culminates with Sziget Fest. At Magyar Sziget there are no drugs. 
We are on a silk prairie… Our little prairie is a peaceful and joyful event and its 
really green. (Szabolcs, Age 20: Budapest).  
 
In Szabolcs’s quotation the reference to the festival as ‘our little prairie' exemplifies 
the subculture around the romanticized peasant Hungarian. The nationalist festival 
invites like-minded patriots, journalists, businesses and nationalist rock bands to 
participate (Ligeti and Nyeste 2006). The festival’s website also shows the literal web 
of radical right wing subcultures coming together as the site links to other radical-
based sites for media (linking to radical right news outlets like Kuruc.info, Magyar 
Jelen and Barikád.hu) as well as channels to national Hungarian rock music 
(NemzetiRoch.hu, Szent Korona Rádio and the band Karpatia). The union between 
movements and subcultures establishes a hegemony beyond politics (Szabó 2011). 
The nemzeti rock (national rock), bands playing at such events, such as 
Kárpátia, Romantikus Erőszak (Romantic Violence) and Hungarica, have had a large 
influx of commercial success in recent years, topping record sales lists in 2009 and 
2010 (Bartlett et. al. 2012). The success of HVIM and Magyar Sziget has also led to 
other outlets for radical right subcultures. Klub 64 is a bar and club based in central 
Budapest opened by HVIM in 2006 as a ‘national nightclub’ (nemzeti 
szórakozóhelye). Former leader of HVIM and founder of Klub 64 explains:  
The crowds of young people are not going to voluntarily go and sit in on a dry 
lecture, but concerts and pleasurable music can seduce them anywhere. And once 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  ‘Rólunk’	  (About	  Us),	  Magyar	  Sziget,	  Official	  Website,	  <www.magyarsziget.hu>.	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they are here you can begin to nurture the minds of the nation’s consciousness.212 
(László Toroczkai in an interview with Kuruc.info, 1 June 2010) 
 
Whether online or in person at festivals and rallies, the media, music, clothing, 
community areas, social clubs and political organizations of the radical right have a 
stronger youth social cohesion than any other politically oriented youth network.213  
Considering the strong emerging radical right youth subculture there is very 
little political counter-culture from the liberal-left. Although there has been an influx 
of liberal-left and opposition protest culture, seen from the opposition efforts of Milla 
and Szolidaritás against controversial Fidesz legislation since 2010, there are still no 
cohesive symbols, slogans, fashion trends or music defining or uniting this subculture. 
Discussing developing subcultures interviewees were aware of the large void within 
the liberal-left: 
Left symbols? There are none… well… maybe the EU flag. The political left is in a 
bad state right now. (Adam, Age 23: Budapest) 
Many times you can tell a party preference by the style someone dresses in and the 
music they listen to. Jobbik is obvious with skinheads and traditionalists. Actually 
there are also one or two left wing bands but there is not really a distinct left wing 
music scene as much as a right one. Between Fidesz and LMP I can’t tell the style 
difference. (Zselykó, Age 17: Budapest) 
The sarcastic reference of Adam to the left’s European allegiance and lack of national 
identity from one of the party’s own youth league members is particularly poignant. 
Zselykó’s quotation also shows the unidentifiable liberal-left and even right wing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  Quotation	  found	  from:	  ‘Klub	  64:	  egy	  magyar	  sziget	  egész	  évben	  Budapest	  szívében’,	  Kuruc.info,	  (1	  
June	  2010),	  <http://kuruc.info/r/6/60545/>.	  
213	  Note:	  The	  multi-­‐faceted	  nature	  of	  radical	  right	  popular	  culture,	  blending	  politics	  with	  civil	  society	  
and	  culture	  is	  not	  unusual	  to	  nationalist	  political	  networks	  (Wimmer	  2002,	  Mudde	  2007).	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subculture. As explained by Bori Kriza, Hungarian sociologist and maker of the 
documentary film Dübörörg a Nemzeti Rock (Drumming the National Rock):214 
There are no myths or symbols on the left or liberal side. You need music, myths, 
history, heroes, fashion. On March 15th [2011] there was a big rally for Milla. There 
was a large group but no ideology, slogan or symbol. Nothing to give people a 
‘togetherness’.  
Bori Kriza: Social Scientist, Teacher, Documentary Film Maker about the National 
Rock movement (Interviewed 8 September 2011). 
 
*** 
Grassroots social movements in Hungary have the potential to create new, 
previously separate networks between people as well as develop new sociopolitical 
goals, potentially implemented or institutionalized by the political elite (see Zolberg 
1972, Tarrow 1998). Fidesz’s civic circles in 2002, the MSZP government scandals in 
2006 and the breaking of electoral hegemonic bipolarity in 2010 created significant 
opportunity structures for mass mobilization through social movements to occur. The 
effect of these social movements was politically significant in cultivating a strong 
grassroots network for right wing mobilization in 2002. In 2006 the large-scale anti-
government protests gave a face and name to the radical right, led by Jobbik. Now, 
after the 2010 national elections breaking previous party bipolarity, current grassroots 
social movements are changing political discourse and political culture norms. Large 
amounts of support are being given to social movements on the street and online and 
new anti-Fidesz movement parties have been formed that will be competing in the 
2014 national elections. Youth-based social movements like Milla and 4K! are also 
changing sociopolitical culture norms as seen by older cohorts developing similar 
social movements (like Szolidaritás and Békemenet) and movement parties (like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214	  The	  word	  dübörörg	  in	  Hungarian	  refers	  to	  a	  lumbering	  or	  a	  continuous	  beating.	  I	  have	  translated	  it	  
to	  drumming	  here	  to	  fit	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  title:	  reference	  to	  rock	  music.	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Together 2014), institutionalizing previously marginalized forms of political 
participation (this process of reverse socialization is discussed further in Chapter 5). 
While civil society is measured as decreasing in Hungary current increases in 
participation in social movements is improving local and national civic participation. 
However, the strongest social movements and youth-based political cultures are not 
necessarily nurturing liberal democratic values. Radical right grassroots social 
movements are attracting youth activists and developing partisanships that are linking 
strongly to an all-encompassing radical right subculture. The inclusive package 
provided by Jobbik, combining politics with grassroots organizations and popular 
culture, presents an outlet for community, individual expression and non-traditional 
political participation, targeting the youth directly. This is the only politically linked 
subculture in Hungary providing music, nightclubs, historical revisionism, festivals 
and fashion trends to go along with the party’s ideology (Kürti 2012, Bartlett et. al. 
2012). 
Meanwhile, liberal-left political parties, like MSZP-SZDSZ, have very little 
youth support and green party, LMP, remains a primarily Budapest-based party. 
These parties are also not organically connecting themselves to the opposition 
grassroots social movements available to them, such as Milla and Szolidaritás. 
Although movement parties, like Together 2014, are trying to unite the liberal-left and 
disillusioned right the separate movements and parties are unwilling to give full 
allegiance to one another, feeling that it takes away from their original limited aims. 
This is the primary difference between the liberal-left compared with the flourishing 
networks backing the right and radical right. Right wing civic circles and radical right 
grassroots social movements work on localized as well as national levels creating 
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depth and breadth for the political parties they support which is lacking within liberal-
left opposition movements and parties. 
Social movements are becoming increasingly influencial in youth and broader 
political activism. In the Hungarian context Social movements are not only increasing 
youth activism but mainstreaming into the political party spectrum. Part Three looks 
at familial networks, education and the media as agents of socialization, analyzing 
how they are affecting partisanship development among young activists. 
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PART THREE 
Socialization Influences 
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5. HUNGARIAN FAMILIES AGENTS OF POLITICAL 
SOCIALIZATION  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the role of the family in relation to 
political partisan formation and the socialization of youth activism. The family is a 
leading factor in the political socialization process as the first formative agent in an 
individual’s political development. Due to the primacy of family-based political 
experiences the family is generally considered one of the strongest, if not the 
strongest, agent of political socialization influencing political alignment, party 
membership and voting trends (Greenstein 1956, Hyman 1959, Jennings and Niemi 
1968, Volgyes 1975, Brady et. al. 1995, Verba et. al. 2005, Bruter and Harrison 
2009). Most theories about family political socialization have been based in American 
and Western European research making it difficult to compare overarching family 
theories within a post-communist context (Szabó 1991, Todosijević and Enyedi 2000, 
Tarrósy 2004).215 However, this chapter looks at familial socializing trends and 
narratives from interviewees about the role and influence of family relations in 
developing political identities. I find that the family is the strongest socializing agent, 
influencing political activism and partisanship in the Hungarian case study, 
particularly important for the conservative-national right and radical right supporting 
youth activists.   
My expectations around familial influences on the political socialization of 
youth activists in Hungary were three-fold. Firstly, I expected that the family 
continued to be a largely influential agent of socialization as a continuation from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215	  Western	  family	  political	  socialization	  theories	  assume	  certain	  things	  about	  the	  family	  unit	  and	  
political	  environment,	  which	  are	  not	  applicable	  in	  the	  post-­‐communist	  case,	  such	  as	  parents	  being	  
raised	  with	  a	  longstanding	  tradition	  of	  democracy	  and	  democratic	  history.	  Western	  theories	  also	  
assume	  political	  cultures	  which	  are	  open	  to	  political	  discourse	  and	  which	  agree	  with	  general	  liberal	  
democratic	  principles	  –	  which	  is	  not	  always	  the	  familial	  basis	  within	  post-­‐communist	  family	  units.	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communism, where the family was the only secure private sphere for information 
uninfluenced by government agendas. My second assumption was that there would be 
stronger family political influences based on nationalist and conservative discourse 
compared with liberal and left wing influences as a possible link to the increasing 
youth support for right wing party, Fidesz, and radical right party, Jobbik. Lastly, I 
predicted that familial socialization would be less influential in Budapest compared to 
the other two locations I conducted field research, Miskolc and Debrecen. Although 
Miskolc and Debrecen are considered large cities by Hungarian standards, with 
populations of 170 thousand and 200 thousand, they have significantly smaller city 
centers compared with Budapest.  
My assumption was also based on the fact that within Budapest, as the capitol 
of Hungary, there are more active alternative political stimuli, such as demonstrations, 
protests, and a larger international population to counteract familial political 
socialization.216 As outlined in Chapter 1, interviews were with young political 
activists between the ages of eighteen and thirty. Activism is based on their traditional 
political participation in elections, campaigning or membership. Activism is also based 
on non-traditional participation in political demonstrations, social movements or 
protests. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the political 
socialization experience of the parent generation with reference to the infiltration of 
political agendas in every day life and the historical experiences parents and 
grandparents underwent which have contributed to historical narratives, passed on to 
young Hungarians. Historical narratives are the related stories of complicated and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  An	  outline	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interview	  questions	  is	  given	  in	  Appendix	  5	  to	  exemplify	  how	  
interviewees	  were	  questioned	  about	  familial	  political	  socialization.	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controversial experiences, retold through a subjective narrative (Mink 1978). Parent 
and grandparent experiences and historical narratives play an indirect, but often 
influential role in partisanship, cultivating ideas and sentiments around politically 
relevant events and time periods (Feldman 1990, Ochs and Taylor 1992). The second 
part of this chapter looks at how families discuss political topics at home and the 
parent – youth relation towards partisanship, voting and party membership. This more 
direct political socialization is discussed with reference to how contemporary politics 
is discussed at home and how family-based socialization might have stronger 
predispositions towards right and radical right political options.217  
5.1 FAMILIAL LEGACIES: PARENTAL SOCIALIZATION 
 During the socialist era, the family was often the only private sphere where 
unofficial socialization could take place, making the family unit one of the few agents 
countering official political propaganda (Volgyes 1975, Tarrósy 2004, Wittenberg 
2006). It is important to understand a little about how the parent cohort of current 
youth activists was socialized under a socialist system.	  The parent cohort referred to 
in this thesis was primarily socialized under the last two decades of the Kádár Era 
roughly born between 1949 and 1969. How the parents of current politically active 
young Hungarians developed their relationship to politics in a non-democratic system 
has an effect on how political culture and national narratives are learned.218  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217	  Discussed	  throughout	  this	  chapter,	  indirect	  socialization	  deals	  with	  topics	  and	  histories	  having	  
political	  implications	  even	  if	  they	  might	  not	  be	  directly	  discussing	  modern	  political	  actors/parties.	  
Direct	  socialization	  concerns	  the	  practices/discussions	  around	  the	  contemporary	  political	  
environment.	  
218	  Stock	  knowledge	  is	  embedded	  information	  about	  a	  nation	  showing	  distinct	  differences	  with	  other	  
nations	  to	  identify	  one’s	  community	  and	  nation	  (Csepeli	  1997).	  ‘Stock	  knowledge’	  of	  past	  
historical/political	  events	  develops	  a	  knowledge	  about	  national	  culture	  and	  identity	  (Bourdieu	  1971).	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There is a body of research questioning whether the post-communist parent 
cohort is capable of passing down democratic values when they themselves were not 
politically socialized within a democratic system (Niemi and Hepburn 1995, Horowitz 
2005). There is concern over whether authoritarianism or post-materialist values are 
emerging among the post-communist youth (Todosijević and Enyedi 2000) as well as 
whether political passivity and distrust are being inherited from a politically apathetic 
parent cohort (Szabó 1991, Szlomczynski and Shabad 1998). There is also general 
apprehension, specifically in Hungary, about whether political and cultural pessimism 
is being taught to the youth by a politically skeptical and disillusioned parent cohort 
(Hideg and Nováky 2009). It is necessary to look at the sociopolitical dynamic the 
parent generation was socialized under in order to comprehend familial social 
environments today.  
5.1.1 Parental Political Socialization 
This section analyzes the overarching political socialization experience of the 
parent cohort assessing the cultural stigmas from the socialist period that might have 
been passed down to the youth. This section gives an account of the experienced 
socialization process during the Kádár Era, mainly looking at the 1960s and 1970s.219 
Ivan Volgyes depicted the parent cohort raised under Kádárism in the 1970s as the 
‘consolidated generation’. He generalized them as a group of young adults that did 
not understand the hardships of WWII nor Stalinist terror, describing them as giving 
support to the regime only in return for material benefit (Volgyes 1975).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  Kádár	  Regime	  is	  previously	  outlined	  in	  sections	  1.1.1	  and	  2.2.2	  for	  reference.	  See	  
pages	  68	  –	  70	  specifically.	  	  
	   181	  
The parent generation of today’s youth cohort took place primarily in the 
aftermath of the 1956 Revolution in Hungary.220 Before the 1956 uprising the state 
had used more stringent totalitarian tactics of government, actively enforcing the 
communist ideology and trying to socialize the masses through psychological 
coercion (Csepeli and Örkény 1992, Niklasson 2006). The political era in Hungary 
after the violent and controversial 1956 uprising, led by János Kádár and the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP), began the subsequent reign of 
‘goulash communism’ in Hungary.  
People renounced their rights to power and participation and, in exchange, they got 
(by Eastern European standards) a relatively tolerant administration ... a kind of 
cultural pluralism, and the opportunity to build up for themselves a more and more 
comfortable, Western-European-style material life. (Urban 1989) 
 
Kádár, produced liberal economic reforms, through the New Economic 
Mechanism (NEM),221 turning a blind eye towards developing a private second 
economy in exchange citizens leaving the politics to the politicians (Volgyes 1975, 
Urban 1989). The events of 1956 were immediately censored by the media, historians 
and textbooks, creating an en masse ‘collective amnesia’ (Cox 1997, Lendvai 2012). 
While politically controversial events were avoided the population was demobilized 
through relative liberalism and allowance of certain freedoms in the private sphere. 
Previously suppressed Hungarian nationalism and patriotism was encouraged 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.222 Folk culture revivalist movements were allowed 
in order to decrease opposition forces. This also served to gain passive support from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220	  After	  the	  violently	  suppressed	  ‘people’s	  revolution’	  of	  1956	  against	  Soviet	  powers	  in	  Hungary,	  
János	  Kádár	  was	  instated	  as	  the	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Socialist	  Workers’	  Party,	  
beginning	  what	  is	  now	  known	  as	  the	  Kádár	  era	  from	  1956	  till	  transformation	  in	  1989.	  
221	  The	  New	  Economic	  Mechanism	  (Üj	  Gazdasági	  Mechanizmus)	  was	  launched	  in	  1968,	  decentralizing	  
economic	  structures	  in	  Hungary	  so	  that	  privatized	  economies	  could	  begin	  to	  form	  (Balassa	  1970).	  
222	  The	  re-­‐nationalization	  of	  certain	  state	  elements	  was	  common	  among	  communist	  states	  during	  this	  
time	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  continue	  citizen	  support	  by	  creating	  a	  nationalist-­‐communist	  alliance.	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rightwing populists and youth factions (now the parent cohort).223 Instead of a 
totalitarian state run by fear by the 1970s, the motto of the Kádár government became 
‘who is not against us, is with us’ (aki nincs ellenünk az velünk) (Szelényi 1998, p. 
16). The post-1956 communist government worked to co-opt opposition movements, 
allowing for limited and constructed facades of nationalist opposition, 
institutionalizing mass cynicism and distancing people from the political sphere 
(Hankiss 1990, Lampland 1991, Arpad 2004).  
Regardless of political cynicism of the time, János Kádár has become a largely 
positive symbolic figure in Hungary in the process of remembering the past (Rásky 
2007). Polling in Hungary in 1999, a decade after János Kádár’s death, indicated that 
58% of Hungarians had a positive view of the Communist era, yet only a minority 
would want to return to the previous regime showing a ‘nostalgic but realistic’ stance 
(Gough 2006, p. 254).224 By 2008 another poll showed that 62% of Hungarians felt 
that the period between World War II and 1989 was the happiest time in Hungarian 
history.225  
5.1.2 Passing on the Partisanship 
As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the family was often the only 
agent that could remain politically critical and unmanaged by the Socialist 
government, often trusting other outlets for political discussion (Marody 1988, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223	  It	  is	  during	  this	  time,	  mainly	  in	  the	  1970s,	  that	  cultural	  reforming	  takes	  place	  and	  traditions	  like	  the	  
Táncház	  (Dance-­‐House)	  movement	  are	  revitalized.	  Táncház	  is	  now	  seen	  widely	  across	  Hungary	  as	  
apart	  of	  the	  traditionalist	  revival	  and	  is	  popular	  among	  many	  young	  Hungarians	  (Information	  on	  
Hungarian	  Táncház	  found	  at	  this	  site	  <http://www.tanchaz.hu/hun/>,	  and	  discussed	  within	  many	  
interviews).	  	  
224	  Hungarians	  were	  significantly	  more	  positive	  about	  the	  communist	  era	  compared	  with	  results	  from	  
the	  Czech	  Republic,	  Poland	  and	  Slovakia	  (Gough	  2006).	  
225	  Wirth,	  Zsuzsanna,	  ‘Kádár	  János	  olyan	  jól	  csinálta,	  hogy	  nem	  tudunk	  leszokni	  róla’,	  Origo	  Itthon	  
Online,	  (28	  May	  2013),	  <	  http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20130527-­‐en-­‐szeretem-­‐kadart-­‐o-­‐a-­‐magyarok-­‐
nagy-­‐jotevoje.html>.	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Slomczynski and Shabad 1997, Kolarska-Bobinska 1998). Statistical data sets as well 
as interviews show a continuing trend of strong familial trust and influence on 
political value formation in Hungary. Looking at attitudes towards change and family 
transformation, Stankuniene and Maslauskaite note that, in Hungary, the very strong 
familial culture continues to impact attitudes towards family-centric values and 
ideologies, as seen in Table 5.2 below (2008, p. 135). Hungary is distinct in its 
continued strength of the family unit as a source of political and cultural information. 
Eurobarometer results (2003) show that out of thirteen examined countries in and 
around Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary is the only country where the youth trust 
and prefer information originating from the family concerning public and political 
information (Keil 2011). These results are comparative to other primary information-
giving agents such as schools, informal social networks and media.  
Table 5.1: Youth Information Retrieval Preference 
 
Political	  Socialization	  Agent	  
(Ranked	  as	  First)	  
Country	   Total	  
Education	  System	   Poland,	   Slovakia,	   Czech	   Republic,	   Latvia,	  
Turkey	  
5	  
Youth	  Organizations/Networks	   Malta,	  Cyprus,	  Estonia,	  Lithuania,	  Slovenia	   5	  
Media/TV	   Romania,	  Bulgaria	   2	  
Family	   Hungary	   1	  
Eurobarometer	   surveys	   questioned	   young	   adults,	   age	   15-­‐30,	   about	   their	   preference	   of	   primary	  
information	   retrieval	   concerning	   public	   and	   political	   ideologies	   and	   participation.	   Hungary	   is	   the	  
only	   country	  where	   the	   youth	   considers	   family	   to	   be	   the	   preferred	   network	   of	   civil	   and	   political	  
information	  (Eurobaromter	  2003,	  pp.	  62	  –	  64).226	  
 One explanation for the high levels of family trust in Hungary is that young 
people are becoming independent at a younger age while remaining economically 
dependent (and often living at home) for longer periods into adulthood, making 
family a larger definer in social citizenship (Wallace 2002, Kürti 2002, Kuhar 2005, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226	  Data	  comes	  from	  analysis	  of	  the	  results	  from	  the	  Eurobarometer	  2003	  compared	  with	  
Eurobarometer	  2011	  in	  Keil	  (2011).	  Unfortunately	  there	  is	  currently	  no	  updated	  Eurobaromter	  
research	  on	  political	  socialization	  agents	  conducted	  since	  2003.	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Walther et. al. 2008). Longer periods of familial dependency are due to increasing 
numbers of young people in higher education in the last twenty years as well as 
increasing difficulties for young people to find jobs, making leaving the home 
financially difficult, if not impossible for many young Hungarians.227 The trend of 
extended youth habitation with the family is not a phenomenon exclusive to Hungary, 
however, and does not fully explain Hungary’s unique Eurobarometer results.  
Another explanation for Hungary’s high level of youth-family information 
retrieval points to the Kádárist legacy of goulash communism. In developing a strong 
second economy with a gray area of legality, interpersonal trust was necessary and 
often the family was the most trusted business partnership for developing semi-legal 
commerce (Hankiss 1988, Sik 1994). Hungary had a high level of open 
communication within the family while other social outlets were known to be less 
transparent (Keitner et. al. 1990). Political and economic topics remain generally 
avoided among social networks.228 This was most exemplified in focus groups 
conducted with young activists. Despite having arranged focus groups based around 
like-minded partisanships, often arranged within a group of friends, most young 
participants avoided talking about personal political opinions or sentiments. Despite 
sharing political ideologies young Hungarians felt wary expressing personal details of 
how they became politically involved or why they chose the party they support in 
front of their social network. The family remains a central source of trusted 
information. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227	  Unemployment	  in	  Hungary	  is	  currently	  11.6%,	  however	  this	  is	  more	  than	  doubled	  for	  youth	  
unemployment,	  which	  currently	  stands	  at	  29.7%	  in	  Hungary.	  Youth	  is	  cut	  off	  at	  thirty	  for	  this	  study.	  
Data	  from:	  ‘Hungary	  Unemployment	  Rate’,	  Trading	  Economics,	  (March	  2013),	  <	  
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/hungary/unemployment-­‐rate>.	  
228	  Among	  interviewees	  very	  few	  respondents	  said	  that	  they	  discussed	  politics	  with	  friends	  unless	  it	  
was	  specifically	  with	  friends	  from	  political	  or	  social	  movement	  networks.	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Despite theories of a post-communist Kádárist layover continuing political 
apathy, a majority of young activists spoke of political discussions at home. Political 
discussions and civil practices shared between parent and child can develop increased 
political knowledge and interest leading to voting practices and incentives for party 
membership later in life (Brady et. al. 1995, Plutzer 2002, Gimpel et. al. 2003, Verba 
et. al. 2005, Pacheco 2008). Political discussions reported by young Hungarians 
occurred indirectly, around family historical narratives and stories (discussed in 
Section 2.2) but also directly, talking about current political parties and voting 
intentions. Most interviewees said that they discussed politics with their parents.229 
Interviewee results parallel high levels of parental-political discussions found in 
nationwide Hungarian surveys throughout the 1990s (see Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1: Frequency of Political Discussions With Associates  
 
These	   studies	   were	   conducted	   in	   Budapest	   between	   1991	   and	   1998.	   Results	   are	   given	   in	  
percentages	  tracking	  how	  often	  students	  recalled	  who	  they	  discussed	  political	  matters	  with.	  (Csákó	  
et.	  al.	  1999).230	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229	  See	  Appendix	  6	  showing	  interviewee	  responses	  about	  familial	  political	  discussions.	  
230	  Although	  the	  age	  category	  for	  ‘youth’	  in	  these	  studies	  was	  slightly	  younger	  than	  the	  age	  category	  
dealt	  with	  in	  this	  thesis	  (13	  to	  18),	  it	  is	  relevant	  in	  comparing	  the	  high	  level	  of	  parental	  conversational	  
socialization	  compared	  with	  other	  social	  agents.	  Currently	  there	  is	  no	  updated	  data	  for	  this	  research.	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Figure 4.1, above, shows parents as the most frequent source of political 
discussion compared with other socializing agents such as classmates, friends and 
teachers. Even among other family members, such as siblings, parental political 
conversation was nearly five times more likely (Csákó et. al. 1999). These results 
suggest that during transition the family maintained its strong socializing role despite 
large sociopolitical changes.  
An interesting finding from my own research was that among interviewees, if 
there was a dominant political figure in the family it was most often the father. These 
results parallel other research about post-communist familial units conserving 
traditional and paternalistic family structures (Pichler and Wallace 2007, Stankuniene 
and Maslauskaite 2008). Seen in Appendix 6, some interviewees, both male and 
female, made a point of mentioning the strong political influence of the father. These 
results are also congruent with 1990s Hungarian studies where among family 
members 66.6% of teenagers mention political conversations with their father 
compared to 53.1% mentioning conversations with their mother. This frequency drops 
significantly mentioning conversations with siblings (7.9%) and other relatives 
(Csákó et. al. 1999). Even when the interviewee chose a different political partisan 
stance to their family the father was still mentioned as the most active familial agent 
for political discourse. Exemplifying this point, Interviewee, Flór,a continued a 
stronger political dialogue with her father despite developing conflicting political 
values with him: 
My dad is culturally conservative, believing in family values. My mother would vote 
LMP due to civil stuff. She is much more left than my dad. With my mom I never speak 
about politics because she is too emotional and does not like to fight. With my dad I 
can speak politics. (Flóra, Age 21: Budapest) 
Note: Flóra is an LMP voter who converted her mother to vote LMP 
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The high levels of political discourse between family members and young politically 
active Hungarians, corresponding with Eurobarometer results (shown in Table 5.1) 
and other research, showing that in Hungary the family remains highly influential as a 
trusted network for political information.231 How the family is influencing the youth, 
however, is another matter. 
5.2 HISTORICAL NARRATIVES 
Cultural reproduction through the family is very important in Hungary. The 
family remains a strong resource for educational attainment and stock knowledge 
(Csepeli and Örkény 1992, van Eijck and de Graaf 1995, Csepeli 1997). In the post-
communist environment, historical narratives addressed by family members passed 
down to young activists are part of political socialization. Many youth interviewees 
expressed their own national and political identities in terms of familial historical 
narratives. As noted by one interviewee: 
The scars of our parents and grandparents are passed down to us from generation to 
generation. (Julia, Age 25: Budapest) 
 
This section lays out some of the primary historical narratives discussed 
within Hungarian families that link to the development of political values and 
partisanships. These family-based narratives focus mainly on divisive historical 
events that have been reinterpreted into politically salient national symbols. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231	  Note:	  Grandparents	  were	  often	  mentioned	  with	  reference	  to	  familial	  historical	  narratives	  as	  an	  
explanation	  for	  their	  party	  preferences	  while	  parents	  were	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  more	  contemporary	  
political	  topics	  and	  discourse.	  There	  was	  generally	  less	  political	  discussion	  at	  home	  mentioned	  among	  
LMP	  supporters	  with	  less	  likelihood	  of	  family	  members	  also	  voting	  for	  LMP.	  This	  is	  partly	  explained	  by	  
LMP’s	  newness	  on	  the	  political	  scene	  in	  Hungary	  and	  its	  youth-­‐focused	  strategy	  and	  media.	  
	   188	  
narratives are specific to a political culture and nation (Mink 1978, Norman 1991).232 
This section gives an analysis of the most frequently addressed family narratives, key 
in understanding some of the stronger political socialization trends in contemporary 
Hungary. 
5.2.1 Contentious Hungarian History 
There are specific politically significant memories, stories and histories being 
passed down to the Hungarian youth by parents and grandparents. Research 
conducted between 2001 and 2005 testing public opinion about Hungarian history 
targeted three of the strongest historical political events/time periods dividing society: 
1) the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, 2) the Horthy Regime (1920 till 1944) and 3) the 
Kádár Era beginning after the 1956 Revolution (Vásárhelyi 2006). These three 
historically significant events and periods are representative of the largest geopolitical 
and sociopolitical changes to Hungary as a nation and remain used in political 
symbols and rhetoric today (mentioned previously in Chapter 1 and 3). These national 
historic periods are explained below with reference to their political divisiveness 
within familial narratives that plays out into broader political partisanships. 
The 1920 Treaty of Trianon was a peace agreement signed at the end of 
World War I between the Allied forces233 and the Kingdom of Hungary, putting 
sanctions on Hungary and ultimately ending the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The 
treaty redistributed two-thirds of Hungarian land to neighboring countries and over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  link	  between	  populist	  and	  nationalist	  developments	  with	  salient	  historical	  
narratives	  (Kramer	  1997)	  particularly	  in	  a	  post-­‐communist	  setting	  where	  democracy	  is	  intrinsically	  
tied	  to	  national	  myths	  and	  symbols	  (Tismaneanu	  1998).	  
233	  The	  Allies	  were	  a	  political	  triple	  entente	  comprising	  of	  the	  French	  Republic,	  the	  British	  Empire	  and	  
the	  Russian	  Empire.	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one-third of the population.234 The treaty also put restraints on Hungarian military 
efforts. The Treaty of Trianon represents a tragic loss of power for most Hungarians 
across the political spectrum (E. Kovács 1998, Vásárhelyi 2011). Meanwhile 
populations of ethnic Hungarians remain significant in certain borderlands of 
neighboring countries, most notably in Transylvania. In Transylvania numerous 
policies and cultural efforts to preserve Hungarian roots have been instated with the 
help of the Hungarian government (Waterbury 2010).  
For most Hungarians Trianon is ‘the most indigestible trauma’ (mindmáig 
feldolgozatlan tramája) (Vásárhelyi 2011). The symbol of Trianon and the 
implications attached to Hungary’s lost territory are highly politicized and the 
treatment of ethnic Hungarians living abroad has become an increasingly salient topic 
in Hungarian politics (Zeidler 2002, Ligeti and Nyeste 2006, Kántor 2008, Lendvai 
2012).235 Trianon along with other national historic symbols are representative of 
Hungary’s cultural pessimism, constantly reminding Hungarians the misfortunes 
Hungary must constantly endure.236 While the Treaty of Trianon is recognized as a 
national tragedy across the political spectrum interviewees supporting right wing and 
radical right political parties and movements most frequently mentioned Trianon as 
part of their learned family narratives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234	  During	  this	  time	  the	  majority	  of	  inhabitants	  within	  redistributed	  Hungarian	  territories	  were	  not	  in	  
fact	  ethnically	  Hungarian.	  This	  was	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  geopolitical	  redistribution;	  however,	  most	  
Hungarians	  believe	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people	  lost	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Trianon	  were	  Magyars	  (Vásárhelyi	  
2006).	  
235	  This	  topic	  is	  mentioned	  here	  since	  beyond	  the	  normal	  scope	  of	  political	  discourse	  over	  half	  of	  the	  
interviewees	  in	  my	  research	  brought	  up	  the	  topic	  of	  Trianon	  and/or	  ethnic	  Hungarians	  without	  
prompting,	  most	  often	  linking	  their	  opinions	  with	  specific	  policies	  or	  political	  parties.	  
236	  Hungary	  is	  known	  for	  its	  cultural	  pessimism,	  which	  is	  present	  in	  much	  if	  the	  country’s	  national	  
culture	  in	  historical	  narratives	  as	  well	  as	  stories,	  folk	  songs	  and	  daily	  communications.	  A	  Corvinus	  
University	  Professor	  pointed	  out	  a	  poignant	  Hungarian	  sang	  relating	  to	  this	  pessimistic	  view	  towards	  
Hungary	  and	  its	  fate:	  There	  is	  a	  saying	  in	  Hungary	  ‘We	  celebrate	  crying’,	  (Sirva	  Vigad	  a	  Magyar).	  	  
Maybe	  this	  is	  also	  why	  people	  vote	  for	  the	  least	  bad	  party.	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 On the left there is a weak sense of identity. The left is still Kádár. My parents (as 
nationalists under communism) couldn’t talk about nationalism, politics or Trianon. 
(Sándor, Age 28: Debrecen) 
 
My grandfather on my mother’s side was a heart surgeon. He was very strong. 
Originally he was from Transylvania but traveled and had prestige in the former 
regime so he turned to Fidesz. His main reason is Trianon. (Béata, Age 23: Budapest) 
 
Sándor’s quotation shows the connection between nationalism and open discourse 
about Trianon that was previously suppressed by the Kádár regime; intrinsically tied 
to current left wing politics for the interviewee. Béata’s quotation expresses the great 
ethnic and economic changes that Hungarians felt from having the boundaries of the 
large territory of Transylvania redrawn and placed within Romania.237 The previous 
wealth and status of many Hungarians changed after 1920 as a result of the Treaty. 
The Treaty also divided many families along contentious newly drawn geographical 
boundaries.  
The image and symbol of the pre-Trianon border has become linked with 
nationalist efforts by right and radical right parties, Fidesz and Jobbik. Fidesz created 
a new national remembrance day in 2010 to take place on June 4th as a day of national 
unity (a nemzeti összetartozás napja) commemorating the anniversary of the signing 
of the treaty. Jobbik has been active in creating large events for June 4th across 
Hungary. The radical right 64-County Youth Movement (HVIM) is also active in 
calling for the reunification of pre-Trianon borders, named specifically after the sixty-
four counties in the pre-Trianon Hungarian borders (see Section 4.1.2).238 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237	  Hungary’s	  largest	  political	  incentive	  to	  make	  alliances	  with	  the	  Nazis	  was	  the	  promise	  of	  regaining	  
Transylvanian	  land	  (Waterbury	  2010).	  
238	  With	  respect	  to	  goals	  of	  gaining	  back	  lost	  territories,	  HVIM	  is	  similar	  in	  form	  and	  objectives	  to	  
Ireland’s	  32	  County	  Sovereignty	  Committee.	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Miklós Horthy was the Regent of Hungary between 1920 and 1944 during 
the interwar period following the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the 
end of the First World War.239 Horthy was declared the Head of State after the 
Hungarian Communist Party was banned in 1920. Horthy is most divisive as a 
historic figure in Hungary for his role leading Hungary into World War II and 
entering an alliance with Nazi Germany. Horthy’s original decision to join forces with 
Germany was an attempt to restore the land Hungary lost in the Treaty of Trianon, 
however, his questionable allegiance led to the Nazi occupation and control of 
Hungary in October 1944 (Lendvai 2012). Right and left polarization around the 
legacy of Miklós Horthy and the Horthy Era in Hungary was resurrected with the 
symbolic reburial of the interwar Regent on 9 September 1991 (Taras 2003). Opinions 
on the regime of Miklós Horthy are strongly divided between viewing Horthy as a 
heroic nationalist or an oppressive fascist (Arpad 2004, Vásárhelyi 2006, Lendvai 
2012).  
Positive historic narratives about the Horthy Regime use Horthy narratives as 
a symbol of a strong Hungarian government making large-scale changes under 
difficult international circumstances (Tarrósy 2004), popular among contemporary 
right wing and radical right partisanships in Hungary. Horthy has symbolic relevance 
for religious conservatives and irredentist radical right supporters in particularly. 
During the interwar period the role and influence of the church was strengthened from 
Horthy’s goals to restore traditional family values through promoting religion and 
privatizing property for the church (Ignotus 1972, Wittenburg 2006). Many of the 
Hungarian elite during the Horthy Era also lost vast amounts of wealth, property and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239	  The	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Austro-­‐Hungarian	  Empire	  also	  ended	  monarchism	  in	  the	  region,	  leading	  to	  
the	  installment	  of	  a	  Regent.	  
	   192	  
social status in the transition after Horthy Era into communism. Many descendents of 
the Horthy Era elite and others dispossessed by communism have found a base within 
right wing and radical right political parties today. As explained by one right wing 
interviewee: 
My parents’ family was nobility during Horthy. The Russian Communists came and 
took their property with force in 1956. This is a big difference in the East and West. 
Here, the family experience is much heavier. Family has blood in its past and it really 
affects peoples’ lives. (András, Age 29: Budapest) 
 
Right wing and radical right youth cohorts that mentioned Horthy or the Horthy Era 
in interviews often discussed the importance of values within Hungarian culture and 
the socioeconomic differences between previous family grandeur from the pre-
communist regime compared with today.  
Family-based historic narratives define historical villains and protagonists 
with modern political significance. While right and radical right political parties and 
media outlets depict positive images of either Horthy or the Horthy Era, liberal 
depictions of in media and political commentary show a much different depiction of 
Horthy: 
The Horthy regime’s romantic-nationalistic, populist, racist, anti-liberal, anti-
intellectual and anti-cultural disposition, coupled with the purges and denunciations 
of professors and teachers (by no means only Jewish ones), led in the 1920s to an 
unprecedented brain-drain from the scientific-cultural milieu. (Lendvai 2012, p. 385) 
 
Familial historical narratives are dependent on a family’s past experiences and 
circumstance within these crucial time periods. Elites from the Horthy Era might have 
seen communism take away their status and wealth while to other Hungarians the 
‘oppressive’ Horthy Era was ended by the egalitarian introduction of communism, 
molding perspectives on current political. Villains and heroes of Hungary’s history 
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are dictated by the experiences and narratives passed down from grandparents and 
parents.  
Like their parents, many interviewees gave a positive image of the Kádár Era 
(1956 to 1989), reflecting on a time when Hungary was run by ‘goulash 
communism’.240 If and when interviewees mentioned the Kádár Era it was generally 
expressed as a time when Hungary had job stability and life was simpler, as reiterated 
by their parents.241 This general positive reflection crosses political ideology and 
party alignment. Very few interviewees referred to the era in negative terms and when 
mentioned with negative connotations it was mainly to verify that the ‘golden era’ 
was doomed due to economic instability.242 There is a politically paternalistic 
depiction by interviewees of the era as a time when life was simplified and basic 
needs were taken care of by government social schemes. 
The Kádár mentality remained after 1989. People think they can keep support with 
social benefits but its not sustainable. (Szemere, Age 29: Budapest) 
 
Maybe social issues shift in Hungary but most of us still want the Kádár era. You just 
shut your mouth, keep your work, and die at seventy. It is safe. Hungarians don’t want 
confrontation or debate. (Adam, Age 23: Budapest) 
 
Interestingly, interviewee Adam uses the term us making it clear that although 
the youth cohort in question did not experience this era, the image and altered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240	  Goulash	  communism	  refers	  to	  the	  Kádár	  government’s	  style	  of	  communism	  starting	  in	  the	  1960s,	  
which	  improved	  living	  standards	  and	  introduced	  new	  economic	  free	  market	  elements.	  The	  term	  
goulash	  refers	  to	  a	  popular	  Hungarian	  stew	  mixing	  an	  assortment	  of	  ingredients	  creating	  a	  metaphor	  
for	  the	  mixed	  political	  system	  instated	  by	  Hungary.	  The	  term	  ‘goulash	  communism’	  is	  referenced	  in	  
lots	  of	  the	  literature	  about	  Hungary	  between	  1956	  and	  1989	  (see	  Kovrig	  1986,	  Kornai	  1996,	  Lánczi	  
and	  O’Neil	  1996,	  Solheim	  and	  Ekelove-­‐Slydal	  2013).	  Also	  noted	  by	  interviews	  with	  Hungarian	  
constitutional	  judge	  István	  Stumpf	  and	  political	  scientist	  András	  Bozóki	  (2011	  Field	  Research	  
Interviews).	  	  
241	  Hungarian	  views	  towards	  the	  Kádár	  era	  are	  generally	  quite	  positive	  with	  around	  62%	  of	  Hungarians	  
reporting	  that	  this	  era	  was	  the	  most	  positive	  time	  in	  Hungarian	  history	  (see	  Wirth	  article).	  	  
242	  Those	  referring	  to	  the	  Kádár	  era	  as	  unsustainable	  tend	  to	  be	  mostly	  LMP	  or	  Fidesz	  supporters.	  Also	  
they	  were	  more	  highly	  politically	  aligned	  as	  either	  party	  members	  or	  active	  participants	  within	  their	  
respective	  parties.	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historical experience of the Kádár era is retold and passed down by the parent 
generation. It is important to note the duality behind Kádár era historical narratives. 
Positive attributes given to the Kádár era seemingly go beyond the strong communist 
versus anti-communist divide still apparent in Hungary, used in different ways to 
express various discontents with the contemporary political system.243 Nostalgia goes 
beyond right wing and radical right political discourse antagonizing ‘communists’ and 
instead gives positive attributes to an idealized time now lost. Meanwhile large 
portions of pro-communist support translated into support for the liberal-left in the 
aftermath of transition. Reflecting on an era unknown to them, youth cohorts are 
taking their parents stories and contrasting them with their own reality. Kádár 
nostalgia has cultivates cynicism towards modern dissatisfactions with the difficulties 
of transition. Democracy, in this youth perspective, has brought with it a lack of 
security, uncertain state loyalties and joblessness (Koklyagina 1995, Horowitz 2005). 
The Kádár Era is also tied into the narrative around the 1956 uprising against 
Soviet powers. The 1956 uprising, sometimes referenced as a revolution, was a 
spontaneous revolt against the Hungarian government and Soviet rule in Hungary. 
What started as a student demonstration, 23 October 1956, turned into a people’s 
uprising, lasting until 10 November 1956 and ending violently with Soviet forces 
entering Hungary.244 The legacy of 1956 remains tied into many familial nationalist 
narratives. The parent generation were socialized as young people in the aftermath of 
the 1956 Revolution, starting the early divide of those rebelling against the 
communists versus those that sided with the communists. The onset of the Kádár 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243	  Discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  
244	  During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1956	  Revolution	  over	  2,500	  Hungarians	  and	  700	  Soviets	  were	  killed.	  It	  
also	  led	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Hungarians	  fleeing	  the	  country	  with	  estimates	  of	  about	  200,000	  
refugees,	  not	  to	  mention	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  arrests	  (Molnár	  and	  Kõrösi	  1996,	  Lendvai	  2008).	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system suppressed open discussions of 1956 through media and literature censorship, 
referring to it solely as a National Tragedy caused by nationalists (Schöpflin 1991). In 
1989 open discussions of previously suppressed historical topics, such as the 1956 
Revolution, surfaced again (Korkut 2012). The current national consensus is that 1956 
represents the Hungarian will to independence, the fight against oppression and a 
legacy of civil society, demonstrating through street protests and uprisings (Kubik 
1998).  
5.2.2 Relating Familial Experiences to Youth Political Opinions  
Some have postulated that the socializing affects of a parent generation 
socialized under the Kádár Era are breeding current strands of apathy among the 
youth (Szalai 2011). However, youth activists interviewed were aware of their 
parents’ and grandparents’ social positions during large sociopolitical transitions and 
events like the ones mentioned above. While discussions directly concerning politics 
are not always frequent in the home, familial historical narratives develop distinct 
identities for young Hungarians, defining historical events along personally relevant 
political lines. The 1956 revolution and subsequent Kádár Era of goulash communism 
have distinct family meanings for young political activists.  
My uncle was in the 1956 revolution and fled to the USA. My dad had Catholic 
School and went to groups illegally under communism. He almost went to jail for this. 
(Palko, Age 23: Budapest) 
 
My grandfather was in WWII. He got home and tried to start a business with trucks. 
The communist party came and just took the trucks. (Benigna, Age 27: Budapest) 
 
My father’s parents were really MSZMP (in the Kádár Era). My Grandfather hated 
the church and everything saying religion being (politically) important is a bad thing 
so after transition MSZP is the only choice. (Flóra, Age 21: Budapest).  
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In all three of the above quotations interviewees connected their familial narratives to 
their own perception of events and their political outlooks. Palko and Benigna’s 
aversion towards harsh communist measures was later related to their inability to vote 
for the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP later in their interviews. Alternatively, 
Flóra’s relation to her grandparent’s narrative has led her to see MSZP as one of the 
only political options since Fidesz and other right and radical parties use religious 
rhetoric. She is now interested in LMP as a younger and more innovative liberal-left 
option.  
Table 5.2: Linking Familial Historical Narratives to Political Alignment 
Historical	  Events/Figures	   Division	  in	  Views	   Political	  Tendencies	  
National	  hero.	  	  
Strong	  nationalism.	  Strong	  
family-­‐based	  and	  religious	  
values.	  	  
Fidesz	  
Jobbik	  
KDNP	  
Some	  LMP	  
	  
	  
	  
Miklós	  Horthy	  +	  Gov.	  
Harsh	  dictator.	  
Leads	  Hungary	  into	  WWII	  
joining	  the	  Nazis.	  
Causes	  Hungarian	  Holocaust.	  
MSZP	  
SZDSZ	  
LMP	  
Less	  totalitarian	  governing.	  	  
Economic	  growth.	  
Goulash	  communism.	  
MSZP	  
SZDSZ	  
LMP	  
	  
	  
János	  Kádár	  +	  Gov.	  
Continuation	  of	  Soviet	  control.	  
Government	  takes	  control	  of	  
private	  enterprises.	  
Anti-­‐elite	  discrimination.	  
Fidesz	  
Jobbik	  
Trianon	  is	  a	  sad	  element	  of	  
Hungary’s	  past.	  
There	  were	  reasons	  why	  
Trianon	  happened.	  
MSZP	  
SZDSZ	  
Some	  LMP	  
	  
	  
Treaty	  of	  Trianon245	  
Ethnic	  Hungarians	  are	  still	  a	  
major	  concern.	  
Pre-­‐Trianon	  territory	  is	  
Hungarian.	  
Fidesz	  
Jobbik	  
Some	  LMP	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245	  Note	  that	  all	  Hungarians	  see	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Trianon	  as	  a	  devastating	  blow	  to	  Hungary	  as	  a	  nation	  
with	  the	  large	  loss	  of	  land	  and	  people	  to	  neighboring	  countries,	  however,	  there	  are	  political	  divides	  
over	  how	  much	  Trianon	  should	  remain	  a	  political	  issues,	  causing	  potential	  conflicts	  with	  the	  countries	  
in	  question,	  or	  if	  it	  remains	  a	  tragedy	  of	  the	  past.	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Table 5.2 maps out the three largest narratives discussed from youth 
interviewees, the divisions within historic views and how they relate to their own 
political opinions and party support. Often time communist injustice is translated into 
right and radical right support while those experiencing less injustice had more 
positive ties with liberal-left political options. Likewise the Horthy Regime was 
beneficial to older Hungarian elites while others experienced harsh reforms causing a 
similar right-left divide.  LMP, as undefined on the political spectrum, was the only 
party that showed cross over between certain historical narratives. LMP supporting 
youths come from both Fidesz and MSZP supporting families. 
Without prompting, many times interviewees mentioned the experiences of 
their parents or grandparents as an explanation as to why they feel a certain way 
towards a political party. Historical narratives develop relations between 
sociopolitical events in the past and present political divisions. This interplays 
strongly with the bipolar political division between right wing Fidesz and left wing 
MSZP. Antagonistic political sentiments developed from familial narratives were 
most frequently vocalized in interviews with right and radical right interviewees 
against MSZP, often directly referred to as a continuation of the communist MSZMP.  
When I really started getting into politics it was in 2002. I was 18 so it was my first 
vote. Viktor Orbán versus the post-communist guys proving that they don’t 
understand Hungary. They had 40 years and couldn’t carry out building up 
Hungary…I joined Fidesz in 2002 and a few weeks later I joined Fidelitas. (Dave, 
Age 27: Debrecen) 
 
We shouldn’t be proud of allowing MSZMP to become MSZP. We should admire the 
nations that held communists accountable. Now we face the problem that other 
countries don’t have to face. We passed our possibility and now after 20 years it is 
difficult. (Sándor, Age 28: Debrecen) 
	  
Fidesz uses the term ‘revolution’ because we still need to rid communism. In Hungary 
we still need to purge the system of its communism. Young people are aware of the 
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communist past… If MSZP comes back my vote will definitely be Fidesz. (Jakab, Age 
30: Budapest) 
 
I can’t vote MSZP out of principle, seeing the shift from old communists that stayed in 
power. (Gábor, Age 24: Budapest) 
 
Liberal-left and green supporting interviewees vocalized their dislike of parties like 
Fidesz and/or Jobbik, however, this was rarely related back to familial historic 
narratives. Fidesz was a product of the transition era and the party has used MSZP’s 
historical ties to the previous regime to play off of pre-existing narratives against the 
communist era.  
5.3 DIRECT FAMILIAL POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 
 The family is one of the main distributors of human capitol and inter-
generational values (Walther et. al. 2008). Direct family political influences deal with 
the relation between family and youth political activism. Section 5.2.1 analyzes 
familial socialization of traditional democratic practices. The main practices analyzed 
in this section are partisanship, voting routines and party memberships in correlation 
with familial practices. Section 5.2.2 analyzes why familial socialization is showing 
stronger positive relations towards youth activist taking on right wing and nationalist 
partisanships. This section also analyzes why liberal-left partisanships are not 
showing strong parent-youth correlation as well as the newer trend of reverse 
socialization. 
5.3.1 Family Influences on Partisanship, Voting and Membership 
The large majority of young Hungarians are avid voters. Hungary is above the 
EU average with 82% of eligible youths (between age eighteen to thirty) participating 
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in local, regional, national or EU elections.246 Despite concerns about a politically 
apathetic, post-communist youth developing from parents socialized under the Kádár 
regime the current youth population in Hungary is highly engaged in voting practices. 
This engagements relates strongly to parental partisanship and voting trends. Similar 
to results found by Keil (2011) and Cross and Young (2008), most interviewees 
mentioned that politics was discussed at home and many intended on voting for the 
same party as their parents.247 Many interviewees discussed how a parent got them 
involved in political discussions around election times from a young age onwards and 
either encouraged them or took them to vote when they came of age. The process of 
learning political efficacy, partisanship and traditional democratic participation is 
apparent in the familial socialization process despite a parent cohort socialized in a 
non-democratic political setting: 
In 1998 I was too young to vote but in 2002 I could and I had big debates with my 
parents… When my dad was on his way to elections with me and my siblings, when 
we were eligible to vote, he would tell us in the care where to put our X. (Dóra, Age 
28: Budapest) 
 
My first vote was in 2002 and I voted for Fidesz, before I was my own thinker. I voted 
with my family… They were very adamant that elections were important, especially 
this one. (András, Age 29: Budapest).  
Note: András is now an LMP supporter.  
 
Both Dóra and András’s quotations show the initial socializing influence of parents 
inculcating them into voting practices and influencing their initial political views. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, 2002 was a divisive polarizing election year between Fidesz 
and MSZP with Fidesz narrowly losing the elections. These elections were seminal in 
developing antagonistic political tactics and strong civic circles by Fidesz, discussed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246	  ‘Youth	  on	  the	  Move:	  Analytical	  Report’,	  Flash	  Eurobarometer,	  (319a),	  (European	  Commission:	  May	  
2011),	  <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_319a_en.pdf>.	  
247	  Party	  preference	  influenced	  by	  family	  members,	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  6,	  charts	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  
interviewee	  votes	  for	  the	  same	  political	  party	  as	  their	  parents.	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in Chapter 3. While other socializing agents such as political parties and the media 
(discussed in Chapter 7) played a role in heightening the atmosphere around the 2002 
national elections the reaction and emotional involvement within the home was also 
significant. Interviewee responses like these are indicative of a politically polarizing 
atmosphere being socialized through family activism. Many interviewees said that 
they felt voting was a large family discussion point during election times in particular.  
As noted in the quotations above, some youth activists began their political 
involvement following their family’s party preferences and later changed 
partisanship, showing the potential for other influencing agents of socialization, such 
as politicized friends, media or educators.  
Hungary has quite low levels of party membership (seen in Figure 3.1), 
unsurprising for Central and Eastern Europe and consistent with party non-alignment 
trends (Mair and van Biezen 2001, Scarrow and Gezgor 2010, Whitely 2011). It is 
significant, however, that those who are becoming or maintaining membership show a 
trend towards right and radical right ideologies (Enyedi and Linek 2008). Data 
collected by the Hungarian National News Agency (Magyar Tábirati Iroda – MTI) 
shows that while party membership numbers are dropping for left wing party MSZP 
and remains relatively small for Green Party LMP, membership for right and radical 
right parties Fidesz, KDNP and Jobbik are maintaining and increasing.248  It is also 
noteworthy that the average age of membership for traditional parties like MSZP and 
Fidesz are forty-nine and fifty-six, respectively, while it is estimated that LMP party 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248	  See	  Figure	  3.1.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  keeping	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  mention	  of	  KDNP	  (Hungarian	  Christian	  
Democrat	  Party)	  membership	  relates	  directly	  with	  its	  coalition	  with	  Fidesz.	  Fidesz	  is	  the	  only	  political	  
party	  that	  allows	  dual	  membership	  with	  Fidesz	  and	  other	  right	  wing	  parties,	  mainly	  KDNP.	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members are mainly around thirty-five years old and Jobbik members are estimated to 
be mostly between the ages of twenty and thirty-five.	  	  	  
The family is often the strongest influence for youth membership in political 
parties, whether driven by fighting for the same cause as a family member or being 
inspired to join in a non-ideological way (Bruter and Harrison 2009). Common across 
Europe, youths are twice as likely to become a party member if a parent or close 
relative are a member of a political party (Cross and Young 2008). Over 50% of 
young party members across Europe report that a member of their family was a fellow 
party member or had been associated with the same party that they decided to take 
membership in.249 In Hungary interviewees that were also members of political 
organizations mostly had politically active parents that held open political discussions 
at home and encourage activism: 
My political interests started in 2009. My dad introduced me to SZDSZ and did 
campaign work for the European Parliamentary elections. I also helped by collecting 
slips. SZDSZ dissolved after this so I was looking for something new. In 2011 the 
MSZP Socialist academic program250 appeared in an advert and my mom found it and 
said ‘Hey this is for you’ and I was accepted! My parents introduced me to politics. 
They inspired me into politics. (Adám, Age 23, Budapest). 
 
Parent-youth partisan correlations with membership showed strong differences 
depending on political alignment. Young Jobbik party members interviewed were 
divided. Some parents were not party members, however, of the Jobbik activists 
interviewed none of their parents were non-Jobbik supporters, though some had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249	  In	  a	  study	  on	  young	  party	  members	  family	  was	  mentioned	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  joining	  53.4%	  of	  the	  
time.	  Compared	  with	  other	  reasons	  such	  as	  friends	  (16.4%)	  or	  membership	  in	  other	  organizations	  
(18.1%)	  the	  family	  remains	  the	  strongest	  incentives	  for	  youth	  political	  membership	  (Cross	  and	  Young	  
2008).	  
250	  The	  MSZP	  Youth	  Academy	  was	  started	  in	  2010	  to	  train	  young	  Hungarians	  in	  various	  political	  
realms.	  Developing	  young	  politicos	  academy	  members	  were	  admitted	  to	  the	  program	  through	  a	  
written	  and	  verbal	  exam	  process	  before	  being	  given	  training	  about	  local,	  national	  and	  international	  
political	  jobs.	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previously Fidesz voters. The liberal-left suffers in attracting official membership, 
especially among the youth with very few young MSZP or SZDSZ members, 
regardless of parental partisanship. MSZP badly discredited its youth division with 
the ‘Zuschlad scandal’ in 2007 so although some parents and youths were MSZP 
supporters no interviewees mentioned official party membership.251 LMP remains a 
relatively new party, just developing its membership base. Among LMP members 
some parents were interested in the party but very few parents were official members.  
The strong parent-youth activist and membership correlation was found 
among Fidesz supporters. Fidesz youth party members all had a parent or family 
member that was or had been a party member or actively involved within Fidesz. One 
reason for the higher likelihood of parent-youth membership correlation is due to the 
fact that Fidesz has a higher membership base in general compared with other 
political parties in Hungary (refer to Figure 3.1) paired with the fact that Fidesz has 
two official youth organizations, both with the largest youth memberships in Hungary 
(refer to Table 3.1). However there are also other reasons for strong youth 
predispositions to the right relating to familial socialization. 
5.3.2 Familial Predispositions to the Right  
Nearly all Fidesz and Jobbik interviewees had the same political preferences 
as their parents, while the majority of liberal, left and green supporting youths voted 
for different parties than their parents.252 While familial divergences can be partially 
explained by the influences of other agents of political socialization, there are two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251	  Mentioned	  in	  chapter	  2,	  finances	  attached	  to	  a	  foundation	  of	  MSZP’s	  youth	  organization,	  Societas,	  
were	  found	  to	  be	  embezzled	  by	  János	  Zuschlag,	  the	  president	  of	  Societas	  at	  the	  time.	  
252	  The	  table	  in	  Appendix	  6,	  tracking	  interviewee	  relations	  to	  familial	  political	  discourse	  and	  activism,	  
shows	  a	  large	  parallel	  between	  interviewee	  and	  parental	  party	  preference	  among	  rightwing	  and	  
radical	  right	  supporters.	  While	  my	  own	  data	  is	  not	  statically	  relevant	  it	  does	  track	  possible	  trends	  
emerging	  in	  the	  political	  socialization	  process	  relating	  to	  partisanship	  and	  political	  values.	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primary reasons for stronger family-based predispositions towards the right, 
embodied by Fidesz and Jobbik partisanships: 1) Hungary has developed a parent-
youth generational divide within liberal-left and green partisanship options and 2) 
historic narratives, first learned within the family unit, correlate more strongly with 
right wing and radical right partisanships. Jobbik, and to some degree LMP, are also 
developing new trends of ‘reverse socialization’, branching out from their youth-base 
to incorporate a more diversified age range in support.  
Reasons for parental influences playing into the current shift in support of 
right wing and radical right political parties among the youth in Hungary are two-fold. 
One explanation is the deterioration of strong liberal-left political options (discussed 
in Chapter 3). Liberal and left wing political parties, embodied by the MSZP-SZDSZ 
alliance, have been discredited, as discussed in Chapter 3, by changing alliances and 
political scandals.253 For liberal-left supporters the parent cohort often expresses the 
dilemma of having few strong political party options. This is reflected in how the 
youth explains family dynamics in relation to their own political options. 
I would have voted for Fidesz. I exclude MSZP-SZDSZ as an option because they 
have discredited themselves…I’m more right wing, national, traditionalist. All of my 
family comes from Transylvania. My uncle was in the 1956 revolution and fled to the 
USA, my dad had Catholic School and went to groups illegally under communism. He 
almost went to jail. So my family is on the side closer to Fidesz. My dad voted SZDSZ 
in the first elections – he was liberal. But when MSZP and SZDSZ joined he could not 
vote for them. (Palko, Age 24: Budapest) 
 
MSZP has also become stereotyped as a party for the older left wing generation. As 
described by Flóra’s quotation below, there is not necessarily outright lack of support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253	  The	  largest	  events	  to	  discredit	  liberal-­‐left	  options	  were	  the	  decision	  of	  liberal	  party,	  SZDSZ	  to	  form	  
an	  alliance	  with	  MSZP	  in	  1994	  as	  well	  as	  the	  2006	  Őszödi	  Beszéd	  Scandal,	  leading	  to	  months	  of	  
protests	  outside	  of	  parliament.	  SZDSZ	  is	  often	  discussed	  as	  a	  traitor	  to	  its	  original	  anti-­‐communist	  
platform	  and	  MSZP	  is	  vilified	  as	  a	  party	  of	  financial	  and	  political	  scandal.	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for MSZP by liberal-left youths but the party seems to be supported more by the 
grandparent cohort and holds little appeal for young activists.  
Yes, we have an old party, MSZP, that works. My grandparents vote MSZP. 
Nowadays though to say to a twenty to thirty year old, ‘Yes I vote left’ then he or she 
thinks this is something just old and it does not live. I think for LMP it would be 
important to go left because there is nothing there. (Flóra, Age 21: Budapest) 
 
Flóra’s quotation addresses the lack of MSZP allure for young voters as well as 
utilizing LMP as a substitute for liberal-left youth voters. LMP is a political option for 
younger cohorts but the newness of the party and the lack of clarity in the party’s 
positions remains problematic for older cohorts who have been MSZP or SZDSZ 
voters for nearly twenty-five years. Very few LMP members had a parent that was 
also an LMP party member or supporter. The newness as well as the youth-based 
makeup of LMP plays into the lack of trust in the party for older cohorts.   
My parents do not support LMP. To them LMP is not strong enough to be a leader of 
a country. [LMP] needs time to develop for older people to trust it. (Angela, Age 29: 
Debrecen). 
 
 More than other political parties, LMP supporting youth activists often 
expressed that they had common political ideologies as their parents but voted for a 
different party.254 Parents were often MSZP or SZDSZ supporters who sympathized 
with the choice of LMP but were not willing to vote for the party. The generational 
partisanship divide is not present within right and radical right parent-youth 
socialization making familial socialization weaker among liberal-left parent and youth 
supporters compared with the right and radical right. 
The second explanation for strong familial socialization towards the right and 
radical right is the fusion of symbolic historical narratives, developed firstly within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254	  This	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  5.2	  under	  the	  column	  titled	  ‘Family	  Influences’.	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the family, combined with the use of similar symbolic references in right and radical 
right wing political party rhetoric and legislation. Fidesz and Jobbik have used 
national narratives and symbols, common in familial historical narratives, to cultivate 
support, touched upon in Chapters 3 and 4. Fidesz’s use of the national tri-colour 
during political events and Jobbik’s use of the ancient Árpád flag and Greater Map of 
Hungary are prime examples of this (see section 4.1.2). 255 The dual exposure to 
certain national symbols and historical narratives by family members and political 
parties helps solidify partisan ties that many young activists have been exposed to. 
The dominance and mainstreaming of these nationalist narratives have helped solidify 
right wing and radical right support among the youth. More overtly radical right 
familial discourse around historical narratives has also been increasing in recent years 
as Jobbik becomes a more nationally accepted (Kovács 1996 and 2000).  
I think ideas are much more dependent on family. If your family says Trianon is 
wrong then for you it is wrong. On the street the other day I saw an old lady saying to 
her grandchildren ‘we live in this small nation because Jews made Trianon which 
was not peaceful!’ You know that kid will be Jobbik. (Ármin, Age 20: Budapest)  
 
Ármin’s quotation shows how familial narratives about Hungary’s past relate 
directly to radical right partisanship. Historical narratives in Hungary are first 
introduced through family stories and discussions and then utilized by right wing and 
radical right political parties as politically salient symbols. As it stands, liberal and 
left wing political outlets have been less successful in using national symbols and 
narratives to form accessible identifying markers, particularly with younger cohorts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255	  The	  two	  most	  notable	  current	  examples	  of	  this	  are	  the	  wearing	  of	  the	  national	  cockade	  (kokárda)	  
on	  national	  holidays	  by	  Fidesz	  supporters	  and	  the	  utilization	  of	  the	  Greater	  Map	  of	  Hungary	  by	  Jobbik.	  
The	  kokárda,	  made	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  tricolor,	  was	  politicized	  first	  during	  the	  1998	  national	  elections	  
causing	  a	  stark	  bipolarity	  between	  MSZP	  and	  Fidesz.	  The	  kokárda	  is	  generally	  worn	  in	  Hungary	  during	  
national	  holidays,	  mainly	  commiserating	  the	  1848	  and	  1956	  revolutions	  on	  March	  15th	  and	  October	  
23rd.	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One trend recently affecting partisanship and voting trends in Hungary is the 
appearance of youth activists attached to alternative political parties, Jobbik and LMP, 
changing the political partisanship of their parents. While this was only mentioned a 
few times it was limited to Jobbik and LMP support and both mentioned that they had 
explained their partisanship and loyalties to their respective parties with their parents, 
eventually causing their parents to change their vote in the 2010 national election. 
This ‘reverse socialization’ from youth to parent is interesting in that newer youth-
based parties are spreading their networks through youth activists to a broader cohort 
range.256 In some cases parents even became party activists due to their child. 
My mom raised me alone. She worked at City Hall around 1980 and joined the 
communists. She became very political for years and later she also became pro-
Fidesz. Then she joined LMP. She was my campaign manager. I ran in the local 
elections. (Balint, Age 29: Budapest) 
Newer political parties, and potential new movement parties, have the ability to bring 
new political discourse to the forefront of discussion within their families.  
*** 
 Hungary is the only country within Central and Eastern Europe where the 
youth continues to utilize the family unit as their primary source for sociopolitical 
knowledge and information (seen in Table 5.1). The post-communist youth also 
discuss politics with their family more than other social outlets like classmates, 
friends or teachers. One of the reasons for the continued strength of family as an agent 
for socialization is the strongly polarized political environment in Hungary, making 
political discussions with friends or teachers potentially contentious and undesired. As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256	  Reverse	  socialization	  has	  limited	  studies	  looking	  at	  how	  youth	  cohorts	  can	  re-­‐socialize	  parental	  
tendencies	  and	  preferences.	  While	  some	  studies	  have	  tracked	  reverse	  socialization	  of	  technological	  
usage	  (Grossbart	  et.	  al.	  2002,	  Aslan	  and	  Aslan	  2009)	  or	  parental	  purchasing	  decisions	  (Gelperowic	  and	  
Beharrell	  1994),	  very	  little	  research	  has	  looked	  at	  cases	  of	  young	  people	  politically	  socializing	  their	  
parents.	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mentioned in Chapter 1, friendship networks, originally intended as chapter topic, 
proved primarily a-political with very few interviewees saying that they ever 
discussed political subjects with friends outside of friendships made from within 
political or youth organizations or social movements. Political debates and clubs are 
also often banned from secondary and higher education institutions, discussed in the 
next chapter. 
 Within the family socialization process many young Hungarians are using 
historic narratives, told by family members, to define themselves within the modern 
political spectrum. Highly politicized versions of contentious historical political 
figures, time periods and events relating to family members are linked directly to 
partisanships (see Table 5.2). Stories around the Treaty of Trianon, the Horthy Era 
and the post-1956 Kádár Era are the most influential and contentious historic 
narratives deciphered through familial political partisanships and being used by 
political parties.  
Familial political socialization is taking place most strongly forming right 
wing and radical right partisanships. More right Fidesz and Jobbik supporting youths 
have the same voting preferences as their parents compared with MSZP-SZDSZ and 
LMP partisanships. This is largely due to the generational divide between liberal-left 
options with older cohorts preferring the traditional option of MSZP-SZDSZ while 
younger cohorts are more attracted to new alternative youth-based parties without 
previous political scandals attached to them, like LMP. Regardless, the youth are 
tending to prefer similar sides of the political spectrum compared with parental 
preferences and families are socializing active political participation in elections and 
activism, negating claims of political passivism past down from the Kádár Era.  
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The Hungarian case produces results that are in line with more broad political 
socialization theory, which originates socialization from within the family context. 
However, with such strong familial influences on sociopolitical knowledge 
development other socializing agents have developed a-typical socializing functions. 
The next chapter looks at the role of secondary and higher education in the political 
socialization process.  
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6. EDUCATION AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 
  This chapter aims to analyze the effects of secondary and higher education on 
both youth political efficacy as well as political partisan formation in Hungary.  In the 
United States and across Europe educational institutions are thought to play a large 
role in developing civic skills and normalizing democratic participatory practices 
(Torney-Purta 2002, Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2003). Although socialization in 
schools begins in early childhood (Easton and Hess 1961) this chapter focuses on 
secondary and higher education institutions. This is the time period when distinct 
political identities tend to form among individuals and when actual political activism 
begins for many young people and participation in elections becomes possible. 
Schools tend to play the most important role in secondary socialization, transferring 
uniform information about political practices and norms outside family influences 
(Szabó 1987, Tünde 2004). However, this is fully dependent on how curriculums are 
developed and implemented with potential disparities on local, regional or national 
levels. While there have been larger cross-European research projects analyzing civic 
education there is very little research looking at political socialization taking place 
within schools and its effect on potential political activism and partisanships (Szabó 
and Falus 2000, Csákó 2005).  
Of all post-communist transitioning countries Hungary opted for the most 
decentralized and localized system of educational reforms with varying results (Radó 
2010). This choice for large-scale decentralization was a political decision to move 
away from the previously state-centralized communist system, yet the results have 
become controversial and re-politicized within party politics. This has ultimately 
affected the structure, content and nature of education in Hungary with sociopolitical 
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ramifications. This chapter analyzes not only how civic education is implemented and 
conducted but also how contentious political history and modern political topics are 
being addressed in the classroom within secondary institutions, where civic education 
would be mandatory, and high education institutions, where young Hungarians are 
potentially by politically active students and/or professors.   
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section gives an overview 
on how secondary and higher education institutions transitioned from a socialist 
education model to a decentralized academic system. This section analyzes the 
political difficulties of education overhauls and the politicized nature of 
decentralization and centralization efforts by the MSZP and Fidesz governments, 
ultimately affecting curriculums, standards and funding. The second section of this 
chapter looks more directly at the socialization process young people are 
experiencing. This part looks more at how interviewees recall personal experiences at 
school dealing with politically relevant subjects, the transparency of political biases 
within the classroom and how sensitive political histories are dealt with. The last part 
of this chapter looks specifically at Special Colleges in Hungary as an elite socializer. 
These dorm-like institutions create a small unit of highly active, politically focused 
young members, many of which have historically become politically significant 
actors. 
6.1 EDUCATION DECENTRALIZED & RECENTRALIZED 
 Hungary’s Communist Era between 1946 and 1989 changed the goals and 
framework of education from primary through higher education. The shift to a 
socialist political system in Hungary brought on a complete restructuring of the main 
aims and availability of education. In 1946 free education was established as a right 
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providing eight years of free education, irrespective of background and status. The 
new academic system stressed vocational and technical training coupled with a high 
emphasis on political education of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.257 Even in satellite 
states like Hungary the schools were tied closely to the requirements of planned 
economic developments, allowing increased educational opportunities for women, 
rural youths and the poor (Grant 1969). However, educational institutions were also 
used as political tools of indoctrination embodied with a calculated process of 
political socialization (Szabó and Falus 2000).  
With a strict system of centrally imposed schooling, official ideology and civil 
standards were applied, prohibiting flexibility, pedagogical experimentation or 
innovative teaching in the classroom (Hiller 2008). Political ideologies and 
propaganda were embedded in academic literature and civic themes. By the 1980s it 
was apparent that the effectiveness of heavy communist indoctrination embedded in 
course curriculum and scouting programs as well as the quality of overall education 
was less than expected. Restructuring of the education system in Hungary was 
apparent in the years leading up to transition.  
6.1.1. Post-Communist Educational Restructuring 
The fear of political influence entering education after transition led to a quick 
and drastic shift away from centralized education in the early 1990s. The strong 
political influences in the communist structure of academics in Hungary created an 
equally strong aversion towards politically centralized education leading to large-
scale decentralization efforts. Decentralization in education was considered a 
safeguard against strong political agendas and partisan biases being taught within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257	  ‘Hungary	  Country	  Studies:	  Education’,	  Country	  Studies	  Online,	  US	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  
<http://www.country-­‐studies.com/hungary/education.html>.	  Hereafter:	  	  ’Hungary	  Country	  Studies’.	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academic frameworks. There was general agreement among the democratizing 
political parties in the early 1990s that integrating regional and local levels of public 
administration into educational decision making would create politically autonomous 
bodies where the government could not issue direct orders to manipulate local 
governments (Baráth 2004). The initial decentralization structure of administration in 
1990 is shown in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Structure of Administrative Decentralization in Education 1990 
	  
Information	   and	   image	   from	   Halász	   (1995),	   showing	   the	   early	   decentralization	   efforts	   in	   the	  
education	  system	  in	  Hungary.	  
As seen in the figure above, by 1990 there were already mechanisms in place 
for a decentralized education system in Hungary. While definite hierarchies still 
existed between the government, county authorities and local instillations of 
educational programs the county educational departments had only indirect guidelines 
given to local education department and county institutions provided only loose 
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counseling for primary and secondary school programs (Halász 1995).  Educational 
decentralization is often a natural choice for countries making the transition from 
authoritarian to democratic governments, seen in various levels among democratizing 
countries in Latin America and across the post-communist region (Hanson 1996, 
Hanson 1998).258 Decentralization is the transference of decision-making and 
responsibility from the national, governmental level to lower levels of organizational 
authorities, such as local administrations and institutions.259  
In Hungary educational transition was not as drastic as in other post-
communist transition countries. Hungary was already in a state of educational 
transformation before the official end of Soviet control. During the Kádár era 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s local and regional councils were given an increased 
role in the administration of schools (Halász 1995, Kaufman 1997). The Hungarian 
Education Act of 1985 put in place councils to monitor and supervise local 
implementation of education systems allowing County Pedagogic Institutes to create 
partnerships with schools, setting the foundations for decentralization (Howell 1988, 
Kaufman 1997). By 1990 the decentralization process had already began instating 
localized flexibility, creating counseling services from the county to the local level to 
foster independence in primary and secondary schools (seen in Figure 6.1).  
By the late 2000s Hungary was considered the most successful case of 
nationwide decentralized education systems in Europe (Radó 2010). The first main 
laws changing the structural outline of the education in Hungary came by way of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258	  Centralized	  education	  systems	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  reducing	  regional	  economic	  disparities	  in	  
schools,	  creating	  uniformed	  academic	  programs	  and	  creating	  state	  control	  over	  the	  nationwide	  
curriculum	  (Winkler	  1993,	  Weiler	  1993).	  
259	  Decentralization	  tries	  to	  change	  the	  installation	  and	  administering	  of	  academic	  facilities	  from	  a	  
top-­‐down	  decision-­‐making	  process	  to	  a	  more	  horizontal	  process,	  incorporating	  the	  decisions	  and	  
ideas	  of	  local	  authorities	  and	  institution	  heads	  (Radó	  2010).	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1993 Act on Public Education expelling certain communist-based laws and making 
it possible for churches and private entities to found and run schools. It also gave 
parents free choice in where their children attended school and gave more power to 
local authorities and governments in managerial roles of developing and running 
schools. In order to ensure that the decentralized system had a united basis for 
developing educational content the MSZP government created a National Core 
Curriculum in 1995, setting general academic standards. However, in a decentralized 
academic system the application and structure of implementing curriculums and 
subjects is left up to localities (Radó 2010). In 1998 the new Fidesz government 
began to supplant previous decentralizing trends. Fidesz introduced further 
frameworks for a national curricula, making certain portions of the state-based 
curriculum requirements with regards to the volume and content of subjects being 
taught (Szabó and Falus 2000).260  
More education reforms took place with the entrance of Hungary into the 
European Union, adjusting certain aspects of Hungary’s education system. These 
changes were aimed particularly at Hungary’s higher education system. The Higher 
Education Act in 2005 created more flexible legal and policy conditions for higher 
education finances introducing a credit system and financial autonomy for university 
institutions (Hiller 2008). Hungary and other post-communist EU members signed the 
Bologna Declaration, taking measures to standardize higher education institutions by 
European standards. The Bologna Act was established to enhance academic mobility, 
increase university autonomy and administrative capacities and incorporate students 
into administrative processes (Bologna Declaration 1999, Prague Communiqué 2001, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260	  Generally	  speaking	  in	  the	  political	  back	  and	  forth	  in	  the	  previous	  bipolar	  system	  in	  Hungary	  the	  
MSZP	  government	  has	  always	  made	  policy	  efforts	  to	  de-­‐centralize	  education	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  
while	  the	  Fidesz	  government	  has	  tended	  to	  re-­‐centralize	  policies.	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Berlin Communiqué 2003).  These changes were instated to allow for greater 
European academic exchanges as well as increase higher education participation in 
Hungary, which has been highly successful. 
Figure 6.2: Students enrolled in Secondary School and Higher Education  
 
The	   above	   figure	   shows	   enrolment	   rates	   of	   secondary	   and	   higher	   education	   in	   Hungary	   as	   a	  
percentage	  of	  the	  total	  age	  group	  (OECD	  2012).	  
	  
Government changes aimed at increasing Hungary’s enrolment in 
foundational and higher education has been highly successful. Seen in Figure 6.2, 
enrollment in education for ages fifteen through nineteen has increased from 64% of 
the relevant age group in 1995 to 92% by 2010.  Higher education attendance has also 
increased from 10% to 25% in the same time frame. Increased participation in 
secondary and higher education is seen as a positive indicator of a well-transitioned 
academic system. However, beneath the surface Hungary is dealing with large 
structural and political dilemmas affecting political socialization within the education 
system.  
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6.1.2. Difficulties and Complexities 
The complexity and increased thrust of local innovation involved in producing 
a fully decentralized education system has caused certain difficulties in Hungary. On 
the national level, government decisions and party politics in Hungary have affected 
educational political socialization directly and indirectly from constant policy 
changes. These decisions have affected how educational institutions are used as 
sociopolitical and civic socializers in two primary capacities. The first concerns 
regional economic disparities where smaller localities lack central monitoring 
mechanisms to ensure education equalities and standards. Decentralized education 
systems without strong local and regional resources are at a disadvantage to develop 
strong academic programs. Secondly, constantly changing government positions 
towards how academic institutions should be organized make it difficult for local 
authorities and schools to understand and implement academic systems. The polarized 
political system in Hungary has created a divergence in educational outlooks between 
parties, constantly changing the role of the state in educational attainment.  
One of the largest problems in the post-communist decentralized education 
system is that a large amount of authority for developing budgets, curriculum and 
pedagogy is almost entirely given to local and regional actors (Kaufman 1997). 
Regional disparities not only effect the potential quality of education provided, but 
without centralized regulatory agents, it can also create large variations in the content 
of curricula, affecting sociopolitical and civic content. Decentralization requires 
innovation and increased participation from localized actors yet in Hungary very little 
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incentive has been given to increase output without increased financial assistance.261 
Centralized education institutions provide uniform schooling, socializing a common 
civic culture (Gradstein and Justman 2001). Regional differences in Hungarian 
education concern local economic disparities as well as variations in student 
evaluation criteria creating large differences in educational opportunities based on 
location. The most disadvantaged regions in Hungary are in the northeastern and far 
southern regions that were highly dependent on heavy industries in the socialist 
period (Lackenbauer 2004). While there is very little regional disparity in the rates of 
students in secondary education there are very large differences in the rate of students 
enrolling in higher education showing an advantaged central Hungary (around 
Budapest) and a disadvantaged Northeastern and Southern Hungary (Ballas et. al. 
2012).262 
A side effect of these disparities is that teachers often lack the resources to 
acquire training in democratic civic education teaching competencies.263 The national 
core curricula from 2007 onwards states that civic skills are necessary learned 
requirements for Hungarian students but gives no pressure or authority for ensuring 
that action is taken to develop such courses. There is currently no political 
administrative institution responsible for the implementation of civic courses.264 
While many countries in Europe create mandatory teacher training for civic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261	  Teachers	  in	  Hungary	  did	  not	  see	  increased	  wages	  despite	  an	  increased	  role.	  In	  1997	  many	  teachers	  
had	  to	  supplement	  earnings	  with	  private	  tutoring.	  Over	  75%	  of	  teachers	  multiple	  (Kaufman	  1997).	  
262	  There	  are	  also	  significantly	  fewer	  established	  higher	  education	  facilities	  in	  these	  counties	  making	  
training	  more	  difficult	  to	  acquire	  without	  relocating	  cities	  as	  a	  student,	  a	  financial	  pressure,	  which	  
many	  young	  Hungarians	  can	  not	  afford	  (Rechnitzer	  2000).	  This	  also	  means	  that	  classroom	  content	  for	  
civic	  education	  varies	  regionally.	  
263	  ‘Questionnaire	  on	  the	  State	  of	  Civic	  Education	  in	  Hungary’,	  Civic	  Education	  in	  Europe,	  (European	  
Confederation	  of	  Political	  Science	  Associations	  (ECPSA),	  2010).	  Hereafter	  (ECPSA	  Questionnaire	  2010).	  
264	  ‘Hungarian	  National	  Core	  Curriculum	  –English	  Version’,	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Resources,	  (Budapest:	  
Ministry	  of	  Education	  and	  Culture,	  2007).	  Note:	  Recent	  Fidesz	  developments	  establishing	  a	  
centralized	  monitoring	  system	  could	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  educational	  regulatory	  sector	  in	  the	  future.	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democracy courses this training is optional in Hungary and subjective upon 
institution-based regulations.265 There is also currently only one training facility 
providing teacher training in civic education at Szeged University’s Teacher Training 
College created in 2008 (ECPSA Questionnaire 2010).266 Szeged is in the southeast of 
Hungary, making it inconvenient for many secondary teachers to take time to undergo 
training without proper subsidies provided by their institution. In disadvantaged 
regions of Hungary this is an added expense that is often unaffordable.  
The large regional economic disparities in Hungary have put pressure on local 
governments and teachers trying to allocate funding for primary, secondary and 
higher education institutions when government funding proves insufficient (Radó 
2010). Local governments currently finance more than 80% of primary and secondary 
school institutions (Csiszárik-Kocsir and Medve 2009). Funding for higher education 
institutions has also dropped significantly in Hungary from the early 1990s to 2003 
(Kärkkäinen 2006).267 Hungary has one of the lowest annual expenditures per student 
among OECD countries (see figure 6.3 below). Hungary’s expenditure on education 
is not only lower than other OECD and EU averages but was one of the only countries 
to decrease government funding between 2005 and 2009.268  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265	  ECPSA	  Questionnaire	  2010.	  
266	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  civic	  course	  given	  as	  teacher	  training	  contains	  minimal	  political	  
science	  topics	  within	  the	  Hungarian	  ‘civic	  agenda’	  for	  students.	  
267	  Hungary	  shows	  the	  highest	  decrease	  in	  higher	  education	  government	  spending	  among	  all	  OECD	  
countries	  in	  this	  time	  period.	  Figures	  are	  given	  in	  USD	  due	  to	  OECD	  standards,	  also	  creating	  continuity	  
with	  the	  figures	  in	  Figure	  6.3.	  	  	  
268	  Hungary	  was	  one	  of	  only	  four	  countries	  that	  has	  seen	  a	  decrease	  in	  government	  funding	  towards	  
education.	  Between	  2005	  and	  2009	  Hungary	  decreased	  spending	  by	  0.3	  percent.	  The	  only	  other	  
countries	  seeing	  a	  slight	  decrease	  in	  such	  funding	  were	  Poland,	  Israel	  and	  Canada	  (OECD	  2012).	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Figure 6.3: Total GDP Spent on Education: A Comparative Glance 
 
The	  above	  figure	  shows	  the	  annual	  percentage	  of	  total	  GDP	  spent	  on	  education.	  This	  figure	  shows	  
Hungary’s	  spending	  on	  education	  between	  2005	  and	  2009	  compared	  with	  other	  Central	  European	  
OECD	  members	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  the	  OECD	  and	  European	  Union	  21	  average	  expenditure	  (raw	  data	  
sourced	  from	  OECD	  2012).	  
	  
There are four centers of power facilitating educational decentralization: 
political parties, government institutions (both national and regional), teachers and 
local citizens (see Appendix 9, Hanson 1998). University funding in Hungary comes 
from a combination of state subsidies, tuition fees and funded research projects (Radó 
2010). Since government expenditures per student have decreased along with 
decreasing public funding, institutions have had to become innovative in making sure 
government resources are received with negative effects on academic quality 
(Kärkkäinen 2006). Universities are given government subsidies according to the 
number of registered students, creating incentives for elongated periods of study.269 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269	  Among	  bachelor	  degree	  students	  10%	  to	  20%	  finish	  their	  courses	  in	  six	  to	  seven	  years	  instead	  of	  
the	  instated	  four-­‐year	  bachelors	  course	  framework.	  That	  is	  between	  38,000	  and	  76,000	  students	  that	  
are	  taking	  extended	  educational	  government	  funding	  from	  the	  tuition-­‐free	  system	  Hungary	  currently	  
has	  (Radó	  2010).	  In	  1998	  Fidesz	  abolished	  tuition	  fees	  that	  had	  originally	  been	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  
MSZP	  government’s	  economic	  package.	  (‘Hungarian	  Higher	  Education’,	  Hungarian	  Spectrum,	  (21	  May	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Recognized by university students, the creation of ‘useless’ or ‘time wasting’ degree 
programs was mentioned by a number of interviewees, discussing the vast disparities 
between universities and the increasing number of degrees with diminishing 
applicable value. 
It’s harder for the youth. A diploma is just a piece of paper and our background [from 
university] is not strong enough. The fault is in part due to teaching. There is also a 
demographic problem. We need more centralization. (Sándor, Age 28: Debrecen) 
 
I’m the only person in my class of fifty or sixty that pursued and got a job related to 
my studies. Most have no job or work in a clothing shop or something. Hungarian 
universities do not teach you anything useful for the real world… There is a 
centralized core curriculum but we set the level low and then we try to crawl under it. 
That is the student mentality in university. (Júlia, Age 25: Budapest) 
 
While part of the difficulties facing university graduates are the high unemployment 
rates in Hungary, the devalued benefit of having a university degree has also impacted 
young Hungarians.270 Universities in Hungary are not always providing a strong 
structural basis for socializing young Hungarians into the adult world. This is less 
concerned with partisan socialization and more focused on civic socialization, failing 
to educate the youth in a manner preparing them to interact at a higher level with the 
world around them. Recent Fidesz changes to the role of the state in ensuring quality 
higher education will, perhaps, change how universities socialize towards a more 
nationalist centralized agenda. In 2010 government documents laid out an agenda for 
the new higher education act stating: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2009),	  <	  http://esbalogh.typepad.com/hungarianspectrum/2009/05/hungarian-­‐higher-­‐
education.html>)	  
270	  Youth	  unemployment	  is	  currently	  at	  29.7%	  as	  of	  February	  2013.	  This	  is	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  
general	  population,	  which	  shows	  nationwide	  unemployment	  at	  11.6%.	  Data	  from:	  
	  ‘Hungary	  Unemployment	  Rate’,	  Trading	  Economics,	  (March	  2013),	  <	  
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/hungary/unemployment-­‐rate>.	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Hungarian higher education has to serve the public by increasing the qualification 
level of citizens and thereby serve their interests as well as national development in 
accordance with universal values and national cultural goals with traditions.271 
 
How ‘national cultural goals’ are translated into policy has become a contentious and 
politicized issue mainly concerning the content of the national core curriculum. 
Since the mid 1990s there has been a constant back and forth in education 
policy between the leading parties. The two most powerful parties have had very 
different ideas about educational content and state influence. The Hungarian Socialist 
Party, MSZP, has been the forerunner in strong decentralization initiatives while 
Fidesz has reinstated centralized factors to Hungarian education policies (see Table 
6.1). The national core curriculum in particular has changed drastically since 1995 
centralizing and decentralizing state influences on course content and structure. The 
content of the core curriculum has been a particularly contentious topic recently with 
the influx of right wing and radical right authors included in the mandatory literature 
requirements.  
With the reinstatement of the Fidesz government in 2010 large-scale 
educational recentralization efforts have again been instated. The national core 
curriculum and government funding agendas have all been rewritten. The new 
national core curriculum was implemented September 2013, dictating around 90% of 
what secondary school teachers can teach, containing a number of nationalist authors, 
some of which have caused debate around the nationalist implementation of 
controversial authors and themes. Some of the authors implemented in the core 
curriculum include Transylvanian writers that were apart of the national conservative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271	  ‘Strategic	  Directions	  in	  the	  Development	  of	  Higher	  Education’,	  The	  System	  of	  Education	  in	  Hungary,	  
Prepared	  by	  the	  experts	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Resources	  of	  Hungary	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  
Hungarian	  Eurydice	  Unit,	  (Budapest:	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Resources,	  2010).	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school.272 One particularly controversial example is the author József Nyiro, a former 
Catholic priest supporting the fascist Hungarian Arrow Cross Party (Murphy 2012). 
Table 6.1 MSZP Decentralization Versus Fidesz Recentralization 
1993	  Act	  on	  Public	  Education	  
MDF	  Government	  
Free	  to	  found	  schools	  by	  private	  or	  religious	  
church	  entities	  –	  Schools	  run	  mainly	  by	  localities	  	  
1998	  National	  Core	  Curriculum	  
Fidesz	  Government	  
Setting	  content-­‐based	  standards	  for	  classes	  and	  a	  
system	  of	  national	  monitoring	  
2001	  Rules	  of	  the	  Textbook	  Market	  
Fidesz	  Government	  
Provides	  free	  textbook	  supplies	  to	  institutions	  
and	  give	  structures	  national	  framework	  for	  
textbook	  approval	  
2002	  Cancel	  Mandatory	  Core	  Curriculum	  
MSZP	  Government	  
The	  MSZP	  government	  edits	  and	  changes	  the	  
core	  curriculum	  so	  that	  it	  is	  a	  suggested	  
framework	  rather	  than	  mandatory.	  
2005	  Higher	  Education	  Act	  
MSZP	  Government	  
Decentralize	  to	  local	  bodies	  the	  supervision,	  
hiring,	  programming	  and	  regulations	  of	  higher	  
education	  facilities.	  
2010	  Restructuring	  Core	  Curriculum	  and	  
Government	  Oversight	  
Fidesz	  Government	  
A	  reinstallation	  of	  national	  standards	  for	  
curriculum,	  grading	  and	  oversight.	  
 
As outlined in Table 6.1 decentralization began concretely with the 1993 Act 
on Public Education giving authority for running schools almost entirely by local 
governments and authorities (Csákó 2005). Fidesz’s recentralizing educational 
standards began with the National Core Curriculum in 1998 (Vágó and Vass 2005). 
The Act on the Rules of the Textbook Market was also passed in 2001. Compulsory 
usage of the core was cancelled with the reinstatement of an MSZP government 2002 
(Baráth 2004). The MSZP government’s Higher Education Act in 2005, further 
undermined Fidesz recentralizing attempts.273 Since Fidesz’s return to power in 2010 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272	  The	  most	  noteable	  and	  controversial	  authors	  included	  in	  the	  new	  mandatory	  core	  curriculum	  are	  
Albert	  Wass,	  Deszo	  Szabó	  and	  József	  Nyiro,	  all	  interwar	  patriots	  that	  at	  some	  point	  produced	  anti-­‐
Semitic	  articles	  and	  writings.	  
273	  This	  act	  increased	  decentralization	  efforts	  by	  giving	  more	  regulatory	  responsibilities	  to	  local	  
governments	  and	  institutions,	  this	  running	  95%	  of	  institutional	  decision-­‐making	  in	  colleges	  and	  
universities	  (Hiller	  2008.	  See	  also:	  Act	  CXXXIX	  of	  2005:	  On	  Higher	  Education).	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the national core and its content have been largely altered and deemed mandatory by 
the Fidesz government.  
The core curriculum has not only dictated what texts should be taught but in 
some cases the Fidesz government has given directions on how certain topics should 
be taught. In 2010 the government decreed June 4th a Day of National Unity 
commiserating the signing the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. Not only is this new national 
holiday a compulsory day of remembrance, but all educational institutions in Hungary 
received a 131 page document instructing teacher how to teach about the Treaty of 
Trianon.274 In order to enforce centralized standards and monitor implementations the 
Fidesz government has reintroduced a national school inspector system.275 The end 
result of Fidesz’s educational policy changes is not yet settled however, the constant 
fluctuation in Hungarian education policies remains highly political and indicative of 
differences in parties’ views towards the role of the government within the education 
process. Taking these policy changes to a classroom level, existing legislation about 
how to cover most politically and historically sensitive topics in Hungary remains 
vague and often teachers are not certain of their role in interpreting topics (Csákó 
2005). As for students undergoing education through these transitions, there seems to 
be disparities in class structure and content making education within secondary and 
higher education institutions an illusive agent of socialization on the structural level. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274	  For	  further	  details	  about	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Trianon	  and	  its	  significance	  to	  Hungarian	  political	  culture	  
and	  usage	  as	  a	  political	  symbol	  refer	  to	  Chapter	  5.	  Reference	  to	  131	  page	  pedagogical	  guide	  to	  
teaching	  Trianon:	  ‘A	  Nemzeti	  Összetartozás	  Napja:	  Pedagógiai	  Háttéranyag’,	  A	  Nemzeti	  Erőforrás	  
Minisztérium,	  (May	  2011),	  
<http://www.kormany.hu/download/0/cd/30000/A%20nemzeti%20%C3%B6sszetartoz	  
%C3%A1s%20napja.pdf#!DocumentBrowse>.	  	  
275	  This	  was	  announced	  mid	  March	  by	  education	  state	  secretary	  Rózsa	  Hoffmann.	  Test	  runs	  with	  the	  
new	  school	  inspection	  system	  will	  began	  between	  April	  and	  May	  2013	  (‘Government	  to	  recive	  
communist-­‐era	  school	  inspector’,	  Politics.hu,	  (27	  March	  2013),	  <	  
http://www.politics.hu/20130327/government-­‐to-­‐revive-­‐communist-­‐era-­‐school-­‐inspector-­‐system/>.	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6.2. POLITICAL EFFICACY AND ACTIVISM IN SCHOOL 
Going beyond the national level of government policy the second part of this 
chapter analyzes the youth experience of socialization within secondary and primarily 
higher education institutions on an institutional and classroom level. This section 
analyzes the varying political socialization processes within educational institutions 
dealing with topics of political efficacy and civic participation. In Hungary political 
teaching concerning values, ideologies and relaying policies is primarily perceived by 
families as a familial responsibility, as a response from the previously politicized role 
of education during communism (Szabó and Falus 2000). 276  The role of the school is 
perceived as an instrument to teach civic education with relation to understanding 
society and political practices. Hungarians often consider sensitive sociopolitical 
topics inappropriate for classroom content by Hungarians (Szabó 2013).  
As expressed in Chapter 5, the family is arguably the strongest agent for 
political socialization. However, schools and universities are still responsible for 
teaching civic education and democratic practices, as stated by the Ministry of 
National Resources and the Hungarian National Core Curriculum.277 Interviews with 
young political activists and professors showed high levels of variation in the 
willingness and availability to discuss contemporary political topics at secondary and 
higher education institutions. The two largest factors effecting politicization within 
schools in Hungary on an institutional and classroom level are: 1) school regulations 
specifically prohibiting certain sociopolitical discourse and activities in universities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276	  In	  research	  done	  among	  OECD	  countries	  Hungary	  has	  a	  noticeably	  higher	  perception	  of	  the	  
school’s	  role	  in	  developing	  civic	  and	  social	  skills	  among	  the	  youth.	  Only	  16%	  of	  Hungarians	  consider	  it	  
to	  be	  the	  school’s	  role	  to	  assist	  personal	  and	  civic	  development	  while	  56%	  of	  Hungarians	  think	  the	  
school	  and	  family	  have	  equal	  roles.	  The	  OECD	  average	  shows	  33%	  considering	  the	  school	  has	  a	  
primary	  civic	  role	  with	  63%	  thinking	  the	  school	  and	  family	  share	  responsibility	  (Szabó	  and	  Falus	  2000).	  
277	  Refer	  to	  ‘The	  System	  of	  Education	  in	  Hungary’	  and	  the	  ‘Hungarian	  National	  Core	  Curriculum’.	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and 2) subjective political opinions and narratives introduced into classroom 
discussions by certain teachers and professors. 
6.2.1 Prohibiting Political Socialization in Universities 
 Hungary’s decentralized education system has led to institution-based 
regulations of contemporary political topics in many universities. Political science, as 
a field of study, in the post-communist era is structured around university-specific 
parameters.  How sociopolitical content is viewed in Hungary, particularly concerning 
contentious events in the twentieth century, is highly influenced by debates between 
leading intellectuals and politicians about the nature of political science itself (Ágh 
1993, Csizmadia 1993, Tőkés 1993, Szabó 2006). Due to the continued controversial 
nature of modern political topics and aversion towards politicized government 
influence in schools combined many universities create regulations to safeguard 
against contemporary political debates and activism on campus. Although some 
teachers do bring up political topics and party preferences general university policies 
(official or unofficial) try to prohibit classroom politicization through debates and 
partisan discussions. Expressed by professors and teachers in Hungarian institutions: 
I had an open session of political discussion in class. I was told specifically not to 
bring up politics in my class by the heads of the university. But students want the 
opportunity. They are very willing to talk when they are told they can… To not speak 
of politics or sensitive issues is a hangover from politics of old. Some youth are 
fearful to talk. They have inherited weariness.  
(Professor at Debrecen University – preferring to remain anonymous) 
 
Political opinions can’t develop in school. It is not allowed to, so you are not allowed 
to present your political opinions as a teacher or student. There is no debate or 
forums of opinions… I could get kicked out of my school for this.  
(Teacher from Miskolc preferring to remain anonymous) 
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Political parties, and their youth organizations, are often banned from working 
or congregating through many universities (Csepeli 1994, Csákó 2004). Because of 
the decentralized nature of instating university regulations these are not national 
regulations, rather, they are instated on an institutional basis by universities.278 
Student political societies, found in most of Western Europe and the United States, 
are prohibited by most university regulations in Hungary.279 Youth activists in 
university said that attempts to put up flyers for politically related events, and even 
politically themed surveys, were all condemned and rejected by university officials, 
saying that it was against school policy. Youth organizations attached to political 
parties are often prohibited from using campus space to campaign, recruit or debate. 
There is no politics in university. It is not allowed to have rallies or recruit members. 
You can’t flyer or even really discuss politics at university. (Szabolcs, Age 20: 
Budapest – Jobbik Youth Member) 
 
Directly political organizations and groups are generally prohibited from school 
campuses. However, grassroots youth organizations linked with political parties, such 
as early LMP rallies and the radical right 64-County Youth Movement (discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4) seem to fall in between the gaps of what is political and what is 
not.280 These quasi-political movements are finding ways of permeating into 
educational institutions as youth organizations since they represent a political gray 
area with regards to their goals and content. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278	  Higher	  education	  institutions	  in	  Hungary	  can	  be	  either	  public	  (state-­‐owned)	  or	  private	  (either	  
denominational	  or	  other).	  Of	  the	  69	  higher	  education	  institutions	  in	  Hungary	  (as	  of	  2010)	  there	  are	  29	  
public	  and	  40	  private	  institutions	  (see	  ‘The	  System	  of	  Education	  in	  Hungary’,	  2010).	  
279	  Because	  regulations	  are	  by	  individual	  university	  regulations	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  say	  that	  all	  political	  groups	  
are	  prohibited	  in	  all	  universities	  in	  Hungary.	  One	  interviewee	  mentioned	  that	  at	  ELTE	  there	  were	  
groups	  of	  Fidesz	  students	  making	  semi-­‐formal	  groups	  on	  campus.	  	  
280	  Discussed	  further	  in	  Section	  5.3:	  LMP	  began	  as	  a	  youth	  movement	  before	  it	  became	  an	  official	  
political	  party,	  holding	  meetings	  within	  Special	  College,	  TEK,	  attached	  to	  Corvinus	  University.	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The 64 County Youth Movement is active within schools. Even in Budapest. Even in 
2002 they were helping organize camps in school. They are just semi-political. At 
universities the young people are very active not just for the right wing but also for 
LMP and Jobbik. (Áron, Age 23: Budapest) 
 
University-based researchers have also come across difficulties in Hungary 
due to formal and informal rules opposed to political topics. Professors and students 
interviewed confirmed that most universities have created official institution-based 
regulations against party influences and politically contentious topics. It is 
understandable that universities would have an aversion towards politicization on 
campus as a reaction to the previous regime’s enforced political socialization. 
However, regulations are sometimes prohibiting universities from being a space for 
cultivating rational debate and discussion. Even Hungarian researchers questioning 
political interests and opinions in universities have found it difficult to receive 
permission from administration to conduct surveys and interviews. Administration 
often dismisses potential research projects dealing with political topics and 
preferences, labeling them as issues that are not of interest within the school (Csákó 
2005).281  Students conducting undergraduate and masters research for classes have 
also come across similar difficulties. 
For university I made surveys and asked the principal if I could distribute my survey. 
It was about socio-linguistics. He said it was not allowed if it had anything to do with 
politics, religion or drugs. I was outraged at the idea that you couldn’t ask about 
‘anything’ political. (Adam, Age 23: Budapest) 
 
Most interviewees mentioned that they felt there was a lack of contemporary 
political debate in schools. This was not only on the level of avoiding controversial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281	  Hungarian	  sociologist	  Mihály	  Csákó	  was	  administering	  research	  on	  political	  socialization	  within	  
secondary	  schools.	  Surveys	  included	  questions	  such	  as	  ‘How	  interested	  in	  politics	  are	  you?’,	  ‘Who	  do	  
you	  talk	  politics	  with?’,	  and	  ‘How	  do	  you	  define	  a	  parliamentary	  democracy?’.	  The	  headmaster,	  upon	  
examining	  the	  questionnaire	  deemed	  that	  it	  concerned	  issues	  that	  were	  not	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  school	  
environment	  and	  that	  he	  should	  leave	  them	  alone	  (Csákó	  2005).	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topics during history or governance classes but also in the prohibiting of student-run 
discussions, forums or political promotion on campus. Most young people 
interviewed agreed that they would like to be able to debate and have in-class 
discussions about political topics in class. At the same time both students and teachers 
are uncertain on how to ensure political partisanships and ideologies are not brought 
into the classroom. 
6.2.2 Subjective and Selective Teaching 
In early transition efforts in the new academic environment most teachers had 
been trained under the socialist regime and found implementing innovative 
educational changes difficult, not knowing where decision-making was meant to 
occur (Mitter 1987, Horváth 1990). With constantly changing educational policies 
and core curriculum criteria it remains difficult for teachers to know how to cover 
certain sociopolitical and civic topics when the country itself has not fully come to 
terms with controversial national historical events (discussed in Section 5.2). 
Interviewees were asked about political topics discussed in high school and university 
(if applicable).282 Interviewees were asked how political topics were discussed in the 
classroom as well as whether or not they felt they knew the political orientation of 
their teachers, due to the strong divisive political biases in Hungarian party alignment, 
making neutral political discourse difficult. Interviewee responses showed lots of 
variation concerning in-class politicization experiences, indicative of the local and 
institutional differences in a decentralized system. However, some current trends in 
contemporary socialization are emerging concerning 1) avoidance of contentious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282	  Appendix	  10	  outlines	  interviewee	  responses	  on	  political	  socialization	  in	  school.	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historical and political topics, 2) student awareness of teacher partisanships and 3) 
overarching partisanships of certain universities and/or university departments.  
One of the more notable trends that came through during interviews is that 
there seems to be a high level of teachers currently avoiding contemporary political 
topics, either cutting all modern, potentially polarizing, political topics or tailoring 
political discussions to avoid certain areas of discourse. While the other two trends 
discussed deal with university trends this point was relayed within interviews 
discussing both secondary and university courses that dealt with politics, government, 
history or civics. Interviewees most often discussed censorship of political discussions 
in potentially controversial topics, such as contested historical events, elections, 
policy changes and post-communist transition.283 
Education aimed at civic society and touching on political identity is a problem and 
it’s a real problem because the 20th century is very controversial and very politicized 
even up to today. So if the central government wants students to learn factual history, 
they have to water it down basically because it will depend on the teacher what he or 
she will say about it. So after the regime change it was a very strict government policy 
to kick politics out of school all together. [In my experience] there is absolutely no 
chance for high school students to learn about politics or even the 20th century. Most 
of my teachers, to avoid controversy, they skip the 20th century…sometimes not even 
the 1956 revolution, so most of the time maybe they go up to 1956 maybe not, maybe 
just 1945 so they say ok here is the book read it at home. Very few schools teach the 
communist years or regime change. (László, Age 24: Budapest) 
 
The same historical narratives discussed in Chapter 5 are mentioned in the 
above quotation, showing the controversial and politicized nature of recent history for 
Hungarians. Even looking at modern political history on high school core curriculums 
multiple interviewees said that some teachers are apprehensive about these topics and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283	  These	  trends	  pertain	  to	  classes	  that	  relate	  to	  politics	  and	  civic	  education	  such	  as	  government	  
classes,	  political	  sciences,	  history	  (with	  regards	  to	  sensitive	  recent	  historical	  events)	  and	  civic	  
education.	  Obviously	  certain	  classes	  are	  not	  applicable	  to	  these	  questions	  like	  maths	  or	  sciences.	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leave them till the last one or two weeks of class, rushing through the topic on a 
simplified level, or left to read at home.  
While not all teachers avoid political discussion, the classroom settings that 
did tackle contemporary political and civic education tended to identify the awareness 
of teachers’ political biases in the way content was shared and discussed. Interviewees 
primarily discussed this with reference to university experiences. Interestingly, even 
students who reported that there was no discussion of contemporary political subjects 
in the classroom also reported that they were aware of many of their teachers’ 
political alignments (highlighted in yellow in Appendix 10).284  
History in Hungary is a fairytale. Right wing teachers are usually more aggressive. It 
is hard to look at history without emotions in Hungary. Trianon, WWII, 1848, 
1956…Post transition there are no big children or youth movements. No teaching 
groups or democratic cohesion. (Gábor, Age 30: Budapest).  
 
I took a class on the Hungarian History of Law and the teacher never spoke about his 
political alignment but he came to class wearing a Bocskai oufit so you knew [he was 
radical right]… When I was finishing university and the state exams had a committee 
come to judge you one member was wearing an Árpád flag tie. It was embarrassing 
for me because this was inappropriate… It is always the right and radical right which 
show themselves. (Daniel, Age 28: Budapest) 
 
As noted by Daniel’s quotation above, often times political partisanship is visible 
within universities, as well as in public, through easily identifiable political symbols 
such as the red and white striped Árpád flag or Bocskai dress style, signifying support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284	  Sometimes	  interviewees	  were	  not	  certain	  of	  the	  exact	  party	  a	  teacher	  might	  vote	  for	  but	  knew	  
whether	  they	  were	  nationalist	  conservative	  or	  liberal-­‐left	  supporting.	  Only	  one	  interviewee	  
mentioned	  that	  political	  topics	  were	  discussed	  in	  class	  while	  the	  teacher’s	  political	  alignment	  was	  
unknown	  (highlighted	  in	  green	  on	  Appendix	  10).	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of the traditional nationalist sentiments and often support of the right or radical 
right.285  
Typecasting of political partisanship was also mentioned with reference to 
university departments, seen in the above quotations, and institutions. Many 
interviewees mentioned history courses as being a bastion of right wing and 
particularly radical right ideologies and partisanships. Institutional stereotyping 
occurred in a number of interviews where students felt there were overwhelming 
political biases within certain universities.  
Studying communication and talking media there is an obvious political side. 
Catholic university is so right wing. Mostly KDNP and Fidesz. (Dóra, Age 28: 
Budapest)286 
 
Many in the University of Debrecen are Jobbik. Liberals are in hiding… Some far 
right supporters are putting posters up at school. Only Jobbik was visible at my 
university. Everyone is either right or passive. (Adam, Age 23: Budapest) 
 
I go to ELTE university287 and study history. At ELTE it is about 1/3 of the students 
that are Jobbik. In the history department maybe it is 50%. (Tibor, Age 20: Miskolc) 
 
Dóra’s quotation is unsurprising since there are strong correlations between 
the right and the church. This is mainly due to Fidesz’s longstanding alliance with the 
Christian Democrats (KDNP). Recent findings by Hungarian researchers and 
investigative reporters have also verified certain university and departmental partisan 
tendencies.288 History and religious studies seem to be particularly attractive for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  Bocskai	  is	  a	  Hungarian	  traditional	  style	  of	  suit	  jacket,	  most	  often	  worn	  by	  a	  man,	  
however,	  Jobbik	  MEP	  Krisztina	  Morvai	  has	  re-­‐popularized	  the	  outfit	  along	  with	  other	  Jobbik	  MPs	  and	  
older	  radical	  right	  MIÉP	  supporters.	  	  
286	  Dóra	  attended	  Pázmány	  Péter	  Katolikus	  Egyetem	  (known	  as	  Pázmány	  University).	  The	  Catholic	  
University	  is	  located	  in	  Budapest.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  and	  most	  prestigious	  universities	  in	  Hungary.	  
287	  ELTE	  is	  the	  abbreviation	  used	  for	  Eötvös	  Loránd	  University	  (Eötvös	  Loránd	  Tudományegyetem).	  
288	  Jobbik	  was	  founded	  within	  ELTE	  University	  by	  a	  group	  of	  nationalist	  history	  students	  in	  1999	  
(Havas	  2009,	  Korkut	  2012).	  At	  ELTE	  it	  was	  discovered	  recently	  that	  the	  student	  union,	  (HÖK)	  was	  
making	  lists	  of	  students’	  religious	  affiliations	  and	  party	  preferences,	  slandering	  Roma	  and	  Jewish	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radical right supporting students and teachers.289 This is partially linked with the 
highly politicized historical narratives mentioned previously. Historical revisionism is 
highly attractive for nationalist and radical right supporters since how history is 
depicted creates distinct narratives about Hungarians as a people and Hungary’s 
position in international relations.290 As mentioned by interviewees and confirmed by 
Hungarian studies right wing and radical right support for Fidesz and Jobbik is most 
prevalent in universities when partisanship is identifiable (Vásárhelyi 2003). 
6.3 SPECIAL COLLEGES: ELITE SOCIALIZATION 
 In contrast to the restricted political content and subjective channeling of 
political information within universities the development of Special Colleges 
(Szakkolégiumok) provides an elite opportunity for political information sharing that 
classrooms and main campuses prohibit. Although Special Colleges only admit a 
small amount of university students they are relevant here for their role as a seedbed 
for developing political elites as well as new parties and movements. Special Colleges 
are small semi-autonomous institutions attached to a university, providing their own 
extracurricular structure and classes, financing and system of admittance around a 
specified field of study. These colleges are self-run by student members, generally 
ranging between sixty and one hundred members in each. While not all Universities 
have a szakkolégium program the more well known universities in Budapest tend to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
students.	  The	  vice	  president	  of	  the	  union	  and	  several	  other	  former	  presidents	  and	  members	  were	  
Jobbik	  members,	  using	  these	  lists	  for	  Jobbik	  recruitment	  (‘Listázták	  ELTE	  gölyait’,	  Index,	  (19	  February	  
2013),	  <	  http://index.hu/belfold/2013/02/19/listaztak_az_elte_golyait/>).	  
289	  Studies	  by	  Maria	  Vásárhelyi	  concluded	  that	  there	  were	  high	  levels	  of	  radical	  right	  xenophobia	  
among	  ELTE’s	  history	  and	  religious	  students.	  At	  ELTE	  it	  was	  found	  that	  among	  history	  and	  religious	  
students	  21%	  openly	  felt	  that	  Jewish	  citizens	  weakened	  the	  Hungarian	  nation	  while	  49%	  felt	  that	  
Jewish	  interests	  were	  different	  to	  Hungarian	  interests	  (Vásárhelyi	  2003).	  	  
290	  The	  historical	  ties	  to	  Attila	  the	  Hun	  and	  the	  seven	  warrior	  tribes	  that	  lived	  in	  Pannonia	  (pre-­‐
Hungary)	  play	  into	  narratives	  of	  Hungary’s	  strength	  and	  will	  to	  conquer.	  Later	  histories	  of	  Hungary’s	  
oppression	  by	  outside	  forces,	  such	  as	  the	  Hapsburbs	  and	  Soviets,	  play	  into	  radicalized	  conspiracy	  
narratives	  of	  Hungary	  struggling	  against	  the	  world.	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have one or two Special Colleges attached to the larger institution. Most Specialist 
Colleges include a designated area or hall of residence developed to create a special 
environment focused on extracurricular education and research for top students, above 
and beyond what the general university curriculum provides.291 As described by a 
member of the law-based Special College, Bibó: 
It’s like a hostel with classes. (Mónika, Age 21: Budapest) 
 While some College programs have non-political foundations for 
specialization, for the purposes of my research I focus on an analysis of the 
foundational three Special Colleges, important for being the first Colleges of their 
kind as well as the most politically influential: Rajk László College for Advanced 
Studies (Rajk László Szakkollégium – known as Rajk), the College for Advanced 
Studies in Social Theory (Társadalomelméleti Kollégium – known as TEK) and the 
Bibó István College for Advanced Studies (Bibó István Szakkollégium – known as 
Bibó). These three Colleges are attached to two of the main Universities in Budapest, 
Corvinus University (Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem), previously the Karl Marx 
School of Economics and Eötvös Loránd University (Eötvös Loránd 
Tudományegyetem – known as ELTE).  
These Special College institutions, the three listed in particular, are of 
important mention since within their confines they have founded and developed 
Fidesz and LMP as well as some links with Jobbik members. While Special Colleges 
are openly politically unbiased they have distinct links with political entities such as 
Bibó and Rajk’s link with the founding members of Fidesz and TEK’s participation in 
LMP’s beginning. This section discusses these three oldest and most influential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291	  By	  western	  reference	  points	  these	  colleges	  are	  somewhat	  comparable	  to	  Oxbridge	  colleges	  or	  co-­‐
ed	  fraternity-­‐like	  structures	  in	  the	  United	  States.	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Special Colleges in Budapest as an elite outlet for political socialization that has direct 
party politic consequences.  
6.3.1 Origins of the Szakkollégium in Hungary 
 The first Special Colleges were developed in Budapest in the 1970s. Small 
groups of between twenty and forty students would congregate regularly to train 
themselves further on subjects pertaining to their degrees.292 The Rajk Lászlo College 
for Advanced Studies (hereafter referred to as Rajk) was the first Specialist College of 
Hungary founded in 1970 as an autonomous, self-governed student association 
formally attached to the Karl Marx School of Economics (now Corvinus University). 
The College was established with Marxist principles and goals of providing members 
with a larger range of possibilities for professional, social and political self-education 
and activism with members coming from the economics, business and social sciences 
faculties. Hungary’s more open and liberal stance towards non-political associations 
at this time allowed for the beginning of Special Colleges. 
Rajk College’s mission is to provide students with opportunities to increase 
their professional standard and educate members as socially sensitive intellectuals. 
Members operate the college as a democratic community, teaching active 
citizenship.293 Rajk College, named after a socially dividing political figure, showed 
the post-1956 Kádárist easement of the time, allowing for certain levels of social 
commentary and critique as long as it did not go against the main lines of the Socialist 
Party.294 During the transition period in Hungary between 1989 and 1990 Rajk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292	  ‘Tortenet’,	  ELTE	  –	  Bibó,	  <http://bibo.elte.hu/tortenet>.	  
293	  Rajk	  College	  openly	  modeled	  itself	  off	  of	  the	  English	  College	  systems,	  seen	  in	  Universities	  like	  
Oxford	  and	  Cambridge:	  <http://rajk.uni-­‐corvinus.hu/index.php/english>.	  
294	  The	  naming	  of	  the	  College	  after	  Lászlo	  Rajk	  in	  1970	  displayed	  a	  critical	  stance	  towards	  the	  political	  
structure	  and	  discourse	  of	  the	  time.	  Rajk	  had	  been	  a	  former	  Communist	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  
	   235	  
members continued the College as a decentralized, anti-communist institution, taking 
a more neoliberal stance, supporting the liberal camp of political parties SZDSZ and 
Fidesz.295 
The second oldest Szakkollégium in Hungary is the College for Advanced 
Studies in Social Theory (TEK) founded in 1981. TEK was founded by a group Rajk 
students, splitting from Rajk to develop a more left-wing theory base. While Rajk was 
looking to move away from Marxist centered sociopolitical theories, TEK looked to 
reinterpret political structures within Marxism. During democratic transition the 
College began to move away from Marxism and explore values of self-expression and 
global subject matters, though reinterpretations of Marxist ideology remains part of 
their discussion core. Today the College is known for its central debates on Hungary’s 
environmental projects, internal ethnic issues and the effects of globalization.296 
Bibó István College for Advanced Studies (Bibó) also lays claim as Hungary’s 
second advanced studies student community. A group of between twenty to forty 
ELTE University law students began convening between 1977 and 1978 to debate 
contemporary law issues and relating sociopolitical topics. Bibó College, named after 
another politically relevant figure297, was formally established from this group in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
made	  into	  a	  prominent	  figure	  through	  his	  victimization	  within	  the	  Rákosi	  ‘show’	  trials	  in	  1949.	  His	  trial	  
and	  execution	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  first	  in	  a	  series	  of	  illegal	  trials	  against	  party	  members	  (K.K.	  1969).	  
295	  As	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  original	  liberal	  camp,	  in	  the	  tripolar	  political	  system	  in	  1990,	  was	  the	  
more	  hard-­‐line	  anti-­‐communist	  camp.	  This	  was	  before	  SZDSZ	  shifted	  left	  to	  align	  itself	  with	  MSZP	  and	  
before	  Fidesz	  re-­‐aligned	  itself	  as	  a	  national	  conservative	  party.	  Information	  on	  the	  transition	  position	  
of	  Rajk	  comes	  from	  interviewees	  who	  were	  Rajk	  members.	  
296	  From	  interviewees	  that	  were	  members	  of	  TEK	  some	  of	  the	  extracurricular	  lecture	  themes	  offered	  
in	  their	  Fall	  2011	  program	  included	  ‘Revolutionary	  Situation:	  A	  Critical	  Relationship	  Between	  Nature	  
and	  Society	  Today’,	  ‘Psychedelic	  World	  View’,	  ‘Roma	  Murders’	  and	  ‘Border	  Cases’.	  
297	  Considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  political	  thinkers	  of	  Hungary,	  István	  Bibó	  (1911-­‐1979)	  had	  
been	  a	  law	  student	  in	  Szeged	  continuing	  his	  career	  into	  the	  Royal	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Justice	  by	  1938.	  He	  had	  helped	  word	  the	  12-­‐point	  manifesto	  of	  the	  left-­‐wing	  intellectual	  group	  the	  
March	  Front,	  supporting	  communist-­‐social	  democratic	  cooperation.	  In	  1944,	  Bibó	  helped	  draft	  the	  
‘peace	  proposal’	  for	  the	  communist	  party	  and	  issued	  safe	  conducts	  to	  restrict	  the	  deportation	  of	  
Jews.	  In	  1956	  he	  backed	  Imre	  Nagy’s	  coalition	  government,	  and	  was	  consequently	  sentenced	  by	  the	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1983, when the student group moved into a semi-professional college building on 
Ménesi Road in Budapest, where members continue to reside today.298 Members 
come from the law and social sciences departments of ELTE. Like Rajk, the main aim 
of Bibó College is to prepare members for professional training and the labor market 
as well as build knowledge and networks that will benefit members in future careers. 
Bibó claims, similarly to the other colleges, to adhere to ‘political neutrality, tolerance 
and diversity, quality research and practice-oriented training, support, embracing 
talent and a well-functioning community life providing all that can be achieved’.299 
6.3.2. Membership Process and Structure of Special Colleges 
Membership into one of Hungary’s prestigious Specialist Colleges is not a 
simple task and aims to select the best and the brightest individuals to enhance the 
College’s community and activities. Active student membership of each college 
maintains numbers of around one hundred or less per College. Student members run 
admission processes into each College democratically. Rajk, TEK and Bibó all have 
Admissions Committees, usually made up of members that hold active leadership 
roles within the college.  Applicants must be full-time students at the university the 
College is attached to.  Although there is some variation in the format and questioning 
of College applicants, generally a written questionnaire is filled out containing topical 
questions relating to the central focus of the College. Short essay questions ask about 
personal perspectives, world-views and expectations. For Colleges like Bibó, Rajk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Supreme	  Court	  to	  life	  imprisonment	  August	  1958	  due	  to	  his	  various	  cohorts	  and	  political	  writings.	  
(István	  Bibó,	  1911-­‐1979’,	  The	  Institute	  for	  the	  History	  of	  the	  1956	  Hungarian	  Revolution,	  (2000),	  <	  
http://www.rev.hu/history_of_56/szerviz/kislex/biograf/bibo_uk.htm>,	  (Accessed	  8	  May	  2012).	  	  
298	  http://bibo.elte.hu/tortenet	  
299	  He	  was	  later	  released	  and	  lived	  on	  but	  is	  most	  well	  known	  for	  his	  connection	  to	  the	  Imre	  Nagy	  
government	  and	  his	  political	  writings	  during	  the	  interwar	  period.	  http://bibo.elte.hu/	  ‘politikai	  
semlegesség,	  a	  tolerancia	  és	  sokszínûség	  talaján	  állva,	  az	  igényes	  kutatómunka	  és	  a	  
gyakorlatorientált	  képzés	  támogatásával,	  a	  tehetségek	  felkarolásával,	  jól	  mûködõ	  közösségi	  lét	  
biztosításával	  lehet	  elérni’.	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and TEK questions often include current national political debates and broader 
questions about globalization and economic policies that show the focal interest and 
topical orientation of each College.300 All Colleges ask applicants to question the 
sociopolitical world around them to get a sense of their views to see if they will fit 
within the close knit College environment. Successful written applications are 
followed by an interview with the Admissions Committee.301 Members create a close 
community, living and working together to educate one another and network with 
like-minded students and professionals. 
Once admitted, members play an active role in the creation and participation 
of events. The Colleges are self-sustaining, funded by alumni and as well as revenue 
from programs, seminars, tutorials and conferences they host. Special Colleges allow 
the open sociopolitical discourse that the wider universities prohibit. These events as a 
platform for members to network with established professionals, intellectuals and 
politicians. Although Colleges are student-run an adult director is proposed by the 
Board of the General Assembly as well as the Student Affairs Committee and 
approved by the greater university body that the College is attached to.302  
6.3.3. Developing Political Parties and Socializing Activism  
 Special Colleges provide an elite arena for political socialization within 
universities. Professors, policy-makers and experts from Hungary and abroad are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  TEK	  2012	  written	  application	  short	  questions	  ask:	  What	  constitutes	  social	  
responsibility?	  What	  does	  an	  oligarch	  do?	  How	  do	  we	  differentiate	  between	  a	  freedom	  fighter	  and	  a	  
terrorist?	  What	  does	  an	  ethical	  bank	  do?	  Applicants	  are	  also	  asked	  to	  pick	  two	  quotations	  to	  write	  
essays	  on	  commenting	  on	  contemporary	  philosophers,	  urban	  planners,	  economists	  and	  sociologists.	  
<TEK	  Felvételi	  2012,	  A	  Társadalomelméleti	  Kollégium	  Felvételi	  KérdÍve	  (2012)>.	  
301	  The	  intensity	  of	  the	  interview	  process	  varies	  as	  well.	  While	  some	  interviewees	  have	  noted	  a	  very	  
formal	  interview	  process	  within	  Bibó,	  TEK	  is	  more	  relaxed	  with	  an	  informal	  interview	  structure.	  	  
302	  This	  rector-­‐like	  figure	  is	  appointed	  for	  a	  fixed	  period,	  usually	  between	  three	  and	  five	  years.	  Semi-­‐
annual	  meetings	  have	  College	  members	  manage	  funding,	  proposal	  writing,	  programming	  and	  the	  
management	  of	  publications.	  Colleges	  become	  intricate	  mini-­‐localities	  with	  Student	  Boards,	  
Committees	  for	  Academic	  Activities	  and	  members	  of	  Assembly.	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invited to give lectures, participate in conferences and debates, or conduct roundtables 
with College members. While general university policies and courses avoid 
controversial historical and political topics, Special Colleges have the freedom to 
question contemporary issues and discuss them in an academic setting. Those 
attending Special Colleges usually commented on the contrast between general 
university education courses and the more open political discourse permitted in 
College programs and discourse.  
At University we were not allowed to have political debates, but within colleges there 
is intellectual behavior more and it is more open. In those circles if is more common. 
(Beata, Age 24: Budapest - TEK Member). 
 
It’s very different in high school. There is no fear about speaking about politics [in 
Bibó College] but you can always tell someone’s opinions (Monika, Age 21: 
Budapest). 
 
Special Colleges create a space for stronger political socialization that does 
not happen as strongly in general high school and university atmospheres. 
Interviewees that mentioned their membership in Special Colleges almost always 
noted a large influence of their respective college in developing their political 
ideologies and partisan alignment, as seen in Appendix 10 highlighted in blue. This 
strong college influence had the potential to counteract previous familial socialization 
while most other interviewees said that schooling had little or no effect on their 
political views.  
My influence was not so much in the family, just general discussion at home. I am a 
member of Bibó College. I was a-political before but now these Colleges are 
politicized. My fellow classmates were a big influence in how to practice politics, to 
give a voice. (Dániel, Age 25: Budapest). 
 
Besides creating a unique space for youth political socialization via 
conferences, lectures and open discussion, these Special Colleges have also played an 
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active role in political activism and creating party elites. Rajk College states proudly 
that their ‘college and its members have played an important role in preparing and 
assisting the transformation of Hungary to a democratic country with a market 
economy’.303 Rajk, Bibó and TEK have been particularly influential in political party 
formation from the first youth party, Fidesz, to more recent youth-based parties like 
LMP.304 The foundations of Bibó were directly linked with creating a space for open 
anti-establishment discourse. From the atmosphere created by Bibó and Rajk came 
the foundations of the Association of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták 
Szövetsége – FIDESZ) in its original form. Fidesz was established at the Bibó College 
dorm in Budapest on 30 March 1988. Ten of the thirty-seven original founders of 
Fidesz were Bibó College members while a number of other founders were Rajk.305 
Fidesz continues to recognize Bibó as the birthplace of the party and the older 
generation of Fidesz’s political activists remains in contact with the newer Bibó 
members. Social events are arranged, used sometimes to recruit Fidesz members from 
within the Bibó alumni network.306 Well-known Bibó-Fidesz members include Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán, President János Áder and Foreign Affairs State Secretary 
Zsolt Németh. A list of well-known Bibó members are given on the colleges website, 
many with government and civil service positions.307  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303	  Offical	  Website	  of	  Special	  College	  Rajk:	  <http://rajk.uni-­‐corvinus.hu/index.php/english>.	  
304	  One	  interviewee	  also	  mentioned	  the	  cultivation	  of	  certain	  Jobbik	  members	  within	  Bibó	  more	  
recently	  but	  this	  remains	  unconfirmed	  and	  without	  external	  data.	  	  
305	  Some	  of	  the	  other	  founding	  students	  could	  not	  be	  Bibó	  members	  since	  they	  were	  not	  students	  of	  
law	  while	  another	  group	  of	  founding	  members	  were	  economists	  within	  Rajk	  College.	  (Information	  
from	  an	  interview	  with	  Bibó	  Founding	  Director,	  István	  Stumpf	  –	  Current	  constitutional	  judge	  in	  
Hungary).	  	  
306	  Fidesz	  founders	  even	  held	  the	  party’s	  twentieth	  anniversary	  party	  at	  their	  former	  College,	  Bibó	  
with	  cake	  and	  speeches	  from	  prominent	  founding	  members	  such	  as	  László	  Kövér,	  current	  Speaker	  of	  
the	  National	  Assembly	  of	  Hungary	  and	  temporary	  incumbent	  President	  after	  the	  resignation	  of	  Pál	  
Schmitt.	  ‘Fidesz	  Birthday	  Bash:	  Twenty	  Years’,	  Hungarian	  Spectrum,	  (30	  March	  2008),	  	  
<	  http://esbalogh.typepad.com/hungarianspectrum/2008/03/fidesz-­‐birthday.html>.	  
307	  List	  of	  Bibó	  College	  Alumni:	  <http://bibo.elte.hu/voltt>.	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More recently, TEK has also played a role in party formation providing a 
space for the founders and members of youth-based green party, Politics Can Be 
Different (LMP). As mentioned previously, themes within TEK are based on a more 
alternative political stance, focusing on urban renewal, sustainable living and tackling 
controversial socioeconomic concerns about homelessness and Roma integration in 
Hungary. These topics parallel much of the policy focus of LMP, allowing for an 
intellectual space for political thought development and socialization.  
I am a member of TEK College. Founders of LMP were also TEK, communicating 
heavily, holding lectures and discussions. Then they became a party. My friends were 
apart of it. There were online newsletters and mail lists [from LMP]. We debated if it 
should be allowed in our Colleges mail stream. In TEK it’s really usual to talk 
politics without getting a negative stamp. It created an open space for me to shape my 
opinion and give my point of view (Beata, Age 24: Budapest). 
 
While there are instances across Europe of students and universities giving 
rise to social and political movements this type of political socialization is limited to 
the elite sphere of Special Colleges in Hungary, operating on more active political 
premises. While universities prohibited open debates the Special Colleges set up 
debates, demonstrations and roundtables questioning the new political developments 
in Hungary. While the number of members in any given College generally remains 
limited to less than one hundred their impact on political activism and socialization 
goes beyond the scope of membership through their activities and publications.308 
Their socializing also goes beyond their youth-based premises bringing alumni, 
scholars and policy-makers into their realm of debate. These Colleges provide a space 
for political socialization and discourse that universities are currently lacking. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308	  Rajk,	  TEK	  and	  Bibó	  have	  all	  been	  active	  in	  government	  protests	  over	  the	  new	  changes	  to	  education	  
policies	  by	  the	  Fidesz	  government,	  drawing	  out	  thousands	  of	  students	  in	  various	  protests	  (reported	  by	  
Hungarian	  MTI,	  Magyar	  Narancs,	  Index.hu	  and	  Politics.hu).	  	  
The	  Special	  Colleges	  also	  work	  with	  various	  NGOs	  and	  develop	  their	  own	  publications	  for	  public.	  TEK	  
works	  closely	  with	  Habitat	  for	  Humanity	  while	  Bibó	  produces	  a	  monthly	  publication	  through	  
Hungarian	  think	  tank	  Szazadveg	  (information	  from	  interview	  with	  founding	  director	  István	  Stumpf).	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*** 
While education in most western democracies is used to socialize democratic 
practices and teach civic participation, in Hungary the education system remains 
dysfunctional as a political and civic socializing agent. Aspects of the education 
system impeding democratic civic socialization are caused at the national, 
institutional and classroom level. With regards to government effects on secondary 
schools and universities, large-scale decentralization efforts have created regional 
disparities since over 80% of institutional funding is meant to come from local and 
regional municipalities. Economic disparities in certain regions of Hungary, such as 
the northeast and far south, mean that institutions and teachers are often unable to 
access the same resources, such as teacher training courses, to ensure that young 
Hungarians are being taught newly introduced civics courses at an equal standard. 	  
Decentralization requires a power shift, which comes with a necessary 
attitudinal shift to embrace new roles and local levels of responsibility.309	  There is a 
lack of continuity or mutual agreement between political parties in Hungary about the 
role national and local actors should be playing. The nature of governmental 
regulations has affected educational political socialization with shifts between 
decentralization efforts, put forth by the MSZP government, and recentralizing 
legislation, instated by the Fidesz government. This has not only created confusion for 
institutions and teachers trying to implement legislation but the content of the core 
curriculum has become highly politicized. Particularly since changes made by the 
Fidesz government since 2010, the new national core curriculum has a distinct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309	  Appendix	  9	  shows	  a	  model	  of	  the	  collaborative	  efforts	  necessary	  in	  a	  well-­‐working	  decentralized	  
education	  system,	  involving	  national	  and	  regional	  actors	  dealing	  with	  political,	  economic,	  
organizational	  and	  educational	  goals.	  As	  seen	  in	  this	  model	  the	  process	  demands	  high	  levels	  of	  
innovation	  and	  commuication	  between	  local,	  regional	  and	  national	  actors.	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national focus, incorporating new and controversial literature by interwar authors that 
are known to have supported the fascist Arrow Cross Party in Hungary. The Fidesz 
government has also begun distributing material on how contentious sociopolitical 
topics should be taught, as seen by the documents provided for teaching about the 
Teaty of Trianon. These changes are consciously realigning education-based 
socialization, mainly in secondary schools, re-nationalizing content and aims. 
On an institutional level, regulations often suppress campus environments 
from developing healthy political debates and discussions in universities by 
prohibiting partisan content or organizations. Debates, political youth organizations, 
and surveys about sociopolitical perspectives are all often prohibited by institutional 
rules. Students are often faced with the contradictory nature of institutional 
restrictions compared with certain openly politicized teachers and professors, most 
often reported supporting the right and radical right. Students also reported certain 
overarching partisanships in certain universities or specific departments, most often 
correlating with right wing and radical right alignments. The only arena for strong and 
direct socializing processes in education is within the small elite Special Colleges. 
The environment provided for the students participating in these colleges is 
cultivating active young political elites as well as developing new political 
movements.  
The next chapter looks at the role of the Hungarian media as an agent of 
political socialization. 
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7. MEDIA AS AN AGENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION  
Across Europe mass media today is considered to have an increasing influence 
on socialization. TV news, newspapers and online media portals are reaching wider 
audiences and providing easy access to local, national and international news 
(Chaffee and Yang 1990, Chaffee 1997, Horowitz 2005). Journalists and media 
outlets in the post-communist environment in the last twenty-five years have 
experienced new democratic liberties of freedom of speech and press (Niemi and 
Hepburn 1995, Horowitz 2005). The early years of transition grappled with the 
process of privatization and decentralization with varied results. In the Hungarian 
case, certain distinct trends have emerged with regards to media-based partisanships 
and the transformation of online media accessibility. In theory, the state’s direct 
control over the media is drastically reduced in a post-communist democracy, 
however, the influence and power of the ruling party remains substantial. Political 
parties have retained influence over public radio, television stations and press 
agencies. This is not uncommon for most of Central and Eastern Europe. Many post-
communist nations are struggling with defining and institutionalizing the role of the 
media offering fair and fact-based journalism (Gross 2004).  
This chapter analyzes the current role media is playing in the process of 
political socialization in Hungary. Media considered in this chapter includes 
television, radio, newspapers, weekly magazines, and online news portals. 
Throughout the chapter ‘traditional media’ pertains to television, radio and various 
newsprint while alternative media refers broadly to alternative online news portals 
that are not attached to larger traditional broadcasts or publications. It should be noted 
that questions about media usage pertained to gaining information about political 
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news and not usage for entertainment.310 Online news portals considered in this study 
are included in cases where traditional news outlets have online outlets for their 
content, as well as newly developed news portals and politically relevant political 
news blogs.311 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the top 
down process of post-communist media decentralization, looking at how political 
actors managed media privatization with distinctly political ends. This section follows 
a rough chronological development of national media from the end of the Kádár Era 
of highly centralized media, to post-transition media liberation. This section also 
analyzes the accessibility for marginalized political organizations and parties, such as 
Jobbik or newer grassroots social movements, to penetrate mainstream media outlets. 
The second section of this chapter looks at the bottom up process of how young 
people are interacting with various media outlets as a source for cultivating political 
efficacy and solidifying partisanships. This section tracks the types of media outlets 
being used with regards to attaining sociopolitical news as well as tracking how 
young Hungarians view political media as a whole, particularly with regards to newer 
online news outlets.312 How online media content compares with traditional news 
outlets and what affect this might have on media as an agent of socialization is also 
analyzed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310	  This	  is	  important	  mainly	  because	  in	  Hungary	  and	  across	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  there	  are	  high	  
levels	  households	  watching	  television	  but	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  correlate	  with	  watching	  television	  
relevant	  to	  political	  socialization	  and	  acquiring	  news	  media	  (Eurobarometer	  75	  Autumn	  2011).	  	  
311	   While	   blogs	   may	   sometimes	   be	   categorized	   as	   more	   a	   social	   rather	   than	   media	   form	   of	  
socialization,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Hungary	   a	   majority	   of	   youth	   respondents	   referred	   to	   certain	   sites	   as	  
primary	   media	   portals	   for	   political	   information,	   rather	   than	   social	   online	   interaction.	   It	   is	   for	   this	  
reason	   that	   sites	   such	   as	  Mandiner,	   Konzervatórium	   and	   Jobbklikk	   as	   well	   as	   Index	   and	   Origo	   are	  
included	  in	  this	  section.	  
312	  Increasing	  online	  media	  usage	  by	  youths	  is	  a	  trend	  across	  Europe	  (Eurobarometer	  76,	  Autumn	  
2011).	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7.1 POST-COMMUNIST MEDIA TRANSFORMATION  
During democratic transition the media was one of the largest focal points of 
change in attempts to decentralize the media away from government control. National 
and international private industries took over media outlets and developed new news 
outlets to renew the media sector. Although the new democratic government aimed to 
counter the previous regime’s politically centralized system, the politicized role of the 
media has subsequently recentralized around strong partisanships.  
7.1.1 Privatization of Traditional Media 
Diversifying and decentralizing the media away from state-controlled content 
was a symbol of democratization, allowing for autonomy and giving a platform to a 
diverse array of opinions and perspectives (Linz and Stepan 1996). However, the 
reality of transitional media changes was an elite power struggle for media control 
during the privatization process, recognizing media ownership as a potentially 
powerful too for profit as well as political capital. Despite the major reforms in media 
during the transition from a socialist system to democracy, certain media outlets 
maintained their form, though most have changed drastically in content.313 Certain 
papers were forced to take sides politically during transition in a struggle to maintain 
themselves through the process of privatization (Arpad 2004).314 Many of those that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313	  Papers	  like	  Népszava	  (The	  People’s	  Voice)	  and	  Magyar	  Nemzet	  (Hungarian	  Nation)	  have	  been	  
around	  long	  before	  1989	  however	  they	  have	  changed	  in	  their	  content	  and	  readership.	  While	  
Népszava	  used	  to	  be	  the	  working	  class	  daily	  it	  is	  now	  more	  of	  a	  liberal-­‐left	  news	  outlet.	  Meanwhile	  
Magyar	  Nemzet	  originally	  had	  a	  large	  Budapest	  intelligentsia	  following	  while	  now	  it	  is	  more	  of	  the	  
national	  working	  class	  right	  wing	  paper	  (Arpad	  2004).	  
314	  Some	  stronger	  media	  outlets	  maintained	  through	  the	  transition	  despite	  their	  mostly	  Socialist	  Era	  
roots.	  Népszabadság	  was,	  and	  continues	  to	  be,	  the	  most	  widely	  read	  newspaper	  in	  Hungary.	  It	  is	  still	  
considered	  a	  left	  wing	  news	  source	  along	  with	  Népszava	  from	  similar	  origins.	  While	  some	  media	  
stayed	  aligned	  to	  the	  left	  other	  news	  outlets	  have	  changed	  allegiances	  such	  as	  the	  well-­‐known	  paper	  
Magyar	  Nemzet	  and	  radio	  stations	  like	  Kossuth	  and	  Petőfi.	  Kossuth	  and	  Petőfi	  radio	  stations	  used	  to	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had the financial capital to acquire news industries had maintained wealth during the 
socialist period due to their allegiances, at least passively, to the socialist government. 
Media was a large topic of the decentralization process in the early 1990s with much 
of mainstream media simply exchanging hands and returning to Socialist Party 
supporting strongholds (Tóth 2012). 
The early 1990s saw the development of a media struggle in defining the new 
terms what freedom of press meant in practice (Lendvai 2012). Privatization sold 
state-owned media to investors and entrepreneurs. The majority of Hungarians with 
the finances available to run large media outlets were those that had amassed funds 
during the previous regime, supporting or at least catering to the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party (MSZMP). Democratic transformation also led to spontaneous ‘early 
privatization’ where government run papers were transferred to new private 
ownerships at low costs before the first free elections even took place.315 This 
privatization process saw much of the major media corporations end up under 
management supporting the newly democratic Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 
(Körösény 1999, Tóth 2012). Tracking ownership and chief editor positions, some 
estimates show that during the early and mid 1990s the left controlled, explicitly or by 
association, up to 80% of the major television and newsprint media outlets (Lendvai 
2012). An equal percentage of capital invested into mass media development in 
Hungary was foreign investment (Giorgi 1995, Coman 2000). In Hungary there are 
widespread examples of foreign financial ownership of local and national press. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
run	  twenty	  and	  seventeen	  hours	  a	  day	  respectively	  supporting	  the	  Socialist	  government	  (Volgyes	  
1975).	  Now	  they	  are	  both	  considered	  strong	  Fidesz	  supporting	  stations.	  
315	  There	  were	  numerous	  cases	  of	  regional	  and	  county	  papers	  transferring	  ownership	  to	  foreign	  press	  
entities	  (such	  as	  German-­‐run	  Axel	  Springer)	  for	  low	  cost.	  These	  now	  privately	  owned	  media	  
enterprises	  were	  staffed	  with	  journalists	  from	  the	  socialist	  era.	  Now	  privatized	  very	  little	  lustration	  or	  
overhaul	  could	  be	  conducted	  even	  with	  right	  wing	  party	  MDF	  winning	  the	  first	  elections	  (Lánczi	  and	  
O’Neil	  1996).	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example: popular national dailies Magyar Nemzet, Magyar Hirlap, Mai Nap and 
Népszabadság were all run on foreign investment in the early to mid 1990s (Coman 
2000).	   Although the conservative right wing party Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(MDF) ran the first democratic government, the media shift became more obviously 
left wing when in 1994 MSZP won control of the government, regaining several large 
nationwide publications (Lánczi and O’Neil 1996).  
The largely left wing media was confronted directly by populist radical, ‘new 
right’ articles in the conservative right wing media outlets available.316 Sparking an 
attack on the biased media spectrum was the publication of an article in August 1992 
in the magazine Magyar Forum written by then MDF representative, István Csurka 
(later to be founder of the radical right party MIÉP) (Arpad 2004).  In the first openly 
radical right article written by a political representative in a major news publication, 
Csurka discussed the deceit and treason imposed on the nation by liberals, Jews and 
‘non-Hungarians’ living in Hungary. The article called for ethnic purism and 
intertwined with elements of mythical folk tales about Hungary’s origins.317 Within a 
month of the article’s publication, and republication in various other papers, there was 
a rally in Budapest against the article and the sentiments it supported, however, it also 
laid groundwork for gaining momentum behind radical right politics and rhetoric that 
could be represented within mainstream media without official reprimand (Pittaway 
2003, Arpad 2004). Even though openly radical right media was primarily 
marginalized, with only a few thousand subscriptions, it was made apart of the media 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316	  While	  there	  was	  an	  apparent	  left	  wing	  bias	  in	  mainstream	  media	  outlets	  there	  were,	  of	  course,	  still	  
significant	  conservative	  and	  right	  wing	  publications	  at	  the	  time.	  
317	  The	  article	  was	  published	  in	  Magyar	  Forum,	  a	  leading	  conservative	  magazine,	  on	  20	  August	  1992	  
titled	  ‘A	  few	  thoughts	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  two	  years	  since	  the	  system	  change	  and	  with	  the	  new	  
Magyar	  Democratic	  Forum	  Program’	  (Néhány	  gondolat	  a	  rendszerváltás	  két	  esztendeje	  és	  az	  MDF	  új	  
programja	  kapcsán	  című	  írását).	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made available to government deputies and made available in parliament.318 This is 
one of the first examples of radicalized rhetoric mainstreaming in traditional media. 
The early and mid 1990s was characterized by a largely left wing media 
transformation. Although right wing and radical right media were in existence it was 
not as widely available, particularly with regards to openly radical right publications. 
However, the largest campaigns against the left wing media bias in the 1990s came 
from the radical right. The radical right party, MIÉP (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja – 
Hungarian Justice and Life Party), founded in 1993 and led by ex-MDF MP István 
Csurka (see Section 1.2.1), campaigned strongly against the left wing media takeover 
in Hungary. While MIÉP never gained strong electoral support, only passing the 5% 
electoral threshold in 1998, it did build up a significant protest culture against the left. 
By Autumn 2002 right and radical right supporters mobilized against what Csurka 
labeled the ‘still communist’ mass media (Bayer 2002, Mude-Kopecky 2003, Szabó 
2003). Bringing together a mixture of old nationalists and younger skinheads, calling 
themselves the ‘national-democratic youth’, a series of right-wing demonstrations 
were held against the left wing media monopoly (Szabó 2003).319  
7.1.2 Shifting the Media as a Tool for Right Wing Politics 
 While the radical right protested and published against the left wing media in 
Hungary there were few changes in media ownership or content until the end of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318	  Paramilitary	  right-­‐wing	  journal	  Hunnia,	  referring	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  ‘chosen	  people’,	  openly	  
questioning	  Trianon,	  international	  Zionism	  and	  Israel	  added	  to	  the	  available	  literature	  available	  in	  
parliament,	  lobbied	  by	  MDF.	  The	  journal	  was	  added	  to	  the	  news	  media	  counter	  for	  deputies	  
(Hockenos	  1993).	  
319	  It	  is	  common	  among	  populist	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  to	  accuse	  the	  
media	  of	  being	  run	  by	  foreign	  traitors	  or	  left	  wing	  forces	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  radical	  right	  was	  quick	  to	  
pick	  up	  such	  rhetoric	  (Mudde	  2007).	  What	  is	  relevant	  in	  Hungary	  is	  the	  rapidity	  that	  populist	  
nationalist	  rhetoric	  has	  dispersed	  in	  various	  media	  outlets	  in	  recent	  years,	  leading	  to	  civil	  
demonstrations	  and	  protests.	  Content	  distributed	  and	  normalized	  through	  the	  media	  has	  had	  an	  
active	  role	  in	  disseminating	  political	  messages	  in	  Hungary	  and	  solidifying	  party	  alignment.	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1990s. As Fidesz began concentrating the right in Hungary (see Section 3.1) the party 
realized that a drastic shift in the nationwide media available was needed to solidify 
citizen support towards the right. After winning elections in 1998, one of the major 
political aims of the first Fidesz government was to re-shift the perceived imbalance 
in the media. Fidesz rallied right wing parties and organizations together against the 
MSZP government largely through an attack on the media. Fidesz used nationalist and 
right wing media outlets available as a tool to regain social legitimacy in the party’s 
political shift to the right. Fidesz devoted time campaigning to traditionalists, right 
wing elites and religious figures as well as 1956 veterans, ensuring face time in their 
media outlets, building the party’s umbrella network (Enyedi 2005).  
While in power (1998 to 2002) the Fidesz government made rapid power 
shifts in media control. Exploiting media communications and transforming 
mainstream media into a government apparatus was one of the main goals of the first 
Fidesz government (Lendvai 2012). The Fidesz government, led by Viktor Orbán, 
reiterated parts of István Csurka’s original media discourse, campaigning against an 
unfair liberal monopoly of media in Hungary, calling for a policy of ‘media balance’ 
(médiaegyensúly).320 Relevant political themes of the Fidesz government expounded 
in the news brought back religiosity, urban-rural divides and anti-communist 
discourses (Enyedi 2005). 
 The Fidesz government’s plans to rebalance Hungarian media institutions in 
television, newsprint and radio were solidified through ‘non-governmental’ 
institutions. Under Fidesz administration between 1998 to 2002 only party members 
and adherents were appointed as representatives within the Board of Trustees for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320	  Juhász,	  Gabor,	  ‘A	  jobboldali	  hetilapok	  piaca	  1989-­‐2003’,	  Mediakutató,	  <http://www.media	  
kutato.hu/cikk/2004_01_tavasz/04_jobboldali_hetilapok/>,	  (accessed	  19	  July	  2012).	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Public Media. This resulted in the over-representation of Fidesz agendas in public 
television and radio, particularly during election times.321 In September 2000 the 
Fidesz government created the Natural and Social Development Foundation 
(Természet és Társadalombarát Fejlõdésért Közalapítványt - TTFK). The TTFK was 
registered as a non-profit organization and founded with state funding. By 2001 the 
foundation received 1.5 billion forints in grants (around 5 million Euros) and 500 
million forints (around 1.7 million Euros) from the government.322 This new 
organization made it possible to trasnform Magyar Nemzet, one of the most circulated 
daily newspaper in Hungary, into a nationalist conservative supporting circulation as 
well as developing strong government sympathies in nationwide television (Hír TV), 
and radio (Info Rádió and Lánchíd Rádió) (Pittaway 2003, Lendvai 2012).  
The media has subsequently become one of the main campaigning tools of 
Fidesz. Fidesz’s complex party organization relies on its affiliate organizations, civil 
circles and media outlets in order to appeal to a broad range of right wing 
conservatives, nationalists, populists and more radicalized supporters (Enyedi and 
Linek 2008).323 By the end of Fidesz’s first parliamentary term (1998-2002) the party 
had changed the balance of media, shifting the monopoly away from left-wing media 
moguls and taking over certain critical news sources such as Magyar Nemzet. They 
also changed the role of media as an right wing tool for political socialization, shifting 
the content of media produced to embrace more openly nationalistic rhetoric and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321	  ‘Hungary’,	  Shaping	  Change:	  Strategies	  of	  Development	  and	  Transformation,	  Bertelsmann	  
Transformation	  Index,	  (Bertelsmann	  and	  Stiflung,	  2004),	  <	  http://www.bti2003.bertelsmann-­‐
transformation-­‐index.de/171.0.html?&L=1>.	  
322	  ‘Heti	  Válasz:	  az	  alapítástól	  a	  magánkézbe	  adásig:	  Végkiárusítás’,	  Magyar	  Narancs	  Online,	  (24	  June	  
2004),	   (http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/heti_valasz_az_alapitastol_a_magankezbe_adasig_vegkiarus	  
itas-­‐56414),	  	  <accessed	  19	  July	  2012>.	  
323	  This	  type	  of	  right-­‐wing	  concentration,	  utilizing	  various	  organizations	  and	  media	  bodies	  to	  build	  
support	  is	  what	  Enyedi	  and	  Linek	  (2008)	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘collectivist	  corporatist	  conservatives’,	  aggregating	  
multiple	  outlets	  for	  party	  support.	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reintroducing the idea of Hungary’s displaced Magyar population back into public 
discourse (Pittaway 2003). Mainstream media outlets have been turned into a useful 
secondary tool of political socialization for larger parties like Fidesz and MSZP. As 
explained by András Lánczi and Patrick O’Neil: 
The media became the focus of political battles, involving parliament, government, 
the constitutional court and the president, and purges of journalists and officials in 
the media led to assertions that little had changed since the communist regime. The 
Question is whether control of the media will remain a spoil of election victory, or 
new legislation will establish a non-partisan framework for the future. (Lánczi and 
O’Neil 1996, p. 82) 
 
While mainstream national news outlets have developed strong partisanships 
reflecting the polarized political views of the right (Fidesz) and the left (largely 
MSZP-SZDSZ) the space for alternative political opinions outside the bipolar 
spectrum has become restricted.   
7.1.3 Outlets for Marginalized Political Views in the Media  
 Radio, television and nationwide news press have become a politically 
valuable and malleable tool for the larger parties in power, mainly for MSZP and 
Fidesz, that have brought in large-scale media overhauls each time their respective 
parties have come into power.324 Throughout the 1990s there was very little space for 
alternative media, however, there were some smaller outlets and publications for 
marginalized sociopolitical views. This mainly took shape in the form of zines and 
self-published pamphlets such as Hunnia, mentioned previously, one of the better-
known publications discussing Trianon and Zionist conspiracies. Small publications 
like this developed a hyper nationalist narrative around defining what it is to be a true 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324	  This	  is	  most	  exemplified	  by	  the	  large-­‐scale	  privatization	  plans	  instates	  by	  MSZMP	  (later	  MSZP)	  
before	  the	  first	  democratic	  elections	  and	  FIdesz’s	  media	  overhaul	  to	  rebalance	  the	  media,	  and	  
subsequently	  shift	  the	  scale	  more	  towards	  right	  wing	  media	  support	  through	  the	  TTFK.	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Hungarian. However, subscriptions to these marginalized publications remained 
relatively low and unsustainable.325 Parties like MIÉP used small to medium-sized 
protests and demonstrations as a forum for gaining media attention in the 1990s 
though electoral support remained primarily insignificant. Discussed in Chapter 3, 
Jobbik rejuvenated the radical right and brought it to the mainstream by targeting 
more contemporary nationalist issues such as ‘gypsy criminality’ and ‘police 
brutality’, modernizing old scapegoats previously targeting Jews and Zionist 
conspiracies.326 
 Today the radical right, led by Jobbik, as well as alternative liberal-left 
political options like LMP, have developed two ways to infiltrate Hungarian news 
media: 1) by creating or participating in shocking or performance-based political 
events to gain national media attention and 2) by developing new online media culture 
around specific marginalized partisanships. With regards to the first point, 
marginalized parties can use social movement tactics to compete with the mainstream 
media’s message. Gaining access into the mainstream media, however, has a double 
effect. While it at the very least gives national awareness to the party/movement it 
also is portrayed with a media-driven slant that can potentially be skewed in a way the 
party did not originally intent (Tarrow 1998, Rucht 2004). Arguably the first time 
Jobbik became nationally known was during the protests and riots sparked by the 
2006 political scandal surrounding Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s leaked tape 
(see Section 3.1.2), showing a new level of right and radical right power within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325	  Subscription	  number	  to	  Hunnia,	  for	  example,	  never	  reached	  more	  than	  a	  few	  thousand	  even	  at	  its	  
most	  popular	  in	  the	  early-­‐mid	  1990s	  (Hockenos	  1993).	  
326	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  anti-­‐Semitism	  and	  Zionist	  conspiracy	  building	  does	  not	  still	  exist	  in	  Hungary	  
today.	  However,	  what	  Jobbik	  did	  was	  blend	  old	  radical	  nationalist	  ideas	  with	  new	  contemporarily	  
significant	  discontents.	  Anti-­‐Semitism	  in	  Hungary	  today	  tends	  to	  be	  latent,	  or	  hidden	  within	  carefully	  
placed	  rhetoric	  (Kovács	  2000).	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media. The leaked tape of the speech over a national radio station led to as many as 
50 thousand demonstrators protesting in front of parliament for the Prime Minister’s 
resignation (Palonen 2009).  
Jobbik’s visibility during the 2006 events gave a face and form to the new 
radical right, launching Jobbik into national awareness as they were portrayed with 
unique red and white striped flags and Jobbik banners, creating visually identifiable 
markers and brands to the party. The media network in Hungary has been polarizing 
and strengthening its political allegiances, first through left wing privatization efforts 
and then by way of Fidesz’s media restructuring. The events of 2006 made headlines 
for months across Hungary through national television, radio and newsprint, bringing 
forth a platform for the radical right. The mainstream and traditional news outlets still 
have limited time/space for marginal political parties. The rise of Jobbik as a 
competitive political party has gained support despite a national media that shunned 
and slandered it (Jordon 2010).  
Jobbik, and to a certain extent LMP, have had to find creative and shock-
intriguing ways of breaking into the mainstream media, either by using excitable 
speech or performative political tactics to draw attention from the mainstream 
media.327 Jobbik has developed demonstrations around contentious historical days, 
taking groups of Hungarians to march through Versailles against the Treaty of 
Trianon.328 Jobbik MPs and MEPs have also disrupted political sessions by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327	  Performative	  politics	  is	  often	  used	  by	  marginalized	  parties	  to	  gain	  broader	  attention	  to	  an	  issue	  or	  
partisanship.	  Often	  excitable	  speech	  is	  used	  by	  more	  radical	  right	  partisanships	  as	  a	  means	  of	  drawing	  
mainstream	  attention	  (Butler	  1997,	  Butler	  and	  Athanasiou	  2013).	  
328	  Jobbik	  worked	  with	  the	  ‘World	  Federation	  of	  Hungarians’	  (Magyarok	  Világszövetsége)	  taking	  a	  
group	  of	  four	  hundred	  Hungarians	  to	  Versailles	  for	  the	  commemoration	  of	  the	  1920	  Treaty	  of	  Trianon,	  
waving	  Árpád	  flags	  and	  dressed	  in	  either	  traditional	  Bocskai	  or	  Hungarian	  Guard	  uniforms:	  ‘Trianon	  
előtt	  lengenek	  az	  árpádsávos	  zászlók’,	  Index.hu,	  (4	  June	  2010),	  <	  
http://index.hu/belfold/2010/06/04/trianon_elott_lengenek_az_arpdasavos_zaszlok/>.	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controversially wearing the uniform of the Hungarian Guard, an illegal radical right 
paramilitary group discussed in Chapter 4.329 LMP has also used performative 
political tactics to penetrate mainstream media by creating flashmobs to address 
certain political issues or causing symbolic performances such as projecting the LMP 
logo onto parliament to create awareness of the party’s existence when they first 
launched in 2009.330 LMP has also placed a golden wheelbarrow next to parliament 
symbolizing corrupt public funding policies.331 
Jobbik has been highly successful in creating its own alternative media to 
counteract and substitute the negative views developed in mainstream media towards. 
In a large-scale survey of Jobbik’s Facebook members results showed that supporters 
had very low levels of trust in all major social and political institutions including the 
media (Bartlett et. al. 2012). The study concluded that one of the main reasons for 
Jobbik’s rapid success was not only the en masse disillusionment with mainstream 
political parties among Hungarians but also the attentive and interactive online media 
developed by Jobbik, easily accessible to younger audiences. Catering to Hungary’s 
disillusioned and radical nationalist citizens, including a large number of young 
Hungarians looking for an alternative political outlet, Jobbik and its supporters have 
developed their own media outlets both online and offline. 
 Jobbik’s main media hubs have been very successful in developing an acute 
rhetoric playing off tangible fears such as ‘police brutality’ and  ‘gypsy crime’, used 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329	  ‘Törkvényektől	  tartva	  keresi	  az	  utat	  a	  Gárdához	  Vona’,	  Origo.hu,	  (1	  September	  2011),	  
<http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110831-­‐vona-­‐gabor-­‐es-­‐a-­‐magyar-­‐garda-­‐mellenye.html>.	  
330	  I	  was	  witness	  to	  this	  launching	  event	  while	  living	  in	  Budapest	  in	  2009.	  LMP	  members	  interviewed	  
also	  discussed	  this	  event	  as	  a	  semi-­‐legal	  performance	  for	  gaining	  national	  awareness	  about	  the	  LMP	  
party.	  
331	  ‘Aranytalicskát	  állított	  az	  LMP	  a	  parliament	  elé’,	  Népszabadság	  Online,	  (9	  December	  2012),	  <	  
http://nol.hu/belfold/aranytalicskat_allitott_az_lmp_a_parlamen_ele?ref=sso>.	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repeatedly as a mantra-like theme within articles.332 A number of successful online 
news portals supporting the radical right have emerged since 2006 along with 
successfully developing a weekly news magazine, Barikád! (Barricade), created in 
2009 and costing 390 Forints (roughly 1.3 Euros) per issue (see Appendix 7 for a 
description of radical right media outlets). Analyzing how young Hungarians are 
using alternative online media portals is analyzed in the next section.  
7.2 YOUTH MEDIA USAGE 
Media, as an agent of political socialization, is highly dependent on frequency 
of use as well as trust in given media outlets in analyzing its role in developing or 
solidifying political partisanships and instigating potential activism. Previous research 
has shown that across Central and Eastern Europe television is the most influential 
media outlet on public opinion (Eurobarmoter 75 Autumn 2011, Kaldor and Vejvoda 
2002). Results also show that countries in the Central and Eastern European region 
still maintain high levels of state control over television and that independent TV and 
radio are mostly owned privately by domestic or foreign owners (Kaldor and Vejvoda 
2002). Generally speaking these results are mainly also true in Hungary where 85% of 
Hungarians use television for political information retrieval. Other forms of media are 
used considerably less frequently.333  
Media usage looks very different when stratifying results by age cohorts. 
Looking at media usage across Europe television is still the most commonly used 
media, however, watching television everyday or almost every day is less common 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332	  Medias	  referred	  to	  here	  as	  ‘Jobbik	  media’	  include	  Barikád!	  magazine,	  Kuruc.info,	  N1	  TV	  and	  
Jobbik’s	  own	  news	  feeds	  from	  its	  main	  political	  website.	  
333	  When	   asked	  where	   an	   individual	   goes	   to	   get	   political	   news	   85%	  of	   Eurobarometer	   respondents	  
said	  Television,	  50%	  said	  news	  press,	  39%	  used	  radio	  and	  29%	  used	  the	  Internet	  (Eurobarometer	  75	  
Autumn	  2011).	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among younger cohorts compared with older cohorts (see Figure 7.1). Compared with 
older cohorts, the youth uses traditional forms of media retrieval far less than older 
cohorts. Figure 7.1 shows that younger cohorts (aged fifteen to twenty-four) use the 
television 16% less, the radio 14% less and printed news 26% less than older cohorts 
(fifty-five and older).334 The Internet is the one media medium in which younger 
cohorts supersede older cohorts in usage. Figure 7.1 shows the large disparity 
between cohorts with the youngest cohorts listed using the Internet 56% more than 
older cohorts. While Internet ranked last for the general public as a source for political 
news, the Internet is the most frequently used source for younger cohorts.335 
Figure 7.1: Media Usage in Europe Comparing Age Cohorts336 
 
The	  above	  figure	  looks	  at	  the	  percentage	  of	  daily	  consumption	  of	  various	  media	  outlets	  across	  the	  
European	  Union	  with	  reference	  to	  age	  (Eurobarometer	  76:	  Autumn	  2011).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334	  Data	  for	  these	  results	  come	  from	  Eurobarometer	  76	  (Autumn	  2011)	  raw	  data	  files,	  which	  were	  
then	  stratified.	  The	  cohort	  ranges	  listed	  were	  pre-­‐given	  by	  Eurobarometer	  categories	  and	  could	  not	  
be	  altered	  to	  directly	  parallel	  my	  eighteen	  to	  thirty	  age	  range.	  For	  this	  reason	  I	  have	  left	  the	  four	  
tiered	  age	  range.	  	  
335	  In	  the	  Eurobaromter	  the	  ‘youth’	  category	  is	  aged	  fifteen	  to	  twenty-­‐four.	  
336	  ‘Media	  Use	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  Report’,	  Standard	  Eurobarometer	  76:	  Autumn	  2011,	  (March	  
2012),	  <	  http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_media_en.pdf>.	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Looking specifically at Hungary, while trust in all other forms of media has 
decreased in the last year, the Internet was the only form of media that did not 
decrease with 41% of Hungarians having trust in news found through the Internet 
(Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011). Trust levels in various media outlets also show a 
European youth cohort that is more trusting of information found on the Internet. 
While trust in radio, television and printed press is relatively similar across age 
cohorts, trust in the Internet is much higher among the youth. 52% of those aged 
fifteen to twenty-four trust the information they find on the Internet compared with 
trust levels of only 40% for those aged between forty and fifty-four and only 21% of 
those aged fifty-five and above.337  
It is generally agreed by both youth interviewees and political scientists within 
Hungary that there is an overwhelming political bias within almost all media that 
deals with national politics and culture (Szilágy-Gál 2010, Bozóki 2011338, Lendvai 
2012) partially explaining the decreasing levels of trust in traditional forms of media. 
While political media in recent years has helped mobilize the population by creating 
enemies of the opposition’s political elite (Palonen 2009) it has also created a media 
that is no longer trustworthy of providing critical analysis national politics. 
Awareness of strong biases in Hungarian news has even mobilized demonstrations in 
recent years, protesting for more objective and transparent news.339 Most young 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337	  Trust	  levels	  for	  radio,	  television	  and	  print	  news	  vary	  relatively	  little	  comparing	  ages:	  Trust	  in	  radio	  
55%	  -­‐	  58%.	  Trust	  in	  TV	  51%	  -­‐	  55%.	  Trust	  in	  printed	  news	  40%	  -­‐	  45%.	  The	  highest	  age	  discrepancy	  is	  
trust	  in	  the	  Internet	  ranging	  between	  21%	  for	  older	  55+	  cohorts	  to	  much	  higher	  trusts	  levels	  (52%)	  for	  
cohorts	  aged	  15	  to	  24	  (Eurobarometer	  76:	  Autumn	  2011).	  
338	  Hungarian	  Political	  Scientist,	  András	  Bozóki	  was	  an	  interviewee	  for	  my	  studies,	  discussing	  the	  
apparent	  bias	  in	  Hungarian	  media	  at	  length.	  	  
339	  In	  May	  2012	  the	  Independent	  Union	  of	  Television	  and	  Film	  Makers	  (TFSZ)	  demonstrated	  with	  the	  
NGO	  Clean	  Hands	  for	  a	  Democratic	  Hungary	  Movement	  marking	  the	  World	  Press	  Freedom	  Day.	  Their	  
demands	  were	  based	  on	  the	  need	  for	  unbiased	  and	  fair	  broadcasting	  and	  newsprint	  in	  Hungary.	  
These	  demonstrations	  tie	  in	  with	  large-­‐scale	  discontent	  with	  the	  Fidesz	  government’s	  2010	  Media	  
Laws,	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter	  (‘Union,	  NGO	  join	  in	  World	  Press	  Freedom	  Day	  demo	  for	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people are highly aware of these biases across the political spectrum with most 
interviewees across the political spectrum mentioning the state of polarized media as 
sad and lacking objectivity.  
Media is divided in Hungary. You can try to find ‘objective’ media but you won’t find 
one. (Szemere, Age 29: Budapest).  
Of course there is a media bias. Buy what is aimed at you. There is no objective view. 
We don’t get a chance to broaden horizons and see all the sides. (László, Age 24: 
Budapest) 
 
László’s quotation also points out that with such obvious political biases in 
mainstream media outlets individuals mainly buy and subscribe to media that is 
already supportive of their pre-existing political opinions. The new privatized media 
in Hungary also controls what official music, discourse and topics are allowed to be 
played on national radio stations and television (Kürti 2012). For a younger 
population developing popular culture around music and alternative political activism, 
traditional media does not provide the type of information the youth is looking for. 
While it is not necessarily uncommon for individual’s to consume media that appeals 
to preexisting partisanships it does insinuate that media as an agent of political 
socialization has become a passive, more non-interactive socializing agent, solidifying 
preexisting opinions.  
There is a sense of a void of certain topics on the TV, played on mainstream 
radio channels and in the newspapers. Research on youth perceptions about the future 
shows that the Hungarian youth’s pessimism towards the democratic transformation 
process most often blames the education system and traditional media for inhibiting a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
independent	  public	  media’,	  Politics.hu,	  (4	  May	  2012),	  <	  http://www.politics.hu/20120504/union-­‐ngo-­‐
join-­‐in-­‐world-­‐press-­‐freedom-­‐day-­‐demo-­‐for-­‐independent-­‐public-­‐media/>.)	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more positive future for Hungary (Hideg and Novaky 2002).340 A majority of 
interviewees echoed this sentiment, often critiquing traditional media for lacking 
debate or diversity of opinions. Television in particular was mentioned numerous 
times as a biased media outlet, lacking assorted political dialogue and avoiding real 
political discourse: 
I quit TV. I couldn’t stand it. This is not democratic journalism. I don’t want to 
pretend with my journalism, playing a game, politicians lying bullshit… I don’t watch 
TV or read papers much. My news is now mostly from Facebook and Internet (Flóra, 
Age 30: Budapest). Note: Flóra is a freelance journalist 
 
Even reading papers I go online. No TV watching. TV news is all about chickens and 
old ladies (Monika, Age 21: Budapest). 
 
Even Monika, a Fidesz supporter, was critical of state-TV content, finding it devoid 
of real sociopolitical content. Although television is often the most used media in 
Hungary, young Hungarians are increasingly turning to the Internet for political 
information retrieval, discussed in the next section. Political parties attracting the 
most youth support have been equally keen on using the Internet as a medium for 
presenting platforms, ideas and their own news media. 
7.2.1 Youth Internet Usage 
Hungarians are increasingly using the Internet for information retrieval and 
helping manage their lives. Currently 65.3% of Hungarians are Internet users and up 
to 72% of Hungarians have used the Internet at some point in the last year.341 The 
usage of household Internet is increasing drastically. Internet subscriptions increased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340	  Results	  were	  based	  on	  interviews	  with	  young	  students	  in	  secondary	  school	  and	  higher	  education	  
showing	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  young	  Hungarians	  see	  the	  media	  as	  lacking	  inspiration	  or	  value	  beyond	  
depicting	  depressive	  socioeconomic	  situations	  in	  Hungary.	  
341	  ‘Hungary’,	  New	  Media	  Trend	  Watch,	  European	  Travel	  Commission,	  (ETC/CET,	  2012),	  
<http://www.newmediatrendwatch.com/markets-­‐by-­‐country/10-­‐europe/65-­‐hungary>.	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from 3.3 million to 4.3 million between 2010 and 2011 alone.342 Stratifying usage by 
age, younger Hungarians are the most prominent users of the Internet. Internet usage 
has more than tripled in the last ten years. Figure 7.2 shows the increasing usage of 
the Internet in Hungary between 2004 and 2012. Daily usage of the Internet for 
Hungarians between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four is 24% higher than the 
general populace. Internet usage is significantly higher among younger Hungarians, 
as seen, with the largest usage by sixteen to twenty-four year olds. 82% of this age 
category uses the Internet daily. 
Figure 7.2: Daily Internet Usage in Hungary 2004 to 2012 
 
	  The	  above	  chart	  shows	  the	  increasing	  daily	  usage	  of	  the	  Internet	  in	  Hungary	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  
total	  population	  (given	  in	  blue)	  as	  well	  as	  daily	  Internet	  usage	  for	  those	  aged	  sixteen	  to	  twenty-­‐four	  
(given	   in	   Red)	   and	   twenty-­‐five	   to	   thirty-­‐four	   (given	   in	   Green).	   Information	   comes	   from	   stratified	  
raw	   data	   from	   Eurostat:	   Seybert,	   Heidi,	   ‘Internet	   use	   in	   household	   and	   by	   individuals	   in	   2012’,	  
Eurostat:	  Statistics	  in	  Focus,	  (May	  2012).	  
	  
The Internet is largely being utilized as a replacement for traditional media 
outlets for accessing news. As measured by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342	  ‘Number	  of	  the	  Internet	  Subscriptions	  by	  Access	  Service’,	  Központi	  Statisztikai	  Hivatal,	  (Hungarian	  
Central	  Statistical	  Office,	  March	  2012),	  <http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_	  
oni001.html>.	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61% of Internet usage in Hungary is for reading or downloading online 
newspapers/news. 16% of Hungarian Internet users have subscribed to online news 
services or products to receive news regularly. 30% of Internet users listen to the 
radio and/or watch television online. Even political activism is increasingly online. 
14% of Internet use in Hungary is for reading, posting or voting on one’s opinions 
towards civic or political issues through various websites.343  
While much of the older generation across Europe still prefers traditional news 
outlets, seeing digital media as a less legitimate and distracting outlet (Shea and 
Green 2007), younger cohorts are increasingly relying on the Internet as their primary 
news source (Eurobarometer 75 Autumn 2011). Among youth activists in Hungary 
there is an overwhelming usage of the Internet as a means of getting information 
about political and national news. This becomes very apparent looking at Appendix 8, 
tracking interviewee responses about media usage. Interviewee numbers highlighted 
in red represent those that explicitly stated that they either primarily or solely sought 
political related news through the Internet as a form of media. The table also tracks 
the various media outlets respondents described using to retrieve politically related 
news, showing similar results to Eurobarometer findings. There was an initial 
expectation that most Budapest-based university students would have higher access to 
the Internet. However, interviewees even in rural, more impoverished areas, most 
often sought political news through the Internet before other media outlets were used. 
Many younger interviewees mentioned that newspapers and magazines in hard copy 
form were only really browsed when at their parent’s home.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  ‘Internet	  Use	  and	  Activities’,	  Eurostat	  Raw	  Data	  2012,	  <	  
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupModifyTableLayout.do>.	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As mentioned above, trust in the Internet is much higher among youth cohorts 
in Hungary (Bodoky 2007, Tóth 2012). The Internet is seen as not only more easily 
accessible and free but also as a source of less politically corrupted news. This was 
apparent within youth interviews but also seems to be a more general sentiment in 
Hungary. While Hungarians remain below the EU average in their trust of news 
provided through television, radio and news press, they rank higher than the EU 
average in their trust of Internet news:344 As explained by interviewees: 
The smallest media sources are probably the most objective. Larger corporate ones 
are very biased. The Internet is good. It is good when I see our generation reading 
news on the Internet. (Ani, Age 30: Budapest) 
 
The most interesting news of good quality is available on blogs. It is more interesting 
information… Most of my information I get online: news, Facebook and blogs. 
(Daniel, Age 28: Budapest).  
 
Internet sites provide a contradictory nature of seeming to provide neutrality yet often 
still having identifiable partisan biases (see Table 6.3). The Internet has become, to a 
large extent, a replacement for hard copy subscriptions to daily and weekly 
newspapers and magazines. Circulations of even the largest leading political 
newspapers have seen significant drops in recent years. Leading liberal daily 
Népszabadság currently circulates just over 80,000 papers, down from nearly 250,000 
ten years ago. Leading conservative paper, Magyar Nemzet, subscriptions have also 
dropped down to under 50,000. The other two leading political dailies, Magyar Hírlap 
and Népszava have both dropped to under 20,000 subscriptions.345  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344	  Eurobarometer	  results	  from	  Autumn	  2011	  show	  that	  trust	  in	  Internet	  media	  is	  higher	  in	  Hungary	  
than	  the	  EU	  average	  (EU37%	  -­‐	  HU	  41%).	  	  
345	  ‘Melyik	  lap	  bukott	  nagyobbat	  az	  első	  negyedben?’,	  Kreatív	  Online,	  (5	  March	  2010),	  
<http://www.kreativ.hu/cikk/melyik_lap_bukott_nagyobbat_az_elso_negyedben_>.	  Note:	  Appendix	  
7	  lists	  the	  most	  used	  left,	  right	  and	  radical	  right	  media	  sources	  being	  used	  by	  young	  Hungarians	  with	  
brief	  descriptions	  of	  content,	  usage	  and	  partisanships.	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Table 7.1: Daily Page Views to Main Hungarian News Sites 
WEBSITE	   Political	  Alignment	   Daily	  Page	  Views	  
Index.hu	   Left/Center	   639,163	  
Origo.hu	   Right/Center	   599,455	  
Hir24.hu	   Right	   164,572	  
Kuruc.info	   Radical	  Right	   75,867	  
HVG.hu	  /	  Heti	  Világgazdaság	  online	   Liberal-­‐Left	   51,395	  
NOL.hu	  /	  Népszabadság	  online	   Liberal-­‐Left	   49,778	  
Heti	  Válasz	  online	   Right	   38,602	  
MNO.hu	  /	  Magyar	  Nemzet	  Online	   Right	   32,602	  
Népszava.hu	   Liberal-­‐Left	   18,594	  
Barikád.hu	  (now	  Alfahir.hu)	   Radical	  Right	   17,733	  
Mandiner.hu	   Right	   10,692	  
Table	  7.2	  shows	  the	  top	  Hungarian	  news	  portals	  and	  the	  daily	  page	  views	  each	  site	  receives.	  This	  
table	  is	  limited	  to	  news	  portals	  that	  include	  a	  focus	  on	  political	  and	  national	  news	  sites.	  Top	  news	  
sites	   in	  Hungary	   found	  using	  Alexa.com.	  Data	   filtering	   came	   from	   the	   free	  website	  valuation	  and	  
site	  safety	  rating	  website:	  	  http://www.freewebsitereport.org/.	  Filtered	  12	  July	  2013.	  	  
Meanwhile, falling in line with global media trends, most Hungarian 
newspapers and weeklies have developed online subscriptions and news portals, 
which are often being visited more frequently and by a much wider viewership than 
printed press. Table 7.2 lists the top online news portals in Hungary with their 
political alignment and monthly visitor rating. The most frequented online news 
portals, Index and Origo, were never established as printed publications but were 
developed solely online, incorporating multi-media and social networking functions 
into news media formatting.346 These two portals far surpass all other online news 
outlets in Hungary with regards to daily viewership.347	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346	  Origo	  was	  developed	  in	  1997	  as	  a	  basic	  news	  site	  but	  rebranded	  in	  2000	  incorporating	  a	  more	  
modern	  and	  accessible	  look.	  By	  2006	  the	  site	  re-­‐developed	  again	  incorporating	  social	  networking	  
capacities	  and	  a	  blogging	  section.	  A	  description	  of	  other	  leading	  media	  outlets	  is	  given	  in	  Appendix	  7.	  
347	  See	  Appendix	  7	  and	  8	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  overview	  Hungarian	  news	  outlets	  and	  youth	  usage.	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Looking at the most frequently visited news sites there are two points worth 
noting. The first is that the leading liberal left newspaper, Népszabadság, and leading 
right wing newspaper, Magyar Nemzet, are not the online news outlets gaining the 
most viewership. This supports the idea that the large Internet viewership is less 
interested in sourcing information through tradition media that has been reformatted 
online, preferring newer, less politically attached news portals. Secondly, the two 
leading online news portals, Index and Origo, are developing a forum for a range of 
political stances, often incorporating articles that are critical of government and 
opposition powers. Unlike mainstream media outlets considered these news sources to 
provide more politically neutral news options, attracting readership from across the 
political spectrum, a rarity compared to other forms of media:348 
Usually I read Index but I think they are shifting from left to LMP. It is good because 
they are more critical of the left. They are critical of Fidesz but not enough. (Adam, 
Age 23: Budapest) Note: Adam is a Liberal-Left supporter. 
 
The online sphere is better than traditional news. We have Index, which is technically 
independent and Origo. It was never cheaper to have your own media than now! 
(Gergely, Age 26: Budapest) Note: Gergely is a Fidesz supporter. 
 
Mostly for information I look online. Index. Index is good, seldom too in depth – 
partly trash news… Index is liberal but not upfront about it but they have a general 
audience and not too biased. (István, Age 25: Budapest) Note: István is a Fidesz 
supporter. 
 
István brings up an important point about why these online news portals are so 
accessible and widely read. Articles on Index and Origo tend to be written in shorter, 
concise formats, often using more informal and explanatory language compared with 
traditional media that. Interviewees often sited online formatting as reasons for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348	  Looking	  at	  interviewee	  responses	  about	  media	  usage	  in	  Appendix	  8	  the	  areas	  on	  the	  table	  
highlighted	  in	  Yellow	  show	  which	  interviewees	  mentioned	  reading/watching	  news	  outlets	  from	  
different	  political	  families.	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preferring online news. While there are concerns about the quality of Hungarian 
media consumption declining as people increasing read online news, there is currently 
no longitudinal data showing decreasing news quality (Tóth 2012). The increasing 
trust and usage of the Internet as the primary news outlet for young Hungarians means 
that news sites have increasing potential, compared with other media outlets, to 
influence or reinforce sociopolitical preferences and partisanships.  
7.2.2. Politicizing the Internet: Online News as a Political Tool 
The newly diversified range of online media outlets used by young 
Hungarians has been a factor in creating a space for dissemination of information 
about alternative and radical political movements and parties. Before the widespread 
use of the Internet, party activism was key in communicating alternative political 
ideas to the public and mobilizing citizens awareness (Green and Gerber 2004, 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992). Online media has fundamentally changed how quickly 
people can align and interact with each other to create political communities of 
information sharing through YouTube, Facebook and blogs (Owen 2008, Bennett 
2008). This model of information distribution, used for campaigning and event 
organizing, has proven highly successful in Hungary for marginalized parties like 
LMP but particularly Jobbik, as seen by results of the 2009 European parliamentary 
elections and 2010 national elections. Both parties conducted large-scale online 
campaigns, developing their own platforms through news outlets on their party 
websites as well as linking with other newly created supportive online news portals 
(Jordon 2010).  
While these marginalized parties were forced to use alternative media to 
disperse their messages, largely ignored by mainstream media, they also tapped into 
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the natural trend of young Hungarians that were already using the Internet as a source 
of information retrieval. Due to the youth base of both Jobbik and LMP, the Internet 
was a natural tool for distributing political information and creating online support 
networks. Young activists interviewed supporting Jobbik and LMP all mentioned 
online newsletters, party websites and campaign adds distributed through YouTube as 
ways they accessed party information. They were also able to easily share this 
information through emails and Facebook, using online news sources to network and 
recruit.  
Jobbik especially has developed a strong network of supportive radical right 
online news portals, presenting news from a radical right perspective. Kuruc.info, 
was one of the first Jobbik supporting news portals gaining national attention, 
developed shortly after the 2006 protests. Barikád! (barikad.hu) was founded in 2009 
in the lead up to the European Parliamentary elections, where Jobbik first made its 
strong electoral debut on its own, winning 14.77%.349 Barikád! developed its online 
news site along with a weekly magazine. The most recent online news outlet 
supporting the radical right was developed in 2011 in the form of an online television 
channel called Nemzeti1 (National 1) run through YouTube videos.350 These websites 
are easily accessible with user friendly content, often incorporating or linking with 
other radical right news and subculture outlets including radio stations, online 
clothing stores, Facebook, nationalist events and often Jobbik’s official webpage. 
Jobbik’s strengthening youth support has benefited greatly from their online media 
presence. Jobbik-supporting interviewees expressed gratitude for having Internet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349	  Jobbik	  had	  run	  in	  the	  2006	  national	  elections	  in	  a	  coalition	  with	  older	  radical	  right	  party	  MIÉP.	  The	  
partnership,	  termed	  the	  ‘third	  way	  alliance’,	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  pass	  the	  5%	  electoral	  threshold.	  
350	  A	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  radical	  right	  media	  outlets	  and	  other	  widely	  used	  media	  outlets	  
used	  by	  young	  Hungarians	  is	  given	  in	  Appendix	  8.	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news portals they can relate with, feeling that there is little or no merit in mainstream 
news. For radical right supporters the awareness of Jobbik’s negative portrayal in 
non-radical right media was a main reason for rejecting other forms of media. As 
explained by Jobbik youth activists: 
I don’t understand why the media wants a black and white image of Jobbik as an evil 
party while the Prime Minister [Orbán] sits in power but does nothing about the 
Roma problem. These politicians always say ‘next year’. Always a program saying 
something happens next year but no political party really does anything. You can’t 
trust these words. (János, Age 16: Miskolc).  
 
Jobbik owes most of its success to Internet. That’s where there’s an alternative media 
channel not as biased and you find things that are credential. Facebook and official 
websites form groups of websites to find non-biased sources of information. Putting 
and sharing on the Internet is good because people put things like blogs and it’s 
shared automatically without top-down control… Conventional media treats us in a 
biased way so we share the truth on the sites. (Szabolcs, Age 18: Budapest).351  
 
Both quotations acknowledge strong biases against the radical right in 
mainstream media outlets but also depict online news as a purer and less politically 
corrupted space for horizontal information retrieval without hierarchical content 
controls. The unrestricted nature of online news, unbeholden to traditional media laws 
concerning publishable and inappropriate content, also causes concern over anti-
Semitic and xenophobic themes spreading freely through the Internet (Ligeti and 
Nyeste 2006). Jobbik’s diverse online media networks have helped the party succeed 
where MIÉP failed in drawing enlarged electoral support, specifically from younger 
voters (Szilágy-Gál 2010). MIÉP was not only founded by an older cohort of radical 
nationalists, rarely drawing in younger support, but also MIÉP was limited to the 
information outlets available to the party at the time in the early 1990s, blocked from 
most mainstream media and beholden to smaller zine publications. While today’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351	  Here	  the	  interviewee	  also	  gives	  an	  anecdote	  saying	  how	  it	  is	  always	  shocking	  when	  on	  TV	  the	  news	  
mentions	  a	  Jobbik	  event	  happening	  without	  any	  violence.	  It	  is	  funny	  but	  also	  sad	  for	  him,	  in	  his	  
opinion,	  because	  the	  mainstream	  media	  assumes	  that	  a	  Jobbik	  event	  will	  always	  incite	  violence.	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Jobbik supporters are pleased to have strengthening alternative news feeds, non-
Jobbik supporters, particularly more Liberal-Left and LMP supporters, show anxiety 
over the growing online presence of radical right sites.  
Jobbik has very strong web tools. If there were no Internet Jobbik would not be in 
Parliament. Most of Jobbik voters are young guys. That is why they use the Internet. 
Have you read Kuruc? Lots of young guys think this is the truth. This is a big 
problem. (Balázs, Age 29: Budapest) 
Note: Interviewee is a journalist for multiple radio stations 
 
I saw an interview and program on Nemzeti 1 and it was so radical. The program was 
about how Hungary has an aura around it protecting Hungary, a ‘magical aura’.  
(Sára, Age 21: Budapest).  
 
Radical media subscribers and bloggers are thought to give a false sense of a mass 
support network in the structure and content of articles compared to tangible 
participants and voters (Szilágy-Gál 2010). While Jobbik has strengthened its political 
backing from younger cohorts from their online prowess (Jordon 2010, Bartlett et. al. 
2012) it is very difficult to quantitatively measure support for the parties based on 
online media presence.  
Mainstream parties have increased their online presence since 2009/2010 in an 
effort to compete with increasingly popular alternative political news outlets. Fidesz 
and its support networks have more recently embraced ‘new media’, establishing an 
online economic journal (Napi Gazdaság – Daily Economy) and news portals 
(Portfolio.hu and Index.hu)352  (Lendvai 2012). Young members of Fidesz’s youth 
organization, Fidelitas, have also established a popular conservative online news 
outlet, Mandiner, that allows for supportive and critical analysis of government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352	  While	  Lendvai	  (2012)	  discusses	  Index	  as	  a	  Fidesz	  supporting	  online	  news	  portal	  it	  is	  up	  for	  debate	  
its	  true	  alignment.	  Interviewees	  discussed	  the	  site	  in	  different	  ways	  with	  individuals	  from	  various	  
political	  alignments	  using	  the	  site	  as	  a	  source	  of	  political	  news.	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positions from a conservative perspective.353 Online media outlets allow for a blurring 
between official and informal information retrieval. While this may be problematic 
for mainstream media outlets that find it hard to compete with the Internets 
accessibility and flexibility, as time passes alternative media and Internet news is 
becoming a less marginalized and more legitimate source of information retrieval 
(Rucht 2004, van de Donk et. al. 2004, Eurobaromter 75 Autumn 2011). 
Internet media usage is developing parallel to trends across Europe of 
individualistic participation patterns, allowing for passive or active interaction with 
online media and blogs, creating what Lance Bennett (2004) terms ‘media 
democracy’. New media is having an affect how information is being dispersed within 
mass media (Klein 2000, Bennett 2003, Bennett 2004). Not only do all major 
newspapers, radio stations and weeklies now have online content sites but they are 
also legitimizing online news by referencing information from these portals in their 
own news reports. Internet news outlets such as Index, Origo and Mandiner are 
increasingly major reference points in Hungary. 
7.2.3 The Media’s Role as a Socializer 
While media was never mentioned by interviewees as the initial reason for 
developing an interest in politics, and only rarely mentioned as a reason for 
supporting a party, media remains a large tool for solidifying preconceived political 
ideologies. In this respect media serves as a secondary socializer caused mainly by 
two overriding trends in Hungary. Firstly, this is due to the strong awareness of 
political sympathies within primary mainstream media outlets. Most interviewees 
mentioned the oppositional and bipolar nature of mainstream media, often pointing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353	  As	  explained	  by	  Fidelitas	  members,	  Mandiner	  began	  as	  a	  Fidelitas	  blog.	  The	  site	  changed	  its	  outline	  
and	  broadened	  its	  focus	  in	  2009,	  taking	  on	  a	  format,	  modeled	  loosely	  on	  the	  Huffington	  Post.	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out the obvious political alignments of national television, radio and printed news. 
Many interviewees were also aware of the shift in media partisan, from a primarily 
liberal-left supporting ownership base that was shifted towards the right during 
Fidesz’s first government (1998 to 2002). One previously Fidesz, now LMP 
interviewee recalled the large-scale media transformations of the Fidesz government 
(1998 – 2002): 
I watched some TV and news while my ideas were forming. It was the Fidesz 
government then so there was an obvious bias. There still is an obvious bias. They are 
not even trying to be objective anymore… The early to mid 90s was probably more 
liberal-left media available than right. Fidesz counter balanced the gap in the right 
wing media between 1998 and 2002. It was a smart step. (Daniel, Age 28: Budapest) 
 
Secondly, media is justified as a secondary socializer looking at partisanships in 
comparison to readerships. Appendix 8 shows interviewees responses about media 
preferences, highlighting the rare occasions that young activists looked at media 
outlets that were not aligned with their political preferences. Almost no interviewees 
said that they read media sources outside of pre-developed partisanships. In two of the 
cases where there was partisan diversity in media readership interviewees were 
journalists, making note that they had to read across the political spectrum for their 
jobs. Trends from youth respondents show that media is primarily used as filtered 
information retrieval, solidifying pre-existing partisanships and preferences.  
Table 7.3 shows the media outlets used by youth activists in Hungary, 
mentioned in interviews. Almost all of respondents’ media usage took place online. 
Even for those mentioning the usage of mainstream media sources, such as 
Népszabadság, usage was mainly through online versions of the news rather than 
newspapers or radio. 
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Table 7.2: Media Used by Young Activists 
MEDIA	  OUTLET	   TYPE	  OF	  MEDIA	   ALIGNMENT	  
Index	  (17)	   Online	   Left/Center	  
Népszabadság	  (12)	   Daily/Online	   Liberal-­‐Left	  
Kuruc.info	  (12)	   Online	   Radical	  Right	  
HVG	  (12)	   Weekly/Online	   Right/Center	  
Barikád!	  (11)	   Weekly/Online	   Radical	  Right	  
Origo	  (9)	   Online	   Right/Center	  
Nemzeti	  1	  (8)	   Online	  TV	   Radical	  Right	  
Hírszerző	  (5)	   Online	   Liberal-­‐Left	  
Népszava	  (5)	   Daily/Online	   Liberal-­‐Left	  
Magyar	  Narancs	  (5)	   Weekly/Online	   Liberal-­‐Left	  
Figyelő	  (4)	   Weekly/Online	   Liberal-­‐Left	  
Mandiner	  (4)	   Online	   Right	  	  
Jobbklikk	  (4)	   	   Online	   Right	  
Konszervatórium	  (2)	   Online	   Right	  
Hír	  TV	  (2)	   TV/Online	  info	   Right/Radical	  Right	  
Heti	  Válasz	  (2)	   Weekly/Online	   Right	  
Magyar	  Hírlap	  (2)	   Daily/Online	   Right	  
	  
The	  table	  shows	  media	  outlets	  mentioned	  by	  interviewees	  as	  sources	  for	  where	  they	  find	  their	  civil	  
and	   political	   news	   feeds.	   The	   list	   only	   contains	   media	   that	   was	   mentioned	   by	   two	   or	   more	  
interviewees	   to	   exclude	   smaller	   or	   obscure	   local	   publications.	   The	   number	   next	   to	   the	   media	  
outlets	  listed	  in	  the	  first	  row	  shows	  how	  many	  interviewees	  mentioned	  each	  outlet.	  
	  
Besides the Internet providing a seemingly less biased news outlet354, online 
media also avoids the censorship and editing process that modern privatized media in 
Hungary is beholden to. As a socializing agent, online media sites have the ability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354	  While	  most	  interviewees	  reported	  that	  online	  news	  was	  preferable	  because	  it	  was	  less	  bias,	  when	  
asked	  to	  identify	  partisanships	  of	  news	  sources	  most	  interviewees	  were	  able	  to	  label	  even	  online	  
news	  sites	  with	  a	  general	  overarching	  partisanship.	  This	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  7.3.	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normalize and cultivate awareness of previously marginalized subcultures, 
particularly the increasing radical right support in Hungary (Szilágy-Gál 2010). 
Subcultures such as the Nemzeti Rock movement have found strongholds in radical 
right radio stations and online portals, often linking supporting each other (Kürti 
2012). As mentioned in section 6.1.3, the web of radicalized subcultures existing 
online facilitates the development of fringe subcultures and provides an information 
portal within the media spectrum.355 Content control of online media in Hungary 
might change in coming years with the installation of the Fidesz’s New Media Laws. 
A Note on the 2010 New Media Laws 
When the Fidesz government won its two-thirds majority in parliament in 
2010 there were rapid overhauls of foundational national structures. One of the largest 
changes occurred in the form of the 2010 Media Law, bringing in a new, far-reaching 
package of laws and regulations to media outlets in Hungary. The Fidesz 
government’s Media Law, instated 1 January 2011, has a number of contentious 
issues that have potential limiting effects on the freedom of speech and press in 
Hungary. Critiqued by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, Amnesty International, Freedom House and many other large 
international watchdogs, the new media regulations call into question Hungary’s 
democratic values. The 2010 Media Law has, in effect, altered media market 
conditions in Hungary (see Table 7.3). 
One of the major points of contestation with the new law is its creation of the 
National Media and Information Communications Authority (Nemzeti Média És 
Hírközlési Hatóság - NMHH). The NMHH has the power to fine media for content 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355	  The	  online	  info	  web,	  particularly	  built	  by	  radical	  right	  supporters,	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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that is considered against the ‘public interest’, ‘morality’ and ‘national order’ or on 
the basis of unbalanced reporting.356 Specific fines for unbalanced coverage or 
breaching rules concerning violence, sex and alcohol are up to 722,000 Euros for 
television and radio stations and about half that for newspapers and websites.357 While 
Fidesz has argued that other countries have similar laws concerning content, 
incitement and public interest, the main problems seem to be found in the vague 
rhetoric about what deems a particular article or broadcast in breach of the new laws. 
The media authority of the NMHH has vast regulatory powers with members 
appointed by the ruling Fidesz government. 
 Table 7.3 Major Changes Imposed by the 2010 Media Law 
Modification	  of	  Act	  I	  of	  1996	  
This	  modification	  created	  the	  new	  media	  authority	  (NMHH)	  and	  the	  Media	  Council	  (Médiatanács)	  
Act	  CIV	  of	  2010	  ‘Media	  Constitution’	  
The	   ‘Freedom	   of	   the	   Press	   and	   the	   Fundamental	   Rules	   on	  Media	   Content’	   is	   known	   as	   the	  media	  
constitution.	  Adopting	  this	  Act	  gives	  the	  basic	  obligations	  and	  content	  requirements	  of	  media	  outlets	  
for	  television,	  radio,	  newspapers	  and	  online	  outlets.	  
Act	  CLXXXV	  of	  2010	  on	  Media	  Services	  and	  Mass	  Media	  
This	  Act	  regulates	  competition	  issues,	  penalties	  and	  fines	  that	  can	  be	  imposed	  on	  media	  outlets.	  This	  
Act	  replaced	  Act	  II	  of	  1986	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  provisions	  given	  in	  Act	  I	  of	  1996	  
Modification	  of	  the	  National	  Constitution	  
The	   Fidesz	   government	   used	   its	   parliamentary	   majority	   to	   modify	   two	   constitutional	   articles	  
concerning	   the	   media.	   These	   amendments	   declared	   that	   ‘everyone	   has	   the	   right	   to	   proper	  
information	  on	  public	  issues’358	  and	  the	  NMHH	  president	  was	  given	  the	  right	  to	  issue	  decrees	  that	  can	  
thereafter	  be	  enforced.359	  
These	   are	   the	   major	   media	   reforms	   in	   the	   new	   2010	  Media	   Laws	   that	   have	   caused	   the	   largest	  
concerns	  for	  the	  freedom	  of	  speech	  and	  press	  in	  Hungary.	  Information	  from	  Tóth	  (2012)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356	  ‘Sweeping	  new	  media	  law	  threatens	  freedom	  of	  expression	  in	  Hungary’,	  Amnesty	  International	  
News,	  (23	  December	  2010),	  <http://www.amnesty.org>.	  (Accessed	  1	  May	  2011).	  	  
357	  ‘Hungary	  to	  create	  new	  media	  watchdog’,	  BBC	  News	  Europe,	  (21	  December	  2010).	  
358	  Act	  XX	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Hungary	  amended	  Article	  61.3	  in	  January	  2011.	  
359	  Act	  XX	  of	  1949	  was	  amended	  by	  the	  new	  constitution	  in	  2011,	  coming	  into	  effect	  1	  January	  2012.	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There have already been a number of contentious regulatory impositions by 
the new media authority, justifying international concerns.360 Freedom House 
declared in June 2011 that Hungary had declined in its independent media status 
along with Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Ukraine and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.361 As one of the first countries to join the EU from Central and Eastern 
Europe, as well as pioneering efforts to Westernize on the basis of EU, UN and 
NATO standards, this decline was seen as a shock to most international bodies. The 
instatement of the Media Law has already caused limitations by causing concern and 
fear among journalists about the content they produce, specifically if it gives critique 
to Fidesz related topics.362 If media content changes in accordance with Fidesz’s 
Media Law the diversity of topics in traditional media outlets could be limited. This 
would not only affect political socialization with limited news content but also 
increase online media, with fewer restrictions on content and easier access. 
*** 
The media landscape in post-communist Hungary has developed highly 
bipolar partisanships within mainstream media. This development was caused, in the 
first case, by large-scale decentralization and privatization away from previous state-
owned media in the early 1990s. However, due to the nature of privatization most 
large media industries went back into the hands of socialist supporting individuals, 
who had capital after transition, supporting the democratized left wing party, MSZP. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360	  The	  laws	  starting	  their	  effect	  January	  2011	  had	  immediate	  ramifications	  with	  news	  outlets	  like	  
Tilos	  Radio	  having	  investigations	  by	  the	  National	  Media	  and	  Communications	  Authority	  2	  January	  
2011	  for	  playing	  certain	  American	  rap	  music.	  There	  have	  also	  been	  issues	  with	  online	  news	  outlets	  
like	  Népszava.	  ‘Under	  fire	  Hungary	  media	  watchdog	  raises	  concerns’,	  BBC	  News	  Europe,	  (2	  January	  
2011),	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐europe-­‐12104203,	  <accessed	  3	  May	  2011>.	  	  
361	  ‘Democracy	  Deficit	  Grows	  in	  Former	  Soviet	  Union’,	  Freedom	  House,	  (Press	  Release:	  27	  June	  2011),	  
www.freedomhouse.org,	  <viewed	  1	  July	  2011>.	  
362	  Four	  different	  Budapest-­‐based	  journalists	  interviewed	  all	  shared	  concern	  over	  their	  job	  positions	  
and	  writing	  content	  feeling	  like	  their	  opposition	  stance	  could	  get	  them	  in	  trouble.	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Re-balancing of the media occurred as political polarization between MSZP and 
Fidesz heightened. The first Fidesz government (1998 – 2002) made legislative and 
administrative changes to stabilize strong conservative right wing media outlets. This 
growing politicization of traditional print, television and radio media has caused a 
decline in balanced coverage and has also facilitated a shift towards partisan-based 
media. Media has subsequently become a secondary socializer, functioning as a tool 
to solidify preconceived partisanships by expressing certain value sets and 
perspectives. 
Among youth cohorts in Hungary there has been an increased use of online 
media, used more than any other media source for sociopolitical information retrieval. 
Although biases are still prevalent within Internet-based media it is considered more 
trustworthy and objective to young users compared to the restrained content found in 
traditional media. The shift towards online media by the youth has increased the 
potential for Internet-based political socialization. It is also facilitating marginalized 
political socialization, particularly benefiting radical right parties and organizations 
that have difficulty entering mainstream partisan media sources. Radical right online 
media has developed a wide and intricate network of radical right content with its 
own online news, blogs and television station. Radical right online media links 
directly to Jobbik party partisanships as well as the growing radical right subculture. 
Content-controls for online media are difficult to regulate, however, recent changes in 
Hungarian media laws may see monitoring of all Hungarian media. 
With the large-scale changes the Fidesz government has made to media 
regulations through the 2010 Media Laws and the installation of the National Media 
and Information Communications Authority (NMHH) it is uncertain at this time how 
media might change in Hungary and what effect this might have on media as a 
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socializing agent. With the difficulty in regulating online media content these new 
changes might further popularize online news portals for young Hungarians who trust 
these alternative news outlets more than traditional media.  
Similar to other agents, such as education systems, Hungary is developing an 
a-typical process of socialization with regards to the media, highly influenced by 
bipolarity. Although research on contemporary media socialization is less developed, 
it is likely that the youth is increasingly turning to online news outlets for information. 
Similar to social movements, online media is blurring the distinctions. ‘Real’ and 
‘unofficial’ news online is increasingly difficult to distinguish between, affecting how 
our media consumption affects our worldviews and sociopolitical perceptions.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has taken political socialization and applied it to a multi-agent 
analysis of post-communist Hungary. Not only has this research brought together the 
primary agents recognized by political socialization theory to better understand a 
broad process of development, but this research has also added to the scope of 
socialization research by adding social movements to the analysis. Grassroots social 
movements, as seen by the Hungarian case study given, are priving to be an 
incrasingly influential agent, instigating youth participation and helping define 
partisanship and efficacy development. Thus, this research also adds to the growing 
body of literature around youth politics, redefining what it is to be ‘politically active’ 
outside of traditional forms of participation. 
Research analyzed trends in youth political activism, focusing primarily on 
events happening between 2002 through 2012, through the lens of political 
socialization. Political parties, joined more recently by grassroots social movements, 
dominate the Hungarian sociopolitical landscape, developing political culture, 
defining the parameters of political partisanship and giving organizational structure to 
politics at large. This thesis questions how key agents of socialization are affecting 
activism and partisanship development specifically with regards to recent electoral 
shifts towards the right and radical right. The family, educational institutions and the 
media are influential agents in Hungary, developing a basis for political meaning and 
influencing the political socialization process for young Hungarians. This thesis 
provides a multi-agent analysis case study, adding to broader political socialization 
research but also giving context to post-communist socialization processes. Numerous 
trends in Hungary’s modern political socialization have emerged with larger 
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implications for the future of Hungary, as today’s youth activists become tomorrow’s 
adult population.  
8.1 Parties and Movements 
Family, political parties and social movements are the primary socializers of 
Hungarian political culture. They are the organizations and agents having the largest 
impact on youth activism and political involvement. Parties and movements are 
defining political actors and participatory options while family socialization identifies 
how the individual youth fits within this political landscape. The socializing process 
in Hungary has amplified youth appeal for populist, nationalist and alternative forms 
of political participation. This played an important role in the high electoral support 
from the youth for right wing party, Fidesz, and radical right party, Jobbik, in the 
2010 national elections. There are multiple reasons for right wing and radical right 
youth support connected directly to the post-communist political socialization 
experience. As shown in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, to a large extent, the youth appeal 
of Fidesz and Jobbik is due to the grassroots and informal political approaches these 
parties have used, incorporating mass mobilization protest politics. The same is true 
of the liberal-green LMP, using similar strategies to amass a Budapest-based 
following in the 2010 national elections, although with less success due to its inability 
to effectively maintain internal and external formal and informal networks.  
The organizational prototype of combining party politics with grassroots 
mobilization tactics was created by Fidesz in 2002 by solidifying localized support 
networks across the country and providing an organizational structure which youth-
based parties, like Jobbik and LMP, are now using. This grassroots approach to 
political party strategy was developed first within Fidesz, founded through the 
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creation of informal localized civic circles in 2002 during a close election with the 
Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP. Civic circles have allowed for non-membership 
based political affiliation as well as the dissemination of emotionally charged political 
agendas. Despite an electoral defeat to MSZP, the tactics and populist support 
developed by civic circles solidified a strong Fidesz following, with many young 
interviewees reporting their first political awareness and activism around this time. 
Fidesz was a game changer for the right, and subsequently for alternative youth-based 
parties, by utilizing mass mobilization tactics and cultivating strong youth support 
through formal youth organizations working parallel with informal activist networks.  
This formal and informal blending within a political party structure has 
subsequently been used as a prototype for current Hungarian youth-based parties, 
Jobbik and LMP. Jobbik has become the most successful youth-based party in 
Hungary, sparked by the anti-government demonstrations and riots in 2006. Political 
scandals in 2006 delegitimizing the liberal-left provided an opportunity structure for 
Jobbik to gain nationwide attention, breaking into mainstream media through visible 
participation in anti-government riots. Jobbik has also developed and maintained a 
strong youth following and popular radical right image largely from its informal ties 
to grassroots social movements like the Hungarian Guard and the 64-County Youth 
Movement (HVIM), developing a distinctive radical right subculture.  
In this respect Jobbik is the strongest party in Hungary providing its own all-
encompassing socializing process. Jobbik took from Fidesz’s model, combining 
grassroots movement tactics with formal partisanship, working alongside informal 
activist options. Jobbik, like Fidesz, has also developed its own media, with a large 
radical right network of information dissemination, mainly online. However, the 
radical right has furthered socialization efforts by developing the radical right as the 
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strongest politically based subculture in Hungary. This has been accomplished by 
combining official party politics with social movements, unique fashion trends, a 
music movement (nemzeti rock), as well as distinct radical right interpretations of 
history. This immersive subculture is brought together within social events, such as 
Jobbik’s summer youth camps or broader festivals like Magyar Sziget, uniting an 
array of radical right youth supporters by providing a space for this multi-faceted 
subculture to be experienced.  
Fidesz still has the largest youth electorate compared with other political 
parties with 58% of youth voters supporting Fidesz in the 2006 national elections 
increasing to 65.19% in the 2010 national elections.363 Fidesz has been successful in 
socializing support through membership within Fidesz’s youth organizations, 
Fidelitas and Fidesz IT. These youth organizations are the largest in Hungary 
compared with much smaller youth organizations within other parties. However, 
youth support is equalizing between Fidesz and alternative political options like 
Jobbik, seen in post-election research and polling showing a higher youth preference 
towards Jobbik. Within party politics this shift has occurred in part due to the 
opportunity structures provided by the diminished liberal-left options to counter 
Fidesz. 
Liberal-left political parties have done very little in employing alternative 
political tactics or incorporating grassroots elements into their political structure. 
MSZP in particular, failed to overcome political scandals seen at the administrative as 
well as youth organization level. Compared with Fidesz and Jobbik, liberal-left and 
green parties have been unsuccessful in cultivating significant national symbols, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363	  See	  Figure	  1.1	  comparing	  youth	  and	  older	  cohort	  voting	  trends	  in	  the	  2006	  and	  2010	  national	  
elections.	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slogans and narratives for their parties, providing very little allure or connection for 
young voters to identify with. For the left, headed by MSZP, this has to do with the 
party’s attempts to distance themselves from their past as the reformed Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party, MSZMP. The liberal-left has been associated with the 
communist past, perpetuated by right and radical right parties’ propaganda. Failing to 
counteract the right and radical right narratives against MSZP-SZDSZ or develop 
grassroots tactics has diminished the liberal-lefts potential for youth appeal and 
socialization potential. The bipolar right-left cultivated by MSZP and Fidesz between 
1998 and 2006 socialized the youth within a highly polarizing political environment. 
This division has created ‘two Hungaries’ which has reappeared in the strong divide 
between youth-based movements and parties in the form of Jobbik on the one side 
and LMP along with opposition social movements on the other. 
In Hungary youth political socialization and grassroots mobilization are 
intrinsically linked. Fidesz developed its popular grassroots support in 2002 with civic 
circles and Jobbik mainstreamed the radical right in 2006 through protest culture, 
however, youth involvement in activist liberal-left political activities has only 
developed more recently since 2010. Youth support for liberal-left leaning entities has 
grown not in the form of political party support but in the support online and on the 
streets for grassroots social movements and movement parties developed in 
opposition to Fidesz. Within movements like Milla and Szolidaritás and within 
movement parties like 4K! and Together 2014 the previously disillusioned liberal-left 
has found a voice. These grassroots social movements and movement parties are 
changing cultural political participation norms, subsequently changing the nature of 
political socialization by providing alternative options to mainstream political parties. 
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The future of movements like Milla, Szolidaritás and Together 2014 is highly 
uncertain depending on their ability to unite opposition forces, including political 
parties, against Fidesz for the 2014 national elections.364 Cultivating long-lasting 
support and partisanships will depend on how these grassroots social movements are 
able to relate to, and interplay with, other socializing agents such as the family, 
education and media.  
8.2 Family 
Foundational political socialization literature places a higher emphasis on 
family relations and education as the strongest agents normalizing democratic values 
and civic practices. The family still plays the most influential foundational socializing 
role in Hungary, priming partisanships and potential youth activism. The family is the 
strongest influencing socializer for young Hungarians, particularly relating to right 
wing party preferences. Parents remain the most trusted and frequented source of 
political discussions compared with classmates, friends and teachers and this channel 
for political information is highly influential. Most parents and grandparents discuss 
contemporary political topics within the family unit. Interviewees also often recalled 
familial historic narratives relating to specific political time periods in Hungary, 
translating previous historic accounts with modern partisan justifications. Familial 
views on national revolutions, transitions and political figures are still relevant for 
young Hungarians defining the modern political landscape.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364	  Note:	  Together	  2014	  is	  currently	  trying	  to	  unite	  opposition	  into	  a	  united	  alliance	  against	  Fidesz	  for	  
the	  2014	  national	  elections	  but	  there	  are	  already	  internal	  and	  external	  obstacles	  present.	  Internally	  
Together	  2014’s	  alliance	  with	  Milla	  is	  faltering.	  Milla	  as	  a	  grassroots	  social	  movement	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  want	  to	  lose	  its	  core	  following	  of	  activists	  by	  ‘selling	  out’	  to	  a	  political	  party.	  Meanwhile,	  
the	  national	  court	  is	  potentially	  making	  Together	  2014	  change	  its	  name	  since	  there	  is	  controversy	  
over	  its	  full	  name	  ‘Together	  2014	  Alliance’	  and	  other	  bodies	  with	  similar	  names.	  This	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  
Fidesz-­‐led	  obstacle	  making	  to	  hinder	  the	  potential	  opposition	  alliance.	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The strong allure for the youth towards right and radical right party support 
also comes from politicized historic narratives told first within the family and 
politicized by right wing and radical right parties. While politicization of Hungary’s 
history has been present since 1989 this has been most strongly and successfully 
incorporated by Fidesz’s monopolization of national symbols and Jobbik’s historic 
revisionism. Familial interpretations of politics and history play a foundational role in 
youth interpretations and partisan development. As seen by interviewee responses, 
there tends to be strong family-youth parallels in partisanship most often correlating 
with the right and radical right. Meanwhile parents with liberal-left supporting 
sentiments varied with relation to their child’s partisan sentiments with many liberal-
left youths opting to vote for the party they felt was the ‘least bad’ (MSZP-SZDSZ) or 
voting for newer green party LMP as a liberal alternative.  
Jobbik support was periodically founded within youth partisanship developed 
by other agents, mainly via social events within radical right grassroots social 
movements, and subsequently brought to the family by the youth activist. This was 
also the case with some LMP respondents. In these instances parental partisanships 
are undergoing reverse socialization towards the radical right, or alternative left, by 
politically active young Hungarians who are enthusiastically teaching family 
members about their political views. The implications of reverse socialization could 
lead to increased support for the radical right but could also more generally lead to 
older cohorts becoming more comfortable with less mainstream political party 
options. This changing political culture is already translating into increased political 
options in the 2014 elections, as seen by the addition of new movement parties, some 
of which have incorporated older cohort bases. 
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Right wing and radical right socialization tactics draw from and build upon 
familial socialization. Familial historical narratives used and politicized by right and 
radical parties have also intensified the nationalist discourse, creating divisive 
political party competitions between right and left and opening the door for anti-
European, xenophobic and anti-Roma discussions in the mainstream.365 With a weak 
liberal-left opposition this trend implies the continuation of nationalist and radical 
right value sets socialized through politicized historic narratives such as the Treaty of 
Trianon, interwar politics and the personification of MSZP as a continuation of the 
communist regime. Utilizing familial historic also implies the continuation of 
emotionally charged, content-based socialization that is highly polarizing in Hungary.  
8.3 Education 
Agents such as education act as a counter agent in traditional political 
socialization theory, diffusing radicalism through civic education and in-class 
political discussions. However, education is an a-typical agent in Hungary. Hungary’s 
highly polarized political party system combined with contentious and unresolved 
historical interpretations of the past make it difficult for teachers and students to 
incorporate modern politics and civic discourse into the classroom and on campus. In 
Western Europe and the United States education is seen as a means of socializing 
normative democratic trends and civic participation, however, in Hungary there is a 
highly varied and often times weak or non-existent classroom engagement with 
modern or contentious history and politics. The avoidance of potentially controversial 
political topics is frequently institutionalized at a university level, in the prohibiting of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365	  This	  is	  best	  exemplified	  by	  the	  increasingly	  open	  discussion	  of	  ‘gypsy	  crime’	  in	  Hungarian	  media	  
and	  within	  social	  networks.	  The	  term	  ‘gypsy	  crime’	  (cigánybűnözés)	  was	  popularized	  by	  Jobbik	  and	  
the	  activities	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Guard	  in	  recent	  years,	  marching	  and	  protecting	  against	  gypsy	  
criminality.	  The	  term	  and	  radical	  right	  activities	  subsequently	  became	  popularized	  within	  online	  and	  
mainstream	  media.	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political youth organizations, debates or research on students. The highly bipolar and 
oppositional nature of political party competition in Hungary means that it is very 
difficult to develop a politically neutral discussion. These trends imply that in 
Hungary, general and higher education are not countering radicalized or politically 
distorted versions of history or modern sociopolitical culture.  In fact, recent changes 
to the national core curriculum are possibly inculcating politicized narratives, 
recentralizing the education system around government agendas. 
There are varied levels of teacher politicization and institutional avoidance of 
political discussion across the Hungarian education system. Special Colleges are the 
exception to this trend. These self-run, dorm-like organizations, affiliated to larger 
university institutions, provide their own elite socialization process. Special Colleges 
like Rájk, Bibó and TEK are also connected with the foundations of parties like 
Fidesz and LMP, creating a space to develop Hungary’s political intelligentsia. Apart 
from the elite grouping of young people involved in Special Colleges education in 
secondary and higher education tends to play a very minor role in the overall political 
socialization process.  
8.4 Media 
The media plays a role as a secondary socializer in Hungary, reinforcing 
previously developed partisanships. Hungarian news media primarily serves the 
interests of larger political entities, creating an information structure that solidifies 
political predispositions. Mainstream media sources are often managed by strong 
partisanships for larger political parties, like MSZP and Fidesz. Television, newsprint 
and radio have created strong political biases within Hungarian media but also have 
made it difficult for marginalized and alternative youth-based political parties to 
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penetrate the news. Young Hungarians, aware of heavy news biases have turned to 
online news sources, often perceived as more objective and better formatted for youth 
consumption. 
Radical right and alternative parties and movements have utilized online news 
media as a means of cultivating a space for information distribution and socialization. 
Particularly for Jobbik and radical right supporters, the Internet provides an 
interlinking web of radical right subculture, connecting radical right online social 
groups to fashion sites, national rock music pages and grassroots organizations like 
HVIM. Online news portals are, moreover, not held to the same regulations and fact-
checking standards as mainstream news meaning the radical right now has greater 
freedom to disseminate its partisan message.  
8.5 The Relation and Interplay Between Socializing Agents 
 All agents have the potential to influence and be influenced by one another, 
creating a complex overall process of political socialization. In Hungary historical 
narratives expressed first within the family and later politicized by parties and 
grassroots social movements best exemplify symbolic reference points and meaning 
developed by one agent and used by another, reinterpreted and reused for different 
socializing agendas. The ability for grassroots social movements to develop 
movement parties, subsequently changing party dynamics and political activism, is 
another example of the interplay between agents changing political culture. In 
Hungary political parties use media as a political tool to reinforce socialization. The 
education system also falls under political influences with regards to regulating 
topical subjects in the classroom as well as centralizing or decentralizing government 
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control.366 What this implies is that no agent is socializing in isolation of other agents 
and in the Hungarian case certain agents, like the family, political parties and social 
movements, are building the foundational environment for socialization to occur. 
Meanwhile other agents, like media and perhaps education, act as secondary 
socializers, solidifying values and political culture developed by primary socializers.  
The relationship between these agents is most often socializing and solidifying 
right wing and radical right partisanships. This is begun at home with the strongest 
familial socializing processes taking place within right wing and nationalist 
supporting households. Meanwhile liberal-left families have a generational divide 
within partisan support. Parent cohorts are more comfortable with voting for older 
mainstream political parties while youth cohorts are disillusioned with liberal-left 
political options, tainted by scandal.  The decline of viable liberal-left party options 
has opened the door for parties like LMP and newer movement parties to amass 
certain, albeit limited, levels of youth support. From familial to educational 
socialization, education institutions try to avoid playing a role in political 
socialization, not wanting to resemble previous communist education systems. 
However, the teachers and professors that do openly discuss political topics and 
themes tend to support right wing and radical right parties. The media then solidifies 
youth partisanships. Even alternative media, found online, tends to have strong 
partisan affiliations, most obviously on the right and radical right. This translates into 
a youth that is exposed to much stronger socializing agents towards right wing and 
radical right partisanships. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366	  Discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  the	  liberal-­‐left	  political	  forces	  tend	  to	  instate	  decentralizing	  policies	  while	  
the	  right	  wing	  government	  recentralizes	  policies.	  Fidesz	  has	  also	  changed	  mandatory	  secondary	  
school	  course	  content,	  most	  notably	  by	  creating	  a	  mandatory	  class	  section	  on	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Trianon	  
along	  with	  a	  booklet	  of	  how	  to	  teach	  the	  subject	  of	  Trianon.	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8.6 Research Limitations 
 While my research gives a broad case study analysis of the political 
socialization process in Hungary there are a few shortcomings limited by time and 
scope. Research was limited to a constrained cohort defined not only by age (defining 
youth as those between the ages of eighteen and thirty) but also by participation. I 
interviewed and analyzed politically active youth cohorts. This meant that I was able 
to engage with young Hungarians guaranteed to have stronger political influences and 
socializing experiences. However, it also meant that much of my qualitative data did 
not include people who might not be at all engaged with political participation but 
still might have socializing experiences worth researching, such as Roma youths. 
There is also a slight bias in my interview sampling of university students. While 
there were interviewees that were not in university (either still in secondary school or 
those who went straight into the work force) university students tended to be easier to 
contact and arrange interviews with and made up a large part of the activist network I 
was involved with. This was also due to the high rate of youths attending university in 
Hungary, particularly in the three locations I was based in.367  
8.7 What Remains to be Learned?   
In the future this research would benefit from continuation and expansion in 
order to combine qualitative work, such as the information found from my own field 
research, with research-directed quantitative data. Often national exit polls were not 
openly available and data from polling agencies had to be stratified for purpose. 
Polling in general within Hungary is often uncertain, with many polling agencies run 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367	  25%	  of	  young	  Hungarians	  attend	  higher	  education	  (OECD).	  This	  rate	  will	  have	  been	  higher	  in	  the	  
areas	  that	  I	  based	  my	  research	  on	  since	  Budapest,	  Debrecen	  and	  Miskolc	  all	  have	  some	  of	  Hungary’s	  
largest	  universities.	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by partisan organizations. Given more time and funding my research would benefit 
from a statistically relevant national survey questioning general political socialization 
tendencies and partisan activism.  
Political socialization research rarely considers more than one agent of 
socialization at a time. This limits the possibility of analyzing an overview of 
influences and agents. The research community would benefit from the continuation 
of multi-agent case studies to compare overarching socialization trends between 
countries and regions. Comparing political socialization case studies within Central 
and Eastern Europe can better determine what can be considered a socializing 
anomaly within a national context, and what is perhaps a common transitional trend 
within the region. Youth political socialization is particularly relevant in tracking 
future political predispositions. The research on Hungary as a case study analyzing 
youth activism through political socialization would also benefit from continuation to 
see how agents of socialization will change as the political spectrum shifts away from 
previous bipolarities and newer movement parties enter the political spectrum.  
8.7 Looking to the Future 
Some of the a-typical political socialization processes in Hungary, mentioned 
above, will take time to develop and stabilize. In time, as the youth population 
matures, the adult population will consist of a cohort with little or no lived experience 
within the communist era, changing certain historical and political narratives and 
outlooks. Hungary is currently undergoing large political overhauls by the Fidesz 
government, re-writing and amending the Hungarian constitution and changing 
fundamental legislation on media, education and the rule of law. While the benefit or 
potential harm of these changes is being debated on the national and international 
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level, how these changes will affect media content and the centralization of the 
education system towards a more national value-based curriculum is yet to be seen. 
Hungary, as a country, is still coming to terms with its communist, Nazi and 
Hapsburg past, questioning how to define contentious national history. Political 
platforms and policy-making are not just a matter of managing contemporary issues at 
hand. They are often also a statement about historical interpretations and views on 
how Hungary perceives itself within Europe. Looking at the changing state of 
political agents and influences Hungary is still undergoing democratic transition. 
 In terms of political socialization the youth are being exposed to agents that 
are also in flux. Educational decentralization and recentralization based on distinctly 
different party views on how education should relate to the state means that varied 
educational experiences and general avoidance of politically sensitive topics will most 
likely continue. It is also unlikely that mainstream media will de-politicize in the near 
future due to strong partisan ownerships, meaning that media will continue to be 
primarily a secondary socializing agent, solidifying preconceived partisanships 
introduced by other agents. The current grassroots social movements rallying in 
opposition to Fidesz are also a highly volatile agent and socializing influence since 
their existence is dependent on the state of their opposition. Newer and smaller parties 
like LMP and 4K! have an uncertain future if they are unable to pass the 5% electoral 
threshold. If Fidesz wins again in 2014 it will be difficult for anti-Fidesz movement 
parties to maintain a strong resistance force in opposition to a party that continues to 
show mass electoral appeal. If Fidesz happens to lose in 2014 to an alliance like the 
one proposed by Together 2014, then the nature and structure of the movement-party 
will have to change drastically. A movement party within parliament will generally 
have to change, strengthening its political structure and developing its positions on a 
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broader spectrum of national and international topics (Kitschelt 2006). While a 
change of government is possible in 2014 through a wide alliance of opposition forces 
it is also largely dependent on undecided voters.368 
With regards to youth support, the strongest political forces remain Fidesz and 
Jobbik, combining grassroots tactics with strong political party structures. In the near 
future it is hard to see an opposition force that can electorally counter Fidesz. Jobbik 
will also remain a stable political party, backed by a faithful subculture. The political 
socialization process in Hungary within the family, educational institutions and the 
mainstream and alternative media is developing most strongly to favor right wing and 
radical right partisanships. The strength of these partisanships is also due to the 
weakness in counter socialization by liberal-left narratives, educational exposure and 
media alternatives. The current process of socialization in favor of the right and 
radical right will therefore continue until counter socialization strengthens or certain 
agents, such as education and media, de-politicize the nature of socialization by 
providing a space for broader civic education and more objective news sources. 
Hungary is a key case study in the greater context of the direction European 
Union member states are taking. This report tracks the growing political shift away 
from liberal European values, giving preference to localized, nationalist and 
increasingly exclusionary politics. These larger trends of right wing and radical right 
voter support are heightened among the youth population. Tracking how these shifts 
are developing and mainstreaming in a nation-specific context better defines what 
might be a national anomaly in Hungary and what might be a predictor of larger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368	  Szonda	  Ipsos	  research	  center	  has	  speculated	  that	  an	  opposition	  alliance	  could	  win	  based	  on	  
current	  figures.	  Fidesz	  has	  two	  million	  decided	  voters	  (July	  2013)	  while	  opposition	  party	  MSZP	  
combined	  with	  Together	  2014	  has	  an	  estimated	  1.5	  million	  supporters.	  There	  is	  currently	  a	  high	  level	  
of	  undecided	  voters.	  Tapping	  into	  this	  group	  would	  be	  key	  for	  victory	  over	  Fidesz	  (‘Change	  of	  Gov’t	  
Possible,	  Pollster	  says’,	  Politics.hu,	  (19	  July	  2013)).	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regional or European trends. Continuing to track the political socialization processes 
across Europe will serve to predict the direction European member states will take in 
the future.  
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APPENDIX 1: Hungarian Election Results 1990 – 2010369 
National Election Results 1990 
PARTY	   ALIGNMENT	   %	   TOTAL	  SEATS	  
MDF	   Right	   24.7	   164	  
SZDSZ	   Liberal	   21.4	   92	  
FKgP	   Right	   11.7	   44	  
MSZP	   Left	   10.9	   34	  
Fidesz	   Liberal	   9.0	   21	  
KDNP	   Right	   6.5	   21	  
National Election Results 1994 
PARTY	   ALIGNMENT	   %	   TOTAL	  SEATS	  
MSZP	   Left	   33.0	   209	  
SZDSZ	   Liberal	   19.7	   69	  
MDF	   Right	   11.7	   38	  
FKgP	   Right	   8.8	   26	  
KDNP	   Right	   7.0	   22	  
Fidesz	   Right	   7.0	   20	  
National Election Results 1998 
PARTY	   ALIGNMENT	   %	   TOTAL	  SEATS	  
Fidesz-­‐MPP(MDF)	   Right	   29.5	   128	  
MSZP	   Left	   32.9	   134	  
FKgP	   Right	   13.1	   48	  
SZDSZ	   Liberal	   7.6	   24	  
MIÉP	   Radical	  Right	   5.5	   14	  
National Election Results 2002 
PARTY	   ALIGNMENT	   %	   TOTAL	  SEATS	  
MSZP	   Left	   42.1	   178	  
Fidesz-­‐MPP(MDF)	   Right	   41.1	   188	  
SZDSZ	   Liberal	   5.6	   13	  
National Election Results 2006 
PARTY	   ALIGNMENT	   %	   TOTAL	  SEATS	  
MSZP	   Left	   43.2	   186	  
FIdesz-­‐MPP	   Right	   42.0	   164	  
SZDSZ	   Liberal	   6.5	   18	  
MDF	   Right	   5.0	   11	  
National Election Results 2010 
PARTY	   ALIGNMENT	   %	   TOTAL	  SEATS	  
Fidesz-­‐MPP	   Right	   52.7	   262	  
MSZP	   Left	   19.3	   59	  
Jobbik	   Radical	  Right	   16.7	   47	  
LMP	   Green	   7.5	   16	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369	  Data	  comes	  from:	  ‘Elections	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  National	  Assembly’,	  Elections	  Resources,	  <	  
http://www.electionresources.org/hu/assembly>.	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APPENDIX 2:  
Participant Observation: Demonstrations, Events & Youth Camps 
 
DATE	   EVENT	   RELEVANCE	  
15	  March	  2011	   Government	  Rally	  for	  
National	  Holiday:	  
Commemoration	  of	  
1848	  Revolution	  
Speeches	  were	  given	  by	  Viktor	  Orbán	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  Mayor	  of	  Budapest.	  Orbán	  
likens	  Brussels	  to	  the	  oppressive	  forces	  
from	  Hungary’s	  history	  such	  as	  the	  
Hapsburgs,	  Nazis	  and	  Communists.	  	  
15	  March	  2011	   Anti-­‐Government	  
Rallies	  
The	  online	  activist	  group	  Milla	  rallies	  
around	  100	  thousand	  people	  against	  
Fidesz’	  Media	  Law.	  	  
18	  April	  2011	   Pac-­‐Man	  Anti-­‐
Government	  Rally	  
Tracking	  various	  anti-­‐government	  
movements.	  This	  was	  an	  event	  making	  a	  
human	  pac-­‐man	  out	  of	  ~100	  of	  people	  
dressed	  in	  Orange	  (representing	  Fidesz)	  
illustrating	  the	  government’s	  abuse.	  
1	  May	  2011	   Jobbik	  May	  Day	  Festival	   Profiling	  the	  radical	  right	  culture	  seeing	  
who	  is	  in	  attendance,	  the	  types	  of	  music	  
being	  played	  and	  the	  types	  of	  goods	  being	  
sold:	  Mixing	  traditional	  ‘ancient	  Hungary’	  
symbols	  with	  modern	  radical	  right	  
‘national	  rock	  music’.	  Jobbik	  Youth	  
Division,	  HVIM	  and	  Hungarian	  Guardsmen	  
were	  also	  in	  attendance.	  	  
10	  May	  2011	   University	  Student	  
Flashmob	  at	  Corvinus	  
University	  
Hundreds	  of	  students	  making	  a	  human	  
chain	  around	  the	  university	  against	  
decreasing	  government	  education	  funds	  
and	  the	  firing	  of	  certain	  professors.	  
18	  May	  2011	   Budapest	  Gay	  Pride	  
Festival	  
Budapest’s	  gay	  pride	  has	  become	  quite	  
controversial	  in	  its	  new	  founding’s	  and	  
recent	  years.	  There	  was	  a	  large	  police	  
presence	  this	  year	  to	  keep	  radical	  right	  
anti-­‐gay	  pride	  rallies	  from	  clashing.	  
14-­‐17	  July	  2011	   Jobbik	  Youth	  Division	  
Summer	  Camp	  
Five-­‐day	  camp	  in	  rural	  Sóstofalva	  (Borsod	  
County).	  Profiling	  the	  types	  of	  young	  
campers	  attending	  and	  the	  organization/	  
planning	  of	  the	  camp.	  	  
17	  July	  2011	   Fidelitas	  Annual	  
Congress	  &	  Elections	  
In	  Debrecen,	  I	  went	  to	  profile	  the	  
dedicated	  Fidelitas	  members	  and	  figures	  
running	  for	  positions	  within	  Fidelitas.	  The	  
Event	  was	  highly	  organized,	  professional	  
and	  included	  entertainment	  and	  meal.	  
20	  July	  2011	   International	  Slut	  Walk	   Budapest	  participated	  in	  the	  international	  
‘slut	  walk’	  against	  male	  molestation	  and	  
rape	  of	  women.	  A	  few	  hundred	  came	  out	  
to	  support	  chanting	  ‘no	  means	  no’.	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5-­‐7	  August	  2011	   Fidelitas	  Summer	  Camp	   Seven	  days	  in	  a	  hotel	  on	  Lake	  Balaton.	  
Profiling	  the	  types	  of	  young	  campers	  
attending	  and	  the	  organization/	  planning	  
of	  the	  camp.	  
12-­‐14	  August	  2011	   LMP	  Summer	  
University	  
Five	  days	  campgin	  on	  Old	  Buda	  Island.	  
Profiling	  the	  types	  of	  young	  campers	  
attending	  and	  the	  organization/	  planning	  
of	  the	  camp.	  
23	  October	  2012	   Government	  Rally	  and	  
Pro-­‐Government	  ‘Peace	  
March’	  on	  the	  National	  
Holiday	  
Commemorating	  the	  
1956	  Revolution.	  
Fidesz	  representatives	  came	  out	  to	  give	  
speeches	  along	  joined	  by	  an	  organized	  
‘Peace	  March’	  by	  pro-­‐Fidesz	  supporters	  
that	  ended	  by	  congregating	  with	  the	  Fidesz	  
rally.	  Estimated	  of	  between	  50	  –	  70	  
thousand	  participated	  in	  the	  Peace	  March.	  
Note:	  this	  is	  organized	  by	  a	  largely	  older	  
right	  wing	  supporting	  crowd.	  
23	  October	  2012	   Anti-­‐Government	  
rallies	  by	  Milla,	  
Szolidaritás	  and	  the	  
announcement	  of	  
Together	  2014.	  
Anti-­‐government	  activist	  organizations	  
Milla	  (mainly	  online	  activists)	  and	  
Szolidaritás	  (unionist	  activists),	  joined	  
forces	  with	  a	  new	  political	  grouping	  led	  by	  
ex-­‐Prime	  Minister	  Gordon	  Bajnai.	  The	  
movements	  (now	  party)	  is	  called	  Together	  
2014.	  Estimated	  of	  around	  100	  thousand	  
came	  out	  in	  support.	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APPENDIX 3: Interviewee Breakdown 
The	  following	  table	  gives	  a	  list	  of	  interviewees.	  Names	  have	  been	  changed	  for	  anonymity	  but	  
respondents’	  age,	  political	  alignment	  and	  region	  is	  given.	  It	  is	  also	  noted	  if	  the	  interviewee	  is	  
classified	  as	  a	  specialist	  of	  some	  kind	  in	  a	  category	  other	  than	  ‘youth	  activist’.	  
No.	   Interviewee	   Age	   Alignment	   Region	   Specialists	  
1	   Julia	   25	   L/S	   BP	   Political	  Analyst	  
2	   Szabolcs	   31	   G	   BP	   	  
3	   Sándor	  Gallai	   NA	   L/R	   BP	   Political	  Professor	  
4	   Jakab	   30	   R	   BP	   	  
5	   Áron	   23	   R	   BP	   	  
6	   Gábor	  	   24	   R/G	   BP	   	  
7	   Melinda	   30	   LSR	   BP	   	  
8	   Dóra	   28	   LSG	   BP	   	  
15	   Ani	   31	   L	   BP	   	  
16	   Balázs	   29	   L	   BP	   	  
9	   László	  	   24	   R	   BP	   	  
10	   Krisztán	   	   R	   BP	   	  
11	   István	   25	   R	   BP	   	  
12	   Mary	   NA	   LS	   BP	   Professor	  
13	   Benigna	   27	   R	   BP	   	  
14	   Palko	   23	   RLG	   D	   	  
17	   Esther	   18	   E	   BP	   	  
18	   Szabolcs	   20	   E	   BP	   	  
19	   Ármin	   20	   L	   BP	   	  
20	   Adam	   23	   SL	   BP	   	  
21	   Daniel	   28	   SL	   D	   	  
22	   Dora	   19	   S	   BP	   	  
23	   Peter	   25	   S	   BP	   	  
24	   Laszlo	   24	   S	   BP	   	  
25	   Tamas	   21	   S	   BP	   	  
26	   GROUP	  Anonymous	   20-­‐22	   -­‐	   -­‐	   	  
27	   Kincse	  Szabolcs	   37	   L	   BP	   Journalist	  
28	   Zsolt	   26	   GL	   BP	   	  
29	   Flóra	   30	   GL	   BP	   Amnesty	  International	  
30	   Gábor	   31	   G	   BP	   	  
31	   Beata	   23	   GL	   BP	   	  
32	   Dániel	   25	   G	   BP	   	  
33	   Balint	   35	   G	   BP	   	  
34	   Monika	   21	   GR	   BP	   	  
35	   Beata	   24	   G	   BP	   	  
36	   Szemere	   29	   R	   D	   	  
37	   Péter	  Radó	   NA	   S	   BP	   Professor	  
Ex-­‐Education	  Minister	  
38	   Philip	  Barker	   NA	   NA	   BP	   Professor	  
39	   Dorci	   23	   R	   BP	   	  
40	   Gergely	   26	   R	   BP	   	  
41	   András	  Istvanffy	   29	   L	   BP	   4K!	  Party	  Chairman	  
42	   Sára	   21	   G	   BP	   	  
43	   Dávid	  	   22	   L	   BP	   	  
44	   Lászlo	   23	   R	   BP	   	  
45	   András	  Bozóki	   NA	   	   BP	   CEU	  Professor,	  Ex	  Minister	  
46	   Flóra	   21	   GL	   BP	   	  
47	   Zselykó	   17	   4K	   BP	   	  
48	   Dave	   27	   R	   D	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49	   István	  Stumpf	   NA	   R	   BP	   Constitutional	  Judge	  
50	   Bori	  Kriza	   NA	   L	   BP	   Sociologist	  on	  Radical	  Right	  
M1	   János	   16	   E	   M	   	  
M2	   Lászlo	  (Louis	  Baci)	   21	   E	   M	   	  
M3	   Gábor	  	   17	   E	   M	   	  
M4	   Attila	   20	   E	   M	   	  
M5	   Lászlo	   28	   E	   M	   	  
M6	   Szabolcs	   17	   E	   M	   	  
D1	   Gábor	   NA	   E	   D	   	  
D2	   Milán	  Szoboszlai	   16	   E	   D	   	  
D3	   Tibor	   24	   E	   D	   	  
D4	   Péter	   24	   E	   D	   	  
D5	   István	   19	   E	   D	   	  
D6	   Máté	   23	   E	   D	   	  
D7	   Sándor	  Nagy	   28	   R	   D	   Journalist	  
D8	   Gergely	   23	   R	   D	   	  
D9	   Angela	   29	   G	   D	   	  
D10	   Joszéf	   NA	   -­‐	   D	   Professor	  
D11	   Zsanett	   20	   R	   D	   	  
P2	   László	  Sebián-­‐
Petrovski	  
33	   S	   BP	   MSZP	  Representative	  
P3	   Hajnalka	   24	   G	   BP	   	  
4	   Erizsebet	  Novaky	   NA	   NA	   BP	   Professor	  
 
*Names	  highlighted	  in	  Blue	  represent	  individuals	  who	  were	  also	  specialists,	  usually	  researchers,	  
professors	  or	  experts	  with	  relation	  to	  my	  topic.	  
**Names	  highlighted	  in	  Yellow	  represent	  individuals	  who	  participated	  in	  focus	  groups.	  Most	  focus	  
group	  participants	  also	  participated	  in	  in-­‐depth	  interviews.	  	  
***	  With	  regards	  to	  Alignment	  (In	  the	  one	  case	  that	  4K	  is	  written	  it	  stands	  for	  a	  new	  political	  party	  
‘4th	  Republic!’):	  
	  
R	  –	  Right	  
L	  –	  Liberal	  Left	  
S	  –	  Socialist	  (MSZP)	  
E	  –	  Radical	  Right	  
G	  –	  Green	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APPENDIX 4: Semi-Structured Interview Format & Example Questions 
 
Interviews conducted were in-depth and semi-structured, allowing for interviewees to 
develop their own narratives and bring up new, unasked topics if and when they 
desired. My role was primarily to make them comfortable enough to discuss personal 
political topics and various agents of socialization and keep the discussion going, 
ensuring that I covered my main topics of question. I would tend to begin discussing 
an interviewees first political memories as a lead into discussing family-based 
political discussions, then ask about media and education, as less controversial 
political topics. I would then begin discussing their political orientation, activism and 
sentiments. Because an interviewee might take a topic in a different direction I kept a 
simple template, usually written on a piece of paper beside my, to make sure I had 
covered all topics: 
 
FAMILY 
• What are your first political memories? 
• Do you recall your parents discussing politics at home? 
• Did your parents/siblings/grandparents discuss politics with you? 
• Did your parents ever take you with them when they went to vote? 
• Do you have the same political values/ideologies/partisanship as your 
parents/siblings/grandparents? 
• Do you feel parents/siblings/grandparents have influenced your political preferences? 
• What sort of newspapers, television, radio is watched/listened to at home? 
MEDIA 
• How do you get political information? 
• What is your most preferred medium for media (TV, Internet, Radio, Newspapers, Weeklies)? 
• How often do you look up political information and how? 
• Do you feel that there are political biases depending on what media you look at? 
• Is there any media you can say gives unbiased political information? 
• How did you first start using your media outlets: at home? From friends? Party information? 
EDUCATION (Secondary and Higher Education) 
• What sort of political/civic information do you learn in secondary school?  
• Do you have political debates in school? 
• Do you talk about politics at school? 
• How is modern political history taught in school? 
• Are there certain political topics you wish were discussed in school? 
• Do you feel that you know the political alignment of teachers/professors? 
• Has school influenced your political outlook? How? 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
• Did you vote last year in the 2010 national elections? Was it your first time?  
• Do you feel that you have a strong/weak party preference? Membership? 
• Has your political preference changed in the last few years? If so how and why? 
• When did you first identify yourself with a political party? Explain? 
• Would you ever change your party preference? Is there another party you would vote for? 
• Have you ever postered? Debated? Attended political events? Attended political camp? 
GRASSROOTS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
• Have you ever protested? Demonstrated? Gone on strike? Why? 
• Are you involved in any political social movements (list a few). 
• How did you hear about these movements? How did you get involved 
• What do you think these movements can impact? 
• Do you have family members that also participate in these movements?  
In your opinion what is the greatest impact on your own political partisanship/viewpoint? 
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APPENDIX 5: Family Political Discussion and Party Alliance 
Interview 
No. 
Party 
Preference 
Political 
discussion 
Vote same as 
Family 
Family Influences 
3 Fidesz + + Same but no direct discussion at home 
4 Fidesz + + Strong values from family 
5 Fidesz + +  
9 Fidesz + +  
10 Fidesz + +  
11 Fidesz + + Strong Father influence 
14 Fidesz + + Strong Father influence 
36 Fidesz + + Strong family values - Anti-Communist 
39 Fidesz + + Sibling difference though 
40 Fidesz + +  
48 Fidesz + - Strong Grandparent influence 
D7 Fidesz - +  
D8 Fidesz + + Strong Grandparent influence 
D11 Fidesz + + Strong Father influence 
6 Fidesz/LMP + +  
13 Fidesz/LMP + + Strong Grandparent influence 
34 Fidesz/LMP + -  
17 Jobbik + +  
18 Jobbik + +  
M4 Jobbik + +  
M6 Jobbik + + Strong Father influence 
D1 Jobbik + +  
D2 Jobbik + +  
D3 Jobbik + +  
D4 Jobbik + + Changed Parents to Jobbik 
D5 Jobbik + + Changed Parents to Jobbik 
D6 Jobbik + + Changed Parents to Jobbik 
2 LMP - -  
8 LMP + -  
15 LMP + - LMP over Fidesz family, Strong Father influence 
16 LMP + + Strong Father Influence at first – changed later 
19 LMP - +  
28 LMP - -  
29 LMP + + Changed Parents to LMP - from SZDSZ 
30 LMP - + Strong Grandparent influence 
31 LMP + - Same ideology - different party- left 
32 LMP - - Strong Grandparent influence 
33 LMP -/+ -/+ Changed Mother to LMP - from Fidesz 
35 LMP -  - Previously Fidesz 
41 LMP + -  
46 LMP + -/+ Changed Mother to LMP 
47 LMP + - Previously Fidesz 
D9 LMP  + - Same ideology but different party vote 
1 MDF + - Same ideology but different party vote 
7 MDF + -  
20 MSZP + -  
21 MSZP + + Strong Father influence 
22 MSZP - -  
23 MSZP + +  
24 MSZP + -  
25 MSZP + - Same ideology but different party vote 
P2 MSZP + +  
42 SZDSZ/LMP + - Same ideology but different party vote 
 
This	   table	   reviews	   interviewee	   responses	   about	   political	   discussions	   and	   voting	   alliance	   with	  
relation	  to	  the	  family.	  The	  chart	  is	  arranged	  in	  party	  preference	  order	  of	  the	  interviewee	  so	  that	  a	  
visual	  comparison	  can	  be	  seen.	  Boxes	  with	  (+)	  express	  an	  affirmative	  answer	  that	  the	  interviewee	  
experienced	   political	   discussions	   at	   home	   or	   supports	   the	   same	   political	   party	   as	   their	   parents.	  
Similarly	   (-­‐)	   expresses	  a	  negative	  answer.	  Areas	  highlighted	   in	   yellow	   show	  when	  an	   interviewee	  
responded	   negatively	   and	   areas	   highlighted	   in	   green	   show	   a	   parental	   discrepancy	   when,	   for	  
example,	  the	   interviewee	   is	  able	  to	  discuss	  or	  share	  party	  alignment	  with	  one	  parent	  but	  not	  the	  
other.	  The	  right	  hand	  column	  notes	  family	   influences	  that	  were	  mentioned	  strongly	  or	   interesting	  
facts	  that	  changed	  the	  typical	  or	  expected	  family-­‐youth	  dynamic.	  
	   300	  
APPENDIX 6:  
Mapping Political Media Outlets Used by Young Hungarians 
	  
This section gives a breakdown and analysis of some of the leading media 
outlets in Hungary, their alignment and data about media usage. The following is a 
concise breakdown of the most frequently mentioned news outlets discussed by 
interviewees. Television stations, newspapers, radio stations and Internet news sites 
are included. Media outlets are grouped in categories of political ideologies looking at 
conservative-nationalist, radical right, liberal-left media and media outlets that are 
questionable independent. Media is categorized by how interviewees mentioning the 
following news outlets described each, as well as looking up the media’s history and 
self-description. Independent media is listed as such because they not only describe 
themselves as independent but interviewees had mixed answers when categorizing the 
outlet themselves. Found at the end of the chapter are charts looking at what media 
outlets interviewees mentioned as their own sources of political information as well as 
a chart showing how often online media sites are used by individuals, to show the 
frequent use of online news portals by Hungarians. This section only includes media 
that was mentioned in interviews two or more times, giving an idea if the most used 
media outlets by young Hungarians. Some interviewees mentioned small local papers 
or obscure media blogs that were not included due to their marginal status.  
Conservative-Nationalist Media 
Heti Válasz (meaning Weekly Choice)- Heti Válasz defines itself as a moderate 
conservative weekly magazine. Topics covered deal with politics, economy and 
culture related issues. The magazine was created in 2001 founded around the first 
governmental term of Fidesz in 1998 when Orbán called for a policy of balance in the 
media, shedding light on the liberal media monopoly in Hungary at the time. Funding 
for creating Heti Válasz came indirectly from the government-created foundation, the 
Natural and Social Development Foundation (Természet- és Társadalombarát 
Fejlődésért Közalapítványt (TTFK)).370 
Hír TV – Hír TV was registered in 2002 and is a Hungarian television news channel. 
The station gives investigative reports and political discussions. Although the news 
channel declares itself as delivering unbiased and independent news, the nationally 
broadcasted channel is politically right leaning, having partnerships with the well-
known right-wing newspaper Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian nation) as well as Lánchíd 
Rádió (Chain Bridge Radio).371 It was the only TV channel to broadcast the 2006 
protests in Hungary live. Some say they were the only station given access. In their 
online information the station states a viewership of 2.9 million households. 
Jobbklikk.hu (meaning the Right Click)– Jobbklikk, founded in 2009, is a 
conservative virtual community combined with blog-like articles. Jobbklikk considers 
itself ‘a community of young bloggers, writers and professionals who seek to Promote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370	  ‘Heti	  Válasz:	  az	  alapítástól	  a	  magánkézbe	  adásig:	  Végkiárusítás’,	  Magyar	  Narancs,	  (24	  June	  2004),	  
<accessed	  10	  June	  2012>.	  
371	  http://hirtvklub.hu/	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Conservative ideas in the Hungarian public discourse’.372 The site provides a forum 
for debate as well as published articles. The site has three columns allowing access to 
an Op-Ed section, a blogging section or Jobbklikk journalists and links to other 
related articles of interest from other sites. The site also has a twitter and Facebook 
page. Jobbklikk mentions on its homepage that it has common thinking with 
conservative online news portals like Mandiner and Konzervatórium. While it has a 
mainly conservative right-wing framework it also brings in a more moderate-radical 
right audience. (jobbklikk.hu)  
Konzervatórium – Is currently the most well recognized conservative news-blogs in 
Hungary. Although the political alignment of the site is not hidden, articles maintain a 
healthy critique and open dialogue about current political issues and event concerning 
Hungary. With a format more like a news portal than a blog compared with its 
website rivals Mandiner and Jobbklikk, Konzervatórium has sections about the 
economy, politics, culture, interviews and impressions. All three websites link to each 
other showing a mutual respect of providing news portals for young conservatives 
interested in finding information and building conservative networks online. 
Magyar Hírlap (meaning Hungarian Press) – Magyar Hírlap is a daily newspaper 
created in 1968 as a paper of the Hungarian Government. The paper became 
independent in 1990 later bought by media mogul Gábor Széles in 2006. The paper 
has since become a supporter of more conservative, traditional politics and parties. 
The paper has been strongly criticized for its publications of certain articles with anti-
Semitic undertones, mainly written by well-known conservative writer Zsolt Bayer, 
who is a strong Fidesz supporter on the more radical side of their support network. In 
one article Bayer openly referred to Jews as ‘Israeli Jewish occupiers’ in Hungary and 
even as ‘stinking excrement’.373 Magyar Hírlap online was created in 2008, following 
the trend of many newspapers, radio stations and TV channels to develop online 
counterparts.  
Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation)- Magyar Nemzet was established in 1937 as a 
moderate conservative paper, originally read mainly by Budapest based intellectuals 
(Arpad 2004). This newspaper was one of the top Socialist Government newspapers, 
behind Népszabadság (Volgyes 1975) and remains one of the most circulated dailies. 
Magyar Nemzet changed alignment in 2000, becoming a largely conservative, Fidesz 
supporting paper and maintaining its status as Hungary’s second largest daily.374 
Despite it being one of the most highly circulated newspapers in Hungary only one 
youth respondent mentioned Magyar Nemzet as a news source that they read to find 
political information, reflecting the shift in media attainment for younger cohorts.375 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372	  As	  written	  by	  Jobbklikk	  published	  on	  Mandiner:	  ‘Levél	  a	  toryknak’,	  Mandiner.hu,	  (1	  February	  
2012),	  (http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20120201_jobbklikk_szerkesztoseg_level_a_toryknak),	  <accessed	  3	  
June	  2012>.	  	  
373	  Weinthal,	  Benjamin,	  ‘Anti-­‐Jewish	  tirades	  at	  Hungarian	  newspaper	  provoke	  outrage’,	  The	  Jerusalem	  
Post,	  (8	  April	  2011),	  (http://www.jpost.com/JewishWorld/JewishNews/Article.aspx?id=232389),	  
<accessed	  10	  June	  2011>.	  	  
374	  ‘The	  Press	  in	  Hungary’,	  BBC	  News,	  (29	  April	  2004),	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3616011.stm,	  <Accessed	  28	  June	  2012>.	  	  
375	  I	  have	  added	  information	  about	  Magyar	  Nemzet	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  not	  mentioned	  more	  
than	  once	  by	  interviewees	  as	  a	  source	  for	  political	  information	  used.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  because	  it	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Mandiner (meaning cushion)– Mandiner is an interactive online blog and news site. 
Similar to Jobbklikk the site was developed by young conservative Hungarians to 
provide news, debate and opinions about Hungarian politics, culture and society. 
Maniner was created in 2009 as a sort of online Huffington Post and blog formatted 
site. The site has gained attention with its young-based intellectual responses to 
contemporary politics, justifying certain questionable political actions and giving a 
debate about the nature of current political trends and conflicts concerning 
Hungary.376 Alongside political dialogues, the site caters to a more youthful audience 
with specific sections on ‘wine’, ‘bicycling’, and ‘festivals’.  
Századvég – is a polling agent now although it started as a periodical in 1985 founded 
by Bibó students with the first editor in chief István Stumpf. The periodical contained 
articles from politically active young people and turned into a relevant political 
reference at the time. Names on the list of some of the first to submit pieces to 
Századvég include István Bóka, Lászlo Köver, János Máté and Viktor Orbán. All 
politically relevant people linked with Fidesz. It also developed a political/civil 
academy started in 2003 assisting with polling agency, think tank and publishing 
house (Interview 49).377  
Radical Right Media 
Barikád.hu – Similar to Kuruc, Barikád is an online as well as weekly news source. 
Barikád comes out as a weekly magazine as well as a linking online portal. Barikád 
more recently also linked Barikád TV to its online portal, using the format of radical 
right online news TV Nemzeti 1 where news is created and streamed through 
YouTube. Barikád openly supports the Hungarian Guard and its various factions as 
well as Jobbik. Barikád is the most well-known and lucrative radical right weeklies in 
Hungary. The weekly magazine was founded in 2009 and costs 390 forint-per-issue 
(roughly 1.3 Euros). Legally there are no link between Barikád magazine and 
Barakad.hu but they share similar emblems, topics and are virtually considered the 
same source. The magazine is more directly linked with Jobbik than Kuruc and 
possibly less openly extreme. Jobbik’s website has a link to the magazine.378 
Kuruc.info – Kuruc is a name for the anti-Habsburg rebels within Hungary during 
the late 1600s to early 1700s. The name itself hints at the alignment of an online news 
portal Kuruc.info, which is currently the leading news site for supporters of the 
radical right and extreme nationalists. The site has a more openly hostile tone towards 
Roma, Jewsish-Israeli and other foreign forces seen as invading Hungary.379 Created 
in February 2006 the site has caused numerous controversies with the content of its 
articles, once even exposing personal details of anti-Hungarian targets, that the 
Socialist government attempted banning the site in the summer of 2008, succeeding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is	  the	  second	  most	  circulated	  daily	  newspaper	  in	  Hungary	  so	  I	  feel	  that	  information	  on	  it	  should	  be	  
added,	  particularly	  due	  to	  its	  significant	  change	  from	  a	  left	  wing	  to	  right	  wing	  supporting	  paper.	  
376	  Szmöre,	  ‘Bántó’,	  Mandiner.blog.hu,	  (19	  January	  2012),	  
(http://mandiner.blog.hu/2012/01/19/banto#more3575223),	  <accessed	  5	  July	  2012>.	  
377	  http://www.szazadveg.hu/	  
378	  http://jobbik.hu/node/6303	  
379	  ‘Nemcsak	  nigger,	  muszlim	  is	  az	  amerikai	  jelölt’,	  Kuruc.info,	  (16	  January	  2008),	  
(http://kuruc.info/r/1/20214/),	  <accessed	  1	  July	  2012>.	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only in stopping the site for a month.380 The site has an openly irredentist opinion, 
feeling that the pre-Trianon Treaty borders should be restored. They were one of the 
first portals to call the anti-government protestors during the 2006 Ozsod riots 
‘revolutionaries’, catapulting Kuruc.info into the centre of radical right news outlets.  
Nemzeti1.hu (National One aka N1) – N1 TV is a radical right online TV ‘station’ 
running through YouTube. The main website links the user to a list of video clippings 
ranging between eight and sixteen minutes in length of news reporting’s, political 
speeches and interviews. N1 was launched in January 2011 as ‘an attempt to correct 
biased reporting by the liberal media and disseminate information that the corporate 
media won’t cover at all or give a distorted version of it’.381  With little funding, the 
TV program runs a fifteen-minute newscast at 8pm on weekdays. Jobbik’s leader, 
Gabor Vona, announced the stations launch, showing an undeniable link between the 
station and the party. N1 subject matter targets Hungarian mysticism, history, politics 
and traditionalism. Controversial topics broadcasted include a report on Hitler’s 
birthday praising his qualities as a politician, showing images of Nazi parades.382  
 Liberal-Left Media 
Figyelő (meaning Observer)- Created in 1957, Figyelő is a weekly business and news 
publication looking at business, politics, economy, society and technology. The 
content of articles shows a slight liberal bias although the publication considers itself 
impartial, showing leanings towards centre-right and centre-left.383 
Hírszerző (meaning Intelligence)– Hírszerző is an online journal started in 2005 in 
self-run, though in relation to the think tank Political Capital and Capital Group Inc.  
The site was acquired by HVG Online Inc. in May 2010 strengthening the more 
journalistic and investigative side of the journal.384 The site defines itself as an 
‘independent, liberal site’ maintainging that they remain ‘fair, moderate, but highly 
critical’ (tisztességes, mértéktartó, de nagyon kritikus).385  The site is written in 
colloquial dialogue in almost blog-format, using satirical headlines and remains 
openly critical of the government. 
Magyar Narancs (meaning Hungarian Orange)- Magyar Narancs was founded in 
1989 as a more radical, liberal-minded magazine relating to younger early Fidesz 
supporters (when Fidesz was still liberal). Currently the magazine is considered a 
liberal-liberal, intellectual weekly magazine. The content of the magazine tends to be 
colloquially written laced with irony and satirical articles tackling social, cultural and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380	  The	  site	  runs	  its	  operations	  from	  a	  US	  based	  web-­‐network	  so	  that	  it	  can	  continue	  its	  media	  output	  
without	  worrying	  about	  Hungarian	  censorship:	  Magyari,	  Gábor,	  ‘Törvénysértő	  a	  Kuruc.info?	  Hol	  van	  a	  
szervere?	  Kik	  szerkesztik?	  -­‐	  Amit	  hírportálunkról	  tudni	  kell’,	  Kuruc.info,	  (23	  February	  2010),	  <accessed	  
1	  July	  2012>.	  
381	  ’N1	  on-­‐line	  TV	  Station	  has	  been	  launched’,	  Hungarian	  Ambiance,	  (31	  January	  2011),	  
http://www.hungarianambiance.com/2011/01/n1-­‐on-­‐line-­‐tv-­‐station-­‐has-­‐been-­‐launched.html,	  
<accessed	  10	  July	  2012>.	  
382	  ’Hungarian	  extreme-­‐right	  TV	  celebrates	  Hitler’s	  birthday’,	  The	  European	  Jewish	  Press,	  (24	  April	  
2011),	  http://www.ejpress.org/article/news/eastern_europe/50513,	  <accessed	  10	  July	  2012>.	  
383	  http://www.figyelo.hu/hetilap/	  
384	  ‘A	  HVG	  vette	  meg	  a	  Hírszerző’,	  Index.hu,	  19	  May	  2010,	  
http://index.hu/kultur/media/2010/05/19/a_hvg_vette_meg_a_hirszerzot/,	  <accessed	  18	  July	  2012>	  
385	  ‘Nem	  ülünk	  senkinek	  a	  zsebében!’,	  eMasa.hu,	  15	  July	  2005	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political issues. The name ‘Hungarian Orange’ refers to a film, mocking communism 
in the endeavor to try to cultivate oranges in Hungary, which of fails and a sour lemon 
is presented to the leader instead.386 
Népszabadság (meaning People’s Freedom)/ NOL.hu – Népszabadság was founded 
in 1956. Its name is in reference to its communist roots in the dissolved daily paper 
Szabad Nép (Free People). Népszabadság was previously and continues to be the 
most widely read newspaper in Hungary. In 1989 the paper became ‘independent’ but 
is considered a liberal-left leaning paper. The paper has an official website: NOL.hu. 
The paper is mainly owned by a Swiss publishing house Ringier but the Free Press 
foundation (Szabad Sajtó), which was founded by MSZP and owns 26.7% of the 
paper’s shares.387 It is generally a pro-EU/US paper and pro liberal left parties.  
Népszava (meaning ‘People’s Voice’) – Népszava is the oldest Hungarian Daily. The 
newspaper was originally established in 1877 as the official paper of the Hungarian 
Social Democratic Party, until 1948. Mainly the working class originally subscribed it 
to while papers like Magyar Nemzet were read more by Budapest intellectuals at the 
time (Arpad 2004). Up till 2002 is was the newspaper of the trade unions in Hungary 
in various forms before becoming privatized, now owned by its staff, relying on 
donations for funding.388 The paper and its online version, started around 2000, 
remain close to the Socialist party in its content.389  The format of Népszava in print 
and online provides short, easy to understand articles laced with images 
Independent 
HVG = Heti Világgazdaság (World Economy Weekly) – HVG is a weekly political 
economic magazine. Founded in 1979 modelled on the Economist. One of the few 
Hungarian journals considered to be truly independent as far as 2002 records show. 
Considered the leading news magazine of the country. HVG considers itself to be a 
liberal-minded news source providing public economic news weekly. Readership of 
HVG among interviewees seems to go beyond traditional right-left divides with 
individuals supporting Fidesz, LMP and MSZP-SZDSZ mentioning readership of 
HVG either in newspaper or online form.390 
Index – Is a one of the most popular Hungarian language news portals with an 
estimate of 1.3 million readers monthly. They are also particularly popular among 
younger people with an estimated 64% of their users between the ages of 18 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386	  ’Magyar	  Narancs’,	  PressEurop:	  Sources	  and	  Authors,	  presseurope.eu,	  
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/source-­‐profile/,	  <accessed	  10	  July	  2012>.	  
387	  Gavra,	  Gábor	  and	  Gábor	  Miklósi,	  ’A	  Népszabadság	  átalakulása:	  Színes	  és	  kalandos’,	  Magyar	  
Narancs,	  (23	  June	  2004),	  
http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/a_nepszabadsag_atalakulasa_szines_es_kalandos-­‐60279,	  <accessed	  
3	  July	  2012>.	  	  
388	  ‘Hungary’s	  media	  landscape	  –	  print	  media’,	  <www.wieninternational.at>,	  (28	  January	  2009).	  
389	  ’Népszava’,	  PressEurop:	  Sources	  and	  Authors,	  presseurope.eu,	  
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/source-­‐profile/1390631-­‐nepszava,	  <accessed	  10	  July	  2012>.	  
390	  Carmody,	  Deirdre,	  ‘The	  Media	  Business:	  East	  Europe’s	  Press	  Still	  Beckoning’,	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  
(17	  June	  1991)	  and	  <http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-­‐04-­‐01/why-­‐big-­‐media-­‐guns-­‐are-­‐
tracking-­‐hvg>,	  (accessed	  10	  June	  2012).	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39.391 Index was founded in 1995 under the internet portal name Internetto.hu and 
then changed to Index.hu. The site states itself as independent. Interestingly 
interviewees often class it both liberal and conservative. Usually liberal-left 
supporters will depict it is secretly conservative and conservative supporters state the 
opposite. From the content of the site there is possibly a liberal slant. Index mixes 
sociopolitical critiques with more tabloid-style news drawing in large youth 
readership. Articles are short with easy-to-read language. 
Origo – Origo is by far the most trafficked portal, none the less news portal, in 
Hungary with 4.46 million visitors monthly (almost half of Hungary’s population). 
Origo Zrt. Includes its news portal (Origo.hu) as well as an email service (free mail) 
and a social networking site IWIW that was the leading social networking site among 
young people in Hungary before the Facebook boom three to five years ago. Origo 
was founded in 1997. Origo attempts a more objective and neutral journalistic brief-
article style compared with its main news portal rival Index, who publishes more 
opinion-based articles. (Origo.hu) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391	  Information	  from	  an	  Index	  media	  analysis:	  Index:	  Általános	  médiaajánlat,	  Central	  European	  Media	  
and	  Publishing,	  (23	  May	  2012),	  http://ajanlat.index.hu/ajanlatok/Index_mediaajanlat_2012.pdf,	  
<accessed	  14	  June	  2012>.	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APPENDIX 7: Information Retrieval for Sociopolitical Information  
 
	   WEB	   TV	   RADIO	   PAPER	   MAG	   MEDIA	  	   KEY	  
1	   x	   	   	   x	   	   	   ONLINE	  MEDIA	  
2	   x	   	   x	   	   	   	   I	  =	  Index	  
4	   x	  	   	   	   	   	   I	   J	  =	  Jobbklikk	  
5	   X	   	   	   	   	   I,	  K	   M	  =	  Mandiner	  
6	   X	   X	   	   X	   	   HVG,	  N	   K = Konzervatórium	  
7	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   Journalist	  =reads	  all	   KU	  =	  Kuruc	  
8	   X	   	   X	   X	   	   MN,	  T,	  RC	   B	  =	  Barikád!	  
11	   X	   X	   	   	   	   J,	  K,	  I	   N1	  =	  Nemzeti1	  
13	   X	   X	   	   	   	   I,	  O,	  HT	   HI	  =	  Hírszerző	  
14	   X	   	   	   X	   	   NSZ,	  O,	  M	   O	  =	  Origo	  
15	   X	   	   X	   	   	   	   ME	  =	  Median	  
16	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   HVG,	  IR	   TA	  =	  Tarki	  
17	   X	   	   	   	   X	   KU,	  B,	  J	   	  
18	   X	   	   	   	   X	   KU,	  B,	  J	   RADIO	  
19	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   T	  =	  Tilos	  Rádio	  
20	   X	   	   	   X	   X	   I,	  NSZ,	  N,	  HVG	   RC	  =	  Rádio	  Café	  
21	   X	   X	  	   	   X	   	   HVG,	  F,	  N,	  MH,	  I,	  HVG	   IR	  =	  InfoRádio	  
22	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   RTL	  =	  RTL	  Klub	  
23	   X	   	   	   X	   X	   HVG,	  F,	  NSZ,	  N	   	  
24	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   DAILIES	  
25	   X	   	   	   X	   	   HVG,	  ES,	  I,	  O,	  ME,	  TA,	  MN,	  N	   MH	  =	  Magyar	  Hírlap	  
26	   X	   	   	   X	   	   I,	  HVG	   N	  =	  Népszabadság	  
27	   X	   	   X	   	   X	   	   NSZ	  =	  Népszava	  
28	   X	   	   	   X	   	   I,	  O,	  HI,	  NSZ	   MNe	  =	  Magyar	  Nemzet	  
29	   X	   	   	   	   	   HV,	  MN,	  RTL,	  HT	   	  
30	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   WEEKLIES	  
31	   X	   	   	   	   	   N	   HV	  =	  Heti	  Válasz	  
32	   X	   	   	   	   	   HVG,	  HI,	  O,	  I	   MN	  =	  Magyar	  Narancs	  
33	   X	   	   	   	   	   N,	  HI,	  I	  	   F	  =	  Figyelő	  
34	   X	   	   	   X	   X	   HV,	  MN,	  NSZ,	  F,	  HVG,	  N	  	   HVG=	  Heti	  Világgazdaság	  
35	   X	   	   	   X	   	   HI,	  N,	  MN	  	   ES	  =	  Életes	  Írodalom	  
39	   X	   	   	   	   	   FN.hu	   	  
40	   X	   	   	   	   	   M,	  K	   TV	  
41	   X	   	   	   X	   	   N,	  I,	  O	   HT	  =	  Hír	  TV	  
42	   X	   	   	   	   	   HVG,	  I	   MTI	  =	  National	  TV	  
46	   X	   	   	   	   	   I,	  HI	   D	  =	  Duna	  TV	  
47	   X	   	   	   	   	   I,	  O	   	  
48	   X	   X	   	   	   	   I,	  O,	  MH,	  MNe,	  B,	  N	  	   	  
M1	   X	   	   	   	   	   J	   	  
M2	   X	   	   	   	   	   K,	  N1	   	  
M4	   X	   	   	   	   X	   K,	  B,	  N1	   	  
M5	   X	   	   	   	   X	   K,	  B	   	  
D1	   X	   	   	   	   X	   K,	  B,	  N1	   	  
D2	   X	   	   	   	   X	   K,	  B,	  N1	   	  
D3	   X	   	   	   	   X	   K,	  B,	  N1	   	  
D4	   X	   	   	   	   X	   K,	  B,	  N1	   	  
D5	   X	   	   	   	   X	   K,	  B,	  N1	   ***	  
D6	   X	   	   	   	   X	   K,	  B,	  N1	   Interviewees	  highlighted	  
D7	   X	   X	   	   X	   	   MTI,	  HVG	   in	  red	  reported	  	  
D8	   X	   X	   	   	   	   I,	  O,	  D	   	  
D9	   X	   X	   	   X	   	   HVG,	  N,	  F,	  LMP	   	  
D11	   X	   X	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APPENDIX 8: Conceptual Model of the Decentralization Process 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
This	  model	  maps	  the	  goals	  of	  decentralized	  education	  reforms,	  with	  relation	  to	  political,	  economic,	  
organizational	  and	  educational	  considerations.	  This	  figure	  demonstrates	  the	  complexity	  and	  
constant	  monitoring	  necessary	  in	  maintaining	  a	  well-­‐balanced	  decentralized	  system.	  It	  also	  displays	  
the	  heightened	  responsibility	  of	  regional	  and	  local	  actors,	  including	  teachers	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  
the	  regional	  planning	  and	  technicalities	  involved	  in	  implementation	  of	  decided	  guidelines	  and	  
standards	  (Figure	  and	  data	  from	  Hanson	  1998).	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APPENDIX 9: Political Discourse and Socializing Influences in Schools 
	   Politics	  Discussed?	   Teachers	  Alignment?	   Teachers/School	  Influence	  Political	  Ideas	  
1	   -­‐	   +	   +/-­‐	  
2	   -­‐	   +/-­‐	   -­‐	  
4	   +	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
5	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   -­‐	  
6	   -­‐	   +/-­‐	  	   +	  
7	   +	   +	   -­‐	  
8	   -­‐	   +	   -­‐	  
9	   -­‐	   0	   -­‐	  
11	   -­‐	   0	   -­‐	  
13	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +/-­‐	   -­‐	  
14	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   -­‐	  
15	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
16	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   -­‐	  
18	   -­‐	   0	   -­‐	  
19	   0	   +	   -­‐	  
20	   -­‐	   +/-­‐	   +/-­‐	  
21	   -­‐	   +	   -­‐	  
22	   -­‐/+	  in	  special	  schools	   +	   +	  rebel	  against	  teacher	  
23	   -­‐	   +	   -­‐	  
24	   +	   +	   -­‐	  
25	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   +	  
28	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   +/-­‐	  
29	   0	   +	   +	  rebel	  against	  teacher	  
30	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   -­‐	  
31	   -­‐/+	  in	  special	  schools	   +/-­‐	   +	  rebel	  against	  teacher	  
32	   -­‐/+	  in	  special	  schools	   +	   +/-­‐	  in	  special	  college	  
33	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   +	  
34	   -­‐/+	  in	  special	  schools	   +	   +	  
35	   -­‐/+	  in	  special	  schools	   +/-­‐	   +/-­‐	  in	  special	  college	  
36	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   -­‐	  
39	   -­‐	   +/-­‐	  	  history	  teacher	  	   -­‐	  
40	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   +	  
41	   -­‐/+	  in	  special	  schools	   +	   -­‐	  
42	   -­‐	   +/-­‐	   +/-­‐	  in	  special	  college	  
46	   -­‐	   +	   +	  rebel	  against	  teacher	  +	  in	  special	  college	  
47	   -­‐	   +/-­‐	   -­‐	  
48	   -­‐/+	  certain	  professors	  	   +	   -­‐	  
D1	   -­‐	   +	   -­‐	  
D2	   -­‐	   +	   -­‐	  
D3	   -­‐	   +	   -­‐	  
D4	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +	   -­‐	  
D5	   -­‐	   +	   -­‐	  
D6	   -­‐	   +	   -­‐	  
D8	   -­‐	   +/-­‐	   -­‐	  
D9	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
D11	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
M1	   0	   0	   -­‐	  
M2	   -­‐	   0	   -­‐	  
M3	   -­‐	   0	   -­‐	  
M4	   -­‐	   +/-­‐	  	  history	  teacher	  	   -­‐	  
M5	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
P2	   -­‐/+	   +/-­‐	   +	  
P3	   -­‐/+	  (skip	  some)	   +/-­‐	   +	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NOTES	  FOR	  APPENDIX	  10	  
The	   first	   column	   looks	   at	   responses	   given	   about	   whether	   or	   not	   current	   political	   topics	   were	  
discussed	   by	   teachers	   in	   the	   classroom.	   The	   (-­‐/+)	   means	   that	   some	   topics	   were	   skipped	   in	  
contemporary	   political	   discussions.	   The	   second	   column	   records	   responses	   of	   interviewees	   over	  
whether	  or	  not	  they	  felt	  they	  knew	  their	  teachers’	  political	  alignment.	  The	  (+/-­‐)	  signifies	  that	  they	  
knew	  some	  teachers	  but	  not	  all	  their	  teachers’	  political	  views.	  The	  last	  column	  tracks	  respondents	  
feelings	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  felt	  teachers	  or	  their	  university	  environment	  has	  affected	  their	  
political	   orientation	   and/or	   identity.	   The	   (+/-­‐)	   signifies	   that	   a	   particular	   class	   or	   teacher	   has	   had	  
some	  affect	  on	  their	  orientation. 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   310	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
Ágh, Attila, ‘A koraérettség dilemmái: A politikatudomány egy évtizede Magyarországon’, 
Politikatudományi Szemle, 2(1), (1993), pp. 104–110. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara, ‘Participation in Heterogeneous Communities’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 115 (3), (2000), pp. 847-904.  
 
Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1963). 
 
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
(London: Verso, 1991). 
Antić, Miljenko and Jadranka Vlahovec, ‘Was Communism Better?: A Comparison of Economic and 
Social Development of Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania’, Anali Hrvatskog 
politološkog društva, 7(1), (2011), pp. 51 – 72. 
Arato, Andrew, ‘Revolution and Restoration: On the origins of right-wing radical ideology in 
Hungary’, in Christopher Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki (eds.), The New Great Transformation?: 
Change and continuity in East-Central Europe, (London/New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 99-119. 
Arpad, Joseph J., ‘The Question of Hungarian Popular Culture’, The Journal of Popular Culture, 29(2), 
(5 March 2004), pp. 9 - 31. 
Ash, Timothy Garton, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent, (New York: Vintage 
Books-Random House 1994). 
Aschaffenburg, Karen E., ‘Schooling for Socialism’, in Szelényi, Szonja (ed.), Equality by Design: The 
Grand Experiment of Destratification in Hungary, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 
21 – 41. 
Aslan, Elif and Murat Aslan, ‘An Empirical Search over Reverse Socialization: The Effects of Turkish 
Teens over Family Purchase of Cell Phone and Computer’, Conference of the International Journal of 
Arts and Sciences, 2(1), (2009). 
Art, David, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe, 
Draft 5.0, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009). 
Ballas, Dimitris, Ruth Lupton, Dimitris Kavroudakis, Benjamin Hennig, Vassiliki Yiagopoulou, Roger 
Dale and Danny Dorling, Mind the Gap: Education Inequality Across EU Regions, Authored for the 
European Commission’s Directorate-General for Education and Culture, (NESSE and European Union: 
2012) 
Balassa, Bela, ‘The Economic Reform in Hungary’, Economica, 37(145), (February 1970), pp. 1-22. 
Balogh, Éva, ‘Hungarian Public Education: 1945 – 1956’, Hungarian Spectrum, (26 May 2009),  
< http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2009/05/26/hungarian-public-education-19451956/>. 
Balogh, Éva, ‘Hungarian Gypsies (Roma): Past and Present (Part 1)’, Hungarian Spectrum, (10 June 
2009), < http://esbalogh.typepad.com/hungarianspectrum/2009/06/hungarian-gypsies-roma-past-and-
present.html>. 
Bang, Henrik, ‘Among everyday makers and expert citizens’ in Janet Newman, (ed), Remaking 
governance: peoples, politics and the public sphere, (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005), 159-179. 
Barany, Zoltan, & Volgyes, Ivan (eds.), The legacies of communism in Eastern Europe, (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
Baráth, Tibor, ‘School improvement in public education: Case of Hungary’, Közoktatási Vezetőképző 
Intézet, (power point presentation at the University of Szeged: 4 November 2004). 
	   311	  
Barnes, Samuel and Janos Simons, The Postcommunist Citizen, (Budapest: Erasmus Foundation, 
1998).  
Bartlett, Jamie, Jonathan Birdwell, Péter Kekó, Jack Benfield and Gabor Gyori, Populism in Europe: 
Hungary, www.demos.co.uk, (Demos: London, 2012), 
<http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Demos_Hungary_Book_web-1.pdf?1327923915>. 
Bayer, József, ‘The Process of the Change of the Political System in Hungary: Deepening crisis, 
emerging opposition’, East European Quarterly, 39(2), pp. 129–147. 
Baytchinska, Krassimira, ‘Values of Contemporary East European Culture:  A cross-cultural and 
developmental approach’, in Andrew Blasko and Diana Janušauskienė (eds.), Political Transformation 
and Changing Identities in Central and Eastern Europe, (36), (Washington D.C.: Council for Research 
in Values and Philosophy, 2008), pp. 299-324. 
Beck, Paul Allen, ‘The Role of Agents in Political Socialization’, in Stanley Allen Renshon (ed.), 
Handbook of Political Socialization Theory and Research, (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 115-
142. 
Beck, Ulrich, ‘Freedom’s children’, In Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gensheim, (eds.), 
Individualisation. (London: Sage, 2001), pp. 156-171. 
Beck, Paul Allen, Russell J. Dalton, Steven Greene, and Robert Huckfeldt, ‘The Social Calculus of 
Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices’, American 
Political Science Review, 96(1), (2002), pp. 57 - 73. 
 
Bencédy, József, Public Education in Hungary, (Budapest: Corvina, 1982). 
Benda, Kálmán, Magyarország Történi Kronológiája (The chronological history of Hungary), 2nd ed. 
vol. 4, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1983). 
Bennett, Lance W., ‘Communicating Global Activism’, in Donk, Wim van de, Brian D. Loader, Paul 
G. Nixon and Dieter Rucht (eds.), Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2004). pp.123-146. 
Bennett, Lance W., News: the politics of illusion (5th edn.), (New York: Londman, 2003). 
Bennet, Lance W., ‘Civic Learning Online: Responding to the Generational Shift in Citizen Identity,’ 
Around the CIRCLE, (5), (2008), pp. 1-2. 
Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion 
Formation in a Presidential Campaign, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). 
 
Bessant, Judith, ‘Mixed messages: Youth participation and democratic practice’, Australian Journal of 
Political Science, 39 (2), (2004), pp. 387 - 404. 
van Biezen, Ingrid, Political Parties in New Democracies: Party Organization in Southern and East-
Central Europe, (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2003).  
van Biezen, Ingrid, ‘On the Theory and Practice of Party Formation and Adaptation in New 
Democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, (44), (2005), pp. 147 – 174. 
Bíró Nagy, András and Dániel Róna, ‘Jobbik’s Road to the Hungarian Parliament, 2003-2010’, 
Rational Radicalism, (2011), pp. 1 – 25. 
 
Bíro Nagy, András, Tamás Boros and Áron Varga, Euroszkepticizmus Magyarországon, A Policy 
Solutions politikai elemzése a Friedrich Ebert Alapítvány számára, (Policy Solutions: Budapest, 2012). 
Bodoky, Tamás, ‘Nincs tévém, nem olvasok papírújságot’, Média-Kutató, (Budapest, 2007). 
Bohlen, Celeste, ‘Hungary’s odd affair with the right’, New York Times, (12 May 2002). 
	   312	  
‘Bokros-csomag: a tények a mítosz mögött’, Origo Gazdaság, (18 July 2002), < 
http://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/hirek/hazaihirek/20020418bokroscsomag.html#1>. 
Boros-Kazai, András, ‘Hungary’, in Richard Frucht (ed.), Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the 
People, Lands and Culture, (1), (ABC-CLIO, Inc.: Santa Barbara, 2005). 
Bourdieu, Pierre, ‘Genése et structure du champ religieux’, Revue Francaise de Sociologie, (12), 
(1971), pp.295-334. 
Boyer, Dominic, ‘Simply the Best: Parody and Political Sincerity in Iceland’, American Ethnologist, 
40(2), (2013), pp. 276 – 287. 
Bozóki, András, ‘Post-Communist Transition: Political Tendencies in Hungary’ Found in EEPS (Easr 
European Politics and Societies’, East European Politics and Societies, 4(2), (1992), pp. 211 – 230. 
Bozóki, András, ‘Rhetoric of Action: The Language of Regime Change in Hungary’, in András Bozóki 
(ed.), Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 
1999), pp. 263-284. 
Bozóki, András and Miklós Sükösd, Anarchism in Hungary: Theory, History, Legacies, CHSP 
Hungarian Studies Series 7, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
Bozóki, András, ‘Consolidation or Second Revolution? The Emergence of the New Right in Hungary’, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 24(2), (1 June 2008), pp. 191-231. 
Bozóki, András, András Körösényi and George Schöpflin (eds.), Post-Communist Transition: 
Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, (London and New York: Pinter Publishers and St Martin’s Press, 
1992). 
Bozóki, András and Miklós Sükösd, Anarchism in Hungary: Theory, History, Legacies, CHSP 
Hungarian Studies Series (7), (New York: Columbia University Press, first published in Hungary in 
1994 and in England in 2006). 
Bozóki, András and Borbála Kriza, ‘The Hungarian Semi-loyal Parties and their Impact on Democratic 
Consolidation’, in Andrew Blasko and Diana Janušauskienė (eds.), Political Transformation and 
Changing Identities in Central and Eastern Europe, (36), (Washington D.C.: Council for Research in 
Values and Philosophy, 2008), pp.215-242. 
Brady, Henry, Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, ‘Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political 
Participation,’ American Political Science Review, (89), (1995), pp.271-294. 
Brannen, Julia, Suzan Lewis, Ann Nilsen, and Janet Smithson (eds.), Young Europeans. Work and 
Family Life: Futures in Transition, (London: Routledge, 2002) 
Brim, Orville., ‘Socialization Though the Life Cycle’ in Brim, Orville and Stanton Wheeler, 
Socialization After Childhood: Two Essays, (RE Krieger Publishin Co., 1966). 
 
Brubaker, Rogers and Margit Feischmidt, ‘1848 in 1998: The Politics of Commemoration in Hungary, 
Romania, and Slovakia’, in The Selected Works of Rogers Brubaker, (University of California: Los 
Angeles, 2002). 
Bruck, András, ‘Viktor Nem Fog Elmenni’, Élet és Irodalom, LVI.(45), (9 November 2012). 
Bruszt László and János Simon, ‘The Great Transformation: Theoretical Conceptions and Public 
Opinion on Democracy and Capitalism in Eastern Europe’, in Szoboszlai (ed), Flying Blind, (Budapest: 
Institute of Political Science, 1993), pp. 780-781. 
Bruter, Michael and Sarah Harrison, The Future of our Democracies: Young Party Members in 
Europe, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).  
Buckingham, David, After the Death of Childhood: Growing Up in the Age of Electronic Media, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 
	   313	  
Bunce, Valerie and Sharon Wolchik, ‘Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions’, Journal of 
Democracy, 17(4), (October 2006), pp. 5 – 18. 
Burstein, Paul, ‘Interest organizations, political parties, and the study of democratic politics’, in Anne 
Costain and Andrew McFarland (eds.), Social Movements and American Political Institutions, 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 39 – 56. 
Burgess, Robert (ed.), Field Research: Sourcebook and Field Manual, (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1982). 
Burstein, Paul and April Linton, ‘The Impact of political parties, interest groups, and social movement 
organizations on public policy: Some recent evidence and theoretical concerns’, Social Forces, 81(2), 
(2002), pp. 380 – 408 
Bustikova, Lenka and Herbert Kitschelt, ‘The radical right in post-communist Europe: Comparative 
perspectives on legacies and party competition’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, (42), (2009), 
pp. 459 – 483. 
Butler, Judith, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, (New York and London: Routledge, 
1997). 
Butler, Judith and Athena Athanasiou, Disposession: The Performative in the Political, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2013). 
Bynner, John and Kenneth Roberts, Youth and Work: Transitions to Employment in England and 
Germany, (London: Anglo-German Foundation, 1991). 
Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides, (Evanston, IL: Row, 
Peterson, 1954). 
 
Campbell, David, Why we vote: How schools and communities shape our civic life, (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
Cannon, David, Generation X and the New Work Ethics, Working Paper (London: Demos, 1995). 
Chaffee, Steven H., Jack M. McLeod, and Daniel B. Wackman, ‘Family communication patterns and 
adolescent political participation’, in J. Dennis (ed.), Socialisation to Politics: A Reader, (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1973), pp. 349-364. 
Chaffee, Steven H, and Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, ‘Mass Communication in Political Socialisation,’ in 
Renshon, S.A. (ed.), Handbook of Political Socialisation, (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 223-
258. 
Chaffee, Steven H., and Seung Mock Yang, ‘Communication and political socialisation’, in Ichilov, 
Orit (ed.), Political Socialisation, Citizenship Education, and Democracy, (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1990), pp. 137-157. 
Chaffee, Steven H., ‘The newspaper as an agent of political socialisation in schools: effects of “El 
Diario en la Escuela” in Argentina’, paper presented at the annual convention of the Association for 
Education in Journalism, (Chicago, IL, 1997) 
Chan, Kenneth Ka-Lok, ‘Strands of Conservatism in Post-Communist Democracies’, from ECPR Joint 
Sessions of Workshops 4: Conservative Politics and the Nature of Consensus in the 1990s, (Mannheim: 
26-31 March 1999). 
Chong, Dennis, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement, (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991). 
Chuprov, Vladimir, Julia Zubok and Christopher Williams, Youth in a Risk Society, (Moscow: Nauka, 
2001). 
	   314	  
Chytilek, Roman and Petr Kaniok, ‘Territoriality and Eurosceptic Parties in V4 Countries’, Paper 
presented at Constructing New Identities in Transforming Europe Enlargement and Integration: are 
they compatible?, (University of Helsinki: Helsinki, 2006). 
Cigler, Allan, and Mark R. Joslyn, ‘The Extensiveness of Group Membership and  
Social Capital: The Impact on Political Tolerance Attitudes’, Political Research  
Quarterly, 55(1), (2002), pp. 7 – 25. 
Clawson, Robert, ‘Political Socialization of Children in the USSR’, Political Science Quarterly, 88(4), 
(December 1973), pp. 684-812. 
Cohen, Phil, ‘Subcultural Conflict and Working-class Community’, CCCS Working Papers in Cultural 
Studies, (2), (1972), pp. 5–53. 
Cohen, Stanley, Folk Devil and Moral Panics, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 
Coleman, James, The Adolescent Society (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1961). 
Coleman, Stephen, Remixing citizenship: democracy and young people’s use of the Internet, (London: 
Carnegie YPI, 2006). 
Coman, Mihai, ‘Development in Journalism Theory About Media ‘Transition’ in Central and Eastern 
Europe 1990-99’, Journalism Studies, 1(1), (2000), pp. 35 – 56. 
Connelly, John, Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher 
Education, 1945 – 1956, (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).  
Costa, Dora, and Matthew Kahn, ‘Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An  
Economist's Perspective’, Perspectives on Politics, 1(1), (2003), pp. 103 – 111. 
Cox, Terry, Hungary 1956: Forty Years On, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997). 
Cross, William and Lisa Young, ‘Factors influencing the decision of the young politically engaged to 
join a political party: An investigation of the Canadian case’, Party Politics, (14), (2008), pp.345 – 369. 
Crossley, Nick, Making Sense of Social Movements, (Philadelphia and Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 2002).  
Csákó, Mihály, Eszter Berényi, Éva Bognár and Kyra Tomay, ‘Politikai Szocizlizáció Magyarországon 
a Kilencvennes Években’, A Nemzetközi Politikatudományi Társaság politikai szocializációs 
kutatóbizottságának, (IPSA RCPSE) Presented at the Round Table Talks, (19 May 1999), < 
http://www.mtapti.hu/mszt/20001/csakom.htm>. 
Csákó, Mihály, ‘Ifjúság és Politika: A politikai szocializáció kutatásáról’, Educatio, (4), (2004), pp. 
535 – 550. 
Csákó, Mihály, ‘Iskola és Politikai Szocializáció’, Paper presented at the Politics and School 
Conference (Politika és Iskola – Konferencia), (Hotel Mercure Metropole: Budapest, 24 March 2005). 
Csepeli, Gyorgy, ‘Children of a Paradise Lost’, in Csepeli et. al. (eds) From Subject to Citizen, 
(Hungarian Center for Political Education: Budapest, 1994) 
Csepeli, György and Antal Örkény, Ideology and Political Beliefs in Hungary: the Twilight of State 
Socialism, translated by: McLean and Julianna Parti, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992). 
Csiszárik-Kocsir, Ágnes and András Medve, ‘The Financial Specialties of Hungrian Public Educagtion 
Compared with International Figures’, International Conference on Management, Enterprise and 
Benchmarking, (Budapest: MEB 2009, 5-6 June 2009). 
Csizmadia, Ervin, ‘Magyar politikatudomány – múlt nélküli jelen?’, Politikatudományi Szemle, 2(2), 
(1993), pp. 152–157. 
	   315	  
Czene, Gábor, ‘Itt vannak apolgári körök jobbikos változatban’, Népszabadsád, (27 May 2009), 
<http://www.nol.hu/belfold/20090527-jobbikos_ortuzek__kardokkal>. 
Dahl, Robert A., Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 
Dahlgren, Peter, ‘Forward’ in Donk, Wim van de, Brian D. Loader, Paul G. Nixon and Dieter Rucht 
(eds.), Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, (London/New York: Routledge, 
2004). 
Dalton, Russell, Citizen Politics, 4th Edition, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2005). 
Dalton, Russell, The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American Politics, 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008). 
Dalton, Russell and Steven Weldon, ‘Public Images of Political Parties’, West European Politics, (28), 
(2005), pp. 931–51.  
 
Davidson-Schmich LK, Hartmann K, Mum- mert U., ‘You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t 
(always) make it drink: positive freedom in the aftermath of German unification’, Communist Post-
Communist Studies, 35(3), (2002), pp. 325–52. 
 
Delanty, Gerald, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics, (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 2000). 
Delli Caprini, Micheal and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics and Why it Matters, 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). 
Demeter, Zayzon Mária, A budapesti Népesség Nemzeti, (Humanitas Civitatis Alapítvány: Budapest, 
1994). 
Dieckhoff, Alain, ‘Beyond Conventional Wisdom: Cultural and Political Nationalism Revisited’, in 
Alain Dieckhoff and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.), Revisiting Nationalism: Concepts, Structures, 
Processes, (London: Hurst, 2003). 
Dobbins, Michael and Christoph Knill, ‘Higher Education Policies in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Convergence toward a Common Model?’, Governance, 22(3), (2009), pp. 397- 430. 
 
Donk, Wim van de, Brian D. Loader, Paul G. Nixon and Dieter Rucht (eds.), Cyberprotest: New 
Media, Citizens and Social Movements, (London/New York: Routledge, 2004). 
Dudley, Robert and Alan Gitelson, ‘Political Literacy, Civic Education, and Civic Engagement: A 
Return to Political Socialization?’, Applied Developmental Sciences, 6(4), (2002), pp. 175-182. 
Easton, David and Robert D. Hess, ‘The Child’s Political World’, Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, 6(3), (August 1961), pp. 229 – 246. 
Easton, David, and Jack Dennis, ‘The child’s image of government’, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, (361), (1965), pp. 40–57. 
Edwards, Bob and John McCarthy, ‘Resources and Social Movement Mobilization’, in Snow, Soule 
and Kriesi (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 116-
152. 
‘Az egyetemisták közt a Jobbik a legnépszerűbb’, Index, (16 February 2013), < 
http://index.hu/belfold/2013/02/16/az_egyetemistak_kozt_a_jobbik_a_legnepszerubb/>. 
Van Eijck, Koen and Paul M. De Graaf, ‘The Effects of Family Structure on the Educational 
Attainment of Siblings in Hungary’, European Sociological Review, 11(3), (Oxford University Press: 
December 1995). 
Eisener, J., Taking Back the Vote: Getting American Youth Involved in Our Democracy, (Boston: 
Beacon, 2004). 
	   316	  
Eisenstadt, Shmuel, ‘From Generation to Generation’, in Harry Silverstein (ed.), The Sociology of 
Youth: Evolution and Revolution, (New York: Macmillan, 1956). 
Ekiert, Grzegorz and Jan Kubik, ‘Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia, 1989–1993’, World Politics, (4), (July 1998), pp. 507–547. 
Enyedi, Zsolt, ‘The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation’, European Journal of Political Research 
(44), (2005), pp. 697-720. 
Enyedi, Zsolt, ‘Party Politics in Post-Communist Transition’, in the Handbook of Party Politics,  
Richard Katz and William Crotty (eds.), (Sage Publications: London, 2006), pp. 228 - 238. 
Enyedi, Zsolt and Lukáš Linek,  ‘Searching for the Right Organization: Ideology and Party Structure in 
East-Central Europe’, Party Politics, 14(4), (2008), pp. 455-477. 
Enyedi, Zsolt and Gábor Tóka, ‘The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in Hungary’, in Paul Webb & 
Stephen White (eds.), Party Politics in New Democracies, (Oxford: Oxofrd University Press, 2007), 
pp. 147 - 178). 
 ‘The far right in Eastern Europe: Right on down’, The Economist, (12 November 2009), < 
http://www.economist.com/node/14859369>. 
Farthing, Rys, ‘The Politics of Youthful Antipolitics: Representing the ‘issue’ of youth participation in 
politics’, Journal of Youth Studies, 13(2), (April 2010), pp. 181-195. 
Feldman, Steven P., ‘Stories as Cultural Creativity: On the Relation Between Symbolism and Politics 
in Organizational Change’, Human Relations, 43(9), (1990), pp. 809 – 828. 
Fendrich, James, and Robert Turner, ‘The Transition from Student to Adult Politics’, Social Forces, 
(67), (1989), pp. 1049-1057. 
Ferge, Zsuzsa, A Society in the Making, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1979).  
Fisher, Dana, ‘Youth Political Participation: Bridging Activism and Electoral Politics’, The Anuual 
Review of Sociology, (38), (2012), pp. 119 – 137. 
‘Flashmob köszönti este SchmittetL Csak úgy doktor úr ő...’, Népszabadság Online, (27 March 2012), 
< http://nol.hu/belfold/csak_ugy_doktor_ur_o__ahogyan_es_orvos_-_flashmob>. 
Foley, Michael W., and Bob Edwards, ‘The Paradox of Civil Society’, Journal of Democracy, 7(3), 
(1996), pp. 38 – 52.  
Forbig, Joerg,  ‘Democratic politics, legitimacy and youth participation’, in Forbig, Joerg (ed.), 
Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for research and democratic practice in Europe, 
(Council of Europe Publishing, 2005). 
Fowler, Brigid, ‘Concentrated Orange: Fidesz and the Remaking of the Hungarian Centre-Right, 1994-
2002’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20(3), (September 2004), pp.80-113.  
Fowler, Brigid, Sean Hanley, Aleks Szezerbiak, Tim Haughton, ‘Explaining the Success of Centre-
Right Parties in Post-Communist East Central Europe: A Comparative Analysis’, Sussex European 
Institute Working Paper, (94), (University of Sussex, Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2007).  
Fratczak-Rudnicka, B., ‘Political socialization in Poland’, in H. Dekker and R. Meyenberg (eds.), 
Politics and the European Younger Generation: Political Socialization in Eastern, Central and 
Western Europe, (Oldenburg, Germany: Bibliothekas und Informations sytem der Universitait 
Oldenburg, 1991), pp. 183-209.  
Fuchs, Dieter and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, ‘Citizens and the State: A Changing Relationship?’, in D. 
Fuchs and H.D. Klingemann (eds.), Citizens and the State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
Furlong, Andrew, and Fred Cartmel, Young People and Social Change: Individualisation and Risk in 
Late Modernity, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997). 
	   317	  
Füzessi, Károly, ‘Higher education under threat in Hungary’, Open Democracy Online, (11 February 
2013), <http://www.opendemocracy.net/k%C3%A1roly-f%C3%BCzessi/higher-education-under-
threat-in-hungary>. 
Gal, Susan, ‘Bartók’s Funeral: Representations of Europe in Hungarian Political Rhetoric’, American 
Ethnologist, 18(3), (1991), pp. 440 - 58. 
Galston, William, ‘Political knowledge, political engagement, and civic education’, Annual Review of 
Political Science, (4), (2001), pp.217-234. 
Gamson, William and David Meyer, ‘Framing Political Opportunity’, in Doug McAdam, John 
McCarthy and Mayer Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press,1996).  
Ganev, Venelin, ‘Ballots, Bribes, and State Building in Bulgaria’, Journal of Democracy, 17(1), 
(January 2006), pp. 75 – 89. 
Garcia-Castañon, Marcela, Alison Rank and Matt Barreto, ‘Plugged in or tuned out? Youth, race, and 
Internet usage in the 2008 election’, Journal of Political Marketing, (10), (2011), pp. 115 - 38. 
Gelperowic, Roseline, and Brian Beharrell, ‘Healthy Food Products for Children: Packaging and 
Mothers’ Purchase Decisions’, British Food Journal, 96(11), (1994), pp. 4 – 8. 
Gerhards, Jürgen and Dieter Rucht, ‘Mesmobolization: Organization Framing in Two Protest 
Campaigns in West Germany’, American Journal of Sociology, 98(3), (1992), pp. 555-95. 
Gerő, András, Hungarian Illusionism, Translated by: Thomas, J., (New York: Center for Hungarian 
Studies and Publications Inc., Columbia University Press, 2008), <Originally Magyar Illuzionizmus, 
(2006)>. 
Gerő, Márton, ‘Radical Changes in Higher Education’, European Industrial Relations Observatory On-
Line, (February 2012), < http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2012/02/articles/hu1202021i.htm>. 
Gheciu, Alexandra, ‘Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe’,  
International Organization (59), (2005), pp. 973-1012.  
Gibson, Rachel and Stephen Ward, Reinvigorating Democracy? British Politics and the Internet, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). 
 
Gimpel, James, Celeste Lay, and Jason Schuknecht, Cultivating Democracy: Civic environments and 
political socialization in America, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2003). 
Giorgi, Liana, The Post-Socialist Media: what power the West?, (Aldershot: Avebury-Ashgate, 1995). 
Giugni, Marco, From Contention to Democracy, (Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 1998). 
Glenn, John K., Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
Goerres, Achim, The Political Participation of Older people in Europe: the Greying of our 
Democracies, (England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
Goklap, C., Quand Vient L’Age des Choix (Paris: PUF-INED, 1981). 
Goldstone, Jack A., ‘Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics’, in Jack Goldstone 
(ed.), States, Parties, and Social Movements, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1 – 
26. 
Gombár, Csaba, Zsolt Enyedi and Hédi Volosin, Két Magyarország, (Osiris: Budapest, 2005). 
Goslin, David (ed), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research Summary, (Chicago: Rand 
McNally  and co., 1969). 
	   318	  
Gradstein, Mark and Moshe Justman, ‘Education, Social Cohesion and Economic Growth’, CEPR 
Discussion Paper, no. 2773, (April 2001). 
Grant, Nigel, Society, Schools and Progress in Eastern Europe, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969). 
Greenstein, Fred I., Children and Politics, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965). 
Greenstein, Fred, ‘The benevolent leader revisited: Children’s images of political leaders in three 
democracies’, American Political Science Review, (69), (1975), pp. 1371–1398. 
Grødeland, Åse B., ‘Public perceptionsof non-governmental organisations in Serbia, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina and Macedonia’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39(2), (2006), pp. 221-246.  
Grødeland, Åse B. and Aadne Aasland, ‘Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe: Perceptions and Use 
of Contacts’, Journal of Civil Society, 7(2), (June 2011), pp. 129-156. 
Gross, Peter, ‘Between Reality and Dream: Eastern European Media Transition, Transformation, 
Consolidation and Integration’, East European Politics and Societies, 18(110), (2004), pp. 110 – 131. 
Gross, Neil, Ward Mason and Alexander McEarchern, Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the 
School Superintendency Role, (New York: John Wily and Sons Inc., 1958). 
Grossbart, Sanford, Stephanie McConnell Hughes, Susie Pryor and Amber Yost, ‘Socialization 
Aspects of Parents, Children, and the Internet’, in NA - Advances in Consumer Research, (29), Susan 
M. Broniarczyk and Kent Nakamoto, Valdosta, GA (eds.). (Association for Consumer Research, 2002), 
pp. 66 - 70. 
Grzymała-Busse, Anna, Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in 
East-Central Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 
Gubrium, Jaber F. and James A. Holstein, Handbook of Interview Research, (London: Sage 
Publications, 2001). Guigni,	  Marco,	  ‘Was	  it	  worth	  the	  effort?	  The	  outcomes	  and	  consequences	  of	  social	  movements’,	  
Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology,	  (24),	  (1998),	  pp.	  371-­‐393.	  	  
Gurr, Ted, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
György, Péter, Néma Hagyomány: Kollektív felejtés és a kései múltértelmezés, (Budapest: Magvető, 
2000). 
Halász, Gábor, ‘School autonomy and the reform of educational administration in Hungary’, European 
Education, 27(4), (Winter 1995 – 1996), pp. 57 – 67. 
Halasz, Katalin, ‘The Rise of the Radical Right in Europe and the Case of Hungary: ‘Gypsy crime’ 
defines national identity?’, Development, 52(4), (2009), pp.490-494. 
Hankiss, Elemér, ‘The "Second Society": Is There an Alternative Social Model Emerging in 
Contemporary Hungary?’, Social Research, 55(1/2), (Spring/Summer 1988), pp. 13 – 42. 
Hankiss, Elemér, East European Alternatives, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990). 
Hanley, Sean, ‘Getting the Right Right: Redefining the Centre-Right in Post-Communist Europe’, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20(3), (2004) pp.9-27. 
Hanley, Sean, Aleks Szczerbiak, Tim Haughton and Brigid Fowler, ‘Sticking Together: Explaining 
Comparative Centre-Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe’, Party 
Politics, 14(4), (2008) pp.407-434. 
Havas, Gábor, ‘Ne próbáljuk a bűnt etnicizálni’, Élet és Irodalom, (3 April 2009). 
Hanson, Mark E., Educational Administration and Organizational Behavior, (4th edition), (Ally & 
Bacon: Boston, MA., 1996). 
	   319	  
Hanson, Mark E., ‘Strategies of educational decentralization: Key questions and core issues’, Journal 
of Educational Administration, 36(2), (1998), pp. 111 – 128. 
Harell, Allison, Dietland Stolle and Ellen Quintelier, ‘Network Diversity and Political Participation: A 
Complication or an Asset?’, Paper prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research, (Pisa, 
Italy : 5 – 9 August 2007). 
Hartmann, Jürgen, and Sylvia Trnka, Democratic Youth Participation in Society: A Concept Revisited, 
(Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1985). 
Heaney, Michael, Matthew Newman and Dari Sylvester, ‘Campaigning in the Internet age’, in The 
Electoral Challenge: Theory Meets Practice, SC Craig, DB Hill (eds.), (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2010), pp. 165 - 93.  
Heany, Michael and Fabio Rojas, ‘Partisans, nonpartisans, and the antiwar movement in the United 
States’, American Politics Research, 35(4), (July 2007), pp. 431 – 464. 
Hebdige, Dick, Subculture: The Meaning of Style, (London and New York: Routledge, 1979). 
Helve, Helena and Claire Wallace (eds), Youth, Citizenship and Empowerment, (Ashagate Publishing: 
Wiltshire, England 2002). 
Simon, Herbert, ‘Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science’, The 
American Political Science Review, 79(2), (June 1985), pp. 293-304. 
Heyns, B., & Jasinska-Kania, A., ‘Values, politics, and the ideologies of reform: Poland in transition’, 
in F. D. Weil (Ed.), Democratization in Eastern and Western Europe: A research annual, (Greenwich, 
CT: JAI.1992), pp. 175-201. 
Hideg, Eva and Erzsebet Novaky, ‘The Future of Hungarian Youth in the Years of the 
Transformation’, in Jennifer Gidley and Sohail Inayatullah (eds.), Youth Futures: Comparative 
Research and Transformative Visions, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002). 
Hideg, Éva and Erzsébet Nováky, ‘Changing Attitudes to the Future of Hungary’, Futures, (42), 2009, 
pp.230-236.  
Hiller, István, Education in Hungary: Past, Present, Future- An Overview, Ministry of Education and 
Culture, (Budapest: Department for EU Relations, 2008). 
Hockenos, Paul, Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Easter Europe, (New York: 
Routledge, 1993). 
Hofer, Tamás, ‘Construction of the “Folk Culture Heritage” in Hungary and Rival Versions of National 
Identity’, Ethnologia Europaea, (21), (1991), pp. 145-70. 
Hooghe, Marc. ‘Political Socialization and the Future of Politics,’ Acta Politica, (39), (2004), pp.331-
341. 
Hooghe, Marc and Dietland Stolle, ‘Age matters. Life cycles and cohort differences in the socialisation 
effect of  voluntary participation’, European Political Science, 3(2), (2003), pp.49-56. 
Hooghe, Marc and Dietland Stolle, ‘Youth organisations within political parties: Political recruitment 
and the transformation of party systems’, in Joerg Forbig (ed.), Revisiting Youth Political 
Participation: Challenges for Research and Democratic Practice in Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2005). 
Hooghe, Marc, Dietland Stolle and Patrick Stouthuysen, ‘Head Start in Politics: The Recruitment 
Function of Youth Organizations of Political Parties in Belgium (Flanders)’, Party Politics, 10(2), 
(March 2004). 
Horowitz, Juliana Menasce, The Post-Communist Generation in the Former Eastern Bloc, (Pew 
Research Center Publications: 2010). 
	   320	  
Horowitz, Edward M., ‘The family and the media in the political socialisation of Polish youth’, in 
Forbig, Joerg (ed.), Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for research and democratic 
practice in Europe, , (Council of Europe Publishing, 2005), pp. 83-92. 
Horvath, Attila, ‘Tradition and Modernization: Educational Consequences of Changes in Hungarian 
Society’, International Review of Education 36(2), (1990), pp. 207-217. 
Howell, D. A.. ‘The Hungarian Education Act of 1985: A Study of Decentralization’, Comparative 
Education Review 24(1), (1988), pp. 126-136. 
‘Hungary’, Shaping Change: Strategies of Development and Transformation, Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, (Bertelsmann Stiflung, 2004), < http://www.bti2003.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/171.0.html?&L=1>. 
Hyman Herbert, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior, (Glencoe, 
Illinois: Free Pres, 1959). 
Hyman, Herbert and Charles Wright, The Enduring Effects of Education, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975). 
Iacovou, Maria, and Richard Berthoud, Young People’s Lives: a Map of Europe, (Colchester: 
University of Essex, 2001). 
Ignotus, Paul, Hungary, (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1972). 
Jamieson, Lynn and Sue Grundy, ‘Political participation and European citizenship identity’, in Joerg 
Forbig (ed.), Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for research and democratic practice 
in Europe, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2005), pp. 121 – 132. 
Jaros, Dean, ‘Children’s orientation toward the president: Some additional theoretical considerations 
and data’, Journal of Politics, (29), (1967), pp. 368–387. 
Jelen, Ted and Clyde Wilcox, ‘Context and Conscience: The Catholic Church as an Agent of Political 
Socialization in Western Europe’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37(1), (March 1998), pp. 
28-40. 
Jenne, Erin and Cas Mudde, ‘Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Can Outsiders Help?’, Journal of Democracy, 
23(3), (July 2012), pp. 147 – 155.  
Jennings, Kent M. and Richard Niemi, ‘The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child,’ 
American Political Science Review, (62), (1968), pp.169-184. 
Jennings, Kent M. and Richard Niemi, Generations and Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1981). 
Jennings, Kent M. and Laura Stoker, ‘Generational Change, Life Cycle Processes, ad Social Capital’, 
presented at Citizenship on Trial: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Political Socialization of 
Adolescents, (Montreal, Canada: McGill University, 2002). 
Johnson, Janet Buttolph and H.T. Reynolds, ‘Introduction’, Political Science Research Methods, 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2007). 
Johnston, Hank and David Snow, ‘Subcultures and the Emergence of the Estonian Nationalist 
Opposition, 1945 – 1990’, Sociological Perspectives, 41(3), (1998), pp. 473 – 497. 
Jokay, Charles, Local Taxes in Hungary: Background Briefing, (Budapest: LGI Development Ltd., 
2007). 
Jordan, Michael J., ‘The Roots of Hate’, World Policy Journal, (Fall 2010), pp.99-111, 
<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/wopj.2010.27.3.99>. 
Jowitt, Ken, ‘The Leninist legacy’, In I. Banac (Ed.), Eastern Europe in Revolution, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 207-225. 
	   321	  
Juhász, Gabor, ‘A jobboldali hetilapok piaca 1989-2003’, Mediakutató, 
http://www.mediakutato.hu/cikk/2004_01_tavasz/04_jobboldali_hetilapok/, <accessed 19 July 2012>. 
Juknevicius, Stanislovas and Aida Savicka, ‘From Restitution to Innovation: Volunteering in Post-
Communist Countries’, in Paul Dekker and Loek Halman (eds.), Values of Volunteering: Cross-
Cultural Perspectives, (2003), pp. 127 – 142. 
Kaldor, Mary, ‘The Idea of Global Civil Society’, International Affairs, 79(3), (23 May 2003) pp. 583- 
593. 
Kaldor, Mary and Ivan Vejvoda, ‘Democratization in Central and East European Countries: An 
overview’, in Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, Kaldor and Vejvoda (eds.), (New York 
and London: Pinter publishing, 2002), pp1-24. 
Kaldor, Mary and Sabine Selchow, ‘The Bubbling Up of Subterranean Politics in Europe’, Journal of 
Civil Society, 9(1), pp. 78 – 99. 
Kántor, Zoltán, ‘Institutionalizing Nationalism’ in Andrew Blasko and Diana Janusuasiene (eds.), 
Political Transformation and Changing Identities in Central and Eastern Europe, Lithuanian 
Philosophical Studies, VI Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, ( Washington D.C.: 
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008). 
 
Kärkkäinen, Kiira, ‘Emergence of Private Higher Education Funding within the OECD Area’, OECD 
Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, (CERI: September 2006), < 
http://www.oecd.org/edu/skills-beyond-school/38621229.pdf>. 
Katz, Richar, Peter Mair and Luciano Bardi, ‘The membership of political parties in European 
Democracies, 1960-1990’, European Journal of Political Research, (22), (1992), pp.329-345. 
Kaufman, Cathy, ‘Educational Decentralization in Communist and Post-Communist Hungary’, 
International Review of Education, 43(1), (1997), pp. 25-41. 
Keil, András, ‘European Values and Youth in Hungary: Mobility, tolerance, post-materialist values and 
participation of Hungarian youth in a comparative perspective’, Paper presented at the UACES 41st 
Annual Conference, (Cambridge, 5-7 September 2011), 
<http://republikon.hu/upload/5000233/keil_a.pdf>. 
Keitner, Gabor, Christine Ryan, J. Fodor, Ivan Miller, Nathan Epstein and Duane Bishop, ‘A Cross-
Cultural Study of Family Functioning’, Contemporary Family Therapy, 12(5), (1990). 
Kéri, László, (ed.), Theoretical Issues of Political Socialization, (Budapest: Institute  
of Social Science, 1987) 
K.K., ‘The Laszlo Rajk Trial: A Lesson in Political and Moral Responsibility’, Radio Free Europe 
Broadcast (documented through the Open Society Archives), (30 June 1969). 
King, Edmund J. (ed.), Communist Education, vol. 6, (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
Kis, János, Politics in Hungary: For a Democratic Alternative, Translated by: Gábor J Follinus, 
Atlantic Studies on Society in Change #60, (Boulder, Colorado: Columbia University Press, 1989). 
Kiss, Csilla, ‘From Liberalism to Conservatism: The Federation of Young Democrats in post-
communist Hungary’, East European Politics and Societies, 16(3), (2002), pp. 739 – 763.  
Kitschelt, Herbert, ‘Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in 
four democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, (16), (1986), pp. 57-85. 
Kitschelt, Herbert, ‘The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe’, Politics and Society, 
(20), (1992), pp. 7 - 50.  
Kitschelt, Herbert, ‘Social Movements: Political Parties, and Democratic Theory’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, (528), (July 1993), pp. 13-29. 
	   322	  
Kitschelt, Herbert, ‘Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical 
Propositions’, Party Politics, (1), (1995), pp.  447–72. 
 
Kitschelt, Herbert,  ‘Constraints and Opportunities in the Strategic Conduct of Post-Communist 
Successor Parties: Regime Legacies as Causal Argument’, in András Bozóki and John T. Ishiyama 
(eds.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 
2002), pp. 14–40.  
 
Kitschelt, Herbert, ‘Movement Parties’, in Richard Katz and William Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party 
Politics, (Sage: London, 2006), pp. 278 – 290. 
Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenska Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski and Gabor Toka. Post-Communist 
Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inner-party Cooperation, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
Klandermans, Bert, ‘Psychology and trade union participation: Joining, acting, quitting’, Journal of 
Occupational Psychology, 59(3), (September 1986), pp. 189-204. 
Klein, Naomi, No Logo: taking aim at the brand bullies, (New York: Picador, 2000). 
Kober, Ulrich, ‘European challenges call for European responses’, in Strategies for Combating Right-
wing Extremism in Europe, (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stifung Verlang,  2009). 
Koklyagina, Leonid, ‘From school to work in a transitional society: Changing patterns in Russia’, in 
Chisholm, Lynne, Peter Buchner, Heinz-Hermann Krüger, and Manuela du Bois-Reymond (eds.), 
Growing up in Europe: Contemporary Horizons in Childhood and Youth Studies, (New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1995), 145-151. 
Kolarska-Bobinska, L., ‘Social interests, egalitarian attitudes, and the change of economic order’, 
Social Research, (55), (1988), pp. 111-138. 
Kopecký, Petr, ‘Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe.  
What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?’, Party Politics, (1), (1995), pp. 515–34. 
Kopecky, Petr and Mudde, Cas, ‘The two sides of Euroskepticism: Party positions on European 
Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics, (3), (2002), pp. 297-326. 
 
Koralewicz, J., & Wnuk-Lipinski, E., ‘Vision of society, differentiation and inequalities in the 
collective consciousness’, Sisyphus Sociological Studies, (5), (1989), pp. 225-240. 
Korkut, Umut, ‘Gauging the Boundaries of Religion, Europeanization and Nationalism: ‘EU 
Pragmatism’ and Fidesz in Hungary’, Political Science Association, (2009). 
Korkut, Umut, Liberalization Challenges in Hungary, Europe in Transition: The NYU European 
Studies Series, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
Kornai, János, ‘Paying the Bill for Goulash Communism: Hungarian Development and Macro 
Stabilization in Political-Economy Perspective’, Social Research, 63(4), (Winter 1996). 
Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society, (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1959). 
Körösényi, András, ‘The Hungarian Parliament Elections, 1990’, in Electoral Studies, 9(4), (1990),  
pp. 337-345. 
Körösényi, András, ‘Revival of the Past or New Beginning? The Nature of Post-Communist Politics’, 
The Political Quarterly, 62(1), (Januar-March 1991), pp. 52-74. 
Körösény, András, Government and Politics in Hungary, (Budapest: Akaprint, 1999). 
Körösényi, András, Csaba Tóth and Gábor Török, The Hungarian Political System. (Budapest: 
Corvinus DKMK, 2009). 
	   323	  
Kostelecky, Tomas, Political parties after communism: Developments in East-Central Europe, 
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002). 
 
Kovacheva, Siyka, Keys to Youth Participation in Eastern Europe, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 
2000) 
Kovacheva, Siyka, ‘Will youth rejuvenate the patterns of political participation?’, in  Forbig, Joerg 
(ed.), Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for research and democratic practice in 
Europe, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2005), pp. 19-28. 
Kovács, András, ‘Anti-Semitism and the young élite in Hungary after 1990’, The periodical of The 
Federation to Maintain Jewish Culture in Hungary, (1996), 
<http://www.szombat.com/archivum/regi/e9807e.htm>. 
 
Kovács, András, Measuring Latent Anti-Semitism, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Politikai 
Tudományok Intézet, (Budapest: Magyar Szociológiai Társaság, 2000), 
<http://www.mtaptu.hu/mszt/a2000/kovacs.htm>. 
 
Kovács, Eva, From the Turul Bird to the Image of the Finance Minister: The Role of Myths in the Post-
Communist Transition, Hungary 1988-1996, (Centre of the Study of Nationalism, 1998) 
Kovács, András, Antisemitic Prejudices in Contemporary Hungary, (Jerusalem: The Vidal Sassoon 
International Center for the Study of Antisemitism (ACTA 16), 1999). 
Köves, András, ‘After the Bokros Package: What Next?’, Acta Oeconomica, 37(3/4), (1995), pp. 249-
265. 
Kovrig, Bennett, ‘Hungarian Socialism: The Deceptive Hybrid’, East European Politics & Societies, 
1(1), (December 1986), pp. 113 – 134. 
Kramer, Lloyd, ‘Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism’, The Journal of History and 
Ideas, 58(3), (1997), pp. 525 – 545. 
Krastev, Ivan, ‘Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus’, 
Journal of Democracy, 18(4) (October 2007). 
Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem. Duyvendak and Marco Giugni, New Social 
Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1995). 
Krishna, Anirudh, ‘Enhancing Political Participation in Democracies: What is the Role of Social 
Capital?’, Comparative Political Studies, (35), (2002), pp. 437-60. 
Kubik, Jan, ‘Institutionalization of Protest during Democratic Consolidation in Central Europe’, in 
Meyer, David S. and Sidney Tarrow (eds.), The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a 
New Century, (New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 131-152. 
Kuhar, Metka, 'Youth and politics in Slovenia: a pre-political group in a post-political age', in Forbig, 
Joerg (ed.), Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for research and democratic practice 
in Europe, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2005), pp. 53-60. 
Kurkchiyan, Marina, ‘The illegitimacy of law in post-Soviet societies’, in D.J Galligan and M. 
Kurkchiyen (eds.), Law and Informal Practices: The Post-Communist Experience, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 25-46. 
Kürti, László, Youth And the State in Hungary: Capitalism, communism and class, (London: Pluto 
Press, 2002). 
Kürti, László, ‘Twenty Years After: Rock Music and National Rock in Hungary’, REGION: Regional 
Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 1(1), (2012), pp. 93-129. 
	   324	  
Laar, Mart, The Power of Freedom. Central and Eastern Europe after 1945, Centre for European 
Studies, (Brussels: Unitas Foundation, 2009), p. 38,  
<http://www.poweroffreedombook.com/preview_PoF.pdf>. 
 
Lackenbauer, Jörg, ‘Catching-up, Regional Disparities and EU Cohesion Policy: The Case of 
Hungary’, Managing Global Transitions, 2(2), (2004), pp. 123 – 162. 
Lampland, Martha, ‘Pigs, Party Secretaries, and Private Lives in Hungary’,  
American Ethnologist, (18), (1991), pp. 459-79. 
Lánczi, András and Patrick H. O’Neil, ‘Pluralization and the Politics of Media Change in Hungary’, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 12(4), (1996), pp. 82 – 101. 
Lánczi, András, ‘Milyen a Fidesz 2001 végén?’, in Sándor Kurtán (ed.), Magyarország Politikai 
Évkönyve 1998, (2002) pp. 198-211.  
 
Lánczi, András, ‘Conservatism in Hungary’, The European Conservative, (2), (May 2009).  
Lane, Robert, ‘Fathers and sons: Foundations of political belief’, American Sociological Review, (24), 
(1959), pp. 502–511. 
Lane, Robert, Political ideology, (New York: Free Press, 1962) 
Lapos, Péter, ‘Can Politics Really Be Given Back to the People? An Analysis of Green Parties’ 
Organizational Developments in the Hungarian Context’, MA in Political Science, (Thesis submitted to 
Central European University, 2010). 
Lasswell, Harold, Psychopathology and Politics. (New York: Viking, 1930). 
Lasswell, Harold, Power and Personality, (New York: Norton, 1948). 
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berleson, and H. Gaudet,, The People’s Choice, (New York: Duell, Sloan 
& Pearce, 1944). 
Legard, Robert, Jill Keegan and Kit Ward, ‘In-Depth Interview’, in Jane Ritche and Jane Lewis (eds.), 
Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, (London: Sage 
Publications, 2003).  
Lendvai, Paul, The Hungarians: 1000 Years of Victory in Defeat, (London: Hurst and Company, 2003). 
Lendvai. Paul, The Day That Shook the Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and its 
Legacy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
Lendvai, Paul, Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism, Keith Chester (trans.), (Hurst and 
Company: London, 2012). 
Letki, Natalia, ‘Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and Democratization in East-
Central Europe’, Political Research Quarterly, (57), (2004), pp. 665-679. 
Lichbach, Mark, The Rebel’s Dilemma, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995). 
Ligeti, György and Tamás Nyeste, ‘Right-Wing Extremism in Hungary’ in Peter Rieker, Michaela 
Glaser, and Silke Schuster (eds.), Prevention of Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Racism in 
European Perspective, (Franckeplatz: Deutsches Jugendinstitute, 2006), pp. 96-112. 
Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South American and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1996).  
Machácek, Ladislav, ‘Youth and Creation of Civil Society’, in Helve, Helena, and Claire Wallace 
(eds.), Youth, Citizenship and Empowerment, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). 
	   325	  
Macintyre, Jean, Political Socialization of Youth in the Soviet Union: Its Theory, Use, and Results, 
Final Thesis, (California: Naval Postgraduate School, 1993). 
Magyari, Peter, ‘Erosen balos part a Jobbik’, Index, (15 June, 2009). 
Mahler, Fred, Introducere in Juventologie, (Bucuresti: 1983); English summary in IBYR-Newsletter 
(1), (1984). 
 
Mair, Peter, ‘Party Organization: From Civil Society to the State’, in R. Katz and P. Mair (eds.), How 
Parties Organize: Adaptation and Change in Party Organizations in Western Democracies,. (London: 
Sage, 1994), pp. 1–22. 
 
Mair, Peter and Ingrid van Biezen, ‘Party membership in twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000’, 
Party Politics, 7(1), (2001), pp.5-21. 
Mammone, Andrea, Emmanuel Godin and Brian Kenkins, ‘Introduction: mapping the ‘right of the 
mainstream right’ in contemporary Europe’, in Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin and Brian Jenkins 
(eds.), Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe, (London and New York: Routledge, 
2012), pp. 1-14. 
Manchin, Robert, ‘Religion in Europe: Trust Not Filling the Pews’, GALLUP, (21 September 2004), < 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/13117/religion-europe-trust-filling-pews.aspx>. 
Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960). 
Mareš, Miroslav, ‘Transnational Activism of Extreme Right Youth in East Central Europe’,  Paper for 
the International Conference: Far right networks in Northern and Eastern Europe, (Uppsala 
University, 25-27 March 2010). 
Mareš, Miroslav and Richard Stojar, ‘Extreme-right paramilitary units in Eastern Europe’, in Andrea 
Mammone, Emmanuel Godin and Brian Jenkins (eds.), Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary 
Europe, (Lodon and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 159-172. 
Marody, Mira, ‘Antimonies of Collective Subconsciousness’, Social Research, (55), (1988), pp. 97 – 
110. 
Marshall, Gordon, ‘Political Socialization’, A Dictionary of Sociology, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998). 
Martin, Greg, ‘Conceptualizing Cultural Politics in Subcultural and Social Movement Studies’, Social 
Movement Studies, 1(1), (2002), pp. 73 – 88.  
McLeod, Jack M., and Steven H. Chaffee, ‘The construction of social reality’, in J.T. Tedeschi (ed.), 
The Social Influence Process, (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), pp. 50-99. 
Melucci, Alberto, ‘The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements’, Social Research, 52(4), 
(1985), pp. 789 – 816. 
Meny, Yves and Yves Surel, Par le people, pour le people: Le populisme et les démocraties, (Paris: 
Fayard, 2000). 
Mény, Yves and Yves Surel (eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge, (New York: Palgrave, 
2002). 
Mesežnikov, Grigorij, Olga Gyárfášová and Danial Smilove (eds.), Populist Politics and Liberal 
Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2008). 
Meyers, David, ‘Protest and Political Opportunities’, Annual Review of Sociology, (30), (2004), pp. 
125-145. 
Meyers, David, The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
	   326	  
Meyers, David and Debra Minkoff, ‘Conceptualizing Political Opportunity’, Social Forces, 82(4), 
(2004), pp. 1457-1492. 
Meyer, David S. and Sidney Tarrow, ‘A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century’, 
in Meyer, David S. and Sidney Tarrow (eds.), The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a 
New Century, (New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 1-28. 
Michnik, Adam, ‘The two faces of Europe’, in Mary Kaldor (ed.), Europe from Below: An East-West 
dialogue, (London: Verso, 1991), pp.195-198. 
Mink, Louis O., ‘Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument’, in The Writing of History, Robert Canary 
and Henry Kozicki (eds.), (Madison, Wisconsin: 1978).  
Minkoff, Debra, ‘From Service Provision to Institutional Advocacy: The Shifting Legitimacy of 
Organizational Forms’, Social Forces, (72), (1994), pp. 943-69. 
Minkoff, Debra C., ‘Producing Social Capital: National Social Movements and Civil Society’, 
Behavioral Scientist, 40(5), (1997), pp. 606 – 619. 
Mishler, William and Richard Rose, ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and 
Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’, The Journal of Politics, 59(2), (May, 1997), pp. 
418-451. 
Mitev, Peter-Emil, ‘Sociology Facing Youth Problems,’ Youth Problems, (34), (1982), pp.1-274. 
Mitter, Wolfgang, ‘The Teacher and the Bureaucracy: Some Considerations from the Soviet Case’, 
Compare (17), (1987), pp. 47-60. 
Molnár, Adrienne and Zsuzsanna Kõrösi, ‘The handing down of experiences in families of the 
politically condemned in Communist Hungary’, IX. International Oral History Conference, (Gotegorg, 
1996), pp. 1169–1166. 
Mónika, Fedor, ‘After Materialism or Before Postmaterialism: The Materialist-Postmaterialist Value 
Orientation in Hungary’, in Peter Šajda, Rebecca Blocksome & Szabolcs Nagypál (eds.), Subtle as 
Serpents, Gentle as Dove’s Equality and Independence, Ecumenical Anthology (4), WSCF Central 
European Subregion, (BGÖI & WSCF-CESR: Praha, 2005), <http://www.koed.hu/serpent/fedor.pdf>. 
Mudde, Cas, Populist Right Wing Parties in Europe, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007) 
Mudde, Cas and Peter Kopecky, (eds.), Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Eastern Europe, 
(London: Routledge, 2003). 
Müller, Jan-Werner, ‘The Hungarian Tragedy’, Living in Diversity: Forum of Concerned Citizens of 
Europe, (1 June 2011), <www.livingindiversity.org>. 
Murray, Elinor, ‘Higher Education in Communist Hungary: 1948 – 1956’, American Slavic and East 
European Review, 19(3), (October 1960), pp. 395 – 413. 
Murphy, Peter, ‘Education: Hungary’s New Curriculum: Writing Wrongs?’, Transitions Online, (7 
September 2012), <http://www.tol.org/client/article/23245-hungarys-new-curriculum-writing-
wrongs.html>. 
Mutz, Diana and Jeffrey Mondak, ‘Democracy at Work: Contributions of the Workplace Toward a 
Public Sphere’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
(Chicago: 23-25 April 1998). 
 
Muxel, Annick , L’expérience politique des jeunes, (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2001). 
Nagy, M., Best and Worst Time for Reform, (Budapest, Hungary: Hungarian Institute for Educational 
Research, 1987). 
Nagy, András Bíro and Dániel Róna, ‘Tudatos Radikalizmus: A Jobbik Útja A Parlamentbe, 2003-
2010’, Nemzet és Radikalizmus, vol. C, Lánczi András (ed.), (Századvég: Budapest, 2011). 
	   327	  
Nagy, András Bíró, Tamás Boros and Áron Varga, ‘Right-wing Extremism in Hungary’, International 
Policy Analysis, (Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2012), <http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/id-moe/09566.pdf>. 
Nie, Norman, Jane Junn and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry, Education and Democratic Citizenship in 
America, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
Niemi, Richard G., and M.A. Hepburn, ‘The rebirth of political socialization’, Perspectives on Political 
Science, (24), (1995), pp.7-16. 
Niemi, Richard G., and M. Kent Jennings, ‘Issues and inheritance in the formation of party 
identification’, American Journal of Political Science, (35), (1991), pp. 970-988. 
Niemi, Richard G. and  Jane Junn, Civic Education, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
Niemi, Richard G. and Barbara Sobieszek, ‘Political socialization’, Annual Review of Sociology, (3), 
(1977), pp. 209-233. 
Niklasson, Tomas, Regime Stability and Foreign Policy Change: Interaction between Domestic and 
Foreign Policy in Hungary 1956 – 1994, Lund Political Studies 143, (Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur 
Lund, 2006). 
Nohlen, Dieter and Stöver, Philip (eds.), Elections in Europe: A data handbook, (US: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010) 
Norman, Andrew P., ‘Telling it Like it Was: Historical Narratives on Their Own Terms’, History and 
Theory, 30(2), (May 1991), pp. 119-135. 
Norris, Pippa, Democratic Phoenix: Political activism worldwide, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
Norris, Pippa, ‘Young people and political activism: from the politics of loyalty to the politics of 
choice’ [online], (2003), Available from: <www.pippanorris.com>, [Accessed 1 November 2008]. 
Nugent, Margaret L., (ed.), From Leninism to Freedom, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). 
Nyyssönen, Heino, ‘Salami Reconstructed: “Goulash Communism” and Political Culture in Hungary’, 
Cahiers du Monde Russe, 47(1/2), (January – June 2006), pp. 153-172. 
Ó Beacháin, Donnacha and Abel Polese, ‘’Rocking the Vote’: New Forms of Youth Organisations in 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union’, in Walker, Charles and Svetlana Stephenson (eds.), 
Youth and Social Change in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, (New York and Canada: 
Routledge, 2012). 
Oates, Sarah, Diana Owen and Rachel Gibson, The Internet and Politics: Citizens, Voters and Activists, 
(London: Routledge, 2006). 
 
Ochs, Elinor and Carolyn Taylor, ‘Family Narrative as Political Activity’, Discourse Society, 3(3), 
(1992), pp. 301 – 340. 
Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 1965). 
Oltay, Edith, ‘Hungairan Democratic Forum Expels Radical Leader’, RFE/RL Research Report, 2(31), 
(1993), pp. 24-29. 
Ost, David, The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005). 
Owen, Diana. ‘Political Socialization in the Twenty-first Century: Recommendations for Researchers’, 
paper presented for the presentation at The Future of Civic Education in the 21st Century, cosponsored 
by the Center for Civic Education and the Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung, James Madison’s 
Montpelier, (21 – 26 September 2008).  
	   328	  
Pacheco, Juliana Sandell, ‘Political Socialization in Context: The Effect of Political Competition on 
Youth Voter Turnout’, Political Behavior, (30), (2008), pp.415-436. 
Palonen, Emilia, ‘Political Polarisation and Populism in Contemporary Hungary’, Parliamentary 
Affairs, 62(2), (Advance Access Publication: 20 January 2009), pp. 318 - 334. 
Palonen, Emilia, ‘Rupture and Continuity: Fidesz and the Hungarian Revolutionary Tradition’, La 
Révolution Français, (9 December 2011), < http://lrf.revues.org/353>. 
Parsons, Talcott, The Social System, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952). 
Paxton, Pamela, ‘Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship’, American 
Sociological Review, 67(2), (2002 ), pp. 254-77. 
Pedersen, Karina, Lars Bille, Roger Buch, Jorgen Elklit and Bernhard Hansen, ‘Sleeping or active 
partners? Danish party members at the turn of the millennium’, Party Politics, (10), (2004), pp.367-
383. 
Percheron, A., La Socialization Politique, (Armand Colin: Paris, 1993). 
Phillips, Susan A., Wallbangin’, Graffiti and Gangs in L.A., (Chicago: Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press,  1999). 
Pichler, Florion and Claire Wallace, ‘Patterns of Formal and Informal Social Capital in Europe’, 
European Sociological Review, 23(4), (2007), pp. 423 – 435. 
Pickvance, Christopher G., ‘Democratisation and the Decline of Social Movements: The Effects of 
Regime Change on Collective Action in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Latin America’, 
Sociology, 33(2), (May 1999), pp. 353-372. 
Pittaway, Mark. ‘Hungary’, in Stephen White and Paul G. Lewis (eds.), Developments in Central and 
East European Politics 3, (Wales, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
Plattner, Marc and Larry Jay Diamond, ;Is East-Cengtral Europe Backsliding?’, Journal of Democracy, 
18(4), (October 2007), pp. 5 – 6.  
Pleyers, Geoffrey, 'Young people and alter-globalisation: from disillusionment to a new culture of 
political participation' in Joerg Forbig (ed.)  Revisiting Youth Political Participation: Challenges for 
research and democratic practice in Europe, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2005), pp.133-143.  
Plutzer, Eric, ‘Becoming a habitual voter: Inertia, resources, and growth in young adulthood,’ 
American Political Science Review, (96), (2002), pp.41-56. 
Postman, Neil, The Disappearance of Childhood, (New York: Vintage Books, 1982). 
Pridham, Geoffrey, ‘European Party Cooperation and Post-Communist Politics: Europscepticism in 
Transnational Perspective’, in Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.), Opposing Europe?: The 
Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, (2), Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 76-102. 
Pridham, Geoffrey and Vanhanen, Tatu, (eds.), Democratization in Eastern Europe, (London: 
Routledge, 1994).  
Putnam, Robert, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
Putnam, Robert, Bowling Alone, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 
Pye, Lucian and Verba, Sidney, Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1965). 
Radó, Peter, Governing Decentralized Education Systems: Systemic Change in South Eastern Europe, 
(Budapest, Central European University Press, 2010). 
	   329	  
Ramet, Sabnna P., Social Currents in Eastern Europe, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991). 
Rásky, Béla, ‘Eloquent Silence: Inscribing Hungarian Memories’, in Restitution and Memory: Material 
Restoration in Europe, Dan Diner and Gotthart Wunberg (eds.), (Printed in the US: Berghahn Books, 
2007), (pp. 217 – 232) 
Rechnitzer, János, ‘The Features of the Transition of Hungary’s Regional System’, Centre for Regional 
Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Discussion Paper 32, (Pécs, 2000). 
Richardson, Robert, “Tube fanaticism sparks network battleground’, Variety, (22 June 1998). 
Riesman, David, Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd, (Yale: Tale University Press, 
1961). 
Risse, Thomas and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The socialization of international human rights norms into 
domestic practices: introduction’, in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The 
Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
Robertson, Fiona, A Study of Youth Political Participation in Poland and Romania, (London: 
University College London - Doctoral Thesis, 2009). 
Roker, Debbie and Karen Eden, A Longitudinal Study of Young People’s Involvement in Social Action, 
report to the ESRC, Award #L 134 251 041, (2002). 
Romsics, Ignác, Magyarország Története a XX Században, (Budapest: Osiris, 1999). 
Róna, Dániel and Andrea Szabó, Racionálisan Lázadó Hallgatók 2012, (February 2013), 
<http://aktivfiatalok.hu>. 
Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives: 
Understanding Post-Communist Societies, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, ‘From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe: Public Participation and the 
Role of Civil Society’, East European Politics and Societies, 21(31), (2007), pp. 31-47. 
Rucht, Dieter, ‘The Quadruple “A”: media Strategies of Protest Movements Since the 1960s’, in Donk, 
Wim van de, Brian D. Loader, Paul G. Nixon and Dieter Rucht (eds.), Cyberprotest: New Media, 
Citizens and Social Movements, (London/New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 29 – 56. 
Rupnik, Jacques, ‘From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash’, Journal of Democracy, 18(4), 
(2007), pp. 17 – 25. 
Rupnik, Jacques, ‘Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: How Things Went Wrong’, Journal of Democracy, 23(3), 
(July 2012). 
Salzmann, Markus, ‘Hungary: Socialist Party established right-wing militias’, World Socialist Web 
Site, (14 July 2009), <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jul2009/hung-j14.shtml> [Accessed, October 
2009]. 
Sandor Thomas and Robert Putnam, ‘Still Bowling Alone? The post-9/11 split’, Journal of Democracy, 
(21), (2010), pp. 9 – 16. 
Sapiro, Virginia. ‘Not Your Parents’ Political Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation,’ 
Annual Review Political Science, (7), (2004), pp. 1-23. 
Savicka, Aida, ‘Volunteer Work: Our way back to Civil Society? Specifics of Volunteering in a Post-
Communist Milieu’, in Andrew Blasko and Diana Janušauskienė (eds.), Political Transformation and 
Changing Identities in Central and Eastern Europe, Lithuanian philosophical Studies VI; Cultural 
Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, Volume 36, (Washington 
D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008). 
	   330	  
Scarrow, Susan, ‘Parties without members? Party organization in a changing electoral environment’, in 
R. Dalton and M. Wattenberg (eds.), Parties without Partisans, , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
Scarrow, Susan and Burcu Gezgor, ‘Declining memberships, changing members? European political 
party members in a new era’, Party Politics, (May 2010), pp. 1 – 21. 
Schier, Steven E., By Invitation Only, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). 
Schmitter, Philippe, ‘A Balance Sheet of the Vices and Virtues of Populisms’, paper prepared for The 
Challenge of the New Populism conference, (Sofia, Bulgaria: 10-11 May 2006). 
Schöpflin, George, ‘Opposition and Para-Opposition: Critical Currents in Hungary, 1968–1978’, in R. 
Tökés (ed.), Opposition in Eastern Europe, (London: MacMillan, 1979), pp. 142–187. 
 
Schöpflin, George, ‘Conservatism and Hungary’s transition’, Problems of Communism, (January 
1991), pp. 60-68. 
Schöpflin, George, ‘From Communism to Democracy in Hungary’, in András Bozóki, András 
Körösényi and George Schöpflin (eds.), Post-Communist Transition: Emerging Pluralism in Hungary, 
(London and New York: Pinter Publishers and St Martin’s Press, 1992). 
Schwartz, Shalom, Anat Bardi and Gabriel Bianchi, ‘Value Adaptation to the Imposition and Collapse 
of Communist Regimes in Eastern-Central Europe’ in Renshon and Duckitt (eds.), Political 
Psychology:Cultural and Cross-Cultural Perspectives, (London: Macmillan, 1996). 
Scott, Peter, ‘Reflections on the Reform of Higher Education in Central and Eastern Europe’, Higher 
Education in Europe, 27(1-2), (2002), pp. 137-152. 
Searing, Donald, Joal Schwartz and Alden Lind, ‘The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and 
Belief Systems’, American Political Science Review, 67(2), (June 1973), pp. 415-432. 
Sears, David, ‘Political socialization’, in , F. I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of 
Political Science,  (2), (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975) pp. 93-153. 
Sears, David, and Sheri Levy, ‘Childhood and Adult Political Development’, in Sears, David, Leonie 
Huddy, and Robert Jervis (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 60-109. 
Serrano Pascual Amparo, Waddington Jeremy, Les jeunes : le marché de l’emploi etles syndicats, 
(Brussels: Confédération Européenne des Syndicats, 2000). 
Settle, Jamie and Robert Bond, ‘The Social Origins of Adult Political Behavior’, American Politics 
Research Online, 20(10), (University of California, San Diego: 2010). 
Seybert, Heidi, ‘Internet use in household and by individuals in 2012’, Eurostat: Statistics in Focus, 
(May 2012), < http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-050/EN/KS-SF-12-
050-EN.PDF>. 
Shea, Daniel M., and John C. Green. ‘The Turned-Off Generation: Fact and Fiction?’, in Shea and 
Green (eds.), Fountain of Youth, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), pp. 3-20. 
Siemienska, Renata, ‘Intergenerational Differences in Political Values and Attitudes in Stable and New 
Democracies’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology,  
(43), (Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 368-390. 
Sik, Endre, ‘From the Multicoloured to the Black and White Economy: The Hungarian Second 
Economy and the Transformation’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 18(1), 
(March 1994), pp. 46 – 70. 
Simkus, Albert A., and Rudolf Andorka, ‘Inequalities in Educational Attainment in Hungary, 1923-
1973’, American Sociological Review, (47), (1982), pp.740-51. 
	   331	  
Simonelli, D., ‘Anarchy, Pop and Violence: Punk Rock Subculture and the Rhetoric of Class, 1976-
78’, Contemporary British History, 16(2), (2002), pp. 121 – 144. 
Siurala, Lasse, ‘Changing forms of youth participation’, paper presented at the Round Table on New 
Forms of Youth Participation, (Biel, Switzerland, 2000), <www.coe.fr/youth/research/participation>. 
Skelton, Tracey and Gill Valentine (eds.), Cool Places: Geographies of youth culture, (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
Sloam, James, ‘The ‘Outraged Young’: How Young Europeans are Reshaping the Political 
Landscape’, Political Insight, 4(1), (March 2013), pp. 4-7. 
Slomczynski, Kazimierz M., and Goldie Shabad, ‘Continuity and Change in Political Socialization in 
Poland,’ Comparative Education Review, 41(1), (University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 44-70. 
Slomczynski, Kazimierz and Goldie Shabad, ‘Can Support for Democracy and the Market Be Learned 
in School? A Natural Experiment in Post-Communist Poland’, Political Psychology, 19(4), (1998), 
pp.749-79. 
Smelser, Neil J., Theory of Collective Behavior, (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1962). 
Smilov, Daniel and Tisné, Martin, From the Ground Up: Assessing the Record of Anti-Corruption 
Assistance in Southeastern Europe, (Budapest: Central European University, 2004). 
Smilov, Daniel and Ivan Krastev, ‘The Rise of Populism in Eastern Europe: Policy Paper’, in Populist 
Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, Mesežnikov, Grigorij, Olga 
Gyárfášová and Daniel Smilov (eds.), (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2008), pp. 7 – 13.  
Smith, Martin, ‘A Tale of Two Festivals’, Socialist Review, (September 2009), < 
http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10952>. 
Solheim, Lilliam and Gunnar Ekelove-Slydal, (eds.), Democracy and Human Rights at Stake in 
Hungary: The Viktor Orbán Government’s drive for centralization of power, Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee Report (January 2013) available at: 
<http://nhc.no/admin/filestore/Publikasjoner/Rapporter/2013/Rapport_1_13_web.pdf>. 
Stankuniene, Vlada and Ausra and Maslauskaite, ‘Family Transformation in the Post-Communist 
Countries: Attitudes Toward Changes’, in Charlotte Höhn, Dragana Avramov, Irena Kotowska (eds.), 
People, Population Change and Policies: Lessons from the Population Policy Acceptance Study, 16(1), 
(Springer: The Hague, 2008), pp. 113-140. 
Stolle, Dietlind, and Marc Hooghe, ‘The Roots of Social Capital: The Effect of Youth Experiences on 
Participation and Value Patterns in Adult Life’, paper presented at the 98th Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, (Boston, 29 August-1 September 2002). 
Stumpf, István, ‘Ifjúság, politikai részvétel, pártpreferenciák’, in Gazsó & Stumpf (eds), Vesztesek. 
Ifjúság az ezredfordulón, (Ezredforduló Alapítvány: Budapest, 1995). 
Svynarenko, Arseniy, ‘National, Political and Cultural Identities of Youth: Tendencies in Post-Soviet 
Ukraine’, in Helve, Helena, and Claire Wallace (eds.), Youth, Citizenship and Empowerment, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). 
Szabo, Ildikó, The Role of Values and Knowledge in Political Socialization, Ph. D. Theses, Manuscript, 
Submitted to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, (1986). 
 
Szabó, Ildikó, ‘Political Socialization in the Family’, Ifjúsági Szemle, (4), (1987), pp. 51 - 61. 
 
Szabó, Máté, ‘New Factors in the Political Socialization of Youth in Hungary: The Alternative Social 
Movements and Subcultures’, PRAXIS International, 8(1), (April 1988), pp.26-33. 
 
Szabó, Máté, ‘Political Socialization in Hungary’, in Henk Dekker and Rüdriger Meyenberger (eds.), 
Politics and the European Younger Generation, (Oldenburg, 1991), pp. 57 - 79. 
	   332	  
 
Szabó, Máté, ‘Repertoires of Contention in Post-Communist Protest Cultures: An East Central 
European Comparative Survey’, Social Research, 63(4), (Winter 1996), pp. 1155-1182. 
Szabó, Ildikó and Katalin Falus, ‘Politikai Szocializáció Közép-Európao Módra a Magyar 
Sajátosságok’, Magyar Pegagógia, 100(4), (2000), pp. 383 – 400. 
 
Szabó, Máté, ‘Mobilization and protest strategy of the Fidesz-MPP within and after the electoral 
campaign in Hungary 2002’, Central European Political Science Review, 4(13), (2003), pp. 74-88, 
<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/marburg/papers/10/9/SZABO.pdf>. 
 
Szabó, Ildikó, ‘Eligazodás a társadalomban, a világban: Politikai szocializáció – jelenismereti 
vizsgálatok 1’, Osztályfőnökök Országos Szakmai Egyesülete, (©OFOE: 2001 – 2013),  
< http://www.osztalyfonok.hu/cikk.php?id=191>. 
 
Szabó, Márton, ‘Publicistic Political Science in Hungary in the 1990s’, Discourse and Politics: 
Working Papers, 4(2), (Budapest: Institute for Political Sciences/ Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
2006). 
 
Szabó, Máté, ‘From a Suppressed Anti-Communist Dissident Movement to a Governing Party: The 
Transformations of Fidesz in Hungary’, Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 2(2), (2011), 
pp. 47-66. 
Szalai, Erzsébet, ‘The Power Structure in Hungary After the Political Transition’, in Christopher G.A. 
Bryant and Edmund Mokrzycki (eds.), The New Great Transformation? : Change and Continuity in 
East-Central Europe, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 120 – 143. 
 
Szalai, Erzsébet, Koordinátákon kívül, (Budapest: Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 2011). 
Szczerbiak, Aleks and Paul Taggart, ‘Researching Euroscepticism in European Party Systems: A 
Comparative and theoretical Research Agenda’, in Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.), Opposing 
Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, (2), Comparative and Theoretical 
Perspectives, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-27. 
Szelényi, Szonja, ‘Designing Equality in a Socialist Setting’, in Szonja Szelényi (ed.), Equality by 
Design: The Grand Experiment of Destratification in Hungary, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), pp. 1 – 21. 
Szelényi, Szonja and Karen Aschaffenburg, ‘Inequalities in Educational Opportunity in Hungary’, in 
Yossi Shavit and Hans-Peter Blossfeld (eds.), Persistent Inequality: Changing Education: Changing 
Educational Attainment in Thirteen Countries, (Boulder Colorado: Westview, 1993), pp. 273-302. 
Szelényi, Szonja and Marikop Lin Chang, ‘Where have all the Cadres Gone?: The Fate of the Old Elite 
in Post-Communist Hungary’, in Szonja Szelényi (ed.), Equality by Design: The Grand Experiment of 
Destratification in Hungary, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
Szilágy-Gál, Mihály, ‘The Ethical Dilemmas of Banning Hate Speech: The Hungarian Case Since 
1989’, Paper presented at the International Conference on Antisemitism in Hungary and Poland: 
Genealogies, Transitions, Practices - Panel on Mediality and the Internet, (University College London, 
26 – 27 Mary 2010). 
Szilágyi, Tamás, ‘Sacred Characteristics of the Nation: ‘Hungarianism’ as Political Religion?’, 
REVACERN - Religions And Values: Central And Eastern European Research Network 2007-2009, 
(2009), <http://www.revacern.eu/exchange-programme/EP-paper%20szilagyi.pdf>. 
 
Galasi, Péter and György Sziráczki (eds.), Labour market and second economy in Hungary, (Frankfurt 
and New York: Campus Verlag,1985). 
Taggart, Paul and Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU the 
Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe’, Sussex European Institute Working Paper, (46), 
(Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2001), <http://www.susx.ac.uk/Units/SEI/pdfs/wp46.pdf>. 
	   333	  
Taras, Ray. ‘Executive Leadership: Presidents and Governments,’ Developments in Central and East 
European Politics 3. Ed. Stephen White and Paul G. Lewis. Wales, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003. 
Tarkowska, Elzbieta, and Jacek Tarkowski, ‘Social disintegration in Poland: Civil society or amoral 
familism’, Telos, (89), (1991), pp. 101-109. 
Tarrósy, István, ‘New Political Culture in the Making: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition’, 
power point presented for the Erasmus Link to Norway, (University of Bergen: 11 May 2004). 
Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement: social movements and contentious politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
Tarrow, Sidney, ‘Social Movements in Contentious Politics: A Review Article’, American Political 
Science Review, 90(4), (December, 1996), pp. 874 – 883. 
Tereshcenko, Antonina, ‘Ukranian Youth and Civic Engagement: Unconventional Participation in 
Local Spaces’ in Walker, Charles and Svetlana Stephenson (eds.), Youth and Social Change in Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, (New York and Canada: Routledge 2012). 
Thornton, Sarah, Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital, (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). 
Tilly, Charles, Social Movements: 1768 – 2004, (Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, LLC, 2004). 
Tismaneanu, Vladimir, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist 
Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
Todosijević, Bojan and Zsolt Enyedi, ‘Postmaterialism and Authoritarianism in Hungary: Evidence 
from a Two-Generation Study’, Paper presented at the Annual Scientific Meeting of the International 
Society for Political Psychology, XXIII, (Seattle: 29 June – 4 July 2000). 
Tőkés, Rudolf, ‘Magyar politológia: Vélemény Amerikából’, Politikatudományi Szemle, 2(1), (1993), 
pp. 118–122. 
Tőkés, Rudolf, ‘Political Transition and Social Transformation in Hungary’, Revista CIDOB d'Afers 
Internacionals, (34/35), (1996), pp. 79-101. 
(b) Tőkés, Rudolf, Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political 
Succession, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
Tõkés, Rudolf L., Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political 
Succession 1957-1990, (Cambridge Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
Topf, Richard, ‘Beyond Electoral Participation’, in D Fuchs and H.D. Klingemann (eds.), Citizens and 
the State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
Torney-Purta, Judith. ‘The School’s Role in Developing Civic Engagement: A Study of Adolescents in 
Twenty-Eight Countries,’ Applied Developmental Science, 6(4), (2002), pp. 203-212. 
Torney-Purta, Judith, ‘Adolescents’ Political Socialization in Changing Contexts: An International 
Study in the Spirit of Nevitt Sanford,’ in Political Psychology, 25(3), (University of Maryland: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 
Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2003 
Tóth, Borbála, Mapping Digital Media: Hungary, A Country Report by the Open Society Foundations, 
(Open Society Foundations: Budapest, 2012),  
<http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-hungary-
20120216.pdf> 
Tóth, Olga, ‘Értékátadási problémák a családban’, Educatio, 10(3), (2001), p. 449-460. 
Touraine, Alain, Comment sortir du néolibéralisme?, (Paris: Fayard, 1999). 
	   334	  
Touraine, Alain, ‘The Importance of Social Movements’, Social Movement Studies, 1(1), (Taylor & 
Francis Ltd., 2002), pp. 89 - 95. 
Tünde, Csiha, ‘A fiatal korosztály politikai szocializációja’, Nyugat-Magyarországi Egyetem, Masters 
Thesis, (2004). 
Učeň, Peter, ‘Parties, Populism and Anti-Establishment Politics in East Central Europe’, SAIS Review, 
27(1), (2007), pp. 47 – 62. 
Urban, Lászlo, ‘Hungary in Transition: The Emergence of Opposition Parties’,  
Telos, (79), (1989), pp. 108-18. 
Vachudova, Milada Anna, ‘Centre-Right Parties and Political Outcomes in East Central Europe’, Party 
Politics, 14(4), (30 May 2008), pp. 387-405. 
Vágo, Irén and Vilmos Vass, ‘The Content of Education’, Education in Hungary 2006, (Budapest: 
Hungarian Institute for Educational Research and Development, 2006).  
Varró, Szilvia, Journalist interview with author, 2009 in Halasz, Katalin, ‘The Rise of the Radical 
Right in Europe and the Case of Hungary: ‘Gypsy crime’ defines national identity?’, Development, 
52(4), (2009), pp.490-494. 
Vásárhelyi, Mária, ‘A Kulturális Káosz Szerencselovagjai’, Élet És Irodalom, 46(5), (2002). 
Vásárhelyi, Mária, ‘Egy ezredévnyi szenvedés...’, Mozgó Világ, 32(1), (January 2006), 
<http://www.mozgovilag.hu/2006/01/14vasarhelyi.htm>.  
Vásárhelyi, Mária, ‘A huszonévesek és Trianon’, Élet És Irodalom, 55(22), (3 June 2011), 
<http://www.es.hu/vasarhelyi_maria;a_huszonevesek_es_trianon;2011-06-01.html>. 
Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation 
comparison, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
Verba, Sidney, Kay Schlozman, and Nancy Burns, ‘Family ties: Understanding the intergenerational 
transmission of participation’ in A.S. Zuckerman (ed.), The Social Logic of Politics, (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2005). 
Volgyes, Ivan ‘Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: A Conceptual Framework’, in Ivan Volgyes 
(ed.), Political Socialization in Eastern Europe, (London/New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp.1-
37. 
Wagner, Roy, The Invention of Culture, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
Walker, Jack L. Jr, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social 
Movements, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). 
Wallace, Helena, ‘Introduction: Youth, Citizenship and Empowerment’, in Helve, H. and Wallace C. 
(eds.), Youth, Citizenship and Empowerment, (Wiltshire, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2002). 
Wallace, Claire, and Siyka Kovacheva, Youth in Society: The construction and deconstruction of youth 
in East and West Europe, (London: Macmillan, 1998). 
Walther, Andreas, ‘Learning to Participate or Participating to Learn?’, in Patricia Loncle, Morena 
Cuconato, Virginie Muniglia and Andreas Walther (eds.), Youth Participation in Europe, (Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2012), pp. 189 - 205. 
Walther, Andreas, Manfred Zenther, Elvira Cicognani, Bjorn Jaaberg Hansen, Roman Kühn, 
Zsuzsanna Szelenyi and Howard Williamson, Youth Policy in Hungary: Conclusions of the Council of 
Europe International Review Team, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2008). 
Warleigh, Alex, ‘’Europeanizing’ Civicl Society: NGOs as Agents of Political Socialization’, JCMSL 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(4), (November 2001), pp. 619-639. 
	   335	  
Waterbury, Myra A., Between State and Nation: Diaspora Politics in Kin-State Nationalism in 
Hungary, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010). 
Webb, Paul, David Farrell and Ian Holliday, Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
Weiler, H., ‘Control versus legitimization: The politics of ambivalence’, in Hannaway, J. and Carnoy, 
M. (eds.), Decentralization and School Improvement, J., (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993), pp. 55 - 
83. 
van der Wende, Marijk C., ‘The Bologna Declaration: Enhancing the Transparency and 
Competitiveness of European Higher Education’, Higher Education in Europe, 25(3), (2000), pp. 305 – 
310. 
White, Stephen, ‘Political Socialization in the U.S.S.R.: a study in failure?’, Studies in Comparative 
Communism, 10(3), (1977), pp.328-342. 
Whitely, Paul F., ‘Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the 
democratic world’, Party Politics, 17(1), (2011), pp. 21 – 44. 
Willis, Paul, Profane Culture, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). 
Wimmer, Andreas, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
Winkler, Donald, ‘Fiscal decentralization and accountability in education: experiences in four 
countries’, in Hannaway, J. and Carnoy, M. (eds.), Decentralization and School Improvement, J., (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993), pp. 104 – 109. 
Wirth, Zsuzsanna, ‘Kádár János olyan jól csinálta, hogy nem tudunk leszokni róla’, Origo Itthon 
Online, (28 May 2013), < http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20130527-en-szeretem-kadart-o-a-magyarok-
nagy-jotevoje.html>. 
Wittenberg, Jason, Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in 
Hungary, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
Wright, Steve, ‘Informing, Communicating and ICTs in Contemporary anti-Capitalist Movements’ in 
Donk, Wim van de, Brian D. Loader, Paul G. Nixon and Dieter Rucht (eds.), Cyberprotest: New 
Media, Citizens and Social Movements, (London/New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 77-93. 
Wolek, Artur, ‘Lustration/Decommunization as an Instrument to Enhance Legitimacy: The Influences 
of the Past on the Present Rules of Politics’, in Andrew Blasko and Diana Janušauskienė (eds.), 
Political Transformation and Changing Identities in Central and Eastern Europe, Lithuanian 
philosophical Studies VI; Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and 
Central Europe, Volume 36, (Washington D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008). 
Zaller, John, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992). 
Zaslavsky, Victor and Robert Brym, ‘The Functions of Elections in the USSR’, Soviet Studies  
(30), (1978), pp. 362-71. 
Zeidler, Miklós, A Magyar irredenta kultusz a két világháború Között, (Budapest: Teleki László 
Alapítvány, 2002). 
Zilhaly, Péter, ‘Young Hungarians are Intent on Writing Their Own Future’, The Guardian, (17 
December 2011), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/17/young-hungarians-viktor-
orban>. 
Zolberg, Aristide, ‘Moments of Madness’, Politics and Society, (2), (Winter 1972), pp. 183 – 207. 
 
	   336	  
DOCUMENTS & ARTICLES 
2009 Európai Parlamenti Választások, (Official 2009 European Parliamentary Voting Site), < 
http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ep2009/index.html>. 
Act CXXXIX of 2005: On Higher Education, UNESCO Translation of the 2005 Hungarian Education 
Act, < http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Hungary/Hungary_Act_CXXXIX_2005_on_HE.pdf>. 
ʻAppeals court reaffirms ban on Magyar Gárdaʼ, Politics.hu, (3 July 2009), [Accessed 31 July 2009]. 
‘April 11-25, 2010 National Assembly Election Results – Hungary Totals’, Election Resources to the 
Hungarian National Assembly, < http://electionresources.org/hu/assembly.php?election=2010>. 
 
Berlin Communiqué, ‘Realizing the European Higher Education Area’, Communiqué of the 
Conference of Ministers Responsible for Higher Education in Berlin, (19 September 2003) 
 
‘Bologna Declaration’, Joint Declaration of the European Ministers of Education, (1999). 
 
‘A cigány kérdes kriminalizálása’, Heti Világgazdaság, (21 February 2009). 
Clark, Zsuzsanna, ‘Oppressive and grey? No, growing up under communism was the happiest time of 
my life’, Daily Mail Online, (17 October 2009), < http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1221064/Oppressive-grey-No-growing-communism-happiest-time-life.html>. 
‘Court finds head of radical group responsible for damage in 2006 riots’, Politics.hu, (12 January 
2012), < http://www.politics.hu/20120112/court-finds-head-of-radical-group-responsible-for-damage-
in-2006-riots/>. 
‘CV of Viktor Orbán’, Magyarorszag Jobban Teljesít, Miniszterelnök Hatósági Weboldal (Prime 
Minister Official Website), < http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_cv_of_viktor_orban/>. 
‘Democracy Deficit Grows in Former Soviet Union’, Freedom House, (Press Release: 27 June 2011), 
<www.freedomhouse.org>, (viewed 1 July 2011). 
‘Az egyetemisták közt a Jobbik a legnépszerűbb’, Index, (16 February 2013), < 
http://index.hu/belfold/2013/02/16/az_egyetemistak_kozt_a_jobbik_a_legnepszerubb/>. 
‘ESS Round 5’, European Social Survey, (2010), <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round5/>. ‘Fidesz	  Birthday	  Bash:	  Twenty	  Years’,	  Hungarian	  Spectrum,	  (30	  March	  2008),	  	  <	  http://esbalogh.typepad.com/hungarianspectrum/2008/03/fidesz-­‐birthday.html>.	  
1 List of Bibó College Alumni: <http://bibo.elte.hu/voltt>. 
 ‘A FIDESZ Politikai Program Nyilatkozata’, FIDESZ Hirek, (4), (1988), pp. 4-6. ‘Flashmob	  köszönti	  este	  SchmittetL	  Csak	  úgy	  doktor	  úr	  ő...’,	  Népszabadság	  Online,	  (27	  March	  2012),	  <	  http://nol.hu/belfold/csak_ugy_doktor_ur_o__ahogyan_es_orvos_-­‐_flashmob>.	  	  ‘Gábor	  Vona	  speaks	  at	  the	  opening	  session	  of	  the	  parliament	  wearing	  the	  uniform	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Guard’,	  Hungarian	  Ambiance,	  (14	  February	  2011),	  <	  http://www.hungarianambiance.com/2011/02/gabor-­‐vona-­‐speaks-­‐at-­‐opening-­‐session-­‐of.html>.	  	  ‘Hatvannégyvármegyések	  tüntetnének	  a	  Szigeten’,	  Index.hu,	  (18	  July	  2011),	  <http://index.hu/belfold/2011/07/18/hatvannegy_varmegyesel_tuntetnenek_a_szigeten/>.	  (viewed	  16	  August	  2011).	  	  ‘Heti	  Válasz:	  az	  alapítástól	  a	  magánkézbe	  adásig:	  Végkiárusítás’,	  Magyar	  Narancs	  online,	  24	  June	  2004,(http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/heti_valasz_az_alapitastol_a_magankezbe_adasig_vegkiarusitas-­‐56414),	  	  <accessed	  19	  July	  2012>.	  	  
	   337	  
‘Hungary’,	  Shaping	  Change:	  Strategies	  of	  Development	  and	  Transformation,	  Bertelsmann	  Transformation	  Index,	  (Bertelsmann	  Stiflung,	  2004),	  <	  http://www.bti2003.bertelsmann-­‐transformation-­‐index.de/171.0.html?&L=1>.	  	  ‘Hungary’,	  New	  Media	  Trend	  Watch,	  European	  Travel	  Commission,	  (ETC/CET,	  2012),	  <http://www.newmediatrendwatch.com/markets-­‐by-­‐country/10-­‐europe/65-­‐hungary>.	  	  ‘Hungary	  Country	  Studies:	  Education’,	  Country	  Studies	  Online,	  US	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  <http://www.country-­‐studies.com/hungary/education.html>.	  	  ‘Hungary:	  Major	  Cities’,	  City	  Populations,	  Populations	  Statistics	  for	  Countries,	  Administrative	  Areas,	  Cities	  and	  Agglomerations	  –	  Interactive	  Maps	  –	  Charts,	  <http://www.citypopulation.de/Hungary-­‐Cities.html>.	  	  ‘Hungary	  to	  create	  new	  media	  watchdog’,	  BBC	  News	  Europe,	  (21	  December	  2010),	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐europe-­‐12051665,	  <accessed	  20	  May	  2011>.	  	  ‘Hungary	  Map	  –	  Political	  Map	  of	  Hungary’,	  Ezilon	  Regional	  Maps	  2009,	  <http://www.ezilon.com/maps/europe/hungary-­‐maps.html>.	  	  ‘Hungary	  Unemployment	  Rate’,	  Trading	  Economics,	  (March	  2013),	  <	  http://www.tradingeconomics.com/hungary/unemployment-­‐rate>.	  	  ‘Internet	  Use	  and	  Activities’,	  Eurostat	  Raw	  Data	  2012,	  <	  http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupModifyTableLayout.do>.	  	  
Jobbik Parliamentary Electoral Manifesto: For National Self-Determination and Social Justice, 
<http://jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>. 
 
‘Klub 64: egy magyar sziget egész évben Budapest szívében’, Kuruc.info, (1 June 2010), 
<http://kuruc.info/r/6/60545/>. 
‘Latest Ipsos poll shows Fidesz retaining solid lead against Socialists’, Politics.hu, (18 February 2013), 
< http://www.politics.hu/20130218/latest-ipsos-polls-shows-fidesz-retaining-solid-lead-against-
socialists/>. 
 
Lehet Más a politika 2010 országgyűlési választás, LMP 2010 Manifesto, (Budapest: 2010). 
‘Listázták ELTE gölyait’, Index, (19 February 2013), < 
http://index.hu/belfold/2013/02/19/listaztak_az_elte_golyait/>. 
‘Magyar Választáskutatási Program’, Magyar Választáskutatási Panel 2008: Dokumentáció és árbratár, 
Geregely Karácsony, János Mészáros, Dániel Róna (eds.), 2008 National Statistics raw data, (April 24 
through 30 June 2008). 
‘Media Use in the European Union Report’, Standard Eurobarometer 76: Autumn 2011, (March 2012), 
< http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_media_en.pdf>. 
‘Melyik lap bukott nagyobbat az első negyedben?’, Kreatív Online, (5 March 2010), 
<http://www.kreativ.hu/cikk/melyik_lap_bukott_nagyobbat_az_elso_negyedben_>. 
Miért alakult meg a Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom-párt (Why was the Movement for a Better 
Hungary founded?), zuglo.jobbik.hu (Hungarian), <Accessed 6 January 2008>. 
 ‘A	  Nemzeti	  Összetartozás	  Napja:	  Pedagógiai	  Háttéranyag’,	  A	  Nemzeti	  Erőforrás	  Minisztérium,	  (May	  2011),<http://www.kormany.hu/download/0/cd/30000/A%20nemzeti%20%C3%B6sszetartoz%C3%A1s%20napja.pdf#!DocumentBrowse>.	  	  
 
‘Neo-Nazi groups in Hungary: Guards of the Carpathian Homeland, National Front and Others’, 
	   338	  
Hungarian Spectrum, (26 August 2012). <http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2012/08/26/neo-
nazi-groups-in-hungary-guards-of-the-carpathian-homeland-national-front-and-others/>. 
 
‘Number of the Internet Subscriptions by Access Service’, Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, (Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office, March 2012), 
<http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_oni001.html>. 
 
OECD, ‘How Much is spent per student?’, in Education at a Glance 2012: Highlights, (OECD 
Publishing: 2012), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag_highlights-2012-en>. 
OECD, Education at a Glance 2012: Highlights, (OECD Publishing: 2012),  
< http://www.oecd.org/edu/highlights.pdf>. 
 
Official website of the Hungarian Government, < http://www.kormany.hu/en/hungary/the-electoral-
system-parliamentary-changes>. 
 
Ökopolitikai Műhely Alapítvány (Ecopolitics Workshop Foundation), Official Website:  
<http://okopolmuhely.hu/>. 
 
‘Összefognak a nemzeti radikálisok’, Index, (14 June 2009), 
<http://index.hu/belfold/2009/06/14/osszefognak_a_nemzeti_radikalisok/>. 
 
‘Over one thousand attend Budapest anti-Trianon march’, Politics.hu, (6 June 2011), 
<http://www.politics.hu/20110606/over-one-thousand-attend-budapest-anti-trianon-march/>. 
 
Prague Communiqué, ‘Towards the European Higher Education Area’, Comuniqué of the Meeting of 
the European Ministers in Charge of Higher Education in Prague, (19 May 2001). 
 
‘Public Opinion in the European Union’, Eurobarometer 72, (European Commission: Brussels, 
November 2009). 
 
‘Public Opinion in the European Union’, Eurobarometer 75, (European Commission: Brussels, August 
2011). 
 
‘Questionnaire on the State of Civic Education in Hungary’, Civic Education in Europe, (European 
Confederation of Political Science Associations, 2010). 
 
Radikális Változás: A Jobbik országgyűlési választási programja a nemzeti önrendelkezésért és a 
társadalmi igazságosságért, (Jobbik 2010 Election Program), < 
http://www.jobbik.hu/sites/jobbik.hu/down/Jobbik-program2010OGY.pdf>.  
‘Racionálisan lázadó hallgatók 2012’, Aktív Fiatalok Magyarorszag (AFM), <http://aktivfiatalok.hu/>. 
‘Report to the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary’, United National General Assembly, 11th 
Session Supplement 18 (A/3592), (New York, 1957), p. 20,  
<http://mek.oszk.hu/01200/01274/01274.pdf>. 
‘Results by country (2009): Hungary’, European Parliament Official Website, < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00082fcd21/Results-by-country-
(2009).html?tab=16#result_party>.  
‘Rólunk’, Magyar Sziget Hatósági Webodal, Official Magyar Sziget Site, <www.magyarsziget.hu>. 
‘Strategic Directions in the Development of Higher Education’, The System of Education in Hungary, 
Prepared by the experts of the Ministry of National Resources of Hungary in cooperation with the 
Hungarian Eurydice Unit, (Budapest: Ministry of National Resources, 2010).  
‘A Stronger Hungary’, The Manifesto of Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union, (December 2007), < 
http://static.fidesz.hu/download/_EN/FideszPP2007_EN.pdf>. 
	   339	  
‘Sweeping new media law threatens freedom of expression in Hungary’, Amnesty International News, 
(23 December 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/sweeping-new-media-law-
threatens-freedom-expression-hungary-2010-12-23, <accessed 1 May 2011>. 
‘Tiny fraction of Hungarians members of political party’, Politics.hu, (16 May 2011), < 
http://www.politics.hu/20110516/tiny-fraction-of-hungarians-members-of-political-party/>. 
’Trianon Day in all but name’, The Budapest Times, (9 June 2010), 
<http://www.budapesttimes.hu/2010/06/09/trianon-day-in-all-but-name/>. 
Volunteering in the European Union, Final Report, Educational, Audiovisual & Culture Executive 
Agency (EAC-EA), Directorate General of Education and Culture (DG EAC), Submitted by GHK, 
(Brussels: 2010), < http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc1018_en.pdf>). 
‘Youth on the Move: Analytical Report’, Flash Eurobarometer, (319a), (European Commission: May 
2011), <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_319a_en.pdf> 
Youth Policy in Hungary: Conclusions of the Council of Europe International Review Team, Jaaberg 
(Chair of Committee), Council of Europe, (Strasbourg: Printed at the Council of Europe, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
